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This dissertation presents an account and analysis of published mainland Chinese 
media coverage surrounding three major events of public protest during the Hu-Wen 
era (2003-2013). The research makes a qualitative analysis of printed material drawn 
from a range of news outlets, differentiated by their specific political and commercial 
affiliations. The goal of the research is to better understand the role of mainstream 
media in social conflict resolution, a hitherto under-studied area, and to identify 
gradations within the ostensibly monolithic mainland Chinese media on issues of 
political sensitivity. China’s modern media formation displays certain characteristics 
of Anglophone media at its hyper-commercialised, populist core. However, the 
Chinese state retains an explicit, though often ambiguous, remit to engage with news 
production. Because of this, Chinese newspapers are often assumed to be one-
dimensional propaganda ‘tools’ and, accordingly, easily dismissed from analyses of 
public protest. This research finds that, in an area where political actors have 
rescinded their monopoly on communicative power, a result of both policy decisions 
and the rise of Internet-based media platforms, established purveyors of news have 
acquired greater latitude to report on hitherto sensitive episodes of conflict but do so 
under the burden of having to correctly guide public opinion. The thesis examines the 
discursive resources that are deployed in this task, as well as reporting patterns which 
are suggestive of a new propaganda approach to handling social conflict within public 
media. Beside the explicitly political nature of coverage of protest events, the study 
sheds lights on gradations within China’s complex, hybrid media landscape both in 
terms of institutional purpose and qualitative performance.  
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A Note on Romanization 
This thesis uses the CCP-commissioned and widely-used ‘pinyin’ system of 
Romanization in nearly all situations. The only exceptions are those where older 
Wade-Giles renderings have entered the English lexicon to such an extent that using 
the pinyin equivalent would likely cause confusion. The Wade-Giles system of 
Romanization is still used in Taiwan today and has given us terms such as Kuomintang 
(referred to on page 36). This would be rendered as Guomindang using the pinyin 
method. Other notable examples of non-pinyin usage are the names of early 20th 
Century Chinese leaders Chiang Kai-shek (see page 156) and Sun Yat-sen (see pages 
35 and 123). These both constitute Romanized renderings of Cantonese names (given 
names, as opposed to birth names). In pinyin, the names would appear, respectively, 
as Jiang Jieshi and Sun Yi Xian and would, the author suspects, be unlikely to be 










This project arose from a longstanding interest in the work of China’s class of modern 
journalist and a desire to better understand their place in China’s post-1978 transition. 
My interest in the two broadest academic fields implied by this curiosity – media and 
Sinology – was born primarily of personal rather than scholarly experience. I trained 
as a newspaper reporter in the first years of the last decade. At that time, the UK 
newspaper industry stood on the cusp of epochal change. Within months of ending 
my journalistic apprenticeship in 2002, I found myself living and working in China, a 
country palpably fidgeting within its own historical straightjacket.  
Had I been able to predict the precise nature of the change to either media or China, 
I’d likely be on the cover of Fortune by now, rather than, as is the case, an 
impecunious middle-aged student who barely has the strength to sign off on his own 
PhD thesis. Rather, standing on the shores of history, as I was a decade ago, I fell into 
the kind of arrogance which, perhaps, only a PhD project can truly undo. My work 
within, and consumption of, the print media in both the UK and China gave me what I 
felt to be a lucid conception of the nature and function of news journalism. Likewise, 
the five years I ultimately spent in China spurred a warped sense of ownership over 
the country’s history, culture and society. In 2010, prior to beginning my doctorate, I 
felt I knew China. I had spent time in all but three of its 27 provinces1 and five out of 
its six municipalities2; I had lived for more than 18-months in one of its hyper-modern 
first tier cities, Shanghai, and more than three years in a small and fairly inauspicious 
third-tier city, Zhaoqing. I had worked within China’s then-nascent English-language 
media; I had read widely on its history; and I felt preternaturally licenced to 
pontificate on its future.  
These recent years of study and research have made me acutely aware of the naivety 
in my initial confidence in assuming to know either journalism or China. The 
                                                       
1 The term ‘province’ is here used in its most expansive context and includes regions, like Guangdong, 
which are indeed official ‘provinces’, as well as others, like Guangxi or Tibet, which are administratively 
known as ‘autonomous regions’ but which nevertheless function as provinces in the sense they are 
large, geographically partitioned swathes of land and distinct economic and administrative units. 
2 The term ‘municipality’ here is, again, used in the most expansive sense and includes Beijing, 
Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing, each a provincial-level ‘municipality’ in the strict sense, as well as the 
Special Administrative Regions of Hong Kong and Macau. 
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contingencies of both are far larger than I initially conceived, particularly when 
viewed through a global prism. Just as journalism changes on different platforms, in 
different geographical contexts and within varied industrial formations, so China 
appears endlessly protean when viewed through from near or afar, or from different 
domestic vantage points.  
There is no shortage of Chinese fables on the perils of hubris and the virtues of 
humility; and it’s no irony that many of them involve scholars. The folly of aspiring to 
expertise in the Chinese realm is more evident to me now than ever. I wish that I had 
better internalised Daniel Lynch’s simple but truthful observation that “[h]ubris 
should always be left at the door when studying China” (2010: 496). Despite years 
spent on the ground in China, and further years spent in the library thinking about 
China, the profundity of this observation is still only becoming clear and the creeping 
feeling of knowing less the more I have studied has been occasionally troubling. 
However, it has led me to this point where I feel both the clarity of one who, to 
mangle the sentiments of Socrates, Confucius and Obe-wan Kenobe, at least knows 
that he does not know which, at the very least, sets me apart from the me of a 
decade ago. It has also fostered a stronger desire than ever to continue supping from 
the seemingly inexhaustible lake of Sinology.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
The problem statement and research questions 
This thesis examines and evaluates the role of the Chinese press through the prism of 
social contention. This somewhat immodest ambition requires a little unpacking. 
Firstly, one must consider why the Chinese press should be of interest as a subject of 
study. It is vital that it is seen in terms of its context, as a scribe of, a mirror to, and a 
tool of change in contemporary China. 
China is undergoing a transition which is unprecedented in many key metrics. The 
shifts from relative poverty to relative wealth; from a largely rural, agrarian society to 
a predominantly urban, industrial one; from insularity to internationalism; and from 
dogmatic governance to technocratic governance are all universally recognised. They 
are nevertheless highly contested. The transitological paradigm, as staked out chiefly 
by Fukuyama (1992), envisaged transition in China from Leninist authoritarianism to 
liberal democracy founded on representative democracy, private property and 
constitutionalism. Within this paradigm, a highly ideological school of Sinology has 
grown up, one that persists in certain quarters today. Its apogee came after the 
events of spring and early summer 1989, when the Communist Party of China faced 
down what it regarded as an existential threat and voting began in elections in Poland, 
heralding the beginning of the end of the Cold War and geopolitical bipolarity. As has 
been widely noted, the future at that time appeared easy to read. The subsequent 
success of the Chinese communist ‘Party-state’3 in surviving this turbulent period and 
transforming both itself and China into an economic powerhouse and geopolitical 
superpower proved a huge puzzle for many. Those clinging to a transitological frame 
persist in asking questions of China which speculate on when the forces of liberalism 
will finally undo the dark forces of authoritarianism, or, more commonly, providing 
explanations for why they haven’t, quite managed it yet. Others, however, say that 
entirely new explanations are demanded (Sparks, 2008, Sparks 2010). 
                                                       
3 The conception of the ‘Party-state’ has Leninist roots, though was first appropriated by the 
Kuomintang under Chiang Kai-shek’s leadership in the 1930s (Barme, 2013). As such, the ‘Party-state’ 
cannot be assumed ‘communist’ in nature. The current Communist Party of China-led ‘Party-state’ may 
be seen as merely the second, albeit most important, incarnation.  
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The framework of ‘national development’ – a subject which has engaged almost 
every senior intellectual and politician in China since the 1840s and the country’s 
epochal military defeat to the British (Schell & Delury 2013) – remains an important 
alternative to the transitological frame. Rather than understanding government 
actions as an attempt to cling to power in the face of countervailing social and 
economic pressures, a developmental frame sees the maintenance of control in terms 
of national rejuvenation. Control is not merely a vehicle for the inherently corrupt 
maintenance of power but has several, specific functions: one, it supports and 
coordinates national economic development; two, it acts as a bulwark against 
potential foreign exploitation; and, three, it ensures social stability during a period of 
rapid change. The second and third of these factors appear particularly important in 
the Chinese context where memories of foreign exploitation and episodes of recent, 
and historical, disorder are burrowed deep into the national psyche (Lovell, 2011).   
These two conceptions of China’s transition, differ significantly in terms of their 
explanation of the utility of power, but agree in respect of the fact that the Party-
state seeks to hoard power and maintain control. Transition has unleashed powerful 
social and economic forces; however, control has not, hitherto, been surrendered.  
The chief problem, then, is that control is manifestly under threat in contemporary 
China. This is evident in four key fields: firstly, there is demonstrably an increase in 
social contention, evidenced in the rise of protests and so-called mass incidents; 
secondly, the Internet – regarded as key in China’s economic development – has 
undermined the Party-state’s previous monopoly control of communications and its 
ability to define political discourse; thirdly, partial economic liberalisation suggests 
the market may potentially rival the Party for influence, at least in some areas of 
political and social life; and, lastly, partly as a response to an increasingly complex 
polity and partly through policy design, there has been a process of institutional 
fragmentation within the political sphere and regional fragmentation in the economic 
sphere (Harrison & Ma 2012; Lin, 2008).  
China has, of course, never been a monolith, but the increase in bureaucratic 
complexity, and regional and global economic competition makes it harder than ever 
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to rule. Some have even argued that the case of Bo Xilai4 reveals that corporatism – 
simply defined as the capture of politics by vested interests – has emerged in China 
and that the Party has been subject to hijack by patronage networks (Pei 2014). 
Within the transitological paradigm, the tempting question posed by this surfeit of 
threat is: “How long can the Party-state last?” Though tempting, this is the wrong 
question, not least because it has been asked, unsuccessfully, too many times before, 
and because there is no way to offer a straightforward, empirically-based answer. A 
better starter question can be drawn from the developmental frame which assumes 
that as long as the Party is successfully marshalling growth and maintaining stability, 
it is likely to stay in control. It is this: "How is conflict being managed in China and 
are there signs of negotiation over control?"  
As a guiding question for a PhD project, even this is a little too broad and unwieldy to 
be manageable. This thesis thus narrows the area of enquiry by searching in one 
specific sphere: the Chinese media. 
Simply put, the Chinese media has been one of the most important vehicles of change 
in China over the last 30 years and, perhaps more pertinently, a great source of 
evidence for the nature of that change. It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that the 
public media is one of the few sources of information about the machinations of elite 
politics in China. In its pages is evidence of not only elite decision making, but also 
elite division and governance strategies.  
The media, however, is more than just a window into political decision making 
around the threats cited above. It is, itself, an example of all of these threats: 
commercialised, fragmented, and increasingly devolved from central power. 
Nevertheless, it remains a potential tool of political power, even if its role as a 
‘transmission belt’ of communication between the government and the governed – to 
borrow Lenin’s famous formulation – may be legitimately questioned.  
This project has further narrowed the field by choosing to examine, specifically, the 
Chinese press. Of the available media sources, the press is the one most actively 
                                                       
4 Bo was a member of the CCP Politburo and Party leader of the large and economically important 
municipality of Chongqing (and Dalian prior to that). He was arrested in somewhat sensational 
circumstances in 2012 and eventually prosecuted for grand-scale corruption. 
17 
 
engaged with politics, perhaps as a result of its status as the ‘first’ media (Ke, 2010) 
and one which played a key role in most of the major political campaigns of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC)-era5. While one should not dismiss radio (the 
‘second’ media) and television (the ‘third’), if one is concerned primarily with political 
communications, the press is the obvious media format to probe.  
The question at the beginning of this paragraph thus can be reworked to ask: “How is 
conflict represented and reproduced in the pages of the mainstream press? And 
what might this say about methods of management of social conflict and 
contention?”  
This begs a further question. Precisely because the press is an example of the control-
threatening factors discussed above – commercialisation, fragmentation, intra-
industry rivalries, and so on – it is, itself, an important site of contention around many 
of the tensions discussed above. Thus, it is possible to go one step further and ask: “In 
reproducing conflict, do different parts of the Chinese newspaper industry reflect 
pressures of social contention, of the Internet, of commerce, and of fragmented 
regional and institutional control? And what implications may this have for the role 
of the press in China?”  
To reiterate, the ambition of this thesis is to “examine and evaluate the role of the 
Chinese press through the prism of social contention”.  We have so far seen why it 
may be worthwhile examining the Chinese press. Now we turn to the second part of 
the mission statement.  
As has already been explained, this thesis is concerned with conflict and the 
management of conflict within the Chinese polity. Thus it makes obvious sense to 
look for direct, explicit discussion of conflict within public media. This is problematic 
because it must be assumed that reporting around, and discussion of, social conflict is, 
politically speaking, highly sensitive and therefore scarce. The presence of protest, 
theory holds, may be construed as evidence of lack of local order or leadership and, 
thus, damage the careers of the officials deemed responsible. If one makes the 
reasonable assumption that politics and media in China are heavily intertwined, then 
                                                       
5 Among numerous examples, newspaper editorials initiated the Cultural Revolution (Guo, 2010: 43) 
and fanned the flames of student unrest in the Spring of 1989 (Schell & Delury, 2013: 307). 
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one may assume that issues of conflict are likely to be treated very circumspectly in 
the pages of the Chinese press.  
However, it is for this very reason that protest reporting – that is, reporting on 
protest events – was chosen as a subject for study. Though it eliminates the 
possibility of conducting wide-ranging, quantitative studies – the plausibility of 
censorship is simply too large to yield valid, generalisable findings – where it is found 
it offers a window into political decision-making as well as the more obvious editorial 
decision-making. Put simply, it is inconceivable that local leaders, and possibly even 
provincial and national leaders, would not be in some way involved in the reporting of 
protest events because of their highly sensitive nature.  
Thus we have created some circularity. Social conflict is part of the reason why it is 
important to study changing political approaches – and thus the press – but is also, in 
itself, a valuable vehicle for studying that change.  
Theoretical background 
The focus introduced above requires an explanation of two loci of related theory. 
They are distinct but parallels can be drawn. The first involves the Chinese press; the 
second, protest in China.  
China press theory has two strands. The eldest is drawn primarily from Soviet press 
theory (Siebert et al, 1973) and may be characterised as the propaganda model of the 
Chinese media. This posits the media as the aforementioned ‘transmission belt’ 
between, to put it crudely, an ideologically and professionally enlightened proletarian 
elite – the Party – and the masses. Regardless of their assumed independence or 
objectivity, journalists working within a capitalist system are led by the economic 
superstructure to act as servants of the ruling classes. Communist journalists, 
therefore, take the converse position by explicitly representing the interests of the 
Party who, by turns, are making policy in the interests of the working classes (de 
Burgh, 2003). For this, it is necessary to adhere to an established ‘line on truth’ (ibid), 
as delineated by the Party. In this effort, and working in co-ordination with teachers 
and work units, public opinion is ‘correctly’ guided. In 2012, Zhao detected in modern 
China a “mutation of Soviet press theory” and, even more recently, Schell and Delury 
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have argued that “the notion that artists and members of the media should be a 
megaphone for the party and state is one that still has not been officially amended 
today” (2014: 227). Indeed, under the current Xi presidency and in the theoretical 
writings in CCP journals such as Seeking Truth, there are strong remnants of these 
ideas.  
That Schell and Delury use the word “officially” in the above quote does, however, 
point to the fact that changes have clearly taken place since Mao had the chance to 
put his take on Leninist press theory into effect after 1949.  These are recognised in 
more recent China press theory. This recognises the development of a diversified, 
depoliticized press which caters to an increasingly market-focused and commercially-
minded audience. Here, the press is unleashed from strict Party control and is free to 
pursue market interests, serving investors at the financially literate end of the market, 
and everyday consumers at the ad-heavy, populist end. While some have seen this as 
leading the press into conflict with the Party (Lynch, 1999), most modern scholars 
observe the press working alongside the state and playing a vital role in popularising 
and expediting broader Party-sanctioned market-based reform (Lee et al, 2006). 
Moreover, media workers, though expected to adhere to hazily-defined political goals, 
are given the independence to remake their audiences. As Keane puts it, media 
workers and journalists have moved from being the “engineers of the soul” to 
“entrepreneurs of the soul” (2013). 
Echoing the Postman-esque debates in Western media theory (Postman, 1986), some 
have seen China’s modern media – press included – as a tool of distraction, of 
celebrity tittle-tattle and highly transient stories of individual drama thrown up by the 
daily churn of the World Wide Web. DeLuca and Peeples have argued that the 
concept of the ‘public sphere’ should be replaced by that of the ‘public screen’, a 
communicative environment where constructive exchange is stymied by a screen-
based, image-dominated ‘hypermediacy’ (DeLuca and Peeples, 2002: 125)6. In such a 
milieu, critical debate is possible but far from inevitable. Within this complex 
landscape, the press may intervene to guide fragmented public debate. The 
                                                       
6 See page 81. 
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interaction of mainstream media and the Internet thus produces a force which 
forestalls change and diffuses pressure.  
These competing press theories have echoes in the theories which swirl around the 
second major set of issues related to this project: theories of public protest in China. 
Here there are two predominant strands. One maintains, broadly, that in their 
overarching and enduring fear of ‘chaos’, officials seek to restrict and inhibit protest 
in the pursuit of social harmony and their own career goals. Operating within a strong, 
authoritarian and highly militarised state, officials retain both the means and the 
motivation to do this, suppressing at will, permitting when it suits. 
The other theory – which has gained ground as China has become a more complex 
society – descries ‘responsive authoritarianism’ where the government is content to 
let protests occur, even when protests may lead to consequences which may be 
politically embarrassing or otherwise awkward.  This is for three reasons: one, 
protests perform a useful democratic function in their ability to highlight areas of 
popular discontent and thus improve governance; two, protests have a social 
psychological function in acting as a kind of ‘pressure valve’ to prevent the build-up of 
more ominous social forces; and, three, protests may be state-enhancing in justifying 
the necessity of a strong government and providing a chance to demonstrate its 
efficacy. However, this theory acknowledges drawbacks. Permitting protest is a high-
risk strategy which requires a precarious policy of channelling, rather than 
encouraging, popular anger. 
Aims and methods 
In order to answer the questions sketched out above, this research adopts a case 
study approach. As already intimated, the specific political contingencies of each of 
China’s 150,000 yearly mass incidents (Sparks, 2012: 62) are such that expecting each 
of them to have some testament recorded in the news media, even at the local level, 
is not realistic. This then rules out the possibility of running news data from large-
scale quantitative filters. Rather, this research has selected three specific and large-
scale events from which signposts, rather than firm conclusions, may be drawn. 
21 
 
Each of the three incidents discussed in this thesis was, of course, unique. However, 
each incident was selected because it was emblematic – though not necessarily 
representative – of one of modern China’s most important forms of social contention. 
No exhaustive typology of protest in China has yet been presented. This is for a 
reason; there are as many potential sources of contention as there are people. 
However, one can certainly discern commonalities in the sources of dispute from 
which one can begin to sketch a patchwork of protest genres. Land disputes; 
environmental contention; labour strikes; minority disputes; ‘anger-venting’ incidents; 
free speech protests; police brutality; nationalist protest; student protests. The 
distinctions are necessarily crude, issues frequently overlap, and the thread of 
corruption runs through nearly all of them. However, the first three protest types on 
this list are both the most common, and touch on issues core to the process of 
China’s modern economic transformation, and it is economic issues which are likely 
to form the most meaningful and enduring source of tension. Thus, emblematic 
protests around land, the environment and labour were selected for study.   
The research deliberately shuns those protest forms which, arguably, get the greatest 
attention in Western news media – ethnically or religiously-based protest in the likes 
of Xinjiang and Tibet, and anti-foreigner protests which have intermittently occurred 
throughout the last century, most recently against Japan over the issue of the Diaoyu, 
or Senkkaku, islands. It does so because much has already been written about them 
and also because they appear to the author to be peripheral to the daily ebbs and 
flows of mainstream – read, ethnic Han – society. Issues around land, labour and 
environmental degradation appear to the author to be more central to current 
development of Chinese society. Indeed, it is unimaginable that there are any cities, 
towns or even villages in China where conflict does not brew on a daily basis within 
these spheres.  
In each protest event, the research examines in detail the coverage across a variety of 
news sources. The research has selected a number of publications which, again, 
appear to be as representative as possible of the major kinds of modern publication 
which comprise the modern Chinese newspaper market, principally the business 
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press, the party press and the commercial press. In addition, the research is 
particularly keen to look at both local and national coverage. 
In terms of precisely what kind of data is sought within these publications, the 
research seeks to examine, broadly, the nature of the discourse around these events, 
looking specifically at the language employed by the various newspapers examined. 
In 2013, writing in the Red Flag Manuscript (Hongqi Wengao)7, Ren Xianliang, a 
regional propaganda minister, argued that a marked division had opened up between 
‘traditional public opinion’ – read mainstream newspapers, journals and broadcasters 
– and public opinion carried on ‘internet-based emerging media’, a term which may 
extend to telecom platforms such as SMS. The problem was damaging to effective 
Party governance, he argued. The solution he proposed was for the Party to be bolder 
in asserting control of the unruly internet sphere (Bandurski, 2013).  
Ren Xianliang certainly was not the first to note a ‘dual discourse’ in Chinese 
communications (He 2008, Link 2012), cleaved between official and non-official. 
Neither was his top-down solution to the problem the only possible answer. 
Previously proposals had argued for a more nuanced approach which may allow the 
‘traditional’ to close the gap in language, discourse and agenda with the ‘emerging’ 
(Qian & Bandurski, 2011). Thus one of the specific aspects probed in this study is the 
nature of language and discourse in the mainstream media. There can be no 
assumption of the mainstream press somehow breaking free of ‘traditional public 
opinion’ and competing with the ‘internet-based emerging media’. However, the 
research is interested in the extent to which change may be observed in an attempt 
to reduce to gap that has been cited. It probes whether the historic tendency of 
protestors to “usurp, appropriate and adapt official modes of communication and 
ceremonial forms” (Wasserstrom, 1991: 325-326) may work in reverse. In an Internet-
dominated communications environment characterised by multiple sites of power 
and public accessibility, would there be evidence of official communications 
appropriating and adapting online modes and forms in order to close the discourse 
gap?  
                                                       
7 The Red Flag Manuscript is a subordinate publication of Seeking Truth (qiushi) magazine, a bi-monthly 
published by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CCP) focused on political theory 
and read by elite Party members. See english.qstheory.cn/aboutqs.htm 
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Of course, Ren’s initial conception of the integrity and homogeneity of the ‘official’ 
public sphere looks odd when compared with the changes that have occurred within 
the media industry since 1978. These changes can be summed up in two words: 
commercialisation and fragmentation (Lee, 2000; Zhao, 1998).  
The commercialisation of the Chinese press has its roots in the 1990s. Newspapers, 
like much of China’s publishing industry, underwent something approaching a 
financial revolution at that time, with the Party absenting itself from its historic role 
as financial guarantor. Instead, newspapers became tasked with finding their own 
funds and were unleashed to dive into the commercial world (Zhao, 2008; Hockx, 
2012). The outcome was a press system in which commercial evening and morning 
newspapers flourished; in which news organisations branched out into non-media 
sectors such as hospitality and property; in which dubious news practices such as 
‘news extortion’ and ‘fake news’ became endemic; and in which advertising 
flourished. A contemporary reader of, say, the Southern Daily, a party publication 
linked with the provincial-level government in Guangdong, will routinely find the 
austere ‘Party’ paper disguised beneath an outer, single page ‘wrap’, which carries 
advertising and series of ‘puffs’ pointing to weather reports, crime stories and fashion 
features. Online, visitors to news sites can find lurid advertisements for ‘dating 
services’ beside highly formal Xinhua news copy (Bandurski, 2014). 
Alongside, and often intertwined, with the general trend towards commercialisation 
is the fragmentation of the press into what Zhao (2008) identifies as ‘Party’, 
‘commercial’ and ‘elite’ publications. Further complication comes from the increasing 
complexity of the propaganda system, with the work of national agencies such as the 
State Council Information Office (SCIO) and its subordinate department, the 
Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC)8, as well as the State Administration of 
Press, Publications, Radio, Film and Television (SAPPRFT)9 and its subordinate 
                                                       
8 This is the most recent (English) name of the department created in 2011 as the State Internet 
Information Office (SIIO), responsible specifically for monitoring web content.  
9 SAPPRFT is a recent innovation, formed in 2013 from the merger of two huge regulatory bodies, the 
General Administration of Press and Publications (GAPP) and the State Administration of Radio, Film 
and Television (SARFT). The merger offers clear evidence that there is a keen awareness in Beijing of 
the unwieldy nature of media regulation. In light of consolidation in other areas, the formation of 




department, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), each 
dovetailing with regional propaganda bodies. All of this represents a fragmentation of 
communicatory power in increasingly complex polity. Beyond simple language and 
discourse, the research probes whether this might be reflected in the manner in 
which social contention was reported within the various different section of the 
mainstream press, at different tiers of the media hierarchy, and hence, looks to 
compare, in forensic detail, differences between protest-related output in these 
publications.  
Main Findings 
This thesis examines in detail how three large street protests were covered by China’s 
mainstream China press. Firstly, and most broadly, it shows that, contrary to what 
might be deduced from both academic literature and Anglophone news, reporting 
around three high profile recent episodes of mass social contention was not absent 
from the mainstream media in China. There was considerable reporting and this 
reporting was often self-congratulatory in its tone. Media texts acknowledge, draw 
attention to and celebrate the openness and transparency that their very existence 
purportedly demonstrates. Clearly, ‘openness’ is something which wants to be 
communicated, even if that openness is ultimately lacking. Indeed, any reader relying 
only on contemporary mainstream coverage would have come away with little sense 
of the magnitude and significance of the actions, but that is not to diminish the 
significance of these protest events appearing on the state-sanctioned ‘public screen’, 
something barely recognised in the academic literature around protest in China. 
There are obvious distinctions between the three protests. In Xiamen’s anti-PX 
(paraxylene10) protest in 2007, reporting was halting and largely handled locally. In 
Chongqing’s taxi strike in 2008 there was a clear tension between relatively 
conservative local reporting and strikingly dynamic national reporting. In the land 
protest in Wukan in 2011, the protest was chiefly covered inside the province and the 
most obvious tension between the Party press of Guangzhou, the provincial capital, 
and Shanwei, the local county seat. 
                                                       
10 A benzene-derived hydrocarbon used in the manufacturing of certain plastics and polyesters. 
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In defining conservative and dynamic, we may draw attention to key facets of what 
constitutes ‘normal’ protest reporting in the mainstream Chinese press. Conservative 
reporting may be characterised as thus: report only after the protest has finished; 
emphasise disorder; stress social and economic damage caused; demonise protestors 
as extreme; and laud the efficacy and dynamism of Party officials.  
Much of this chimes with the characteristics of China’s modern propaganda 
techniques detailed by Brady (2010) but these have not before been examined in 
specific relation to protest events. Moreover, one of Brady’s chief contentions – that 
the media do not tackle problems which have no obvious solution – appears to be 
contradicted. The first two protests, in Xiamen and Chongqing, involved highly 
complex, systemic issues where a simple scapegoat was not immediately apparent. 
Dynamic protest reporting may, conversely, be characterised as: releasing 
contemporaneous reports; acknowledging the legitimacy of protestor demands; 
humanising the protestors; and drawing specific attention to areas of compromise.  
A second, tentative finding, is that 2008 appeared to mark an anomaly in protest 
reporting. There is more in common with the treatment of the 2007 and 2011 
protests than there is evidence of linear change from 2007 to 2011. This project was 
not designed with a prominent longitudinal element. It is a cross-sectional study in 
terms of the fact that all case studies are taken from the politically coherent Hu-Wen 
era, and are delineated by protest type rather than any temporal distinction. However, 
the three events do span one, somewhat liminal, threshold. In 2008, the then-
president Hu Jintao detailed a move away from ‘public opinion guidance’ towards 
‘public opinion channelling’ (Qian & Bandurski, 2011). In Xiamen’s PX protest in 2007, 
reporting was halting and largely handled locally. However, reporting around the 
2008 taxi strike seemed to break free of many of the binding tenets of reporting 
protest in China, detailed above, particularly at the national level. By the time of the 
Wukan protests in 2011, however, ‘conservative’ protest reporting was again in the 
ascendancy, albeit in a manner which dwelled on the positive aspects of the protest 
rather more than the reporting in Xiamen did. In short, this study records no major 
change in the handling of protest between 2007 and 2011, despite the onset of a new 
media policy and, notably, the advent of the microblog. There are hints that media 
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workers and propaganda officials are wriggling within their shackles, but the 
innovation that is hinted at in 2008 is not taken up again in 2011. 
The third main finding concerns language and discourse. There is no strong evidence 
of the ‘unofficial’ making incursions into press discourse. However, the study is able 
to corroborate the nature of ‘official’ discourse, as pertaining to events of social 
contention. These included the tendency to claim conspiracy and deviance amongst 
protestors (Tanner, 2004); numeration and sloganeering (Barme, 2012); the 
prevalence of militaristic language (Link, 2013a; Barme, 2012) and, most generally, 
the presence of a strong moral evaluative dimension to the language (Link, 2013a; 
Barme, 2012; Zhao, 2008). This thesis is in agreement with Barme’s claim that the 
discourse of social contention in China represents a “transmogrification rather than a 
collapse [of the ruling ideology]” and absorbs both leftist and neo-liberal ideas (2012: 
10). This was most evident in national level commentary. The ‘masses’ were 
discursively, and repeatedly, roused from their fitful Maoist sleep and were 
frequently aligned with a developmental discourse of competing ‘interest claims’.  
This thesis’ main finding is related to variations within the Chinese press and what 
these might say about the nature of media in China. In short, the press was not 
cleaved between commercial and party, as certain aspects of China press theory 
might have predicted, but rather variation was exposed between different parts of 
the Party, representing different geographical regions.  
Howell (2006) argues that China scholars should be wary of conceptualising the state 
as a homogenous actor. Sociological studies point to the importance of informal 
power networks in China politics (Fei, 1992) and these intersect with more recent 
notions of corporatism in the Chinese context (Sparks, 2010). A study of press 
coverage indeed reveals differences in the output of journalists and editors according 
to precisely which political actors are supervising their work. This remains true even 
when those journalists and editors are faced with obviously sensitive material.   
Conceptualising both the Party-state and the Chinese press as increasingly 
fragmented represents the corrective to the tendency among observers of Chinese 
politics and media to observe intensely strategic thinking in every action. This thesis 
does make the assumption that the media remains a tool of government and 
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invariably performs in the interests of power. However, the fragmentation of that 
power makes it hard to envisage every action, or every printed word, working to 
service a single, strategic purpose. This fragmentation may well explain why media 
behave differently and why Chinese officials often regard journalists as antagonistic 
and adversarial. Such a position is not an expression of media or journalistic power, 
but an expression of hierachical political power. Journalists working for senior 
political units may well be instrumentalised by those units to put pressure on junior 
officials, but this works within the political hierarchy rather than outside it.11  
Revisions   
This research has undergone extensive revisions in its four-year duration. This section 
summarise these changes. A more complete narrative is detailed in Chapter 5.   
This project began with what may be termed “techno-utopian” (Morozov, 2011) zeal. 
One-directional change was assumed to be taking place in China, driven by 
technological developments. Citizens shut out of public communication were 
asserting bottom-up pressure through online platforms, placing strain on the one-
party state. The theoretical frame conceived of a retreating Party and an advancing 
demos, with mainstream Chinese media playing a vital role in mediating this 
confrontation.  
Initially, the project tested this hypothesis by seeking interviews with media workers 
and examining contemporary online discourse. It gradually became clear that the 
author grossly underestimated the dynamism of online censorship practices and 
overestimated his own ability to capture and process real-time data. It became 
similarly clear that the project misconceived the Chinese state as monolithic and 
misrepresented the politicized pronouncements of some so-called Netizens as 
representative of all online discourse and Chinese society in general.  
                                                       
11 This function of media does not, of course, only apply to neo-authoritarian systems such as that 
which operates in China. In her biography of the US President Theodore Roosevelt, Goodwin 
articulates how journalists were instrumentalized by elite power within a democratic political system 
in order to generate ‘public opinion’ which may then be used to overcome the problems caused by a 
system which had become fragmented and sclerotic (Goodwin, 2013). In short, oppositional journalism 
may be immensely helpful to elite interests. 
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The search for a solution was a complex and difficult process, explained in more detail 
in Chapter 5, but finally turned towards a focus on more static, mainstream media 
texts and a political frame which considered how the Party-state worked through a 
commercialised media to meet the challenges of a changed communications 
landscape. The decision to settle on protest as the specific focus had inductive roots. 
The high-speed train crash near Wenzhou in 2011 prompted online outrage and 
surprisingly robust media commentary, and alerted the author to the fact that protest 
was a feature within the Chinese press. This appeared a useful pivot on which to hang 
an investigation of press performance in an age where traditional propaganda 
methods and censorship patterns had manifestly changed.  
The research process has been one of progressive narrowing and simplification. The 
changes may be summarised in four ways: firstly, the project has shifted in its 
temporal focus from contemporary events to historic (albeit recent) subjects; 
secondly, it has shifted in its theoretical focus from a sociological inquiry into 
journalistic practice to a political inquiry into press function; thirdly, it has shifted in 
terms of its object of study, from a concern with online contention and towards a 
focus on press performance; and finally, it has moved away from an effort to collect 
representative, quantitative data to a more qualitative and necessarily subjective 
approach.   
Approach 
This project adopts a simple approach to study of mass produced media texts for 
clues about the instrumentalisation of the media by political power. Shunning 
normative conceptualisations of Anglophone journalism, the thesis makes the 
assumption that the information which was ultimately released into the public sphere 
served the interests of the informant in some capacity, and it is this overlapping 
network of contending interest claims from which this research draws its findings. 
The approach builds on Link’s notion of what he calls ‘the language game’:  
…[W]here the standard is not “Is it true or not?” but “Does it serve the 
speaker’s interests or not?” the counterpart of a “lie” is not possible. The 
person who hears a statement can be 100 percent sure that “this 
speaker believes that this statement serves his or her interests.” It might 
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not be easy to figure out exactly what the specific interest is, but one can 
be sure that the speaker is aiming at it. It also can happen that a speaker 
miscalculates in the choice of words which will actually serve his or her 
interests. But that, too, does not change the principle that the speaker 
believes that the words will be expedient” (2010: 281) 
The case study approach used precludes generalizable conclusions and there will be 
no attempt to offer a definite closing statement. Rather each event throws up 
implications – sometimes complementary, sometimes contradictory – for the 
theoretical understandings and conceptualisations of the Chinese media.  
The approach displayed here is one of narrowing and focus in search of meaning. The 
media landscape in China is huge, confusing, contradictory and dynamic. Research 
thus requires an intense focus and a systematic approach so that the chaos is 
confined and extraneous noise eliminated. When one attempts to capture a huge 
field – in the way the eyes and brain do every time they apprehend the world – 
reductions and assumptions become a necessary mechanism for effective analysis. By 
adopting a case study approach and with the application of methods of textual 
analysis, I am hoping to reduce the blind spots and the reductions. Such an approach 
means that is difficult to say something with any degree of certitude about a large 
field of study. However, I can offer certainty – albeit with caveats – within certain 
narrow fields of inquiry, which help point the way to further potential research 
avenues.  
This is an approach which, reluctantly – but consciously, ignores many of the scholarly 
media paradigms which have emerged over recent decades. It neglects reception 
studies, has little to say about issues such as the use of media and takes only a 
passing interest in issues of convergence and the development of networked 
information flows. Rather, the study operates within a tradition of political 
communications, employing a Kremlinology-inspired methodology. Pre-1978, 
Kremlinology (Cohen, 1985: 29-30) offered one of the few ways in Chinese politics. 
Nowadays, there is far greater openness and transparency in most fields, though not 
necessarily in the one this work is most interested in. The opacity of Chinese politics 
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remains strong and there are few better ways of deciphering strategies of political 
communications than by studying the texts that are ‘officially’ produced. 
This work has been inspired, broadly, by the sociological endeavour of 
‘problematizing the ostensibly simple’ and examining data sources which have been 
dismissed or otherwise overlooked on account of their seemingly easy explicability. 
The Chinese press is something too often dismissed as being a modern irrelevance; it 
is dull, it is state-controlled, and thus it is readily dismissible. The majority of scholars 
have rather turned their gaze towards the Internet and pondered issues such as the 
development of civil society, the public sphere and state-society relations. The 
research is interested in each of these things, but for all the detailed, nuanced, 
scholarly work done on issues such as civil society, governance strategies, 
demographics and economics, the mainstream media, and newspapers in particular, 
are too often assumed to be simple, one-dimensional and irrelevant.  
Through the work of scholars such as Lee (2000), de Burgh (2003), Pan (2005), Zhao 
(2008) and Yu (2009b), it is evident that there is increasing transparency in terms of 
journalistic practice. Not only are newsrooms increasingly accessible to scholars, 
journalists are increasingly making the transfer between editorial work and scholarly 
endeavours, bringing with them new insights. This trend is best typified by the work 
of Hong Kong University’s China Media Project, which has provided a platform for 
several notable journalists to make this transition. Collectively, this work has entailed 
a probing of self-conceptions and working practices, very often – though not always – 
with an evident desire on the part of the researcher to resurrect the spirit of 
pioneering journalists such as Wang Tao and discover evidence of an adversarial, 
polemical, investigative, and perhaps even democratising, instinct. Such a focus on 
the ebb and flow of control supposes China’s journalist class is playing an eternal 
game of ‘edge-ball’, probing and extending, where possible, the boundaries of the 
permissible. The reality is unclear, but the likelihood is that, while some do engage in 
such risky and provocative behaviour, the majority are content – though not 
necessarily happy – to perform their journalistic duties within the boundaries set out, 
as best they can be discerned. Rather than study working practices and self-
conceptions, then, this study is focused on these boundaries – what is permitted to 
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be said, in what context, and expressed in what way – and what they might say about 
Chinese politics, and social management techniques, rather than what it says about 
journalists themselves who are, as Sparks (2012) and others have pointed out, as 
multifarious as the society they purport to record.   
Value of research 
This thesis is one of only a handful of studies which has seen fit to look to mainstream 
coverage as a source of data and many of its claims to value are staked on this very 
straightforward basis. It will be the first to provide an account of the patterns of 
reporting protest around three events, two of which have been widely written about 
but whose authors have shown little interest in mainland media coverage. It will 
specifically examine the nature, scope and extent of the discourses of protest and 
connect with the literatures on media development, and on politics and protest in 
China.  
Quite simply, this is an area which has been overlooked, presumably on account of its 
assumed negligible importance. Lee and Chan’s study conducted extensive content 
analysis of a protest within Chinese newsprint (2011) but this was in the very 
different media context of Hong Kong. Lee (2010) and Tong (2008) have both 
examined coverage of protest events in mainland China, but these studies were brief 
and used the mediation of protest to look specifically at questions of, respectively, 
democratisation and journalistic practice. As has been made clear, this study is 
interested in political communications, but with an approach which is shorn of the 
burdens of democratic wishful thinking and obsession with assumptions about 
guerrilla journalists upsetting the apple cart.    
Structure of the thesis 
The structure of this thesis has changed considerably over the period of writing up. 
Initially, it was thought best to provide distinct chapters detailing some of the main 
strands of analysis – separate sections of ‘protest discourse’, on ‘differences between 
the Party and commercial press’ and the ‘narrative’ of press reporting. In the end, it 
was felt to offer a more straightforward structure with separate chapters providing 
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detailed accounts of each of the case study events, with the conclusion knitting the 
analysis together.  
Thus, this final thesis is composed of eight chapters. This introduction has 
summarised the main problem and provided a justification of the relevance of the 
project. Chapters 2 and 3 combine to form an extensive literature review and provide 
an account of scholarship in the two broad fields which impinge of the core subject of 
this thesis, the Chinese press and Chinese protest, which includes a large and 
important sub-section on a field where social contention is most readily discernible, 
the Chinese Internet. Chapter 4 sets out the main theoretical arguments around 
transitology, press theory as it pertains to authoritarian regimes, as well as the vital 
importance of language in Chinese political communications. Chapter 5 sets out the 
methodology of this project. Chapters 6 to 8, as explained, focus on each of the three 
studied protest events in turn, working in chronological order from the 2007 Xiamen 
PX protest to the 2012 Wukan protest. Finally, chapter 9 offers a final analysis of the 













Chapter 2: The Chinese Press in Context  
Introduction 
The Chinese press has gone through several iterations during a history which spans 
nearly a thousand years. Beginning during the dynastic period as an elite tool of 
imperial communication, China’s newspaper industry rapidly expanded under colonial 
tutelage in the 19th century. After a relatively freewheeling period in the 1930s, the 
communist press took on a consistently Leninist visage for most of the Mao years, 
acting as an adjunct of the State and a tool of mass mobilisation and propaganda. 
Since the reform and opening up (gaige kaifang) period began in 1980, the Chinese 
press has experienced great vicissitudes, liberalising, commercialising and diversifying 
to various extents at different times. Currently, though journalists and editors are 
demonstrably conscious of political priorities, China’s newspapers appear more 
concerned than ever with the needs and desires of their consumers, resulting in a 
curiously hybrid system which might crudely be described as a heavily-regulated 
commercial space, or a semi-free press.  
The Chinese Press in Historical Context  
The Early Press 
Of the dizzying number of inventions attributed to China in Needham’s pioneering 
work, Science and Civilisation in China (1978) none have been as transformative for 
human development as printing. The manifold political, social and economic changes 
wrought by Johannes Guttenberg’s popularisation of the printing press in the 15th 
century could not have occurred were it not for the techniques and technologies he 
borrowed, consciously or not, from early Chinese innovation. China’s earliest known 
woodblock printed newspaper, the Kaiyuan Za Bao, originated in the first half of the 
8th century under Tang emperor Xuanzong (Chang, 1989: 4) and an early incarnation 
of Guttenberg’s moveable type printing press was developed in the 11th century by 
craftsman Bi Sheng (Needham, 1978)12.  
                                                       
12 Bi Sheng’s movable type press was necessarily less flexible than Guttenberg’s on account of the 
differences between Chinese and German script.  
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The feting of Guttenberg in historiography inevitably leads to charges of 
Eurocentricism, though one need not be so in elevating printing’s importance. 
Printing has played a vital role in forging China’s historically-constituted and highly 
literate modern culture. The dissemination of information through printed text both 
sustained imperial rule in China for more than a millennium13 and, more widely, 
facilitated the spread of Buddhism across China and East Asia14.  
By contrast, modern journalism may be reasonably described as a Western import. 
Journalism remained largely undeveloped in China until the advent of 19th century 
colonialism. The changes wrought by European interlopers were twofold: 
missionaries brought with them the organisational, technical and commercial 
competencies associated with regularized publishing. The first Chinese-language 
monthly was published by a British missionary, William Milne, as early as 1815 
(Scotten & Hatchen, 2012: 20)15.  Businessmen took over the mantle in the second 
half of the 19th century, particularly in the port cities16. The first daily newspaper in 
China, launched in Guangzhou in 1854, was explicitly commercial and the half-century 
that followed the close of the First Opium War saw the publication of more than 300 
periodicals (ibid). 
The second inspiration that colonialism provided was as an object of scrutiny, 
deliberation and discussion in itself. The fact that a range of European powers were 
able to win ostensibly straightforward military victories and carve out extraterritorial 
concessions prompted Chinese intellectuals to organise opinion in the form of 
publishing and pamphleteering. Colonialism itself was not necessarily the target of 
such published commentary. Rather, the subjects of scorn were the formal 
institutions of Chinese society which had been found impotent against foreign 
incursions. China’s “first modern journalist” (Schell & Delury, 2013: 46), Wang Tao, 
                                                       
13 Hand-written court gazettes, or dibao, are thought to have existed from as early as the Han dynasty 
(202 BC to 221 AD). It was under the Tang that these became printed editions (Chang, 1989: 5). 
14 The world’s oldest surviving printed text, the 9th century Diamond Sutra, is a Buddhist document 
found in grottoes near Dunhuang, a remote oasis town at China’s western desert frontier. It is 
currently (2014) held by the British Library. 
15 Merrill claims that the first modern Chinese newspaper was actually the Chinese-language Eastern 
Western Monthly Magazine, founded in Guangzhou (Canton) in 1833 (quoted in Chang 1989: 7). There 
is, however, agreement over the explicitly religious focus of these early publications. 
16 As well as ceding the island of Hong Kong to the British, the 1842 Treaty of Nanjing guaranteed 
commercial access to five treaty ports for the British. These port cities were Shanghai, Xiamen, 
Guangzhou, Fuzhou and Ningbo. 
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epitomises both influences, beginning as a translator in a missionary school, moving 
to the United Kingdom and returning to establish a daily newspaper in Hong Kong – 
the Xunhuan Ribao (Circulation Daily) – which regularly featured polemical pieces on 
China’s perceived weakness.  
Though potential reform had been discussed ever since China’s comprehensive 
defeat in the First Opium War17 (Fenby, 2009; Lovell, 2011; Schell & Delury, 2013) it 
was the Chinese loss in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 that proved the most 
important grist to the mill of political debate. Indeed, resistance to the Treaty of 
Shimonoseki, which ended the war, had coalesced into something approaching a 
movement by 1898 which called for radical change. The movement’s leading 
intellectual lights were Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao, one-time civil servants who 
collaborated to publish newspapers which unambiguously advocated sweeping 
constitutional reform as a response to the perceived ‘national crisis’. Though Kang 
and Liang were forced from their official positions and saw their publications 
suppressed (Levenson, 1967: 21-22), a trend had been established which would be 
repeated over the next generation by luminaries such as (Nationalist leader) Sun Yat-
sen, (Chinese Communist Party founder) Chen Duxiu and Mao Zedong, who each 
spent time running radical periodicals calling for revolutionary change.  
Thus China’s press emerged from a hybrid and somewhat contradictory tradition, at 
once a vehicle for capitalist exchange and for polemical politics. This cannot be 
described as unique. Indeed, there are obvious parallels with the kind of 
pamphleteering undertaken by the likes of John Milton in 17th century England. Like 
China two centuries later, Britain was then on the cusp of radical constitutional 
change, the franchise was extremely limited in scope and the audience for such 
writings was mainly traders and merchants. In this respect, fin de siècle China could 
be said to be undergoing a process experienced in parts of western Europe some two 
centuries earlier. What was different was what it ultimately produced. 
                                                       
17 Generally regarded as being from 1839 to 1842. 
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The Republican and Early Communist Press   
The precise effect of this activist press in the fall of the Qing Dynasty in 1911 and the 
so-called New Culture Movement which followed is impossible to quantify. That there 
was an effect is equally impossible to deny. The ferment of ideas during this period of 
enormous political and social flux was palpable. By 1919, the transition to a new 
constitutional arrangement was stalled and beset with factionalism. From Russia 
came news that the Bolsheviks had captured and consolidated power; the Treaty of 
Versailles proved, to many, the betrayal of exploitative Western powers, and all the 
while the significant Chinese diaspora was absorbing and transmuting ideas of 
syndicalism, Marxism and other radical philosophies into the Chinese context. The 
burning question that had been asked ever since 1842 – what was needed to 
rejuvenate an ailing nation – continued to be asked in publications and pamphlets 
across the land. 
The 1919-1949 period has been described as the ‘golden era’ of Chinese media (de 
Burgh, 2003). Hundreds of people from different backgrounds and from different 
political persuasions set up periodicals, magazines and newspapers. Though there 
were almost constant attempts to control public discourse, notably by the ruling 
Kuomintang (KMT) party in the 1920s and 1930s, the repression was sporadic and 
inconsistent. Indeed, lacking the strict ideological rigour of their communist 
successors, the KMT eventually publish regulations for the protection of press 
freedom. “Indeed, in spite of all the restrictions imposed (or half imposed) by Nanjing 
[in the 1930s], China possibly enjoyed more intellectual freedom than ever before or 
since” (Gray, 1990, quoted in De Burgh, 2003: 102). By 1947 there were 1,781 
registered newspapers across the country, the majority of which were independent of 
political control or explicit political alignment. 
It was in this vibrant intellectual milieu that the Chinese Communist Party was 
founded in Shanghai in 192118, though its respect for the idea of unfettered exchange 
of information and ideas was limited. The party adhered to a Marxist view of the 
press (see next chapter) – the ‘propaganda model’ – which had already begun to be 
                                                       
18 The CCP was founded in a meeting house within the so-called French Concession, one of Shanghai’s 
colonially-administered districts.  
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implemented and developed by the Russian Bolsheviks. The core of this belief posited 
that journalists – regardless of their personal belief or behaviour – were led by the 
economic superstructure to act as representatives and advocates of the ruling classes. 
Communist journalists, therefore, must occupy the converse position whereby they 
represented the interests of the working classes, and work to persuade the masses of 
their ‘line on truth’. In this task, “[t]he main consideration was not whether 
statements be true or false but the consequences they might have and their ‘class 
nature’” (de Burgh, 2003). 
Both of the CCP’s two great 20th century leaders had personal experience of writing, 
editing and publishing newspapers. During the CCP’s alliance with the KMT in the 
mid-1920s, Mao Zedong worked as chief editor of the KMT’s central organ, Political 
Weekly (Chang, 1989: 16), while Deng Xiaoping once served as the chief editor at Red 
Star, the official organ of the Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army (Xie, 2011: 
294). The lessons of these experiences bore fruit in the communist bases of Jiangxi in 
the early 1930s and, later, in the camps and cave dwellings of Yan’an where the Party 
rehabilitated itself after the almost-fatal ravages of the Long March. It was here, in 
the large but isolated and bounded community, that early communist leaders were 
able to put their theories of information dissemination into practice. These were 
defined by Mao’s speeches through the middle of 1942, later collated and dubbed 
‘Talks at the Yan’an Forum on Art and Literature’, in which he defined all cultural 
works, media included, as belonging to the ideological sphere, and that all must take 
the “correct stand” in the service of the “proletariat and the masses” (Mao, 1960). 
Critical to Mao’s view was the notion, widely held at the time, that the media had 
transcendental powers which could change – or ‘correct’ – an individual’s thinking 
(Schell & Delury, 2013; Chilton et al, 2012: 10). 
The Propaganda Model of the Chinese Press  
The first few months in the life of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) were relatively 
relaxed as the CCP set about building the infrastructure of statehood. Several 
independent publications in Shanghai – home to the most vibrant newspaper industry 
pre-1949 – attempted to continue business, unbelieving that their commercial and 
technical expertise would be so readily dismissed by the incoming regime (Brady, 
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2010). By 1951, however, the totalitarian ideological priorities of the incoming regime 
were clear. ‘New’ China would involve wholesale re-education of the population. An 
era of “relentless political campaigns aimed at the thought reform of the Chinese 
people in all aspects of life” (ibid: 37) was underway.  
Newspapers played a vital role in signalling, driving and ending the mass campaigns of 
the 1950s and 1960s. The Anti-Three and Anti-Five campaigns, the Hundred Flowers 
campaign, the Anti-Rightist Campaign, the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural 
Revolution were all signalled and triggered from newspaper editorials (Scotten & 
Hachten, 2010: 43). During the Hundred Flowers campaign, newspapers were the 
primary vehicle in which dissenting views were aired, though correspondents and 
officials who had heeded Mao’s encouragement to speak out were later purged or 
punished. In day-to-day propaganda work, newspapers were a vital tool in carrying 
out re-education work. Study sessions in factories and offices incorporated clippings 
from official publications (ibid). In this sense, journalists, or ‘news workers’ (xinwen 
gongzuo zhe) (Xu, 2000: 55), were aware of their responsibilities in nation-building. 
PRC media focused to an overwhelming degree on positive developments, unity and 
refrained from contrasting views on a topic (Wasserstrom, 2010: 122-3). In a 
posthumously published work, long-time Chinese president19 Liu Shaoqi, (1984: 30) 
identified four principles of mass persuasion that were at work in the Chinese press 
during this era: insulation (from competing ideas); emotional arousal; simplification; 
and politicisation. 
The problems associated with an uncritical press were made particularly stark after 
the Great Leap Forward (1958-1961). Journalists were among the few people within 
China during these years who were able to travel freely and observe first-hand the 
calamitous effects of the policy of mass collectivisation and large-scale exportation of 
the grain stock. The grim realities of the resultant famine and failing industrial output 
were not, however, reported openly by such journalists. Though some produced 
                                                       
19 As ‘president’ Liu was head of state, though his de-facto position during his time at the ostensible 
peak of Chinese political life was still subordinate to that of Mao. Mao occupied the chairmanship of 
the CCP throughout his 27-year rule of the People’s Republic of China and, as such, remained firmly at 
the helm of China’s immense and complex political bureaucracy. Liu can claim to have commanded 
arguably greater power than Mao in the year which followed Mao’s disastrous Great Leap Forward 
(1957-1961), but Mao reasserted his supremacy shortly thereafter during the Cultural Revolution 
(Fenby, 2009; Shell & Delury, 2013). 
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private neican reports for circulation among the central leaders, many chose to parrot 
the ‘truth’ that had been decided by central government, regardless of the situation 
on the ground. Accordingly, journalists came to be seen by some in the political elite 
as part of the reason why a ruinous policy was not reversed earlier. 
The Great Leap Forward drew attention to one of the most enduring characteristics of 
the Chinese press, that being its role as political battleground at times of national 
debate. Factional disputes were exposed in terms of often-subtle, occasionally-stark, 
differences in the tone and content of editorials in differing publications. Where once 
there had been a blank slate on which China’s supreme leader, Mao Zedong, could 
project absolutely his own personal philosophy, there was ambiguity and contention. 
This was to change radically from 1966 onwards during Mao’s infamous experiment 
in social engineering and decade-long power play, the Great Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution (wuchan jieji wenhua da geming) between 1966 and 1976.  
The bare political power play which underpinned the Cultural Revolution was 
triggered from an article, planted by Mao, in two newspapers in Shanghai, the 
Wenhui Bao and the Liberation Daily (Jiefang Ribao) (MacFarquhar & Schoenhals, 
2006: 18). The resulting convulsion engulfed the entire nation, precipitating an 
unceasing stream of fevered campaigns, crack-downs and organised demonstrations 
which elevated Mao’s personal status and denigrating, at intervals, almost every 
other source of potential authority. 
The ‘permanent revolution’ of the period engendered two kinds of responses: an 
initial feeling of “liberation, freedom of expression and freedom of thought” (Brady, 
2010: 39), felt by many, followed by a creeping fear of speaking out, an attitude 
which characterises the response of news workers at all levels. Just as ordinary 
citizens desperately attempted to adhere to the perceived ‘Party-line’ in public 
behaviours and pronouncements, editors and journalists abandoned all pretence at 
independence. Most newspapers ceased publication altogether, with only the 43 
party organ newspapers surviving. These, in turn, rarely produced more than six 
pages per day, and did nothing more controversial than directly ape the output of 
centrally-controlled media to the point of using identical layouts and typefaces 
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(Scotton & Hachten, 2010: 21). In the words of former Party newspaper editor Qian 
Gang, media in this era were “merely tools of despotism” (2014). 
The Press During Reform and Opening Up 
The post-1978 period in the life of the Chinese press has attracted niche scholarly 
debate. The process that was taking place throughout the 1980s is described by Pan 
as “breaking the confinement of the Party-press system based on the propaganda 
model” (2010, 520), characterised by political liberalisation. This was followed by a 
post-1989 settlement for the Chinese press which is summed up by two words: 
marketization and de-politicisation.    
Liberalisation in the 1980s 
The Cultural Revolution proved a profound lesson to China’s leadership in the 
immediate aftermath of the Third Plenum of the 11th Party Congress20 not least in the 
media field. The response was a conscious rejection of the idea of mass movements 
and thought reform – two of the underlying principles of media development up until 
this point – and a retreat from invasive propaganda work (Brady, 2010: 39). Hu 
Yaobang, one of the most liberal of China’s leaders and the man whose death sparked 
the protests of 1989, was appointed, for a short time, as Director of the Central 
Propaganda Department and, for a lengthier period, senior leader in charge of 
ideological work. The main ideological guidelines of Zhao Ziyang, CCP General 
Secretary through most of the 1980s, were “to give signals that he generally tolerated 
debate and criticism (both inner-Party and within society)” (Brady, 2010: 41). Even 
when Fang Lizhi, an academic who had called explicitly for democratic reform, was 
thrown out of the Party, Zhao defended his right to articulate his views (Schell & 
Delury, 2013: 307).  
This broad ideological shift went in lockstep with the process of radical market-based 
reform. In 1979 the press, for the first time, was given permission to accept 
advertising (Akhavan-Majid, 2005: 557). The development of newspaper advertising, 
like so much in the early period of reform, was a tentative and ambiguous process 
                                                       
20 This is the Party meeting, held in December 1978, when Deng Xiaoping is generally regarded as 




(Stockmann, 2013) but the trend became firmly established within the decade. Partly 
because of new advertising opportunities, the 1980s saw an “explosion of lifestyle 
news-oriented afternoon tabloids” (Zhao, 2008: 77) which, as profit-making vehicles, 
appeared to completely reorient the entire concept of ‘news’ in the People’s Republic 
of China. It may not have been a coincidence that the greatest experimentation took 
place in Guangdong where media outlets were both influenced by, and – to a limited 
extent – competing with unfettered media outlets on the other side of the Hong Kong 
border, and imbued with an entrepreneurial energy influenced by the wider 
economic reforms which were being pioneered there (Cao, 1999). 
More widely, the 1980s also saw the establishment of journalistic laws, as well as 
‘unofficial’ publications which were, for a time, freed from pre-publication Party 
oversight altogether (Wright, 1990: 121). For the first time, newspapers began to 
routinely report negative stories of accidents and touched on difficult social issues 
without immediate fear of punishment. Even national media outlets responded. The 
People’s Daily called for more critical and investigative reporting (Chang, 1989: 48) 
and state broadcaster, CCTV, made programmes such as River Elegy (He Shang) which 
presented a revisionist explanation of China’s fall from geopolitical pre-eminence, 
relegating the importance of colonial subjugation and echoing earlier calls for China 
to embrace overseas ideas, technologies and philosophies21. Again, Guangdong media 
appear as pivotal here, with some southern newspapers taking an explicitly 
adversarial stance, calling on Deng Xiaoping to retire and, in rare cases, appealing for 
the CCP to relinquish power (Chang, 1989).  
The Market and the Party, Post 1989 
Analysis of the model of the Chinese press appears to hinge around the student 
protests of 1989. The Party’s own official assessment of the student protests of that 
year blamed media liberalisation and neglect of ideological work which had fostered 
overly-sympathetic attitudes to perceived ‘western’ values and ideas, especially 
among the younger generation. Politics had, to some extent, consciously withdrawn 
from the media sphere during parts of the 1980s. Post 1989 there was a subtle, but 
                                                       
21 These were most famously articulated by prominent post-revolution reformer and founding member 
of the CCP, Chen Duxiu, who, in 1918, called for China to welcome two Western guests, “Mr Science 
and Mr Democracy”, into its midst (Schell & Delury, 2013: 159)  
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marked, change to this, characterised by what might be termed a highly political de-
politicisation, accompanied by rapid marketisation.  
For the first time since the late 1970s, newspapers immediately found themselves 
required to adhere absolutely to the Party’s political line. There was a re-
establishment of the principle that the press needed to perform ideological functions 
which encouraged unity, explicated government policy and focused on the positive. 
However, rather than encourage a specific treatment of politics, newspapers were 
encouraged to simply shrink the space for political news and commentary and, 
conversely, expand the scope for non-political news. While political subjects became 
unambiguously off-limits, the Chinese press was ‘unleashed’, freed to pursue popular 
stories on issues of entertainment, commerce and anything non-political which would 
appeal to readers. The logic of the modern Chinese press – and Chinese social and 
economic life at large, one could argue – was established: largely unfettered, market-
driven activities, contained within an authoritarian system where politics was 
reported, rather than discussed, and decisions by the Party’s ruling technocrats were 
final.   
In 1992 sweeping cuts to press subsidies were announced, forcing Party publications 
to seek new and independent sources of revenue (Akhavan-Majid, 2004: 557). As 
noted, advertising had first appeared widely in the 1980s but the withdrawal of 
subsidies accelerated this process. Party newspapers added explicitly market-oriented 
sections and mass-appeal ‘weekend editions’. The second half of the decade and the 
first half of the new millennium saw a proliferation of new metropolitan dailies and 
business-focused newspapers (Zhao, 2008: 77).  
The 1990s saw the “rise of de facto privately run newspapers” (Akhavan-Majid, 2004: 
557) with government entities actually contracting out their publishing licences. 
“Legally, these papers [were] ‘owned’ by the licence holder and [were] subject to its 
editorial supervision. In practice, however, full operational, editorial and financial 
responsibility for the paper [was] assumed by the private investor” (ibid). 
Continued political control of the press 
The post-reform press in China was formally released from the totalising philosophy 
whereby all news was propaganda of one sort or another. But it was released not into 
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the wild, but rather into a complex environment configured by longstanding 
institutional restrictions. This basic structure remains in place today.  
There are three main strands to this bargain. Firstly, no newspaper can be set up as 
an independent business; secondly, a strict licencing system operates whereby any 
new publication needs specific permission to legally publish and market itself; and 
thirdly, since 2003 at least, a ‘sponsor unit’ is required of each publication. This unit 
needs to be a recognized institutional publisher who can be specifically held 
responsible for the output of the publication, and thus who can be relied upon to 
screen for sensitive content (Brady, 2010: 115). Censorship is thus delegated, but 
delegated to trusted partners.  
These three core planks are supported by an array of measures which seeks to 
maintain what might be deemed a remote form of political control. Baum suggests 
there are three “concentric circles” of media control in the post 1990s media sphere. 
Beijing-based central media such as the People’s Daily, cling to a Maoist model where 
every word is honed; at the intermediary level are regional media outlets which enjoy 
relative freedom; and at the periphery is commercial “fringe media” (Baum, 2008). 
The vast majority of printed output in modern China is not subject to routine review 
by censorial bodies though a formal review process does exist and direct 
communiques to editors are occasionally issued by the Central Propaganda 
Department and its local equivalents. These may explain subjects which are 
impermissible, which topics must be carried, which subjects are to be emphasised 
(Brady, 2010: 95) 22. In areas of potential sensitivity, senior publications may establish 
the substance and the tifa – approved linguistic constructions and collocations – to be 
used in such articles through exemplar editorials in the likes of the People’s Daily and 
Xinhua (Shambaugh, 2007). However, one of the conclusions of a 2013 symposium 
convened to discuss an archive of propaganda instructions sent to media outlets 
across China found that local propaganda officials tended to be diligent within their 
own jurisdiction but could not extend that censorial reach to other areas, with the 
                                                       
22 These have been catalogued by the China Digital Times website, though the majority are claimed to 




effect that “[n]ews of a scandal in Henan, blocked in Henan, might appear in Shanxi” 
(Link, 2013b: 4). 
Other forms of control include adoption of the Soviet-styled nomenklatura system 
which functions by making the hiring and firing of all senior personnel in the media 
(as well as education and cultural) sector a responsibility of the Central Propaganda 
Department (Ke, 2010: 52). There exists a long history of senior media positions being 
filled by those who have been parachuted in from senior Party roles and who often 
return to full-time governmental duties. Journalists, too, are encouraged to join the 
Party, making them disciplinable under Party rules if they err in their work23 (Brady, 
2010: 116). 
Perhaps the most important form of political control at work in newsrooms is the self-
censorship born of ambiguity (Stern & Hassid, 2012). According to the “Provisional 
Rules for the Administration of Periodicals”, there are eight specific offences which 
periodicals must avoid making. These include “inciting subversion of the regime of 
the people's democratic dictatorship and the socialist system, national division, 
rebellion or rioting”, “inciting opposition to the leadership of the Chinese Communist 
Party”, “divulging state secrets, jeopardising national security or harming national 
interests”, and “insulting or slandering other people” (Chang, Wan & Qu, 2003, cited 
by Shambaugh, 2007). Breaches of these rules may result in a newspaper being 
permanently closed but defining them is extremely problematic. The ambiguity of the 
legal framework thus naturally creates a climate of self-censorship amongst news 
workers which complements specific information management24.  
                                                       
23 The CCP’s disciplinary system can involve so-called shuanggui – literally, ‘double regulations’ – 
detention, where Party members are held incommunicado for up to six months while investigations 
are carried out. Most detainees are accused of ‘corruption’. Ren Jianming of Tsinghua University 
believes that the majority of the 140,000 or so officials who are investigated each year are detained 
under shuanggui terms (Economist, 2012a). 
24 This kind of ambiguity also appears to be at the heart of the current (2014) campaign to instil 
discipline into Party members themselves. Numerous Party officials have been detained in an ongoing 
and self-proclaimed ‘anti-corruption campaign’, credited to the leadership of Xi Jinping. Many 
corruption cases have been reported in the Chinese press. Indeed, The Beijing News 
(http://epaper.bjnews.com.cn/html/2014-04/16/content_506503.htm) went so far as to analyse the 
language used to describe the charges and found that there was little reliable correlation between 
specific crimes and specific charges. Officials, therefore, have no way of knowing what specific ‘crimes’ 
– how many mistresses or how much personal wealth, for example – may trigger investigation. No 
obvious logic drives corruption charges and thus all who are somewhat corrupt are encouraged to rein 
in their behaviour in an attempt to stay on the right side of an ambiguous and shifting moral line.    
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This section has focused on the possibilities for control in a commercialisation media 
environment but the chief strategy may be said to be encouraging non-political, non-
sensitive news to permeate the fiscally and administratively decentralised 
commercial media sphere. The lowering of ideological restrictions, along with the 
introduction of new technologies of electronic communication, discussed above, has 
increased the volume and flow of “spontaneous, unscripted information” (Baum, 
2008: 162) but, for the reasons outlined above, this has not resulted in the kind of 
polyphonic political journalism that was glimpsed, briefly, in the 1980s.  
Public Opinion ‘Guidance’ and ‘Channelling’  
There have been attempts to update this vision of a depoliticised newspaper market. 
Even through the 1990s, newspapers were tasked with some kind of political role 
(Chan, 2007). This is in evidence in the concept of ‘public opinion guidance’ (yulun 
daoxiang), a virtual buzzword under the leadership of Jiang-Zhu (Qian & Bandurski, 
2011: 56) and harking back to a Maoist vision of the media and media function25. In 
the Hu-Wen era, this concept was replaced by the notion of public opinion 
‘channelling’ (yulun yindao). This approach recognised that the Party had lost ground 
amid the rise of commercial media and the Internet, and that, in recognition of the 
new media landscape, would be better served proactively pushing its messages 
through the new channels open to it, rather than relying solely on what might be 
termed ‘old-fashioned’ methods of censorship and information control (ibid). 
Channelling was not intended to imply that control had been abandoned. Rather, 
journalists were encouraged to be active and speedy in their reporting but work must 
be carried out within boundaries. 
The term “guidance” was first introduced by Hu Jintao at the national ideology work 
conference in January 2008 (Qian, 2013) and was re-emphasised in June 2008 during 
a speech made at the People’s Daily editorial office. Some have argued that 2008 was 
a watershed moment in the realisation of the need for a new approach, principally 
around the Tibetan uprising of that March and the subsequent banning of foreign 
reporters from visiting the scene (Qian & Bandurski, 2011: 56). To borrow the 
language of public relations, this created significant reputational damage for China at 
                                                       
25 See Schell and Delury’s summary of Mao’s ideas on elite ‘guidance’ of common opinion, drawn from 
the 1942 Talks at the Yan’an Forum of Art  and Literature (2013: 225). 
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a moment, in the run up to the Beijing Olympic Games, when the country’s media 
managers were desperate to impress on the global stage. The relative transparency 
demonstrated the following year, during unrest in Xinjiang, was the response, and 
evidence of lessons learned. Some have seen this policy deepening under Xi’s post-
2013 leadership (Anderlini, 2013). 
Another key term frequently used in relation to the media is that of ‘supervision of 
public opinion’ (yulun jiandu), suitably ambiguous in the sense that it is not clear 
whether public opinion is supervised by the media – thus making it similar to public 
opinion guidance – or whether it is public opinion which itself supervises the work of 
government, a democratic notion which has, at times, been embraced by officials. 
The latter definition is closely related to the concept of ‘watchdog journalism’, a term 
which chimes with fourth-estate notions of Anglophone journalism (see page 108) 
and which has been used by some investigative journalists working within commercial 
media to justify their activities. However, such tactics have been damned within Party 
press editorialising for being motivated by commercial gain and their association with 
corrupt practices (Gu, 2014). Though indirect, such editorials may be read as a form 
of control.    
Commercial Newspapers: From Within or Without? 
The most enduring debate within scholarly circles engaged with Chinese media is 
around the extent to which the logic described above – market activities contained 
within authoritarian embrace – is “contradictory logic”. Put another way, is there a 
natural tension between Party demands and the pursuit of profit, between “the party 
line and the bottom line” (Zhao, 1998)? And, if so, is that tension likely to lead to an 
unpicking of Party control over the media. To a large extent, these mirror and 
prefigure the later debates around Internet usage, described in the following chapter. 
Lynch (1999), Wu (2000) and Yu (2013) see the media’s propaganda role as in decline 
due to commercialisation, while Akhavan-Majid (2004), Lee, He and Huang (2006), 
Zhao (2008) and Brady (2010) find the Party has been able to strengthen ideological 
control, not only in spite of commercialisation but because of commercialization.  
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To take the latter set of arguments first, Zhao rejects the notion that there is a simple 
“dual-track system” (Ke, 2010) in operation in China, neatly divided between the 
Party press and the commercial press. She points out that it is “party-state organs 
themselves [who] have spearheaded the process of commercialization, adopting and 
containing the market mechanisms within the existing structure” (Zhao, 2008: 79-80). 
An example of this may be seen right at the top of the newspaper hierarchy. The 
People’s Daily, the organ of the Central Committee of the CCP, is the Party paper par 
excellence; an eight-page daily carrying news which often assumes knowledge of 
arcane political debate and, thus, likely to be of interest to a limited audience. 
However, it operates a sister paper, The Global Times, which, while perhaps carrying 
the institutional imprimatur in its tendency to focus on ‘big’ stories of international 
scope, does so in a colloquial and emotive manner in an effort to appeal the mass-
market and advertisers. In other situations, a single newspaper may operate a twin-
track edition where the front page carries austere political news, while inner-sections 
comprise soft, commercial fare. 
Moreover, market mechanisms may not only be contained within the structure but 
may be actually exploited for the purposes of control. The 14th Party Congress in 1992 
made explicit provision for economic controls coming to replace purely political 
control in the cultural and arts sphere (Brady, 2010: 111). The Party regulates the 
space for commercial activities and, thus, by opening and closing profit-making 
avenues, can secure political obedience (Lee et al, 2006). All major ‘metro’ 
newspapers which emerged in the mid-1990s are, for example, subsidiaries of 
provincial or national party organs. While party organs are mandated to serve both 
urban and rural areas and are thus unattractive to advertisers, metro newspapers 
may reach the commercially lucrative mass-appeal market in core urban centres and 
because they are affiliated with central or provincial party organs and are thus above 
the political jurisdiction of municipal party authorities, they are able to write critical 
reports on municipal affairs. These papers, which operate as semi-autonomous 
business units of the traditional central and provincial party organs serve as a means 
for the Party to reach the affluent urban consumer strata. At the same time, they 
function as ‘cash cows’ that cross subsidise the traditional Party organs (Zhao, 2008) 
but retain political discipline because of their reliance on Party publications.  
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Zhao sees in this evidence of the state harnessing market forces to buttress both its 
financial and ideological clout. “…if the revolutionary and Maoist era CCP had only the 
traditional organs to reach both its rank-and-file officials and the masses, party-
controlled media commercialisation has now enabled the CCP to divide the task 
among two primary press segments: the traditional party organs, which serve as a 
means of intra-party communication between its leadership and its grassroots units, 
and the mass-appeal newspapers, which serve as a means by which the CCP 
reconstitutes and rearticulates the terms of its hegemony with the rising middle class” 
(Zhao, 2008: 158). 
However, beyond the broad bifurcation between Party and ‘mass appeal’ publications, 
elucidated above, two powerful niche markets may also be identified which have 
their roots in the marketization that followed Deng’s ‘Southern Tour’ (Nan Xun)26 
(Qian, 2014; Brady, 2010). One is the intellectually-oriented press – with Southern 
Weekend and its sister-paper within the Nanfang newspaper group, the Southern 
Metropolis Daily (SMD) being prominent examples – and the elite business press, an 
exemplar being the business magazine Caixin. These publications earned a reputation 
for a more outspoken, investigative and antagonistic form of journalism in China in 
the mid-1990s (Brady, 2010: 58) which has drawn substantial scholarly focus, 
particularly from those who have seen evidence of the power of the market to push 
back against the Party. In arguing for a ‘golden period’ for commercial media in the 
years 1995 to 2005, Shi (2014) specifically cites Nanfang group newspapers and Caixin 
as a site of independent public opinion generation. Qian (2014) suggests they 
represent market forces as seizing a share of power within the hitherto politically-
dominated media sphere. The outbreak of the SARS virus was a boon to these specific 
publications, with the SMD being particularly brave in defying restrictions and 
reporting on the outbreak in early 2003 (Zhao, 2008: 253).  Hu argues SARS prompted 
a period of growth in “market-oriented alternative journalism” (2014).  
                                                       
26 The ‘Southern Tour’ – sometimes known as the ‘Southern Progress’ – involved Deng Xiaoping, then a 
very elderly and frail man, paying a symbolic visit to several of the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) which 
had been established in the 1980s in southern China during the PRC’s first major experiment with free 
market economics. The encouragement it gave to advocates of market-based economic reform within 
the Party was transformative and ultimately led to the side-lining of ‘leftists’ at the Party elite. The 
Southern Progress is thus generally regarded as the moment China clearly struck out on its current 
path of economic liberalisation after a two-year period of ambivalence following the 1989 crackdown 
on student protests. 
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Scholars working within this research furrow have tended to analyse and emphasise 
the supposed two-way battle between professionally-minded media workers and 
Party propagandists, with control sought by Party overseers and resisted by 
journalists. Yu argues that the subsidies received by newspapers made them 
fundamentally “beholden” to the Party-state, but that commercialisation had eroded 
their subservience (2013). “As the economic base crumbles, the superstructure 
threatens to collapse”, leading to events such as the one in early 2013 when Southern 
Weekly journalists effectively went on strike in protest at overbearing censorship 
practices. Some have characterised the relationship between journalists and the state 
as a constant game of push and pull, with boundaries being forever challenged and 
tested (Shambaugh, 2007; Tong, 2008; Yu, 2011). , These studies have certainly 
established that some journalists and editors consciously resist Party controls and 
have exploited opportunities created by media commercialisation and increasingly 
remote political oversight.  
These strategies often have deep historical roots. The tradition of ‘opening a skylight’ 
(kai tianchuang) to protest censorship – leaving a section of the newspaper 
ostentatiously blank – has been used several times since the 1980s, most recently in 
2009 in Southern Weekend (Stockmann & Gallagher, 2011). Likewise, there is the 
“venerable Chinese tradition of chunqiu bifa, expressing critical opinions in subtle or 
indirect linguistic ways” (Yang, 2014), or more vividly known as “pointing at the 
mulberry and abusing the locust” (zhisang mahuai) (Schoenhals, 1992: 124). 
Discussion of an historic incident which has obvious contemporary resonances is one 
notable tactic. The 6am Morning News (Jinchen Liudian), a relatively minor Shandong 
newspaper, demonstrated the art in August 2012 when it printed a highly sensitive 
report on the outcome of the trial of Gu Kailai, wife of former-Politburo member, Bo 
Xilai. Though the newspaper dared not deviate from the strictly controlled court 
report, it did run an obviously allegorical report about a mouse trapped inside a beer 
can, immediately below the Gu Kailai story on the front page of the newspaper 
(Martinsen, 2012)27.   
                                                       
27 An even more iconic example of this is the classic 1961 play Hai Rui Dismissed From Office which 
damned Mao’s perseverance with the policies of the Great Leap Forward (Da Yue Jin) through the 
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Other resistance strategies have involved rushing stories into print – as was the case 
at the SMD in its reporting around Sun Zhigang28 in 2003 and in a pro-Hu Yaobang 
editorial printed in the World Economic Herald as student protestors gathered in 
Beijing in April 1989 (Wright, 1990: 126) – or playing with typography, as when the 
Shanghai-based Oriental Morning Post blazed a tabloid-style front page banner 
concerning the dismissal of Beijing mayor Liu Zhihua in 2006 before asking readers to 
turn to an inner page for more on the story where the official two-line Xinhua story 
was printed (Brady, 2010: 106).  
These examples certainly point to a level of dissatisfaction among parts of the 
commercial Chinese press around political control. However, it would be misleading 
to characterise the examples given above as commonplace in the Chinese press. Most 
reporters and editors follow most of the rules most of the time.  
Professionalisation  
Anticipating later discussions around protest and the Internet, debates around the 
Chinese press tend to identify two models, one a ‘strong state’ model in which 
tensions are comfortably contained, and the other a ‘resistance’ model where threats 
emanate up from the grassroots and pose a challenge to the elite. In terms of the 
media, where commercialisation is seen as the threat, some scholars have sought a 
way out of this bind by seeking new pastures for academic enquiry.  
Perhaps the dominant debate revolves around concepts of professional practice 
within the Chinese press. That is, to what extent are there universal standards of 
what it means to be a ‘professional’ journalist, and to what extent do Chinese 
journalists operate within a different paradigm of journalistic practice?  
Though the term is contested, there exist three fairly straightforward and 
uncontentious definitions of a ‘professional’: one, as someone who earns their living 
                                                                                                                                                             
vehicle of a Ming era court drama. An article responding to this perceived criticism was the spark for 
the launching of the Cultural Revolution, as discussed on page 38. 
28 Sun Zhigang was a university graduate from Hubei who died in 2003 while in police custody in 
Guangzhou. He had been arrested for failing to produce a local residents’ permit and ID card and was 
subsequently beaten to death in circumstances that have never been fully explained. The story of the 
case was investigated by the Southern Metropolis Daily and rushed into print, despite attempts locally 
to have the story quashed. The reporting is often cited as leading directly to national laws surrounding 
the detention of so-called ‘illegal residents’ to be annulled.  
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from an occupation; two, as someone who demonstrates mastery of the technical 
norms of an occupation; and, three, someone who is a member of an occupational 
group that enjoys high social status.  
Some have seen notions of professionalism as transformative in the Chinese context, 
allowing journalists to begin the pushback against the twin bulwarks of the market 
and elite politics and establish a ‘professional’ commercial media. In a 2005 study, 
Zhou “detected a convergence in professional values and a transformation towards 
professionalism, of which the internet is a key catalyst” (2005; 198). Similarly, Tong 
notes that adherence to ‘professional’ standards has become an “ideological weapon” 
for journalists of the Southern Metropolis Daily (2008).  
Others have problematized the entire notion of what it means to be a professional in 
the Chinese context. Pan and Lu cite professionalism as one of the four main 
journalistic discourses29 (2003). However, professionalism as an ideology is truncated 
and fragmented, they claim (ibid). “Chinese journalists appropriate diverse and often 
conflicting ideas of journalism to construct and ‘localize’ professionalism though ‘their 
improvised and situated practices’ in a rapidly transforming media system” (Pan and 
Lu, 2003). 
Yu points to what this means in practice. She argues that journalists “have learned to 
self-censor rather than risk letting any politically incorrect views or news pass the 
gate of mainstream media. [Their] gatekeeping… is a mix of professional ethics, 
political pressure and market imperative.  And agenda setting is no longer 
determined by the party state alone but negotiated among various socio-politico-
economic powers” (2011: 381). In other words, whereas in the ideals of British 
journalism, to be ‘professional’ is to put aside the pressures of business and politics, 
or perhaps even battle directly against them, in their pursuit of ‘news’, Chinese 
journalists integrate their professional ‘news sense’ for what a reader might find 
interesting, with the competing pressures of politics and business. This ability thus 
becomes a part of their professionalism. Zhou puts it as follows: 
                                                       
29 The others are the “party-press”, “Confucian intellectualism”, and the “market economy”  
52 
 
…after working for two bosses [the Party and the market] for such a long 
period, Chinese journalists have found their own way to balance between 
propaganda missions and professional pursuits in daily practices. In order 
to avoid conflicts between attitudes and behaviours, they have managed 
to internalize and integrate two streams of professional beliefs into one 
value system. This unexpected finding might have two implications. First, 
journalistic professionalism in China is not a revolution that modern values 
suddenly suppress orthodox values. Rather it is a slow process in which the 
pro- and anti-professionalism forces coexist and interact with each other 
for a long time. Second, Chinese journalists are not determined in the 
process of professionalism, but are always ready to make compromise” 
(2005: 196-197). 
While recognising the inescapability of political discussions, other scholars have tried 
to orient the discussion away from an explicit focus on Party control. De Burgh’s study 
into the attitudes of individual journalists foregrounds the cultural attitudes which 
also weigh in on ostensible professional practice in China. Journalists in China operate 
in a culture still touched by Confucian principles of social responsibilities and 
deference to established hierarchy, he argues. It is, therefore, this, rather than 
worries over political sensitivities or market concerns, that leads to the stated 
reluctance to ‘over-report’ bad news (De Burgh, 2003). Even so-called ‘Good Official’ 
Chinese journalists – those who may be minded to expose wrong-doing or highlight 
negative areas – “do not share the iconoclastic, outsider status of the western model, 
but are deeply bound up with the system and seek to project their righteousness 
from within” (ibid: 155). In other words, to be ‘professional’ in China may be to be 
restrained and subtle in the way one writes stories that impinge on a national debate. 
Hassid presents a typology of idealised professionals in China. These include 
traditional ‘throat and tongue’ (houshe) journalists, trusting in the Party and 
committed to its discipline, US-style professionals who cling to a belief in the truth at 
all costs, advocacy journalists who write consciously to influence elite opinion makers, 
and workaday journalists who regard the production of content purely as a means to 
earn a living (2011).  
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In summary, discussion around professionalism in the Chinese media can still tend to 
get dragged into a model where state is pitched in a two-way contest against society, 
as it was often in the early commercialisation debates. 
Summary 
As we have seen, the Chinese press is historically constituted and has a particularly 
important place in the history of the PRC, where it has been instrumental in triggering 
major political campaigns and exposing political divisions at various levels of the 
political hierarchy. The institutional changes of the 1980s have resulted in a highly 
diversified newspaper market which has a pronounced commercial underpinning. 
Indeed, certain parts of the Chinese newspaper market are, in some aspects of their 
coverage, scarcely less lurid than the British red-tops.  
Within academic debate, there are different opinions as to whether 
commercialisation has resulted in fundamental change in the Chinese press. Some of 
those who once argued that commercialisation would inevitably result in change have 
updated their views in the light of the apparent ability of the Party-State to manage 
the tension between commercial and political interests. Lynch (2010) seems to have 
rethought his earlier (1999) prediction on the effect of commercialisation on the 
Chinese press to bring it more in line with Zhao’s (2008) perspective. The conclusion 
is that commercialisation has not resulted in a commensurate break-down in Party 
control. On the contrary, the Party has proved highly adept at “…manag[ing] its 
interests, images and national consciousness in different guises” (Lee et al, 2006). As 
Stockmann and Gallagher have it, “marketization of the media can coexist with 
authoritarian political control over media content” (2011: 442). With the exception of 
a short period in the mid-to-late 1980s, the Party has shown little tendency to 







Chapter 3: Social Contention in China  
Introduction 
This thesis examines and evaluates the role of the Chinese press through the prism of 
social contention. This chapter moves the discussion on to an examination of a broad 
sweep of literature which swirls around the second of these two distinct fields. It 
begins by examining the rise in social contention in China and placing it in historic and 
cultural context. It continues with an examination of a platform which exhibits and, 
perhaps, partially explains the rise in contemporary social contention in China – the 
Internet. Taken together, these two sections paint a picture of an environment in 
which top-down political control is being challenged and eroded, though there are 
lengthy discussions on alternative perspectives which challenge the notion that these 
aspects represent a genuine threat to the Party-state. 
Protest in China  
Protest in Historical Context 
Far from the clichéd image of the Chinese as an enduringly resolute and stoic people, 
prepared to suffer fate’s varied blows for the sake of harmony and the ‘pleasure of 
heavenly agreement’ (tianlun zhile), “[n]o country boasts a more enduring or more 
colourful history of rebellion and revolution than China” (Perry, 2001). Though pre-
modern examples abound, one cannot help but be drawn to the 19th century 
cataclysms of the Taiping Rebellion (Taiping Tianguo Qiyi) – probably the bloodiest 
conflict in human history in absolute terms – the Dungan Revolt (Tongzhi Xinjiang 
Huibian) which followed, the turn-of-century Boxer Uprising (Yihetuan Qiyi) and Mao 
Zedong’s so-called Cultural Revolution (Wenhua Da Geming) when considering 
China’s propensity for mass unrest, co-ordinated to greater or lesser extents. The 
Xinhua Revolution of 1911 ended Qing rule and proved a precursor to what Hung calls 
a “century of revolutions” (2010: 201). That protest in China was, and remains, a 
subject of enduring relevance is made manifest by the fact that the ruling Communist 
Party of China was, itself, birthed in the widespread outrage following the May 4th 
protest movement (Wusi Yundong).  
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Such precedents perhaps explain why the fear of chaos (luan) is particularly acute in 
China (Dryzek et al, 2002: 50). In some ways, China’s fear of disorder is comparable to 
the American fear of the ‘Leviathan’ of big government. Though the former has never 
been formally woven into the nation’s political mission-statement, as it has in the 
latter, they both represent a core aspect of the respective nation’s social psychology 
and, concomitantly, a primary ingredient in the assumed recipe for happiness and 
prosperity.  
Despite this, there is clear evidence for a recent rise in social contention. China began 
to issue statistics on public disturbances, or so-called ‘mass incidents’ (qunzhong 
shijian) in 1993 when there were 8,700 events recorded nationally. This policy was 
disbanded in 2005 after a tenfold increase in just 12 years (Perry, 2010: 11). Tanner 
focuses in particular on the acceleration in incidents in the 1990s and claims that, 
during this decade, there was “not a single year during this period did unrest increase 
by less than 9 percent” (2004: 138).  He also notes the “clear trend toward larger and 
larger demonstrations, many involving hundreds, thousands or even tens of 
thousands of protestors” (2004: 141). 
There is no exhaustive typology of protest, but the following categories, identified by 
Perry and Seldon (2010), point to the kind of issues that lie behind these statistics. 
They cite: tax riots, labour strikes, inter-ethnic clashes, religious rebellion, election 
disputes, environmental protest, gender protest, pro-democracy and free speech 
protest. Yu (2009b) identifies another significant protest category, that of the ‘anger-
venting’ event, which draws on pent up local frustrations and is made in response to 
a specific event but which transcends the initial motivation in terms of the variety of 
people drawn into the protest and the lack of clarity of its purpose or targets.  
Given both the propensity for, and the fear of social contention in China, it is no 
wonder that numerous scholars have seen fit to investigate the history and 
significance of protest and rebellion. Surveying the literature, however, it’s possible 
to stake out at least two distinct analytical paradigms, each of which has generated 
sub-branches of investigation as time went on. 
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Democracy and Authoritarianism 
The most obvious question that has been asked of the phenomenon of protest in the 
modern era is the extent to which the demonstrable rise in social contention 
indicates improved prospects for democratization and an increased threat to 
authoritarianism. This paradigm imagines state-society relations to be in a state of 
flux, with the locus of change being one or other of the constituent actors; either 
signs of democratic social forces extending their scope of activity vis-à-vis the state, 
or the state being forced into a process of authoritarian adaptation in a bid to 
forestall change.  
The events of 1989 loom large within this paradigm. They appeared to indicate that 
the forces of democratisation were in the ascendency and those of authoritarianism 
in retreat (Mackinnon, 1994). Studies of these events, and their legacy, have tended 
to interrogate the motives and methods of protestors. Perry (2002), for example, 
points to the failures of the protestors to break free of traditional constraints, such as 
respectful remonstrance, their search for political patrons, and their stress of 
moralism30.  Others point to the classic conception of the ‘grand’ – albeit tacit – 
bargain between society and state which flowed from 1989. Under this, the state is 
said to have guaranteed improved living standards for the people who, in return, 
accept the Party retains political monopoly31. On the authoritarian side, others have 
focused on state repression in attempting to explain why the protests failed and tend 
to argue that it is the fear of what happened in 1989 which has prevented something 
similar happening again (Link, 2014). 
Bringing the debate up to date, there is some discernible variation within both sides 
of the democratic-authoritarian argument. In the first category, the ‘liberation’ strand, 
the focus is on citizen activities, and debates swirl around the extent to which 
increased contention indicates an emergent ‘civil society’ (Lagerkvist, 2012). Göbel 
and Ong (2013), similarly, suggest that social unrest should be seen as a form of 
                                                       
30 Perry tends to work more within the historical-cultural approach to protest in China, and argues that 
the failure of the 1989 protest movement was also down to historical factors such as the CCP’s 
enduring legitimacy, conferred by its revolutionary success in 1949; the vast and somewhat backward 
peasant population; and the ‘fetter[s]’ imposed by a conservative intellectual elite (2002: 310-311). 
31 For a classic expression of this argument, see Whyte, 2010. 
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political participation, one that signifies “the desire of an increasingly complex society 
to take part in the allocation of political and material values” (2010: 21). 
In the second category, the ‘adaptive authoritarian’ strand, commentators largely 
focus on the behaviours of the state in seeking to explain why fundamentals have not 
changed. Writings in this category still tend to be premised on assumptions of 
creeping democratization – the notion that the historical trend points towards 
greater openness and individual freedoms – but focus, instead, on how the CCP is 
adapting to this ostensible threat. Most suggest that the CCP is up to the task (Brady, 
2010; Tanner, 2004; Lorentzen, 2013) – perhaps reflecting the fact that, thanks to 
economic and military expansions, the Chinese state has rarely appeared stronger 
than it does today. However, some still argue that, in the face of the aforementioned 
pressures, the CCP sits on the brink of ruin and that authoritarian adaptation signals a 
futile raging against the dying of the Maoist light (Su et al, 2013).  
There is, however, relative consensus concerning the fact that increased contention 
does not neatly translate into a fully-fledged civil society and that, on the face of it at 
least, the Party-state is currently coping with an increasingly assertive citizenry. This 
then has forced scholars working within this paradigm to look for new questions. On 
the libertarian front, there is a pronounced interest in the issue of ‘rights’. Though 
‘civil society’ may not have yet emerged, to what extent are Chinese people seeking 
to articulate, define and defend so-called ‘rights’? On the authoritarian front, scholars 
increasingly wonder whether increased social contention might not be positively 
state-bolstering. In other words, is the CCP not only engaged in a rear-guard defence 
against an advancing populace, but perhaps also using these forces to strengthen 
itself? These two strands will be examined in the following two sub-sections.  
Rights Consciousness 
Western ideologies of Christianity, Marxism-Leninism and even nationalism have 
demonstrably provided some kind of foundation for disaffected Chinese to launch 
challenges to a variety of authoritarian states. Some scholars have sought to 
investigate the extent to which universal ‘human rights’ might be the latest form of 
this phenomenon.  
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A number of scholars (Li & O’Brien, 1996; Gallagher, 2005) have argued that there is, 
indeed, evidence of an emergent ‘rights consciousness’ (quanli yishi) within Chinese 
society. Li and O’Brien (1996) have discussed the notion of rights discourse in modern 
Chinese rural protest, though concede it is somewhat different to the universalist 
rights discourse espoused in the first set of amendments to the American constitution. 
They point to a growing rights consciousness, which inspires villagers to use 
theoretical rights to appeal to lofty ideals of justice, albeit within a framework 
circumscribed by the Party. Li and O’Brien point to a typology which divides villagers 
into policy-focused researching diaomin, tough and stubborn dingzhu, and compliant 
shunmin (1996). Though not representative of the whole, diaomin employ what might 
be termed an arch-rationalism where strategies maximise chances of success and 
minimise chances of repression in context of authoritarian rule.  
Hung (2010) has looked at contemporary wei quan (维权) movements, referring to 
the “various actions that ordinary people and social activists have employed to 
defend their legal rights or the rights of others” (Hung, 2010) emerging from the 
sense of bureaucratic responsiveness to appeals to rights ostensibly guaranteed 
under China’s current constitution. It would be an overstatement to say that these 
actions have coalesced into a ‘movement’. Indeed, issues range across a number of 
distinct fields, cultural, political, social and economic, and actors may be peasant 
farmers, activist journalists or pioneering lawyers, all of whom are likely to declare 
their ignorance of and isolation from other actors. Though sharing some similarities 
with the democracy movement of the 1980s, wei quan practitioners are usually at 
pains to declare their loyalty to China’s current political arrangements. Wei quan 
protests are usually issue-specific and make narrow appeals to theoretical protections 
while tacitly acknowledging the political legitimacy of its current ruling Party.  
Protest in authoritarian adaptation 
Being an organisation which arose out of a period of huge social contention, the 
relationship between the CCP and protest is complex. The Party learned from the very 
beginning how to co-opt and exploit antagonistic currents in society. After taking 
power, then, one should be careful to assume that protest is inherently state-
threatening. The CCP’s ultimate victory in 1949 has often been put down to its 
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success in mobilising the peasantry in rebellion and inculcating cross-regional class 
consciousness but as Bianco (1975) points out, 1949 did not represent a revolution 
from below. Rather, the “rural masses remain the first and foremost object of 
mobilisation and manipulation” (1975: 331).  
Bringing things into the modern era, the permitting of protest is seen by some as an 
exercise in surveillance, both of lower-level officials and social discontent. Allowing 
protest thus helps to “limit corruption and to bring discontented groups of citizens 
out into the open rather than driving them underground” (Lorentzen, 2013). Tarrow 
agrees: “China’s current leadership is well aware that high-profile coercion can 
exacerbate diplomatic tensions, boost public sympathy for protesters, and radicalize 
participants (Tarrow, 1998: 149)”.The solution, therefore, is to permit and control. 
More than this, protest may actually constitute a resource for the state as it sets 
about maintaining power and refining governance strategies. Lorentzen argues the 
increasing incidence of protest is, counter-intuitively, a sign of the health of the 
Chinese state. Iconic protests such as those which took place across the Greater Tibet 
region in the Spring of 2008 or in major Chinese cities in the Spring of 1989, 
demonstrate clearly that the state is more than capable of putting down protest if it 
chooses to, but, more often than not, opts for a different approach. Protest, he 
argues, has an informational quality; in China’s post-totalitarian society, 
marketisation and decentralisation have disrupted traditional information flows. 
Protest, thus, allows various tiers of government to identify communities where 
discontent is rife and make interventions. Protest can thus become a pseudo-
bureaucratic mechanism where, in lieu of the presence of robust regal structures and 
systems of regulatory oversight, corruption is kept in check. By such means, protest 
may have salubrious effects on local justice and reinforce the overall political 
structure.  
O’Brien argues that permissiveness towards dissent is indeed a ‘high-wire 
legitimation strategy’ (2009: 27) which demonstrates state responsiveness and 
reflects a belief that issues can be resolved. Rather than reflecting a systemic crisis 
within Chinese governance, protest actually points to there being a groundswell of 
trust in the system, particularly at the national level (Göbel & Ong, 2012; Trevaskes, 
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2012). Research at the grassroots level (Li & O’Brien, 1996; Guo, 2001; Cai, 2010) 
suggests this is so.  
Göbel and Ong suggest that the events of 2008 – with riots in Tibetan regions, and 
security management around the Beijing Olympic Games, as well as manifold other 
social protest events – marked a turning point in the state’s handling of large groups. 
“The police have shifted their strategy from quelling demonstrations with force to a 
permissive strategy of ‘containment and management’ (2012: 13). In this frame, the 
apparent increase in incidence of protest is less about rights consciousness, an 
emergence of civil society, or even about an increase in grievances, but rather 
represents an adaptive political strategy (Lorentzen, 2013: 24). 
Using a methodology similar to Lorentzen’s, Cai (2012) examines the issue largely 
from the point of view of the Party-state and is concerned to test the variables which 
both explain the presence of protest and its various outcomes. He suggests that 
collective resistance to combat illegality or malfeasance is expressed in three ways: 
through law, media representations, and petitions. He argues street action is likely 
only when these strategies have failed. The effectiveness of street action is 
determined by three further factors: media coverage, casualties and the number of 
participants. These factors influence how much pressure is applied to officials local to 
the protest site. This pressure, in turn, derives from the threat of social disorder from 
below, or from angry officials higher up the political food-chain.  
Unlike Lorentzen, Cai does attempt to examine both protestor strategies and 
government response, albeit within a rigid positivist frame, but ultimately agrees that 
power lies entirely with the Party-state, and that opportunities for political 
participation in China derives from the “opportunities produced by central-local 
divide” (2010).  
Cai acknowledges the fractures in the governance structure which may allow for 
democratic forces to push back on authoritarian tendencies. However, too many 
scholars working within this framework offer a picture of Machiavellian governance 
perfection, in which every positive is the result of strategic brilliance, and every 
negative is able to be spun into a positive. Such a perspective clashes starkly with the 
impression one forms in China, where disorganisation and ham-fisted compromises 
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appear the order of the day. In seeking to redress the ‘political change’ bias 
(Hildebrandt, 2014) inherent in the democratic, libertarian strand of what I have 
called the Democratic-Authoritarian paradigm, Lorentzen and others assume too 
much of the counter-argument and end up exhibiting what may be termed a ‘political 
stasis bias’ – endless explanations of why everything is destined to remain the same. 
Tanner (2004) and Göbel and Ong (2012) encounter a similar problem by clinging to a 
simplistic conception of the authoritarian state – one that is preternaturally sage and 
strategic. Despite each conducting a comprehensive analysis of trends in modern 
Chinese protest, they ultimately argue for an ingeniously protean and adaptable 
Party-state which is just too smart to be outwitted. Göbel and Ong do point out that 
“local government’s response to social unrest is subject to local variations and 
generally lacks co-ordination by the central government” (2012: p54), but this 
concession only bolsters the sense that, at the national level, the scheming is 
brilliantly strategic32.  
There are other ways of viewing the issue of protest in China, as the following section 
demonstrates. These focus on historical and cultural continuities which cannot easily 
be accommodated in the liberal-authoritarian explanations.   
The Historical-Cultural Approach 
The previously discussed paradigm asks questions around the relationship between 
the Chinese state and Chinese society and supposes change, of some sort, within one 
or other of the constituent actors – democratic change from below in an extension of 
the scope of social action, or governmental change from above as part of a process of 
authoritarian adaptation. Other scholars, however, have avoided the transitological 
trap, alluded to in the previous chapter, by examining protest in terms of China’s 
particular historical and cultural contingencies. This may be seen as a socio-
psychological approach to the study of protest which links behaviour to cultural traits 
which are historically embedded. Such a tradition, by definition, looks for 
                                                       
32 This attitude recalls the confusion over the oft-cited words of former China premier, Zhou Enlai who, 
in reply to a question by Kissinger about the effects of the French Revolution, was said to have replied 
that it was “too early to tell”, despite almost 200 years having elapsed. Such a view played well into 
popular conceptions of Chinese as highly strategic and deeply philosophical long-term thinkers. It was 
many years before it became clear that Zhou had misunderstood the question, and was actually 
speaking about the 1968 Paris protests. 
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consistencies between past protest forms and those of the modern era, and for 
similarities in governance strategies.  
One of the most important organising principles in this work is, as Chen (2011) and 
Hung (2011) point out, the idea that most protest in China is local – something as true 
today as it was in the imperial past – and that attempts to see protest in terms of the 
existential threat they pose to the regime miss the point. It should be remembered 
that even the most serious and sustained protest movement of the post-revolution 
era in the PRC – the 1989 student protests – made no concerted attempt to argue for 
‘regime change’.  
Social management 
Those seeking to understand social contention within the Democratic-Authoritarian 
paradigm, discussed above, have tended to take the tenets of Marxism-Leninism at 
their word. That is, they accept as unproblematic the claim by the ruling communist 
party that it speaks for, and on behalf of, the ‘masses’, and, thus, sees existential 
threat when signs of rupture emerge within the imagined homogenous mass of the 
people, imagining it to be anti-Party by its nature (Tanner, 2004: 143).   
However, in a rebuke to those who see the runes of ruin in rising social contention, 
Perry argues that, in fact, traditional Chinese political theory recognizes the 
legitimacy of revolt. Indeed, “[t]he successful management of disturbances was the 
sine qua non of long-lived dynasties” (2010: 27).  
The foundation stone of this culturally-constituted political philosophy is the so-called 
‘Mandate of Heaven’. Under this Mencian conception of political legitimacy with its 
roots in the Shang dynasty (second millennium BC), the ruler of the nation was 
blessed with celestial favour by the very fact of his occupation of the seat of power 
(McGregor, 2010). However, this favour could not be relied on implicitly. If an 
aspirant, for example, was able to wrest control of the seat of power by force, he 
would, by the very fact of his victory, gain moral sanction for his rule.  
In one way, this may be seen as a fatalistic philosophy – in vernacular terms, ‘you get 
what you deserve, and you deserve what you get’. From another perspective, it 
provided a mechanism for the transfer of power which could not be said to exist in, 
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for example, medieval England where the king exercised a ‘divine right’, with any 
attempt to usurp this rule portrayed as an affront to Heaven. In this sense, the 
imperial Chinese system was philosophically ‘open’. And should bidders for kingship 
exist, they were most obviously able to make their pitch for power through popular 
rebellion. 
Protest and the countryside 
Such popular rebellion, historically, would have been seen as emanating from the 
countryside. In an age where so much discussion of China is saturated in the 
discourse of development – GDP growth, urbanisation, technology – and where so 
much journalistic description and photographic imaging foregrounds the seemingly-
ubiquitous symbols of modernity, it is a challenge to remember that China has 
historically been, and perhaps remains today, an agrarian society. Statistics produced 
in 2013 suggested that, for the first time, there were more people living in cities than 
in the countryside. Leaving aside the problematic definitions – China is a country 
where it is common to see farmers tilling fields beneath newly-built flyovers – it is fair 
to say that, even now, China is, at best, pivoted evenly between the city and country. 
Fei has argued that, industrialisation notwithstanding, China is destined to forever 
remain a “historically-constituted agrarian society” organised, as it is, around 
ritualised social relationships which have their roots in the village milieu (1992). It is 
not surprising, then, that much academic work on social contention in China places its 
emphasis on the relationship between the peasantry33 and the governing classes.  
Perry argues that the most enduring facet of protest in the Chinese context is what 
she calls “moral economy” appeals (2008a: 39). “For over two millennia, Chinese 
political thought, policy, and protest have assigned central priority to the attainment 
of socioeconomic security” (Perry, 2008a: 37). In such a conception, the state gains 
legitimacy and retains legitimacy by guaranteeing the majority peasant class the 
means and opportunity to feed themselves, what Perry calls “subsistence rights”.  
Hung’s extended discussion of peasant protest during the Qing-era (2011) deploys the 
concept of modernism to suggests how this conception of economic contention may 
                                                       
33 Though venerated in Maoist ideology, ‘peasant’ (nongmin) has become as loaded a term in the 
modern Chinese context as it in post-industrial Europe where it has explicitly negative connotations 
and is colloquially used as a term of derision. 
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have developed. Modernism, he suggests, is defined as a move away from the 
parochial and traditional towards the universal and rational (2011). Though the 
defence of subsistence rights was, and remains, at the heart of much peasant protest, 
he argues that in the ‘traditional’, pre-modern conception of the state, Chinese 
peasants were likely to protest the state’s impositions at the local level, where levies 
may threaten a community’s ability to feed itself. In other words, peasant protest was 
primarily reactive to the state.  As the power of the state grew in the 17th and 18th 
centuries, protestors more frequently made pro-active claims on the state and sought 
state support in pursuit of economic claims.  
Hung argues that protest under the Qing was, essentially, cyclical in nature and 
protest tactics by peasant actors depended on changes to the political economy. 
Bluntly, when the state was strong, protestors tended to engage with the state 
structure presented to them; when it appeared weak, they tended to engage in 
strategies of resistance (2011). Thus modernity is not the reason peasant protestors 
engaged in collective action – there was no new-found, universalist sense of 
entitlement amongst peasants. Rather, there was a growing awareness of how best 
to engage or repel the state given the particular historic circumstances. 
Bianco (1975, 2001) and others have examined the role of the peasantry in the rise of 
the CCP and the revolution of 1949. Interest in peasant contention faded during the 
Mao era, when the focus within protest writings was on elite politics and ideology. 
However, the period of reform and opening up sparked a renewed interest in peasant 
contention.  
The years since 1980 have seen the countryside “[seethe] with tax riots and land 
disputes” (Perry, 2010: 21). Bernstein and Lu examine both the policies which 
antagonised peasants and perpetuated the “long festering crisis in the relations 
between peasants and the local state” (2000: 1). They also look to explain how these 
very same policies mitigate against collective action and suggest grassroots collective 
action should be separated from ideology – be it a class-based Maoism, Dengist 
developmentalism, or democratic transitology – and seen rather in terms of specific 
local interests. These were very often organised around subsistence issues, and in 
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which peasants pursue specific strategies which protest through close engagement 
with the state. 
Perry (2010) builds on this work and discusses the contention caused in the 
countryside by the agricultural tax. The harsh, military response to the student 
demonstrations in 1989 led outside commentators to assume that potential 
protesters would defer from taking direct action. In fact, rural China was a hornet’s 
nest of contention, Perry argues. “[There were] frequent report of beatings, property 
destruction, arson, and other violence targeting local cadres; instances of peasants 
killing cadres (and sometimes being hailed as heroes by their fellow villagers for doing 
so) were openly reported in the Chinese press” (2010: 20). Perry claims that the focus 
of rural contention moved from agricultural tax to land disputes after 2006 when 
central government abolished national agricultural tax. Again, the emphasis is on 
localism and state engagement. 
Urban and Intellectual Protest 
Noting the peculiar and culturally-specific qualities of peasant rebellion, scholars have 
tended to view urban protest within a completely different frame. One may further 
sub-divide by studies of urban working class protest, and studies of (overwhelmingly 
urban) intellectual contention. 
Perry (2001, 2008a) has examined 20th century urban labour strikes. The widespread 
strikes in Shanghai in 1925 closed 100 factories and linked up various different 
sections of municipal society. Furthermore, “…the founding of the People’s Republic 
certainly did not spell the end of labour unrest. In fact, every decade has brought a 
new round of widespread strikes” (2002: 319), from actions inspired by Mao’s so-
called ‘Hundred Flowers’ campaign in Shanghai in 1957 to those bound up with the 
Cultural Revolution in 1967. However, pre-1949, protest was occasionally 
characterised by trans-regional, trans-class, institutionally overlapping elements, as in 
Shanghai in 1925. However, while “frequent popular action – sometimes going 
beyond the confines of state-directed limits – was a distinctive feature of Mao’s China” 
(2008: 209), deliberate strategies of fragmentation ensured that trans-class and trans-
regional protest were closed down under Maoist rule.  
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Another important form of urban protest is intellectual contention. There was huge 
intellectual ferment in the latter decades of the 19th century as the Qing elite 
grappled with internal shocks and imperial incursions and sought strength through 
reform (Schell & Delury, 2013). However, one may argue these were primarily elite 
intellectual currents in which the vast majority Chinese had no means of participation. 
The two revolutions in 1911 and 1912, which engineered both the downfall of the 
Qing and ushered in the ill-fated early attempt at Republicanism, as well as the May 
4th Movement, were similarly elite in nature and few would argue they represent a 
genuine revolution from below. Perry has argued that, while being highly active and 
important in policy formation, the intelligentsia has “tended to identify closely with 
the regime in power” (2002: 312). “An alienated academy did not emerge in China 
until the Twentieth Century under foreign tutelage” and perished after a “short-lived 
enlightenment” after the May 4th movement (ibid), she argues.  
Protest repertoires 
Many of the modern scholars working within the historical-cultural paradigm of 
Chinese protest have placed a particular emphasis on the way protest is enacted or 
performed. The deeply hierarchical conception of the state has resulted in the 
development of what Hung has called ‘repertoires’ (2011) of protest which have 
identifiable characteristics and draw from a cultural reservoir which incorporates 
many ‘traditional’ elements. These include a respect for hierarchy, a determination to 
acknowledge subservience, a tendency to “individualis[e] the source of the injustice 
to particular officials together with an actual or symbolic appeal to higher authorities” 
(Hung, 2010). Wasserstrom (1991) suggests the 1989 demonstrations, as well as the 
earlier student protests in Shanghai in 1986-7, have all exhibited some or all of these 
elements. 
Perry describes it in the following way: 
China differs from many other countries in that its dominant modes of 
unrest have for centuries taken the form of highly scripted protest 
repertoires intended not only to register indignation, but also to signal an 
interest in negotiation with an authoritarian state that takes such 
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deferential expressions of popular discontent extremely seriously (2010: 
26) 
Reworking the idea of ‘rights consciousness’ discussed in the previous sub-section, 
Perry (2010) and Yu (2009b) both argue that Chinese have instead a profound ‘rules 
consciousness’ (guize yishi) which strongly circumscribes the limits to contention and 
which is psychologically internalized by the majority of citizens. 
However, connecting somewhat with the ‘rights consciousness’ discussion above, 
Hung acknowledges that the coming of Western ideas in 19th century added ideas 
such as rights-based protest, the rule of law ideology, and the possibility of new 
institutional mechanisms, but that these enriched rather than replaced the traditional 
forms of protest in China (2010).  
Despite this, both Hung and Perry detect strong continuity between pre-20th century 
and modern protest in terms of the tendency for protesters to display filial loyalty 
towards a paternalist political centre and limit the source of their contention to 
individual local officials (Hung, 2010: 201; Perry, 2008b). Wasserstrom suggests that 
student movements, in particular, depend on the “[a]bility to usurp, appropriate, and 
adapt official modes of communication and ceremonial forms” (1991: 325-6). Chen, 
similarly, argues that modern protest represents a “bargaining process” (2009) with 
authorities – a term also used by Tanner (2004: 151) – and that protestors improve 
their position by engaging in a set of familiar, performative acts which engage higher-
level officials or the wider public34. 
                                                       
34 In terms of the expression of protest, a distinction needs to be drawn between visible street protest 
and bureaucratic petitioning. One of the most enduring forms of the latter category is the so-called 
‘Xinfang’ system, sometimes referred to as the ‘Shangfang’ system. In common with much street 
protest, Xinfang protestors seek to trigger the discretionary involvement of political actors by going 
outside the legal channels of state. Literally meaning ‘letters and visits’, Xinfang refers to the methods 
used to draw higher-level authorities into a local dispute. The letter writing is self-explanatory. The 
‘visit’ refers to the habit of making a personal trip to the regional or even national seat of power to call 
for action. Though local governments may go to extraordinary lengths to prevent contact between 
citizens within their own jurisdiction and higher authorities – the 2012 case of rights activist Chen 
Guangcheng is an excellent example – scholars such as Chen (2009) argue that the system is an integral 
part of the feedback mechanism for high-level government, which welcomes information for the 
purposes of improved surveillance and better governance. There are Xinfang bureau (Xinfang Ju) at 
most tiers of government and a ‘State Bureau for Letters and Calls’ (Guojia Xinfang Ju) in Beijing. As 
Minzner points out, the Xinfang system sits uneasily with official legal institutions. While these have 
the veneer of independence, the Xinfang system derives its legitimacy and efficacy from the power of 
the CCP and individual officials (Minzer, 2006: 105).  Estimates suggest there are almost twice as many 
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Protest and the media 
Protest and the Chinese media 
In most discussion of protest in China, the media is largely absent, hence the 
importance of this project. However, there are a few exceptions which were found in 
the literature.  
Engaging the government and the wider public necessarily involves media strategies 
and Cai (2010) is one who identifies the importance of the media in social protest. 
However, he does so principally in terms of identifying it as a binary variable which 
may indicate other, more ostensibly important, outputs. In other words, if one has 
media coverage, one thing may happen; if one doesn’t have media coverage, 
something else is likely. Ansfield (2012) and Fewsmith (2008) lean heavily on media 
coverage of protest to examine the nature of the protest itself, but do place the 
media coverage itself at the forefront of the analytical frame. Fewsmith argues that 
the presence of media coverage in the case of the Weng’an riot in July 2008 suggests 
a new relaxing of attitudes to media coverage of similar social events, something this 
thesis pursues.  
Göbel and Ong (2012) draw a different conclusion and suggest the greater reporting 
of incidents of social unrest during the 2000s was caused by commercial publications 
vying for readership in a competitive marketplace, and point towards emergent 
Internet communication technologies, principally blogging and microblogging, as an 
important source for mainstream journalists which limit what propaganda authorities 
are able to control. 
Lee (2010) is one of the few to actually examine the media output arising from a 
protest event – the Dingzhou protest in the northern province of Hebei in 2005 – but 
her discussion is extremely brief. Though Zheng (2011) does not examine media 
coverage of social protest in a systematic way, she makes an argument around the 
widespread use of the term ‘mass incidents’, both inside and outside China. She 
claims the discursive agglomeration of what are multifarious issues and problems 
under the term “mass incidents” only serves to strengthen the Party-state. Describing, 
                                                                                                                                                             
lobbying attempts made through the Xinfang system as there are formal legal complaints (Minzer, 
2006: 106) but that only 0.2% of complainants succeed in having their issues addressed. 
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for example, ‘rights movements’, ‘anger venting incidents’, or ‘expression of public 
interest’, under the same banner is problematic, she argues.  
One of the most important trends in the scholarship of protest in China is the focus 
on the extent to which Internet and telecoms technologies are involved in both 
fomenting protest and spreading information about protest. The Internet will be 
treated more fully in the next section. Hung (2013) uses a case study of the Xiamen 
PX protest – to be discussed later in this thesis – to explain how “individualistic 
participatory media” made by amateurs effectively challenges “official” media 
coverage. She argues that a new style of citizen activism, enabled by new information 
communication technologies (ICTs), is holding power to account, and is expanding 
scope for public debate. ICTs lead to more distributed power, she argues, and have 
fostered an increased sense of civic engagement. However, predictably, she finds 
strong push back from the state. Hung (2010), too, examines the Internet in her 
discussion of modern wei-quan movements, suggesting that Internet platforms offer 
protestors greater scope to make claims on the state.  
Working within the ‘adaptive authoritarian’ framework, Hassid (2012) argues that 
mainstream media coverage may intersect with online protest events to provide a 
social safety valve for issues of potential political sensitivity. This works best, he 
argues, when mainstream media sets and steers the news agenda. In such instances, 
Internet debate may allow emotion to dissipate but is neutered, in terms of its 
political threat, thanks to the ‘guidance of public opinion’ at the level of mainstream 
media – a concept which will be returned to in the press section of this chapter. 
Though these ideas are critical in guiding this research project, Hassid’s study makes 
online protest its focus, with the mainstream media drawn in only as a dependent 
variable. 
Protest and the Anglophone media 
Though the mediation of protest has not been studied meaningfully in the mainland 
Chinese context, there is a substantial body of literature on the subject in Anglophone 
circles (Gitlin, 1980; Chan & Lee, 1984; McLeod & Hertog, 1998). The assumptions at 
the heart of these studies chime with the theoretical framework used in this thesis 
(see Chapter 4). They are threefold: one, that mainstream media has considerable 
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power to set agendas and confer legitimacy; two, that media representations, or 
‘frames’, are critical in influencing how the public understands protestor claims and, 
therefore, whether those claims should be supported; and, three – logically flowing 
from these assumptions – that protestors must, to some extent, rely on mainstream 
media to reach those political actors who have the power to effect the change 
demanded. Contradicting liberal assumptions of media as a neutral public sphere 
‘resource’35, scholars working within the Anglophone context have consistently found 
that media coverage serves to undermine protest movements.  
The seminal work in this canon is Gitlin’s study (1980) of the experiences of Students 
for a Democratic Society (SDS). Gitlin explores how the mainstream media’s 1965 
‘discovery’ of the SDS – an anti-Vietnam War, free speech movement – was at once a 
breakthrough and a disaster for the group. It went from being an association which 
worked almost exclusively through interpersonal interactions, to one which engaged, 
with varying degrees of reluctance, with organisations like CBS and the New York 
Times – the twin empirical foci of Gitlin’s analysis – in an attempt to control how it 
was portrayed to mass audiences. SDS’s appearances in national media outlets did 
indeed lend the organisation new power to proliferate its ideas but ultimately 
exerted deleterious effects. The “making and the unmaking” (Gitlin, 1980) of the SDS 
was complex but at the heart of the process was the organisation’s inability to control 
its mass media representation and overcome the media ‘codes’ that required 
celebrity, spectacle and drama.  
Building on this work, Chan and Lee identify the existence of a ‘protest paradigm’ 
(1984). This refers to the tendency of media organisations to follow a set routine in 
covering protest events, one which works to trivialise, marginalise and undermine the 
protest action by manipulating how the protest is presented through narrative 
structures, or ‘frames’ (Harlow & Johnson, 2011). Among the elements identified are: 
a focus on the violent and disruptive aspects of protesters’ behaviour; the use of a 
crime news discourse to describe protestors’ actions; a tendency to emphasise 
protestors’ strange or deviant appearances; asserting the ineffectiveness of a protest 
action; a prioritisation of theatrical elements over substantive issues; soliciting quotes 
                                                       
35 For more on the concept of the public sphere, see page 80. 
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from ‘members of the public’ who condemn protest action; and an over-reliance on 
elite government sources in narrating, explaining or condemning protest actions 
(McLeod & Hertog, 1998). These specific textual techniques are the result of three 
methods of control at the level of news production: newsroom management, 
routinization, and unchallenged journalistic norms (Lee, 2014). The cumulative effect 
is to obfuscate the issues which underlie protest, and to delegitimise protesters by 
portraying their actions as deviant, threatening or impotent.  
Such views, generally expounded by theorists from a critical tradition36, posit 
mainstream media as an agent of social control, a modern equivalent to the medieval 
church, or a supportive sibling to society’s legal and educational frameworks. Because 
media is embedded within the larger political-economic structures of society, it tends 
to work to reinforce existing norms and uphold dominant institutions. There is thus 
some overlap with this study of the press in the Chinese context, where to ascribe 
such a functionalist role to media37 does not require a ‘critical’ theoretical framework 
but only an acceptance of Chinese media’s self-proclaimed propaganda model, 
discussed earlier in this chapter.  
Older studies have been updated in light of technological and social developments to 
recognise that there is now a wider diversity of representations of protest and a 
greater complexity in approach by mainstream media organisations (Cottle & Lester, 
2011; Lee, 2014). Part of the explanation is that protest has become increasingly 
normalised within Anglophone societies (Meyer & Tarrow, 1998). More groups than 
ever before are engaged in activism of various kinds on a wide range of issues, 
leading to a “cacophonous field of contemporary protests” (Cottle, 2008: 857). This 
has made the mainstream media response less predictable than it once was.  
Internet platforms, in particular, have appeared to provide activists and protestors 
with tools to circumvent traditional media gatekeeping, control messages and 
independently construct networks, and audiences – a process termed ‘organic reach’ 
within the sphere of digital marketing (Campbell, 2015). Indeed, the so-called ‘Arab 
Spring’ social movements of 2011 were widely, and probably erroneously, attributed 
                                                       
36 The author refers to the term ‘critical’ in the neo-Marxist sense, as in ‘critical theory’. 
37 For more on press functionalism, see page 107. 
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to the democratising influence of platforms such as Facebook and Twitter. They 
prompted an excited response in some scholarly quarters, with the suggestion being 
that the protest paradigm may have been ‘overthrown’ (Harlow & Johnson, 2011). 
However, such techno-utopianism should be tempered by contemporary 
understandings around the non-neutrality of Internet platforms such as Facebook and 
Twitter. This is to say, power has not moved away from mainstream ‘legacy’ media 
companies and towards the people. Rather, a different set of media companies have 
seized gatekeeping power. These companies, driven by the need to produce profit, 
retain the means and the motivation to deny individuals, companies or activists the 
‘organic reach’ they desire, especially when user activities conflict with their own 
goals (Campbell, 2015). Though these goals are more likely to be commercial than 
political, they may be seen as operating within the same wider political-economic 
structure that has been alluded to already in this section.   
Summary 
To return to the subject of protest in the Chinese context, we have seen that social 
upheaval does not, in and of itself, imply an existential threat to central leadership. 
Within Chinese political history, protest has long been locally constituted. Moreover, 
each protest genre – be it nationalist protest, tax protest, religious protest, ethnic 
protest, class protest – has specific historic resonance which may make one particular 
protest more, or less, sensitive than another (Perry, 2001). However, the 
representation of protests is crucial in assessing their overall potential threat and 
benefit. Though protest is increasing in the current era of social and economic 
transformation, it remains a sensitive subject as the legitimacy of the central 
authority’s legitimacy is very much staked on ensuring economic development for all 
and internal harmony during a period of enormous social flux. Managing this process 
involves China’s propaganda system, as well as close attention to the work of 
mainstream media and debate on online social media. However, hitherto, and unlike 
in the Anglophone media realm, there has not been any concerted effort to examine 




The Chinese Internet  
Introduction 
The precise role of the World Wide Web – or ‘Internet’ – in the myriad social, 
economic and political transformations of the last 20 years is a topic that has inspired 
much academic debate and contention. What is uncontentious is that the Internet 
has changed many of the methods of social and economic interactions, with the 
lingering possibility that it may also have changed, more profoundly, the nature of 
those interactions.  
In China, the arrival of this epoch-defining technology has coincided with a broader 
historic transformation that may be characterised as a move away from a closed, 
centrally-planned socio-political system towards an increasingly open and devolved 
socio-political system. Tim Berners-Lee ‘invented’ the Internet in late 1990, just over a 
year before Deng Xiaoping’s ‘Southern Tour’ in early 199238. These sparks of 
inspiration occurred in absolute isolation of one another, but their respective impacts 
on the PRC have unfurled in parallel. Today, these two stories are very obviously 
intertwined, with the Internet a crucial element – albeit one of many – in the broader 
process of economic, social and political change in modern China. 
One sphere where this is particularly obvious is media and communications. In the 
same way that many liberal political theorists assumed – so-far erroneously – that the 
onset of free-market economics would necessarily drive fundamental political reform 
in China, it was widely assumed that the Internet would bring China’s historic system 
of information control crashing down. From the perspective of the mid-1990s, it was 
inconceivable that there could be a fully ‘wired’ China in which the Communist Party 
comfortably wielded power; in the oft-cited words of former US President Bill Clinton, 
censoring the Internet was like trying to “nail Jell-O39 to the wall”. However, the 
ostensible pathway from ‘repression’ to ‘freedom’ never revealed itself and the CCP 
has seemingly proved adept at integrating these two exemplars of US-Anglo 
innovation – consumer capitalism and the Internet – within a Sino-Soviet political 
                                                       
38 See footnote on page 47. 




system. Nearly 20 years on from the first China ISP registration in 1996, the CCP 
remains in power and the internet remains a well-regulated sphere. 
However, public debate in China has been transformed over the last 20 years, with 
the Internet an obvious component in this change. “The participatory and interactive 
qualities of the Internet, its less easily controlled nature…along with the state’s 
deliberate strategy of allowing more leeway in online communication, have enabled 
the Internet public to significantly broaden the terms of political discourse in China” 
(Zhao, 2012: 160). The specific online vehicles for this transformation have changed 
over the years, beginning with personal websites and evolving through Bulletin 
Boards, blogs, microblogs, to highly social text and voice message platforms, Weixin40 
being the most notable current example. The discourse which has flowed through 
these channels includes issues of social contention but, importantly for the purposes 
of the current discussion, one must assert that internet contention does not replace 
street protest, but rather complements it (Yang, 2009).  
The Chinese Web in Historical Context 
From academic beginnings in the mid-1990s, the Internet was identified by central 
planners as a vehicle for the ‘informationisation’ of Chinese society and thus a 
potential driver of economic growth (Hu, 2011). There appears to have been early 
indications that central leadership recognised the Internet’s potential political threat 
as well as its economic potential. Central government demonstrated its willingness to 
monitor online discussion as early as 1996, when forums expressing overly 
nationalistic sentiments were taken down during a dispute over the Japanese-
administered Senkkaku Islands41. There was similar intervention when nationalist 
sentiment flared again in 1998 over the killing of ethnic Chinese in Indonesia and in 
1999 with the ‘accidental’ bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade (Bishop, 
2014). 
                                                       
40 Weixin is known as WeChat in English. 
41 These islands are known as the Diaoyu Dao in Mandarin Chinese. The latest furore over the islands 
flared in September 2012 after the islands were essentially nationalised. At the time of writing, 
tensions remain high, with both China and Japan routinely sending jet aircraft and sea vessels to patrol 
islands which both sides contend are rightly theirs.  
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Given the obvious potential for disruption to the communications landscape, central 
authorities were keen to remain in ultimate control of the development of web 
infrastructure. As with a raft of other industrial sectors deemed to be ‘core’ to 
Chinese national interests, the CCP kept out Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from the 
telecom infrastructure (Wu, 2010; Zhao, 2008). The same rule applies to media 
companies but, despite Internet firms being increasingly engaged in media practices, 
the major Chinese companies which emerged in the late 1990s and early 2000s 
invariably had a substantial element of foreign involvement. Sina, for example, began 
life as Sinanet.com, a Californian website company and only took off after merging 
with Taiwanese company, Stone Rich Sight (SRS) Information Technology. Sohu, 
likewise, was launched with US venture capital (Bishop, 2014; Clark, 2014).  
These ostensibly ‘domestic’ Chinese companies – Sohu, Sina, and Netease foremost 
amongst them – have come to dominate the Chinese web and have been 
instrumental in leading technological innovation. Fierce market-driven competition 
exists between privately-financed domestic industries, but the competitive fight 
unfolds within boundaries determined by the Party and with profits dependent on 
the acquiescence of national politicians who are able to give, or withdraw, licences. 
It’s a remote, proxy form of control which is not entirely water-tight but which has, 
hitherto, worked very successfully.  
There is now more than a decade of evidence proving the Chinese leadership’s 
commitment to technological openness. Though in the Party-state’s opaque 
patchwork of ministries and competing interests (MacKinnon, 2010) there may be 
claims on control, there seems little doubt that when a new technology comes into 
being, it will be embraced in China. Indeed, there has been a drive to put Chinese 
organisations at the vanguard of technological innovation. The 12th Five-Year Plan 
(2011-15) has put stress on major national programs to promote industrial innovation 
in areas, such as China Next Generation Internet, network of things, and broadband 
wireless Internet (Hu, 2011). Where the Internet was central to propelling economic 
growth in the early part of the last decade, it is now deemed imperative to 
transforming that model away from the sale of cheap manufactured goods towards 
higher level services. Chinese telecoms companies such as ZTE and Huawei have 
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emerged as business rivals to established telecoms companies of the West and 
operate globally. As of 2012, Huawei represented a $32-billion business empire and 
had 140,000 employees with customers in 140 countries (Economist, 2012b) 
Scale and Reach 
According to the China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC), there were just 
two million Internet users (out of a population of 1.3 billion) in 1998. This figure had 
risen to 22.5 million by 2000 and 100 million by 2005. In 2008 China replaced the 
United States as the country with the highest number of Internet users in the world. 
By the end of 2013, 618 million people in China had access to the web (CNNIC, 2014).  
This precipitous rise has gone in tandem with the spread of other telecommunication 
technologies. In 1997, there were 70 million fixed-line telephones and 13 million 
mobiles (annual data reported by the National Bureau of Statistics of China, quoted in 
Liang & Lu, 2010). In 2001 China surpassed the United States to become the world’s 
largest mobile telecom market and its total number of mobile phone users reached 
nearly 373 million by 2005 while the number of fixed-line telephone reached 342 
million (Tai, 2006: 119, quoted in Liang & Lu, 2010). The CNNIC’s 2014 survey 
suggested that 500 million accessed the web using mobile technology during the 
previous year (CNNIC, 2014). Indeed, for the majority of modern users, the need for 
physical cable connections has ceased to exist, reducing the inequalities in access that 
characterised the early stage of internet adoption (Hu, 2011).  
The Chinese Internet as a Space ‘Apart’ 
There has been considerable scholarly investigation of media convergence (Meikle & 
Young, 2011; Quinn, 2005). This work tends to focus on both industrial aspects – how 
media companies have exploited new digital technologies – as well as consumer 
aspects – how individuals are using new technologies to create, consume and interact 
with established media. Importantly, many of the trends and tendencies displayed by 
web development in the Anglosphere have failed to materialise in the Chinese 
context, specifically in terms of industrial conglomeration. There is manifestly not the 
same level of convergence between traditional media and online.  
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The explanations for this are political rather than technological. When there have 
been efforts to engender convergent media – the success of the Hunan TV 
programme Super Girl in the mid-2000s being a prime example – political interference 
soon follows. Thus the Internet in China exists in a more easily defined space separate 
from traditional media. This has led, Clark claims, to a failure by official media to 
innovate (2014) and a disconnect between young people and traditional media 
sources. Bishop argues that the lack of trust exhibited by young Chinese towards 
traditional media mean most engage exclusively with Internet-based media. Though 
Internet usage is higher amongst the young in every country in the world, the 
Anglophone media sphere is not quite so starkly divided (Bishop, 2014).  
Ways of looking at the internet in China 
The impact of the Chinese Internet has stirred much academic interest since the turn 
of the millennium. There appears a divide in the nature of the enquiry between 
Western and Chinese academic circles. The first iteration of the ‘China web’ discourse 
in the West saw researchers discuss the web’s liberating potential in the repressive 
Chinese context. In this frame of analysis, the internet is seen in terms of its potential 
as a democratizing force. Internet users are conceptualised as ordinary members of 
society who are able to apply pressure on the state and, in the process, peel back 
authoritarianism. This may be described as the ‘liberation discourse’. 
The apparent failure of web take-up to spur political change in China led to a 
mutation of this discourse, one in which the web is seen as having been captured by 
the State. Under such a perspective, the Internet becomes a potential means of 
surveillance and a site of repression. The discourse remains preoccupied with 
democratization and political change, but argues for the Internet as a means of pre-
empting political change. This may be described as the ‘authoritarian adaptation 
discourse’. 
The predominant Chinese discourse, in contrast, posits the Internet as a tool for 
modernization, with enquiries focusing on how this can be best enacted. In addition 
to its obvious function in economic development, the Internet becomes a potential 
tool for incorporating backward regions and neglected groups in China’s future 
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prosperity. This may be described as the ‘developmental discourse’ (Damm, 2009; 
Jiang, 2010). 
These three strands closely echo the nature of the enquiry surrounding protest, 
discussed in the last section. The first two discourses are at either end of a singular 
and highly politicized paradigm, one perceiving nascent democratisation, the second 
explaining why authoritarianism remains prevalent. The third paradigm is an attempt 
to peer into cultural specificities which introduce further dimensions into the frame 
and provide greater nuance.  
The Liberation Discourse 
The liberation discourse may be seen as an outgrowth of Fukuyama’s ‘End of History’ 
thesis (1992), discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. In summary, it proposes that the 
Internet provides an irresistible counterweight to Party control of public discourse 
which, in turn, is existentially threatening to a regime which relies on strict control of 
information flows.  
That China’s earliest and most enduring forum for online information exchange – the 
Bulletin Board System (BBS)42 – took root within student communities in the 1990s 
(Clark, 2014) is significant in explaining why many saw, and still see, the Internet as a 
threat for authoritarian regime (Rawnsley, 2007; Yang, 2009; Esarey & Qiang, 2011). 
Students occupy a privileged place in the pantheon of 20th century protest in China43. 
Though the student-led reform movement of 1989 was crushed, a feeling has 
persisted that political challenge would most likely emerge from the nation’s 
campuses. 
The first evolution of the BBS format came in the form of the static blog44 and, later, 
the aping of the social networking sites that emerged from the Anglophone web in 
                                                       
42 Bulletin board communication revolves around ‘discussion threads’, long streams of linked 
comments which ostensibly discuss a specific topic but, often, digress into unanticipated areas. Users 
are usually required to sign up to the bulletin board before they are able to contribute and comments 
are often moderated before they appear. 
43 Students were on the front line of the May 4th Movement in 1919, the Cultural Revolution in the 
1966-76 period, and the protests of the 1980s, particularly those in 1986 and, most famously, 1989 
(Wasserstrom, 1991). 
44 Blogs first gained national attention in 2003 when a Guangzhou blogger working under the pen-
name Mu Zimei, began chronicling her sexual encounters in her online diary. They took off in terms of 
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the second half of the 2000s – Facebook and Twitter foremost among them. These 
began to allow individuals the means to broadcast multimedia content, an innovation 
which took place alongside the rise of the smartphone, complete with cameras to 
record images and video. Chan sums the libertarian optimism associated with this 
evolution:  
…every mobile handset and computer is a news broadcast station, a node 
in a vast information network….information can now pass easily across 
national boundaries, both tangible and intangible, and reach millions of 
people. (2010) 
Throughout 2010, the first full year of Sina Weibo’s operation, the microblog’s news 
potency became apparent through a number of extremely high-profile stories which 
garnered huge interest online and attracted mainstream press coverage. The self-
immolation of three people protesting against forced demolition in Jiangxi province 
was one such example. Other notable cases include the ‘Li Gang incident’ in Hubei45, 
the Li Mengmeng case in Henan46, and the death of village leader, Qian Yunhui. All 
three cases stirred online public opinion and appeared to force local Party officials 
into defensive positions. 
The relative decentralization of government supervision, the scale and viral 
possibilities of online content, and the greater number of non-state actors have 
combined to make it difficult for the Chinese state to control the dissemination of 
such episodes (Wang, 2010). Internet-enabled communication technologies appear 
good examples of what Latham defines as ‘disorderly’ media. Where ‘orderly’ media 
carries assumptions of verticality, durable media effects, and a ‘propaganda model’ of 
communication, disorderly media manifests no such verticality, durability or 
politicization (Latham, 2009). Yang agrees that it is the horizontality of Internet 
technologies that marks them out as ‘regime threatening’. The power of the Internet 
                                                                                                                                                             
user numbers in 2005 when major blog platforms such as Blogchina and Sina’s blog service were 
launched (Chi, 2006). 
45In which a drunk driver knocked over and killed a student on a campus pavement and later appeared 
to mock those who tried to apprehend him, presuming legal immunity on the basis that his father was 
Li Gang, a senior local police officer. 
46Which involved a high school student being refused entry to university, despite outstanding scores, 
on the basis that a school administrator absent-mindedly left her academic record in a drawer. 
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lies within its ‘networked’ potential (2006, 2008), and ability to bring together 
disparate elements, previously fragmented. 
Since the so-called ‘Big-V’ crackdown which attempted to rein in opinion leaders on 
Weibo in 201347, the Chinese social network which has gained most in popularity is 
Tencent’s Weixin48. WeChat, to give it its English title, allows users to leave voice 
messages for connected individuals or networks of followers which may be 
supplemented with multimedia content. As of early 2014, Weixin had 270 million 
active users (Economist, 2014a) but, significantly, it is used primarily for private 
chatting and photo sharing and is not universally searchable as were its predecessors. 
Nevertheless, it has facilitated rapid, diffuse and highly networked discussion.  
A Networked Public Sphere? 
The speed, scope and public nature of public communications, combined with 
developments in mobile technology, not least the advent of high quality camera 
phones and near total internet coverage, has energized civil society, encouraging 
engagement with politics and applying pressure on the authoritarian Party-state 
(Yang, 2009). This in turn has prompted widespread discussion of the notion of a 
Chinese web-based ‘public sphere’.  
The notion of a public sphere imagines a space between individuals and the state 
which provides an opportunity for individuals and civil groups to transmit and discuss 
information and ideas. It links civil society – associations of individuals forming social 
bonds independent of the state – at the base, and the state sphere – political 
institutions – at the top of society, and connects them in such a way that allows the 
interaction between the two so that politics is not merely done to a society, but 
where individuals and groups can connect, work through political debates and 
discussion and, in doing so, participate in the effective functioning of society. It thus 
supposes the existence of civil society and a singular, coherent state. 
                                                       
47 This has been colloquially dubbed the ‘Big-V crackdown’. Big-Vs are those microblog users who have 
‘verified’ (V) celebrity status and who broadcast to often millions of followers. In 2013 several of the 
biggest users were caught in vice raids and broadcast confessing to crimes on state television. For 
more on Weibo’s apparent demise, see Moore (2014) and New York Times (2014). 
48 Like RenRen (Facebook) and Weibo (Twitter), Weixin (WeChat in English) is a sophisticated 
reworking of an idea first developed in Silicon Valley. It is modelled on WhatsApp, a start-up which was 
purchased by Facebook in 2014.  
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Because the concept of a public sphere is associated with democratic association, it 
ostensibly stands at odds with authoritarian systems. At the base, many have denied 
China has a civil society thanks to pervasive state interference in social formations 
which are generally private in the Western context, and the strategic denial of 
attempts to form non-state associations in arenas such as organised labour and 
religion. Likewise, at the centre, the Chinese media, mainstream and social media, is 
subject to state control. However, concepts of the public sphere also assume 
openness and diversity, and oppose visions of a mass society. In this context, 
discussion of the Chinese public sphere, or spheres, appears more worthwhile as 
virtually all scholars agree that China has become, in many respects, a highly 
pluralistic society, one in which the State has deliberately withdrawn from 
interference at the grassroots.  
The classical Habermasian definition of a public sphere is that of a “society engaged in 
critical public debate” (1989: 52). Habermas identified 18th century European coffee 
shops as the primary vehicle for the rise of what he termed a ‘bourgeois’ public 
sphere. This was one in which political participants – likely social elites such as 
merchants and politicians of various hues – engaged in private face-to-face 
conversations, organised public debates or distributed pamphlets around various 
political issues. Assuming Enlightenment rationality and Darwinian sense of natural 
selection, the Habermasian conception of the ideal public sphere is one where 
consensus forms from manifold individual voices after they have been subject to 
question and challenge. This distilled and robust opinion may then inform the work of 
the State. Thus the ideal public sphere is democratic in that it mediated between 
state and society.  
Habermas set us this ‘ideal’ vision to help explain the deleterious effects of mass 
commercial media which he saw as turning an ‘active’ public into an audience of 
‘passive’ consumers. The propaganda model of the Chinese press, discussed in 
Chapter 3, supposes the same passivity of Chinese audiences. However, the rise of 
public media – media produced by, and broadcast by, individuals – fundamentally 
challenges this idea.  
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Writing at the end of the 1990s, Lynch saw in China evidence of ideological collapse 
and a fundamental weakening in the Party-state’s control of communicative flows. 
From this, he conceptualised a chaotic, unguided “praetorian public sphere” 
emerging .The term ‘praetorian’ is taken from Samuel Huntingdon’s definition of a 
‘praetorian society’ as one which is “roiled by extensive and intensive political 
participation that isn’t channelled effectively through institutions” (Lynch, 2010). This 
produces a chaotic discursive space in which no one institution, or indeed Party, can 
impose order. Though the work was written during the Internet’s infancy in China, 
Lynch cites technological advances as one of three core explanations for the Party’s 
loss of control49 and he envisages the Internet as being an almost insurmountable 
obstacle to the maintenance of control in China (Lynch, 1999). 
This resonates strongly with much of the discussion around the rise of social media in 
China. However, others have argued for a more nuanced vision of the Internet-as-
public-sphere in China. In particular, they point to the importance of mainstream 
media in public opinion formation. 
Reflecting somewhat Lynch’s fragmented praetorian public sphere, Zhao describes a 
“cacophony of contending public spheres” (2008: 325) which, while including some 
individual voices from the intellectual elite and bloggers, mainly consist of media 
platforms – commercial dailies, party organs, and the business press. Zhan (2013) 
suggests China has a “primitive” civil society which is exclusively media based. Though 
association is denied at the institutional level, he argues the media provides an 
opportunity for both economic actors and social actors, such as individuals and non-
governmental groups, to engage in politics.  He describes this as “media-driven public 
participation” (ibid) and emphasises the manner in which the media can transcend 
the natural fault lines that run across local, regional and national divides within the 
Party-state, and allow certain specific incidents to become national public events.  
Chu, likewise, argues for the emergence of a de-facto democratically-operating public 
sphere, identifying new television formats as the primary vehicle. She points, in 
particular, to a new breed of TV format which took root in the early 2000s. These 
involve members of the public debating issues of political significance. She also 
                                                       
49 The other two are administrative fragmentation and property rights reform. 
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argues that TV documentaries allow for what she terms “polyphonic heterogeneity”, 
that is the coexistence of varied individual voices within the media, albeit ones which 
are reported from the perspective of “individual reality”, or “individual truthfulness”. 
Allied with the opening of a gap between political ideology and commercial interests, 
and the willingness of journalists to engage in limited civic activism, these 
developments constitute an emergent public sphere and an important space for 
discursive behaviour (Chu, 2007). 
Lagerkvist argues that China’s internet politics constitutes a “force field” in which 
different social forces and political interests compete over norms and values. He 
recognises this space is able to be controlled by the Party-state to a much greater 
extent than Lynch thought possible, but nevertheless suggests that the “Party-state is 
severely challenged by an online environment in which young Chinese are forming 
their own norms on the issue of control and freedom in society” (2010: 15). These, in 
turn, have the potential to inform elite debate, both within closed Party politics and 
within the more part-controlled mainstream media sphere.  
The Authoritarian Adaptation Discourse 
Lagerkvist represents the blending of the liberation discourse, with its belief in the 
public sphere potential of the web, with its ostensible antithesis, the authoritarian 
adaptation discourse, which sees new possibilities for disempowerment and control. 
Like Lynch, Lagerkvist recognises the challenge posed by the emergence of a Web-
based public sphere, but argues it is contained within a highly stable, ostensibly 
quiescent political system producing what he terms a “locked in public sphere” 
(2010)50. Debate exists but cannot find genuine public expression and, as such, a 
‘public sphere’ cannot form, as public opinion has no means to coalesce. The 
mainstream media is particularly important, he claims, as it could potentially “unlock” 
the Chinese public sphere (2010: 24). However, he suggests the issue is not merely 
one of “challenge-response” between the Party and social actors. Rather, Lagerkvist 
suggests that the process is embedded as the government is able to control the 
development of both mainstream media and the Internet, and, moreover, is a force 
                                                       
50 Here, Lagerkvist conceives the body politic in physical terms and borrows the language of medical 
discourse, referencing the medical syndrome in which a patient is conscious and cognitively healthy 
but lacks the means to express himself properly. 
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within society itself. Change may occur thanks to new “norms” and “expectations” 
engendered by the Internet but the Chinese state and society are “mutually 
embedded” (2011: 267). 
In a major updating of the Habermasian notion of the ‘public sphere’ – and a concept 
that is particularly relevant to China – DeLuca and Peeples have argued that their 
concept of the ‘public screen’ is a “necessary supplement” (2002: 125) to notions of 
the public sphere. Their starting point is the observation that notions of the rational, 
consensus-seeking public sphere are outdated when one considers the modern 
“televisual world characterised by image and spectacle” (2002: 129). The format of 
information delivery – the frame of a television or computer screen51 - must be 
brought into the analytical fold. Thus, where the public spheres presupposes rational 
debate, consensus and a modicum of civility, the public screen foregrounds 
“dissemination, images, hypermediacy, publicity, distraction, and dissent” (DeLuca 
and Peeples, 2002: 125). Importantly, in contrast to a public sphere which privileges 
embodied voices – an exchange, normally in the form of dialogue, between 
individuals – the public screen allows for the “scattering of emissions without the 
guarantee of productive exchanges” (2002: 130-131). 
A public sphere thus filtered through an image-dominated, rancorous, fast-changing 
public screen may be antithetical to the smooth functioning of public opinion 
formation. Lu Xun, the grandfather of literary modernism in China, first introduced 
the term kanke wenhua nearly a century ago, identifying a ’culture of gazing’. This 
referred to the phenomenon of people drawn to scenes of tragedy but staring on 
with a numb indifference rather than helping. Such scenes are still common in China52. 
The updated term for the Internet age is weiguan, the “surrounding gaze” which 
encourages passive and fleeting interest in sensational or salacious subjects. Echoing 
                                                       
51 Though they were writing in the pre-iPad, pre-smartphone era, DeLuca and Peeples’ notion of the 
public screen may easily be extended to mobile phone screens and tablet devices. 
52 The author can recall seeing several examples of this during his five years living in mainland China 
between 2003 and 2008. 
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criticisms of slacktivism53 in the Western context, such engagement has the effect of 
diminishing public debate as it turns debate into spectacle54.  
Censorship Practices 
Deibert has pointed out that “[j]ust as the domains of land, sea, air, and space have 
all been gradually colonized, militarized, and subject to inter-state competition so too 
[has] the once relatively unencumbered domain of cyberspace”(2009: 334). In China, 
this is manifest in terms of the strategic attempt to bound web interactions within 
what some have called a ‘national intranet’, thereby retaining control of 
infrastructure, as well as the companies which provide the software platforms on 
which interactions take place. As Lagerkvist notes, the Internet has not evolved as a 
sphere apart from politics, but rather a sphere within. Changes to the administrative 
arrangements for Internet control made in 201455 are testament to the Party’s 
concern that while the Internet clearly challenges assumptions of absolute political 
control, it remains determined to ensure it develops within the ambit of political 
oversight (Epstein, 2013).   
The chief plank of this strategic enterprise has been for the CCP to keep major 
‘Western’ web companies at arms’ length – permitting only conditional access to 
China and, on occasion, blocking sites completely – while encouraging the 
development of domestic versions of all of the major web technologies (ibid). The 
benefits of such an arrangement are dispersed among the constituent parties, it is 
argued. On the one hand, the majority of Chinese web users are happy to be served 
by domestic companies who better understand their specific needs, culture and 
language; for the web companies themselves, they have been allowed to thrive in 
something of a walled garden, protected from competitive attacks from the 
international behemoths of the web industry. The payback for China’s political class is 
                                                       
53 A good example is the portrayal of two young migrant workers in the 2013 Jia Zhangke film A Touch 
Of Sin who delight in going online and seeking salacious or sensational news but can only think to 
respond to each of the sorry tales they hear with the phrase, ‘WTF’, or ‘What the Fuck’.   
54 For the counter argument, see Hu (2011) who regards weiguan as progressive force which, even 
regardless of the passivity of the observers, has the effect of applying pressure to the authoritarian 
state. 
55 Under these, Xi Jinping, the Chinese President and CCP General Secretary, personally took charge of 
the newly created Central Internet Security and Informatization Leading Group. Premier Li Keqiang is 
also a member. A Xinhua news story from the first meeting of this group in 2014 quotes the President 




that these web companies are subject to domestic rules and regulations and, as such, 
are enlisted in the ongoing battle to police the web. China’s censorship regime relies 
“on domestic companies to police their own content under penalty of fines, 
shutdown and criminal liability” (Opennet.net, 2009, quoted by Bamman et al, 
201256). “When the head of Bokee.com, China’s largest blog host, was asked to 
explain why his company voluntarily screened out ‘offensive’ subject matter, he 
responded in terms of narrow corporate expediency: ‘We are a commercial 
company… We have a responsibility to our shareholders… If we allow anyone to 
publish sensitive content, the whole site will be blocked’” (Baum, 2008: 171). 
It has become clear that, where ‘hard’ censorship – prevention of access with a catch-
all IP block – has been implemented beyond China’s web jurisdiction, the Chinese 
government has preferred to allow domestic sites to flourish while managing content 
through a process of regulation and self-regulation. In 2011, Charles Chao, Sina’s CEO, 
claimed that around 100 people are employed as censors (Bamman et al, 2012), 
though others have claimed that this number likely runs into the thousands (Sullivan, 
2012: 776). Whatever the number of Sina staff monitors, they have a “real headache” 
(Sullivan, 2012) in ensuring a politically-palatable online environment on account of 
the sheer number of top-down requests. Qiang reports speaking to a senior manager 
at ‘one of China’s largest Internet portals’ who “acknowledged receiving instructions 
from either the SCIO or other provincial-level propaganda officials at least three times 
a day” (Qiang, 2011: 207).  
There is also the considerable problem of the protean nature of sensitive topics and 
keywords. One list exists for settled and fixed sensitivities (i.e. Falun Gong [falun 
gong], 6.4 [liu si]) but another responds almost constantly to the changing and 
dynamic sensitivities of the day (Knockel et al, 2011). Counter-intuitively, it is not a list 
that is necessarily handed down by the government. As Mackinnon notes: 
…rewards and punishments are meted out based on the extent to which 
Internet companies successfully prevent groundswells of public 
                                                       
56 For more on the mechanics of Chinese Internet censorship, see Crandall & Wallach, 2013; Zhu et al, 
2013; Mackinnon, 2009 and Chen & Ang, 2011. 
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conversation around politically inflammatory topics that might inspire a 
critical mass on people to challenge Communist Party authority.” (2009)  
Accordingly, Internet administrators may well take it upon themselves to delete posts 
or side-line a debate if they perceive in it potential risk. This goes a long way to 
explaining the fact that studies have discovered great variance between censorship 
practices of different web administrators (Mackinnon, 2009; Bamman et al, 2012).  
Though web post deletion takes place at the level of the website administrator, there 
is evidence of complicity between both State and commercial interests, with one 
(subsequently deleted) Caixin report in early 2013 investigating the practices of 
professional post deletion companies. One such company, Yaga Times, was claimed 
to have taken upwards of 50 million RMB in 2011 as payment for securing the 
deletion of posts from both private companies seeking to protect their reputation and 
government officials keen on massaging their online profile (Fei Chang Dao, 2013). 
The specific response to postings which reference these problematic issues is varied. 
Broadly speaking, three main tactics are employed. Users may be blocked from 
uploading a post on the basis of a detected sensitive keyword; secondly, posts that 
are made may be retroactively deleted57; finally, search functions may be blocked. 
This has the effect of blocking the vast majority of sensitive content from view for the 
vast majority of users, but does not involve specific posts being taken down 
(greatfire.org, 2013). 
There are two further, more general strategies employed to control the microblog 
space, neither of which involves active ‘censorship’. One is to promote depoliticised 
and non-controversial topics (this is discussed in more detail in the next chapter in 
relation to the press). The other, less well documented, strategy is the use of paid 
commentators to influence sensitive online debate. Bandurski (2008) has drawn 
attention to the so-called ’50-cent party’ (wu mao dang), ostensibly ordinary users 
who are on retainers to articulate ‘the official’ point of view in any given political 
debate. In a similar vein, the Internet Water Army (wangluo shuijun) has been used to 
                                                       
57 With the additional possibility that an entire user account could be deleted. This has happened to a 




refer to group of individuals who are hired to flood forums with comments (Yu et al, 
2012)). Such workers may not necessarily be cleaving to political diktat. Some 
nationalistic Netizens have called themselves ‘voluntary five mao’ workers (Offbeat 
China, 2014). 
The overall result is that, while the Chinese web allows citizens to express themselves 
with unprecedented latitude, censorship mechanisms have been continually 
developed and refined over time to the point that the Party-state can be fairly 
confident about stymying discussion of undesirable topics. More importantly, some 
have theorised that this kind of bounded discussion may actually improve the 
government’s surveillance capabilities (Hung, 2010). Ferguson has suggested that the 
Internet provides China’s rulers with an invaluable method of applying Lockean 
theories of governance58. The greatest benefit of free flowing online discourse, he 
argues, is that it allows the political elite to bypass China's sycophantic bureaucracy in 
its effort to sample public opinion among the relatively affluent, middle class users of 
online platforms (2012). The Chinese Internet, thus, creates a diverse but neutered 
‘civil society’ which can be controlled and manipulated almost as easily as the 
‘totalitarian society’ it replaced (Brady, 2010).  
The non-political web – development and identity 
politics  
While online activism and political discussion commands the attention of a great 
many scholars, the vast majority of Chinese web activity and online communications 
are dissociated from politics. As has been discussed, some have seen a political 
conspiracy in this – “state propaganda as ideotainment” as Lagerkvist puts it (2010: 
262). However, others suggest, more straightforwardly, that politics and activism are 
highly niche interests and that the space is better characterised as one of 
consumption, commerce and identity politics (Mengin, 2004; Herold & Marolt, 2011).  
                                                       
58 Crudely put, Lockean political theory emphasises the importance of the approval of the property-
owning middle classes in any given polity. 
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One survey59 from 2010 suggests young Chinese spend more time using all but one of 
the key internet technologies tested compared to citizens of any other major 
developed or developing nation. The vast majority of the Chinese energetic, active 
and social (Sullivan, 2012) Netizen class are chiefly concerned with gaining access to 
news, games, shopping and chat. Statistics from a real-time survey of Sina Weibo 
users in Hong Kong are indicative of the prevailing culture online. Of all the ‘tweets’ 
sampled in a single day, those that referenced or discussed celebrities outweighed 
any other by a considerable margin60.  
The Internet has an explicit role within central government economic planning for 
economic growth. This was suggested in the 9th Five-Year Plan (1996-2000), made 
explicit in the 10th Five-Year Plan (2001-2005) which remarked that the Internet could 
“drive industrialization through informatization” (Xue, 2005). The emphasis has only 
strengthened in the years since (Hong, 2011). Companies such as Lenovo, ZTE and 
Huawei, may be said to be the product of this strategy. They currently enjoy global 
market share in products which facilitate Internet access, either at the level of core 
infrastructure or for the end-consumer in the form of laptops, tablets and 
smartphones. In terms of the programmes and applications which operate on those 
devices, some of China’s most successful domestic Internet companies – Ctrip61, 
Alibaba62 and Sina – produce such huge profits at home that they have successfully 
listed on New York City’s Nasdaq stock exchange and have attracted considerable 
overseas investment, despite the fact that this investment is indirect and unprotected 
by US law (Bishop, 2014)63.   
Summary 
Discussion of the place of the Internet in Chinese political life follows a similar path to 
that of protest, discussed above. It ostensibly represents a grave threat to the 





61 Ctrip is an online travel agent, offering flight, hotel and train bookings. Though it has real-world 
offices and a large number of customer-facing staff, its chief business is done online. 
62 Alibaba is China’s largest online retailer and has several websites facilitating online shopping, notably 
Taobao and Tmall. 




political status quo. However, faced with the fact that there has been no fundamental 
change, scholars have often looked to explain how the very thing which was once 
assumed to be menacing can be controlled and even become state-supporting by 
improving the effectiveness of authoritarian governance.  
Hassid (2012), Xin (2008) and Yang (2009, 2013) have looked beyond the simple 
society-state binary and examined how the mainstream media may be a factor in 
mitigating or strengthening the impact of online discourse.  
Literature Review Summary 
The two previous chapters, taken together, paint a picture where absolute Party 
control is substantively threatened, by commercialisation, by protest and by public 
discourse. Control has been re-asserted through a strategic fusing of Party and 
market – access to commercial riches is expressly permitted, or denied, based on 
political favour. Moreover, the commercialisation which has resulted, rather than 
spurring on democratisation, has in fact forestalled change in that it has 
“underpinned much of the trivialization and de-politicisation of Internet content and 
usage in China” (Damm, 2009: 95), just as it has done in the press. The challenges of 
protest and public discourse, meanwhile, are met with a complex and evolving 
propaganda system which deploys targeted intervention rather than crude catch-all 
techniques64.These may be characterised as focusing on ‘guiding public opinion’ 




                                                       
64 Though a slight diversion, it is interesting to note the manner in which these interventions echo 
those employed by the world’s central banks in their continuing response to the Financial Crisis of 
2008. There is little sense of a coherent set of ideological beliefs at work. Instead, we see a highly 
technocratic and supremely pragmatic ‘hypodermic’ response, which makes periodic, targeted 
interventions for the purpose of stabilising and harmonising complex economies and polities.  
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Chapter 4: Analytical Framework 
Introduction 
The last two chapters have offered an account of historic and recent scholarship in 
two broad fields – the Chinese press and social contention in China. They treated 
each field as a relatively distinct entity, whilst occasionally pointing to links and areas 
of theoretical overlap. These are mainly found within the liberation-control paradigm 
which sees both possibilities for democratic enfranchisement and for increased state 
control in developments within each of these fields. This chapter moves on to 
providing a framework through which these core elements may be seen engaging in 
one fundamentally coherent process, one which seeks to avoid the liberation-control 
trap.  
The first section examines political post-communist transition theories. It will begin 
by introducing the traditional democratic-versus-authoritarian binary. However, it 
challenges this in two specific areas. Firstly, it explains how fragmented control, 
caused by the rise of commercial and political interest groups, has not ceded power 
to forces of liberalism but rather dispersed it within the historically and culturally 
constituted state. In other words, rather than attempt to see Chinese politics within a 
simplistic state-versus-society frame, this section argues that it is vital to examine 
contention along alternative lines, especially the ‘public-versus-private’ and ‘central-
versus-local’ axes.  
The additional nuance that this adds to the ‘authoritarian’ side of the pendulum is 
balanced and buttressed by explaining how concepts from the ‘democratic’ side of 
the pendulum may also engage in political processes in China. The chapter thus 
introduces the concept of ‘responsive authoritarianism’. This idea has two chief 
strands: that government is presented as being effective in observing and responding 
to societal needs and, importantly, is experimental in delivering solutions. The 
chapter will introduce Pan’s theory of ‘bonded innovation’ (2012) where the state 
opens up space, sets boundaries and encourages experimentation. Citizens are, thus, 
not simply ‘bought off’ but rather support authoritarian rule because the state 
demonstrates democratic accountability in its ability to listen and respond effectively.  
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Media theory is then appended to this otherwise political framework. The narratives 
of democratic responsiveness and authoritarian effectiveness and external and 
internal threat require articulation and maintenance. This, therefore, requires a 
theory of the press to be sketched. The chapter will explain how the press is not 
simply a thing which facilitates democracy and freedom in the ‘democratic’ context or 
one-party rule in the ‘authoritarian’ context but rather that it is a resource used by a 
variety of political actors for specific purposes. In the Western context this requires 
discussion of the ‘propaganda model’ theory of the press, and, in the Chinese context, 
‘authoritarian’ and ‘Soviet’ press theories. However, as this chapter will argue, both 
overstate the cohesiveness of power in their respective operating environments, as 
well as the nature of the ‘bonded innovation’ where commercial media may move 
away from dogma and heavy propaganda but still perpetuate certain core ideologies. 
Finally, there is a discussion of the nature of those core ideologies, particularly as they 
apply to protest and social contention. These primarily involve the promotion of the 
Party as a bulwark against external exploitation and disorder, two historically and 
culturally-constituted fears which act as discursive resources. In this discussion, the 
chapter argues for the importance of studying the language of news discourse in 
terms of investigating broader currents in Chinese media and politics.  
Post-communist transition theory 
This thesis positions the research within a number of academic fields and a number of 
specific debates which will be delineated in this chapter. The broadest area of interest 
is the debate that has surrounded political transformation in the years since 1989. 
This is an era in which many formerly communist states, principally in Europe, 
explicitly changed their ideological allegiance, jettisoning the political architectures 
imposed by the Soviet Union and apparently embracing, with varying alacrity, 
Western European norms. Many more nations – notably China – retained their 
notional ‘socialist’ nomenclature but nevertheless embarked on a radical move away 
from social and economic totalitarianism – characterised by a high degree of 
centralization and fidelity to a rigid ideological blueprint – toward more fluid and 
dynamic societies in which aspirations to social engineering receded and 
entrepreneurialism flourished. From the vantage point of the early-to-mid 2010s, the 
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only country which appears to remotely resemble the Soviet Union under Stalin, 
taken to be the epitome of totalitarianism, is North Korea. Consequently, in terms of 
geopolitics at least, it is reasonable to describe the current era to be one of ‘post-
communism’. 
Transitology 
These sweeping political changes have led to attempts to try to discern the patterns 
and nature of this move from communism to post-communism. The swiftness of the 
collapse of a succession of Eastern European communist governments within the 
Soviet political orbit in 1989 and 1990, and the final dissolution of the Soviet Union 
itself in 1991, led those who had taken sides in the ideological standoff of the 
previous 40 years to come to swift and definitive conclusions about the possibilities of 
Marxism and the political systems it gave rise to. Fukuyama’s The End of History and 
the Last Man, published in 1992 just months after the Soviet Union’s collapse, 
epitomises the triumphalist response to the ostensible defeat of communism that 
existed in parts of the US political sphere, and across academia.  Fukuyama’s now-
infamous ‘end of history thesis’ suggests that liberal democratic values had manifestly 
won out over the credible alternative that communism represented in the 20th 
Century, and, consequently, arguments over certain core questions of political and 
economic philosophy could be laid to rest. It extended a Whig historiography 
(Butterfield, 1931) by not only seeing the preceding half century as an inexorable 
march toward ever greater liberty, equality and rationality, but also suggesting that 
the ostensible victory of the US in its Cold War confrontation with the Soviet Union 
essentially ended any argument over the precise direction of this forward march. 
There may still be a ‘clash of civilisations’ (Huntingdon, 1993), but it would coalesce 
around language, religion and culture, not society’s core economic and political 
systems. Rule of law, state withdrawal from markets and a broad electoral franchise 
were thus established as superior ingredients and countries which lacked them would 
inevitably come to acquire them.  
The problem with the transitological thesis is that it overstated its ostensible victory 
over alternative ideologies and overestimated the ability of liberal democratic 
governments to deliver prosperity, security and well-being to its citizens. China’s 
94 
 
conspicuous rise under the banner of communism is perhaps the foremost piece of 
evidence in support of this dual critique. Despite lacking many of the political and 
social building blocks that Fukuyama identified as superior in his 1992 treatise65, the 
PRC continues to thrive economically and to enhance its diplomatic stature. 
Theories which posit a unidirectional transition from communist totalitarianism to 
liberal democracy are thus to be suspected. Fundamentally, they are ideologically 
blind in ignoring the manifold possibilities of synthesis between these two extreme 
models of political organisation, neither of which are unproblematic. It appears 
obvious that China is not caught between binaries such as democratic-versus-
authoritarian, or, even more crudely, free-versus-unfree. Power has been ceded by a 
formerly totalitarian state, but it has not been handed over to the forces of liberalism 
but rather scattered within the historically- and culturally-constituted state. Thus, 
rather than a simplistic state-versus-society axis of analysis, as the transitologists tend 
to prefer, ‘public vs. private’ and ‘central vs. Local’ are more interesting loci of 
contention. These will be discussed below. 
Axes of Contemporary Fragmentation 
Public vs. Private: Corporate Authoritarianism 
One of the core transitological arguments is that marketization and democratization 
must follow in step. Marketisation entails the creation of what might be termed a 
middle class, composed of both private business owners as well as a home-owning 
professional class. As their personal wealth increased, the theory held, they would 
seek a clearer political and legal framework to guard against the potential loss of their 
wealth by the arbitrary use of political power. Under such a conception, the market is 
society, and society the market. Society and state are thus pitched on an inevitable 
                                                       
65 These building blocks are: rule of law, the withdrawal of the state from markets, and electoral 
democracy. Though the theme of the Fourth Plenum of the 18th Party Congress in October 2014 was 
the development of the ‘rule of law’ in China, there was no serious attempt to separate law and 
politics at the national level (Creemers, 2014). In other words, though law may yet constrain political 
actors lower down the Party hierarchy, it is unlikely to constrain those in Zhongnanhai. In the economic 
sphere, state-controlled enterprises still dominate large swathes of the economy. Finally, and perhaps 
less controversially, there is manifestly no widespread enfranchisement, though debates do exist over 




collision course, one that can only be avoided by the political classes relenting to this 
economically constituted pressure and voluntary ceding power.  
However, as Singapore, Taiwan, Malaysia and South Korea’s examples had all 
demonstrated before the end of the Cold War, it should not have come as a surprise 
that “a flourishing capitalist economy always was compatible with the denial of 
democratic rights” (Mishra, 2014). Key is the manner in which observers of the 
“market-state problematic” (Sparks, 2010: 559) misidentified the key variable in 
profit-making. It was not, as transitologists might claim, merely the size of the 
consumer base. Rather, the key variable is revenue. Sparks argues that because 
revenue is dependent on economic conditions which are highly dependent on 
political permissions, the “opposition between market and politics” is mediated 
through the ‘nexus’ of local officials, entrepreneurs and media workers who managed 
those economic conditions (2010: 558). In other words, just because a market exists, 
it should not be assumed to be ‘free’. It therefore follows that economic gain – be it 
at the personal or institutional level – requires political favour and thus an 
interdependency emerges. As Caragliano has it, “Chinese entrepreneurs forge close—
and often profitable—ties with state officials, giving those entrepreneurs a vested 
interest in opposing any political shakeup” (2013). 
Central vs. Local: Regionally Decentralized Authoritarianism (RDA) 
Harrison and Ma (2013) have coined the term ‘regionally decentralized 
authoritarianism’ (RDA) to describe the system of political and economic organisation 
that presently exists in China. RDA is based around economic decentralisation allied 
with strong political centralisation. In such a system, political and economic decision-
making may be highly devolved, but the centre’s relative performance evaluation is 
essential to the functioning of the model. 
Beneath China’s central government66, there are five administrative tiers: provincial, 
prefecture, county, township and village67. The Chinese economy operates on a multi-
                                                       
66 To borrow Harrison and Ma’s definition, central  government, or the ‘centre’, is defined as the 
central political leadership institutions of the Party-state, namely the CCP’s Politburo, the State Council, 
and their respective standing committees, which often have overlapping memberships (2013: 6) 
67 Note there is no room in this division for cities. Many provincial capitals operate as ‘sub-provincial 
cities’ – answerable to, and governed by, provincial governments, but independent economically – 
while the majority of land within individual provinces comprises ‘prefecture level’ cities. Within these 
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layer, multi-regional basis, where each region at each layer represents an ‘operating 
unit’. Each unit is relatively self-sufficient and oversees its own enterprises along 
functional and specialization lines (Qian & Xu, 1993: 19). The hierarchical structure of 
each region at each level is approximate to that of the central government: just as 
central government hovers above 34 provincial level administrative blocks, a 
township may incorporate 10 to 20 villages. Junior tiers of government administer 
affiliated enterprises by function and specialization – finance or electronics, for 
example – and oversee the work of junior administrations within its jurisdiction (ibid). 
RDA essentially entails a process of “asymmetric decentralization” (Chien, 2010) in 
which economic and political command structures have become disentangled in the 
reform and opening up period. “China’s first and foremost devolution process since 
1978 has been economic decentralization from the central to local level” (Shirk, 1993, 
cited in Chien, 2011: 71). Rather than privatise, China has decentralised and handed 
the economic reins over to increasingly junior politics units. However, this has 
occurred while maintaining upward-looking political command structures. Officials 
have a keen sense of answering politically to the centre, but promoting local 
development remains one of the strongest considerations for anyone looking to 
move up the power chain. “[Economic performance] is often seen to be more 
important than obedience to central policies or regulations” (Chien, 2010: 76).  
RDA in China has deep historical roots. In the post-1949 period, RDA was first 
instituted in 1958 in a conscious rejection of Soviet-style centralization (Harrison & 
Ma, 2013: 7). Further back, regional decentralization became institutionalised under 
the Qing dynasty with its various regions constituted as distinct, independent 
economic units (ibid: 9). 
RDA has a number of positive aspects, not least helping to generate China’s 
remarkable recent economic growth (Chien, 2010). However, among the negative 
consequences she cites are uneven development at the national level, the 
encouraging of unsustainable development at the local level and, most pertinently for 
                                                                                                                                                             
urban areas there are further delineations (‘district’ and ‘neighbourhood’), for example, but these may 
be regarded as tantamount to junior tiers within the six-tiered hierarchy. In other words, a ‘district’ 
within a prefecture-level city may have ‘county’ level responsibilities, and so on (Qian & Xu, 1993: 19). 
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the purposes of this thesis, regional fragmentation, with provincial level units often 
working at cross purposes. 
Howell describes the Chinese administration as “polymorphous”, with different parts 
of the state locked in fierce competition that radically undermined co-ordinated 
activity:  
The state in China is subject to fragmenting, eroding and hyper-rivalistic 
pressures — fragmenting because power and authority are diffused 
amongst a diversity of territorial and socio-economic actors, an outcome 
of decentralization and marketization; eroding because of the gradual 
decay of the class-based, Leninist Party machine and its institutional 
infrastructure; and hyperrivalistic because parts of the state are locked in 
competition with each other — sectorally and regionally — and with other 
nation-states in the world. (Howell, 2006: 291) 
Obviously this must not be overstated. Clearly, China’s bureaucracy has not lost all 
coherency. Political centralisation is still strong and has been a vital ingredient in 
China’s long-term economic growth (Cai & Treisman, 2006). Moreover, since the mid-
1990s there has been a re-centralization of fiscal administration68 which has allowed 
the centre to reassert control over appointments and promotions and enforce 
provincial rivalries69. “[P]olitical centralization is a necessary condition for economic 
decentralization to do its work” (Harrison & Ma, 2012: 6). Nevertheless, it remains 
the case that leaders at lower tiers of China’s political hierarchy enjoy far more 
autonomy within China’s one-party structure than is commonly assumed, even if that 
autonomy is largely economic in nature, and which is ultimately assessed within a 
centralized political structure. 
                                                       
68 In other words, revenue must be transferred upward to the centre, before being returned back 
down to the local level, rather than being retained by local officials. 
69 Schell and Delury argue that one of Zhu Rongji’s main priorities between 1991 and 2003, a period 
when he was the central figure in the Chinese economy, was the recentralisation of the fiscal structure 
and the reclaiming of economic coordination for Beijing (2014: 336). Nevertheless, the fact remains 
that the control which Beijing ceded to the provinces in the 1980s has never been fully reclaimed and 
is cited as the reason China has achieved such remarkable growth rates in the intervening years. 
Indeed, the current concern shown by Beijing over local debt – in contrast to the bountiful fiscal 
reserves it marshals – demonstrates the fact that economic decision making remains primarily at local 
levels in China. 
98 
 
Fracture lines between the centre and the regions may not only be economically 
constituted. Patronage networks infuse Chinese politics, according to Shih, Adolph 
and Liu (2012). These may themselves be economically delineated but also may link 
to ideological divisions within elite politics. Bo Xilai, removed from office in 2012 and 
imprisoned for life the following year, was claimed by some to be a victim of his leftist, 
Mao-inspired political agenda. 
Theorising the media along multiple fracture lines 
Both fracture lines described above have important implications for China’s media. 
The press exemplifies the ambiguous public-versus-private fracture. A highly 
commercialised press co-exists alongside ideologically-oriented Party publications. 
However, as explained in Chapter 2, these commercial outlets have almost exclusively 
been spun off from Party publications and are, therefore, only able to produce profit 
with the explicit permission of political actors.  
Central-versus-local political fragmentation is also key in explaining why officials in 
China have looked to cooperate with entrepreneurs of various kinds:  
The gradual loss of institutional purpose and political power on the part of local 
party cadres and authorities, coupled with the new opportunities provided to 
them by economic reform to replace their political power with economic power, 
and reinforced by the growing CCP emphasis on the importance of economic 
growth, have been the major factors in the increasing receptiveness of the party 
cadres to cooperation with China’s rising capitalist class (Akhavan-Majid, 2004: 
562). 
Market power, thus conceived, is not then so much a sphere outside political power 
rather than something which penetrates into the political power structure70. And that 
political power structure, by turns, fractures along regional and administrative lines, 
albeit within a system which requires a certain obedience to central authorities. 
                                                       
70 There are important overlaps between the way the market and political power is conceptualised 
here, and parallel conceptualisations of the Internet and political power in China, discussed in Chapter 




This configuration gives rise to the possibility of both horizontal and vertical diversity 
within China’s media. Horizontally, political units from the provincial level down have 
achieved economic success, in large part, by acting in competition with each other. 
Given this, there is every reason to suspect that the media outlets affiliated with 
these respective political units may enjoy greater latitude in reporting issues from 
beyond the newspaper’s particular constituency. This concept has long been noted in 
terms of investigative journalism in the phenomenon of so-called ‘cross-regional 
reporting’ (yidi jiandu) but may be of relevance to other, less sensational, forms of 
journalism. 
Fragmentation conceived of a ‘horizontal’ – that is, within units conceived as 
operating on comparable planes of political seniority – the picture is more complex 
than basic inter-regional rivalry. Tensions may indeed exist between competing local 
governments at a macro level, but may be also expressed between competing 
ministries or departments within a single jurisdiction, or even between media 
departments working on ‘new’ or ‘old’ platforms (Lin, 2008).   
Vertically, the structure of the press in China reflects the strictly hierarchical power 
arrangements inherent in the Chinese political system. Under this institutional 
configuration (a diagram of which is given below), publications privileged by their 
association with senior, or national political bodies, enjoy relative freedom in 





TABLE 1: REPRESENTATION OF VERTICAL POWER STRUCTURES WITHIN CHINESE 
PRESS 
Responsive Authoritarianism 
This chapter has so far weighed up the balance between liberalism and 
authoritarianism, and sought to introduce important nuance to the ‘authoritarian’ 
side of the pendulum by incorporating the fracture lines caused by commercial and 
regional fragmentation. It now attempts to buttress this by explaining how concepts 
from the ‘democratic’ side of the pendulum may also engage in political processes in 
China. It does so by introducing the concept of ‘responsive authoritarianism’71. 
In the Chinese context, ‘responsive’, or ‘deliberative’ authoritarianism has two 
interlinked strands. Firstly, notwithstanding the Party-state’s authoritarian, autocratic 
veneer, it is active in observing societal needs and experimental in seeking solutions. 
This, in turn, produces a citizenry which, rather than being bought off by the Party – 
                                                       
71 This concept has been termed slightly differently by various scholars, according to the specific 
manner in which authoritarianism is presumed to be maintained. Stockmann (2013) and Bishop (2012), 
focusing on the role of the media and the Internet respectively, regard China has having a form of 
“responsive authoritarianism”; Brady (2010), highlighting central propaganda, prefers “popular 
authoritarianism”; Heilmann and Perry (2011) use the term “adaptive governance” in drawing parallels 
with the Maoist era, while Nathan (2003) prefers “authoritarian resilience”, which makes more plain 
the normative assumptions about its presumed opposite.   
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as in the classic conception of the post-1989 state-society bargain72 – rather supports 
authoritarian rule because the state demonstrates democratic accountability in its 
ability to listen and respond effectively. 
Active and Experimental 
Heilmann and Perry (2011) argue that the CCP’s own historical trajectory – emerging 
as a guerrilla organisation in the 1920s – makes it prefer local and situational policy 
making, and experimental, as opposed to rule-bound, governance73. The modern CCP 
maintains such adaptability. The establishment of free enterprise zones, Internet 
development, property reform, contemporary financial reform, and, most famously, 
the household responsibility system74 itself are all examples of the Party taking such a 
cautious approach during the reform era (Zhang, 2014).  
Not only has this assisted in the ideological transition of the last 30 years, it has 
facilitated dynamic economic growth. The reform process – famously described as 
one of ‘crossing the river by feeling the stones’ (moshitou guohe) – has proceeded on 
the basis of a series of pilot projects so that ideas can be tested and so that mistakes 
may be recognised and contained (Zhang, 2014). This same general process has 
applied specifically to media reform, as documented by Pan (2010; 2012), albeit one 
in which media reform is unambiguously a state-controlled project and “imbued with 
a strong systemic tendency towards preserving the political legitimacy of the Party-
state” (Pan, 2010: 519). 
The metaphor of crossing the river by feeling the stones runs into a slight problem 
when one considers who, figuratively speaking, has their feet wet. Bream suggests 
reform in China has consistently involved the Party undertaking “enabling measures” 
(2013: 2) rather than doing the legislative hard-lifting. Firms are not privatized. Rather, 
                                                       
72 This refers to the theory, so often repeated that it has become a truism, of a tacit bargain being 
struck between the government and the people following the epochal June 4 crackdown in Beijing. 
This, in summary, involved the Party agreeing to provide for ever-rising living standards in return for 
the people’s willingness to stay out of politics. Such a bargain was, of course, never formally stated but 
China’s former Premier, Zhu Rongji, came close to doing so in 1992 when he argued, during a visit to 
Guangdong, that “if we can increase the speed of economic construction, and continually raise the 
people’s living standards, then the Party will be trusted and respected, and the people will support us” 
(Schell & Delury, 2013: 334) 
73 For more on Maoist continuities, see Schell and Delury (2013: 388-392).  
74 This involved allowing individual farmers to sell privately the surplus made from the plots they 
managed. This was pioneered in Anhui in 1977 in direct contravention of the national regulations 
which existed at the time but extended nationwide.  
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some shares, from a specific part of an enterprise, may be sold in a certain restricted 
fashion. Reform thus becomes a process which involves multi-party interactions, with 
the state, businesses, consumers, and workers each playing their role in interpreting 
and expanding the precise nature of the change. Pan describes this as “bonded 
innovation” (2012), It is the state which has opened up space for potential reform 
without necessarily having specific targets. Boundaries may be set around the reform 
space. However, within, experimentation is encouraged. Pan applies “bonded 
innovation” specifically to media workers but it can just as well apply to the other 
areas described above.  
Even the boundaries of this experimental space tend to become altered under the 
pressure of the scarcely contained activity within. Akhavad-Majid calls this “creative 
renegotiation and expansion” (2004: 556-7). “Historically, the Chinese citizenry has 
been a dynamic participant in pushing the state’s policy openings far beyond those 
initially envisioned by the state” (ibid). Debates may exist as to how far this quality of 
reform is, itself, state willed. In other words, does the state anticipate boundaries 
being redrawn or does the act of redrawing represent social agency which may run 
counter to state goals? Ultimately, the theory of ‘responsive authoritarianism’ would 
see reform as being enabled, guided and controlled by the state but practically 
pursued by social actors.  
Finally, the Party’s protean adaptability and absolute pragmatism is evident in the co-
option of various socio-economic groups, another tactic with deep roots in Party 
history. Co-option of the middle-classes has been a very deliberate political strategy 
during the years of rapid economic change (Saich, 2010). Landmark rulings in 2004 
enshrined limited property rights for the first time under communist rule, and 
entrepreneurs have been officially welcomed within the Party since the national 
congress of the same year75. Co-option has also notably occurred with religious 
organisations. 
                                                       
75 It should be noted that, rather than being a case of opening doors to newcomers, this move may be 
seen as formal acceptance of those who were already present. That is to say, very many Party 
members were already engaged in entrepreneurial activities. 
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Listening and responsiveness 
The second major strand of ‘responsive authoritarianism’ is the Party-state’s ability to 
observe and respond to societal pressures and demands, thereby enhancing its 
popularity. Indeed, assiduous attention to public opinion is, to Brady, a “new political 
paradigm”, one she dubs ‘Popular Authoritarianism’ (2010: 194). 
That the Party is popular is not in doubt. Surveys cited by Jacques (2009), Fenby (2009) 
and Whyte (2010) attest to broad support for the Party at national level, in spite of 
issues of corruption and inequality which, in the latter’s case, were clearly expected 
to diminish public sympathy (Whyte, 2010). This support does not extend to all 
corners of the administration. Fenby argues that central leadership is buttressed by 
an ‘age-old’ belief in the virtuousness of central authorities vis-à-vis venal local 
officials. “Surveys show that the approval rating for the authorities diminishes as one 
goes down the chain of command. The old idea persists that corruption and 
malpractice stem mainly from functionaries at village, township and county level (be 
they imperial magistrates or Party village bosses) and would be put right by the 
supreme power in the capital if only it knew how its servants were misbehaving” 
(Fenby, 2012).  
And now it does know, thanks to online communications. The Internet looms large as 
the primary mechanism of “popular authoritarianism”, and is discussed at more 
length in the section on the ‘Networked Public Sphere’ in Chapter 3. Though the Party 
has long cultivated organisations designed to feed information in an upward direction 
within governing hierarchies, these have been found ineffective – sometimes 
catastrophically so76 – particularly in a culture touched by Confucian caution and 
Communist sycophancy. The Internet, rather, provides an opportunity to sidestep the 
administrative sycophants of junior government and gauge genuine public opinion 
(Ferguson, 2012). Without denigrating the qualities of its own internal 
communications, the State Council Information Office (SCIO) acknowledges as much. 
A White Paper declares “the internet…has become a bridge facilitating direct 
communication between government and the public” (cited in Yang, 2010: 234).  
                                                       
76 Administrative reticence to send accurate production data up the command structure led to mass 
famine during the Great Leap Forward (dayuejin), according to mainstream historical opinion (Becker, 
1996; Dikötter, 2010). Chang and Halliday (2005) argue that the catastrophe was, rather, the result of 
wilful ignorance on the part of China’s then leader.  
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Online communications may help to identify issues which need political attention or 
provide an opportunity to directly address specific concerns. It also uncovers 
misdemeanour and malfeasance, but in a manner which proves ultimately state-
enhancing. The Party-state frequently steps into mete punishment to corrupt junior 
officials who may have been exposed online. 
Within a ‘responsive authoritarian’ frame, online communications do not constitute a 
public sphere in the Habermasian sense. Rather the Internet becomes a heavily 
monitored ‘talking shop’ which may be, depending on the preferred metaphor, an 
“echo-chamber” (Bradshaw, 2008) where the evangelical preach to the already-
converted, or a pressure cooker “safety value” (Hassid, 2012) where anger is vented 
in a controlled manner. Key to this is the transience of online discourse and, vitally, 
the option of outright suppression. There are countless tales of egregious corruption 
or immorality among officials77 which reach a cross-class, cross-regional audience. 
However, rather than being suppressed, these tales of venality, and subsequent 
reprimand, become ‘memes’ which linger long on the Chinese web. These invariably 
paint central government as democratic, responsive and efficient, and thus enhance 
the image of the strong, authoritarian state (Herold, 2013). Those which do not are 
easily removed.  
To conclude this section, responsive authoritarianism may be seen as an outgrowth of 
the transitological liberal-versus-authoritarian framework in that it maintains the 
reality of authoritarian control and seeks to offer explanations for why liberal values – 
individual rights, rule of law, electoral democracy – may be forestalled. In such a view, 
responsive authoritarianism is merely a strategy which involves doing whatever is 
required to maintain control78.  
The danger of such views is that, in seeking to explain why China hasn’t changed 
along the same lines as transitology predicts, other, perhaps more subtle, changes are 
                                                       
77 Among the most prominent of recent years are the cases of Yang Dacai, or ‘Brother Watch’ (biaoge), 
who was photographed in 2012 wearing a suspiciously expensive watch at the scene of a traffic 
accident in Shaanxi, and the case of Lei Zhengfu, a Sichuanese party official who was stripped of his 
position and jailed after a online video was uploaded in 2012 showing him having sex in a hotel with 
his mistress. 
78 See Lorentzen (2013) for a par excellence example of this approach.  
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elided. The only change perceived is the change which preserves a decrepit Party-
state and overall political stasis.  
An alternative perspective sees a more sincere effort to engage with societal needs 
and deliver better governance79. Though one-party rule is unchallenged, the Party-
state is engaged in a process where its quasi-democratic role is the balancing of 
divergent interests in increasingly complex polity.  
This thesis makes no firm theoretical assumptions in respect of these differing ideas 
about the motivation for ‘adaptive’ authoritarian strategies, but acknowledges the 
debate. However, it does make the vital assumption that the ostensibly liberal 
changes discussed at length in this thesis – specifically, the growth of public discourse 
online and media commercialisation – may not only be compatible with 
authoritarianism but may even work to strengthen it (Stockmann & Gallagher, 2011).  
The media play a vital role in the projection of and conduct of responsive 
authoritarianism (Brady, 2010; Stockmann & Gallagher, 2011; Stockmann, 2013). 
Moves to commercialise and liberalise the media have, of course, opened up 
considerable space for discourses which would once have appeared extremely 
threatening to the Party. However, while commercial media profit through increased 
credibility and popularity with their audiences, the move away from dogmatic and 
crudely propagandized ideologies fosters a more benign image of the Party-state 
which reduces both costs and challenges to the government (Stockmann, 2013). 
Moreover, the Party is still able to insist on certain representations – a concern for 
the powerless, the effectiveness of market reform – and commercial media appear 
content to work within such boundaries – some of which are more fluid than others – 
even in the absence of invasive control mechanisms. 
Discussion of the specific role the media plays in enabling so-called “responsive 
authoritarianism” requires a clearer conception of press function to be appended to 
the proposed theoretical framework, and it is to this subject that the chapter now 
turns. 
                                                       
79 See Rosenzweig (2014), French (2012) and Bishop (2012), among others. 
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Authoritarian Press Theory 
Introduction 
The historical juncture at which this thesis is being written is particularly fecund for 
theoretical questions about the nature of the press and wider media. In 2012, the 
Leveson Inquiry80 prompted a prolonged period of introspection pointed to the 
substantial gap between the ideology of ‘free journalists’ working within a ‘free press’ 
to defend a purported ‘public interest’, and the machinations of powerful societal 
institutions. Prior to Leveson, as the inquiry became colloquially known, most 
professional observers of the British press would likely have agreed with the 
suggestion that the press performed a powerful fourth estate (McQuail, 2005: 168) 
function in the British context and was thus a valuable and necessary brake on power. 
Though examples may be paraded to support this point of view, Leveson pointed to 
the way in which institutional culture and senior decision-making can both curb 
journalistic freedom and dictate journalistic behaviour.  
In this, there is considerable overlap between the UK and China, as this section will 
demonstrate. Leveson successfully highlighted how institutions such as the press are, 
to borrow a term from Network Theory, ‘nodes’ (Christakis & Fowler, 2010) within a 
map of power. This thesis assumes that though the precise ‘map’ of institutional 
actors may well vary from country to country, there is a deeper consistency in terms 
of that map’s constituent parts and interactional dynamics. In so-called ‘democratic’ 
societies, as in so-called ‘authoritarian’ societies, the media operates in a web of 
power in which politics and business interlink. These assertions act as a philosophical 
gird to the following discussion, which articulates an updated version of both Siebert, 
Peterson and Schramm’s ‘Marxist Press Theory’ (1956) and Chomsky and Herman’s 
‘Propaganda Model’ (1989) to argue how these seemingly opposing visions of press 
function may, actually, be better viewed as operating on a circular continuum, with 
significant crossover between Authoritarian and Liberal press theory.  
                                                       
80 A judicial inquiry into press standards and ethics instituted by the British Parliament which ran from 
2011 until 2012 and revealed sustained and editorially-sanctioned criminality by journalists, as well as 
collusion between press proprietors, editors and reporters and figures from both the British executive 
and the police. 
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Orientation to press functionalism 
Society consists of a constellation of co-existing individuals. Theory is required to 
understand the network of institutions which holds that constellation in some kind of 
stable order. Authoritarian press theory may be seen as a form of functionalist media 
theory which seeks to explain how communication processes may achieve the ‘social 
integration’ (McQuail, 2005: 99) alluded to. The basic processes involved are: 
surveillance of the environment (information provision); correlation of social parts 
(norm-setting, status-signalling); heritage transmission (maintaining commonality of 
values); entertainment provision (reduction of tensions); and mobilisation 
(campaigning for societal objectives) Lasswell, 1948; Wright, 1960; and Mandelsohn, 
1966, cited by McQuail, 2005: 97).  
Media, indeed information itself, should thus be seen as a potential resource for 
those seeking to generate social integration. Rather than being constitutive of any 
given independent function – to provide information, to facilitate democracy, to 
sustain one-party rule, or, more prosaically, to entertain – they are seen as agents of 
those who exercise political and economic power (Altschull, 1994; Bennett, 1996; 
Walker & Orttung, 2014).  
Framing the media as something akin to a ‘tool’ of order maintenance is problematic 
on several levels. Firstly, the framework is necessarily a conservative one, effective in 
offering explanations for states of equilibrium but less effective in explaining change. 
Secondly, its macro frame of analysis is not well suited to accommodating the 
perspectives of either media workers or those who use mass media. Finally, given 
politics itself might be reasonably defined as the management – usually the 
maintenance – of power relations within a given polity, a structural-functionalist 
framework tends to prioritise media’s political function. Such a focus inevitably 
neglects the impact that the media may have in shaping culture or acting as a forum 
for cultural transformations (Sparks, 2010). All these weaknesses are acknowledged. 
However, a functionalist perspective remains a very useful framework for analysing 
political communications which is the primary interest of this thesis. 
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Theories of the press 
The “original theory of the press” (McQuail, 2005: 169) emerged during the 18th 
century, a tumultuous period of British history where the basis of political legitimacy 
moved from “blood and God” to the “will of the people” (Wahl-Jorgensen & 
Hanitzsch, 2009). Stepping into this milieu were pamphleteers from the intellectual 
elite who used the printing press, a relatively new technology imported from 
Germany, to publically argue for Enlightenment ideals of individual liberty. English 
writer Edmund Burke coined the term ‘fourth estate’ in the late 18th century (ibid.) to 
describe the power of the press on a par with the House of Lords, House of Commons 
and the Church of England within the British political system – reinforcing the notion 
of the press as an institution of power within a wider power network81. The theory 
arose from Enlightenment concepts of rationality as espoused by thinkers such as 
John Stuart Mill and Alexis de Tocqueville. By reporting the work of Parliament, so the 
theory held, the press was the cornerstone of representative democracy. The 
information relayed to the public allowed rational discussion of political issues and 
thus the hope of correct outcomes and ultimate ‘progress’.  
The Four Theories of the Press 
It was the geo-political rise of the Soviet Union, where a Marxist-Leninist notion of 
the press had ostensibly taken root after 1917, that prompted the first serious 
academic enquiry into alternative paradigmatic possibilities for the role and 
responsibilities of the press in non-US or Western European societies. This fledgling 
enquiry intersected with the rise of the ‘transmission model’ (McQuail, 2005: 64) of 
the media which stressed the impact of media effects. Wartime propaganda (by 
fascist, communist and democratic nations alike) along with the rise of the television 
society in 1950s America, had prompted debates over the means by which the any 
given population, could be manipulated, even transformed, by mass media messages.  
                                                       
81 Edmund Burke, often characterised as an ardent liberal, took a deeply conservative view of social 
change. He bitterly opposed the French Revolution and conceived a press which was exercising ‘fourth 
estate’ powers as a mechanism by which the largely aristocratic social structure of 18th century Britain 
could be held in order. The press, in such a conception, may work to prevent the arbitrary abuse of 
power, one of Burke’s great pre-occupations, but was not a vehicle for radical reform (Norman, 2013) 
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Siebert, Peterson and Schramm’s influential text, The Four Theories of the Press 
(1956), represents a significant moment in the theorization of these debates. Four 
Theories placed its emphasis on the differences, in basic form and theory, between 
the operation of the press in the ‘communist’ Soviet Union and the ‘capitalist’ United 
States of America. Siebert, Peterson and Schramm’s typology identified four broad 
categorical divisions of press systems: authoritarian, libertarian, social responsibility 
and Soviet.  
Authoritarian Press Theory 
The authoritarian model is identified as the default setting for most press systems. It 
is identified as the most historic and still the most prevalent of media types, one in 
which the press, though privately owned, functions as a tool of the state. Its guiding 
principle, according to Siebert, may be summarised by the words of Samuel Johnson: 
“Every society has a right to preserve public peace and order, and therefore has a 
good right to prohibit the propagation of opinions which have a dangerous tendency” 
(Siebert et al, 1956: 36). The specific control mechanism used may vary according to 
specific historical context, but the results are broadly the same: the press serves the 
propaganda needs of the elite and operates as the primary tool of social control.  
That isn’t to say that the needs of the ‘masses’ are neglected or uniformly oppressed 
in the authoritarian vision of the press. Rather, the authoritarian press is grounded in 
a set of philosophical assumptions which posits the individual as being naturally 
subordinate to the group and suggests the individual can only find value and meaning 
in belonging to a polity which is stable, unified and necessarily unequal. The state 
becomes the summation of desirable attributes which have the effect of civilising and 
socialising an otherwise rootless and uncivil individual. Crudely put, what’s good for 
the elite is, ultimately, good for all.   
Under such an arrangement – with publishing decisions delegated to private, profit-
making concerns – Siebert claims there is some flexibility as to what the press may 
publish. Indeed, there may even be some occasions when, assuming the audience is 
sufficiently limited, there may be scope for nuanced political issues to be discussed. 
However, the press is restricted from engaging the masses. Rather publishers who 
might be reaching non-elite actors are required to ‘announce’ and ‘explain’ the 
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results of private deliberations rather than draw readers into an argument. Obviously, 
any materials which might be construed as an attempt to unseat, or even undermine, 
the ruling powers, would be unacceptable.  
Soviet Press Theory 
The distinction that Schramm draws between the authoritarian and the Soviet system 
is two-fold. Firstly, there is the issue of ownership of the media. The Soviet 
communist press is seen as being exclusively owned by the state. Not only is the 
profit motive thus removed from publishers’ calculations, the press also becomes an 
entirely monolithic creation – one institution that is integrated with various other 
instruments of the state and imbued with a singular ideology. 
Secondly, the Soviet press displays more of an acute emphasis on what might crudely 
be called political propaganda or agitprop. Where publishers under the authoritarian 
system might be restricted negatively – told what they cannot say – the Soviet press 
was restricted positively – told what it must say. In this sense the Soviet press is 
explicitly an instrument of social change, a “propagandist, agitator, organiser” in 
Lenin’s phrase (Siebert et al, 1956: 116). Marxist theory, which inverted Hegel’s 
notion of dialectical materialism, posits that man will be changed when society is 
changed – bluntly, man is entirely the product of his environment – and thus the 
press plays a critical role in changing the environment, or at least changing the 
impression of the environment, so that a new, communist man might emerge. In this 
effort, the press takes an incredibly serious view of itself. Entertainment is absent and 
words are seen as tools, not of any higher truth, but rather of achieving desirable 
ends82. 
In a related vein, Schramm goes to great lengths to explain how the Soviet journalist’s 
concept of his ‘responsibility’ is judged only on one criterion – his ability to adhere to 
the ‘line’:  
                                                       
82 This discussion of media ‘truth’ has interesting echoes with means and ends arguments around 
‘democracy’ and ‘human rights’. Schell & Delury (2013), amongst others, have seen a distinction 
between democracy and human rights being used as means or ends by a succession of Chinese 
thinkers and statesmen. The Western assumption, they argue, is that democracy is an end to aspire to 
– an inherent good, which will, in itself, produce a stronger, fairer and more stable society. Chinese 
figures such as Lu Xu and Liu Xiaobo have articulated this view (2014: 353). Other Chinese thinkers – 
Feng Guifen and Liang Qichao, for example – rather came to see democracy as being extremely useful, 
but as means in the service of the greater end, national revival (ibid). 
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The purpose for [the Soviet press] is the generation of unity. It is clear that 
the Marxist concept of unity and the sharp distinction between right and 
wrong positions, would not permit the press to function as a Fourth 
Estate…[or] as a forum for free discussion. Rather the Communist press 
would be conceived as an instrument to interpret the doctrine, to carry out 
the policies of the working class or the militant party. (Siebert et al, 1956: 
110) 
In a state where the revolution is directed by a vanguard of elite revolutionaries, and 
in a society where unity has an ‘almost mythical value’ (ibid: 107), one’s duty as a 
news worker is to adhere to the correct line. Ostini and Fung explain a Communist 
conception of media as being “tools that serve as implements of revelation… [and] of 
unity and consensus” (2002). Indeed, in Schramm’s mind, the Russians would have 
perceived American media’s “lack of agreement, or permissiveness towards argument, 
compromise and criticism” as “anarchy and chaos” (Siebert et al, 1956: 107). 
Notably, Siebert, Peterson and Schramm made scarcely a mention of China in The 
Four Theories, with the implication being that China’s press system, what was known 
of it at that time, was a close approximation of the Soviet’s and could safely be 
categorised with the Soviet label.  
Libertarian and Social Responsibility Models 
On the other side of the ideological divide in Four Theories are the libertarian model 
and “its nicer younger sibling” (Nerone, 1995: 181), the social responsibility model. 
The libertarian model is fundamentally a description of the ideal press as envisaged 
by Enlightenment political philosophers such as Locke and Paine, where publishers 
exist beyond state control and their collective output represents a forum for the ‘free 
market place’ of ideas which can compete for the attentions of a rational public 
without interference or manipulation. Peterson ascribes six functions to the 
libertarian press: offering the political class the information necessary to govern; 
giving the voting class the necessary information to select its government; acting as 
the watchdog of government; using advertising to unite buyers and sellers of goods; 
provision of entertainment; profit-making with the purpose of keeping itself free of 
political interference (Siebert et al, 1956: 73).  
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Recognising, it seems, the impossibility of crafting such a press in reality, Peterson 
argues the social responsibility model – the closest fit to the US press – recognises the 
possibility that the pursuit of profit inevitably interferes with the ‘public interest’ (ibid) 
aspects of the model – the unfettered exchange of equally competing ideas which 
assist both the governors and the governed in making rational choices. Rather it 
envisages a tacit exchange between state and media, with the state guaranteeing 
media certain freedoms, including the freedom to pursue profit and the freedom 
from government control, and the press conversely agreeing to behave ‘responsibly’ 
in furnishing both the state and citizens with fair, balanced and truthful information 
and ensuring that the entertainment it provides is ‘good entertainment’ (ibid: 74). 
Irresponsible behaviour, thus defined, carries the legitimate threat of state sanction. 
Conceptualising continuum 
Theories which conceptualise difference along a single, liberal axis – that of greater or 
lesser individual freedom versus greater or lesser state interference – tend to 
overstate the dangers of political interference in the media and fail to recognise the 
plurality of power in both liberal capitalist societies and ostensibly monolithic political 
systems like China’s (Curran, 2013; Wu, 2010).   
Such an objection points towards a solution to the trap of forever seeing the press – 
perhaps even political change more broadly – on a continuum between liberalism and 
authoritarianism, by drawing attention to the commonalities between these systems, 
and pointing to a more useful frame of analysis – that of power networks. 
Among the most important of these alternative power sources is capital. Herman and 
Chomsky’s Propaganda model (1988), extended by Bennett’s Elite Indexing model83 
(1990), point to an overlap between the liberal and authoritarian press theory. The 
model conceives the press as a business concerned primarily with the construction of 
an audience which can then be sold – just like any other product – to advertisers. The 
delivery of truthful and democratically-relevant information is always secondary to 
the pursuit of profit. The Propaganda Model theory postulates five ‘filters’ that 
determine the kind of news that is published or broadcast. The first three concern 
                                                       
83 This suggests news professionals are only at liberty to ‘index’ the range of voices that are expressed 
in mainstream government debate. 
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market mechanisms; rather than being guided by a determination to supply 
democratically-necessary ‘news’, Herman and Chomsky argue that content is dictated 
by, one, the economic interests of the owners of the medium; two, the sources of 
funding that medium relies on – usually advertising; and, three, the generally official 
nature of the sources of information. In addition, two further non-economic ‘filters’ 
are identified: ‘flak’ refers to the phenomenon of political forces making a concerted 
effort to manage public information via “complaint, threat and punitive action” 
directed at the media outlet; and an ideology of fear84 (Herman & Chomsky, 1988).  
The Propaganda Model contains many potential points of cross-over with the modern 
Chinese media. As Herman and Chomsky argue, “…the U.S. media do not function in 
the manner of the propaganda system of a totalitarian state. Rather, they permit – 
indeed encourage – spirited debate, criticism, and dissent, as long as these remain 
faithfully within the system of presuppositions and principles that constitute an elite 
consensus” (1988: 302). This chimes strongly with visions of China’s media as a nexus 
of co-operation between China’s political and business classes where profit is 
extracted while political authority is buttressed by permitting contained and 
inherently limited debate (Stockmann, 2013; Zhao, 2008; Lee, 2000; Lee et al, 2006; 
Akhavan-Majid, 2004).  
The biggest problem that both Herman and Chomsky’s Propaganda Model and 
Siebert, Peterson and Schramm’s authoritarian equivalent have is the assumption of 
elite consensus (Sparks, 2007). Just as it is in the US media, the subject of Herman and 
Chomsky’s theorising, the Chinese ‘elite’ may be differentiated along the ‘fracture 
lines’ discussed earlier in this chapter, with no single source of authority. Schramm’s 
model of the Soviet press may have had some relevance to Stalinist Russia of the 
1930s, or Mao’s China of the 1950s, when a single individual appeared to wield 
almost unlimited personal power. However, the Chinese political system has 
undergone profound change and horizontal and vertical distinctions exist throughout 
the CCP, and even among personal patronage networks which exist within.   
                                                       
84 The original ‘fear’ was conceptualised as being that of ‘anti-communist’ fear and specifically labelled 
as such in Herman & Chomsky’s Cold War-era text. The fall of the Soviet Union and the extinction of 
Soviet communism led to the updated and more generalised term, ‘fear’ which can be said to include 
fear of radical Islam and specific dictators such a Saddam Hussein. 
114 
 
Comparing Media Systems and Corporate 
Authoritarianism 
Attempts to formulate exhaustive ‘theories of the press’ have encountered two major 
criticisms: either they became normative prescriptions for ideal press systems which 
tended to ignore empirical evidence; or, as in the case of the Soviet or Social 
Responsibility models, they are best seen as descriptions of specific societies at 
specific historical junctures. In other words, the analysis tended to be of societies – 
either real or imagined – rather than media systems.  
It was because of such concerns that Hallin and Mancini proposed a ‘proper burial’ 
(2004: 10) for the Four Theories schema. They did not wish to jettison entirely the 
notion of searching for typologies, but rather to suggest that the unit of analysis 
should not be ‘content, purpose and effects’ but rather the commonalities in ‘media 
logic’. Siebert, Peterson and Schramm had pivoted their analysis on a single question: 
the extent to which a press was free, or not free, of state control or manipulation. 
Hallin and Mancini proposed a set of four variables on which to base a comparative 
analysis of media systems. One of these remained the extent of ‘state intervention’. 
The other three, weighted equally, were: the development of a mass press; political 
parallelism (the strength of links between politics and the press, and the extent to 
which the press reflects the constituent parts of the political system), and the 
professionalization of journalists.  
The resulting typology which Hallin and Mancini alight upon divides the Western 
Europe and North America press into three kinds: the liberal model, reasonably 
analogous to Peterson’s social responsibility model (Siebert et al, 1956); the 
democratic corporate model in which political media and commercial media co-exist 
with the state playing some role; and the polarized pluralist model, where the lines 
between different political views are clearly staked and the media play an active role 
in forging and maintaining them (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). Sparks has argued that one 
might need only invent a single further categorisation – that of corporatist 
authoritarianism – to bring most of the world’s other press systems – China included 
– into the analytical fold. Schmitter defines corporatism generally as an “institutional 
arrangement in which corporations are created and sanctioned by the state and are 
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kept as auxiliary and dependent organs of the state, and through which the state 
maintains control over and intervention in the management of these corporations” 
(1974, cited in Tai, 2006). Thus, Sparks’ ‘corporate authoritarianism’ model would see 
political media and commercial media co-existing, as under democratic corporatism, 
but with the state remaining the sole arbiter of the terms of commercial activity85. 
Hallin and Mancini neglect to consider “the ideological maintenance of state 
authority as an avenue along which the state ‘intervenes’ into the media (Roudakova, 
2012: 254-55). This is particularly pertinent in China where, even amid 
decentralisation and commercialisation, state media may be involved in defining the 
boundaries of discourse. Zhao is right to argue that one cannot give the Four Theories 
its ‘proper burial’ because China represents a “major mutation of the Soviet 
communist model” (2012: 143).  
This is primarily constituted in continued ideological control. Rather than define the 
press’s task negatively – to forbid certain topics and aggressively censor those which 
transgress agreed boundaries – the Chinese press, like its Soviet cousin, is tasked with 
being a positive ancillary of change. Given the history of western imperialism, civil war 
and social conflict in the 19th and 20th centuries, the modern Chinese state “is 
invested with the normative expectations of promoting positive freedoms, defending 
territorial sovereignty, promoting national integration, as well as engendering social 
economic developments” (Zhao, 2012: 150).  
This important aspect of state intervention requires the promotion of a hybrid 
ideology which borrows liberally from Marxism, Post-Colonialism, Nationalism and 
Developmental discourses86. The nature of these discourses will be discussed in the 
next section.  
 
                                                       
85 See Akhavan-Majid (2004) and Lee, He and Huang (2006) for fuller explanations of how such a press 
model may function. 
86 For more, see Barme (2012) and Garton-Ash (2014). 
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Language and ideology in China media discourse 
The so-called ‘normative’ theories of the press, described above, are primarily 
concerned with explaining the ‘behaviour and performance’ (Herman, 2000, cited in 
Freedman, 2009) of a media system in achieving social integration. Such an approach 
makes it necessary to at least consider media effects within the frame of analysis. 
There would, of course, be no point in maintaining a behaviour if that behaviour had 
no anticipated impact.  
Though this thesis does not attempt to examine how media texts are read or 
understood by audiences in China, it will make certain assumptions about the power 
of language to define and limit spheres of thought. These set of assumptions build on 
the work of Western discourse scholars who have demonstrated how the integration 
of the parts of any given text - lexical items, propositions, implications, 
presuppositions, descriptions, local and global coherence – may function to construct 
ideology (Van Dijk, 1998: 31-40).  It is also necessary to say a few words about the 
power of language specifically in Chinese political communications. 
An orientation to the importance of language in China  
Most scholars of Chinese politics have tended to attempt to analyse the CCP’s 
propaganda system at the macro level (Brady, 2010; Shambaugh, 2007, 2009). 
Though clearly important – and discussed in the previous chapter – structural 
analyses of institutions and processes can only ever articulate the hinterland of 
control. Equally pertinent is that aspect of propaganda which confronts consumers of 
media in China at the visceral level – language. Language can be seen as being on the 
front line of the propaganda effort and several scholars have sought to understand 
the way in which mediatised language is used to conduct politics (Schoenhals, 1992; 
Davis, 2013; Barme, 2012; Link, 2013). Indeed, the CCP’s continued domination of 
formal discourse and ideology, as discussed in the last section, demands closer 
scrutiny of “linguistic behaviour” (Barme, 2012: 2). 
Certain aspects of mediatised language can be considered “forms of power” because 
they have an intrinsic power to “cut off alternative ways of thinking and limiting the 
conceptual horizons of the people who adopt them” (Link, 2013a: 275). This affirms a 
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Maoist vision of the power of the language, set out in Yan’an in 1942, where 
“conformity with a specific public vocabulary of political terminology approved by the 
Party” is carried out “on the assumption that politically correct language causes 
politically correct thinking and behaviour” (Chilton et al, 2012: 10). The manipulation 
of public language is embedded deep in pre-communist culture. The Rectification of 
Names, a Confucian doctrine, outlines “a view of language according to which words 
determine thoughts” (ibid: 12).  
The language philosophy involved here is not, it seems, like the Platonic 
doctrine…that words naturally denote their real-world referents. Rather, it 
seems clear…that words should be chosen by the ruler in the belief that 
they determine the way people think about reality, in line with policies 
espoused.” (ibid) 
The proper labelling of things in the world, thus, generates amongst users of the 
language a proper understanding of the relationship between things. Confucian 
doctrine therefore suggests social disorder may derive from a failure to correctly label 
the world.  
The view that language may be a saviour of the nation persisted into the communist 
era. Chen Yun, one of the eight elders of the CCP and, alongside Deng Xiaoping, the 
most important leader in the post-1978 period, suggested language would be far 
more important than economics in the course of reform, tasking the “Party’s 
propaganda apparatus – the men and women who “wield the pens” – with the 
preservation of “national stability and unity” (Schoenhals, 1992: 26). 
Drawing on linguistics to argue that ‘perlocutionary’ language will inevitably produce 
“certain consequential effects upon the feelings, thoughts, or actions of the audience” 
(Austin, 1962: 101), Schoenhals is highly critical of students and scholars of Chinese 
politics who “relegate the role of language to the periphery, rather than to the centre” 
(1992: 5). 
Why is it that the art of doing things with words so dear to China’s homo 
politicus has not received the same attention as, for instance, the “art of 
guanxi”? The first explanation that comes to mind has to do with 
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academic training. Political scientists are unlikely to regard language as 
being of fundamental importance in itself and rarely look upon it as 
anything but a kind of container, “a conduit for the communication of the 
essence of thought or reality.” (Schoenhals, 1992: 5-6) 
The ‘dual-track’ language of political communications  
Chinese novelist Yan Lianke has argued that there are “currently two conflicting 
language systems in China, one belongs to the state, the other to ordinary people” 
(Yan, cited in Davis, 2013: 385). Indeed, many scholars looking at language within the 
context of Chinese political communications have observed the same gap between 
what might be termed ordinary language and the language of politics. Yang 
distinguishes between “official discourse” and the distinctively plural (and online) 
“speech genres” (2009: 140). He (2000) differentiates between “public” and 
“personal” discourse, Link (2013) between “official” Chinese and everyday language, 
while Moser (2006) discusses “news” versus “non-news”, suggesting the former has a 
particular imprimatur of officialdom. Davis has suggested these two spheres, 
variously labelled, are actually interdependent in the sense that opinion leaders may 
transmit official modes to everyday speech and official language may be 
vernacularised (Davis, 2013)87. The extent to which these two seemingly separate 
spheres are converging, particularly under the sway of online discourse, is a rich 
future research avenue, as suggested by scholars such as Meng (2010), but beyond 
the immediate purview of this thesis. What can be said with reasonable confidence is 
that the Party continues to assert control over language and continues to see 
language as a mode of power and a tool of social control (Schoenhals, 1992; Link, 
2013; Davis, 2013). 
Link’s ‘Official’ Chinese 
Link argues that the ‘official’, and ‘unofficial’ Chinese used in mainland China operates 
in two distinct spheres. This isn’t to say that two different kinds of people use it, 
rather than they are registers used by almost all people at one time or another for 
differing purposes. Link cites former CCP General Secretary, Hu Yaobang. “’What you 
                                                       
87 This came to particular prominence during Xi Jinping’s inauguration speech in 2013 when he was 
widely praised within China for using frank, down-to-earth language which contrasted strongly with 
the highly formalised language of his predecessor in the role of CCP chairman, Hu Jintao. 
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might say casually at home,’ Hu told an assembly of officials, ‘doesn’t matter very 
much. But to speak in public is to do official thought-work, and this produces social 
effects…that can be good or bad.’ Hu was accepting the political bifurcation of the 
Chinese language and simply trying to ensure that the two kinds of language 
operated in their proper sphere” (Link, 2013a: 240). 
Link defines ‘official Chinese’ in five different categories: lexicon; grammar and 
rhythm; accretion of moral weight; goal orientation; and tifa.  
‘Official’ lexicon is characterised by militaristic and gaseous language such as 
generally polysyballic, Western-derived abstractions with no concrete meaning but 
which add a veneer of scientific impartiality88; ‘official’ grammar and rhythm is 
characterised by frequent use of stative verbs, the transformation of adjectives into 
transitive verbs, and the frequent use of repetition and number lists to draw 
attention to form rather than content; the ‘accretion of moral weight’ in ‘official’ 
language involves ostensibly neutral words being repeatedly associated with positive 
or negative aspects, despite the word itself having no inherent moral orientation; the 
‘goal orientation’ of ‘official’ language refers to the habit of official discourse to state 
goals without explanation of potential methods. Readers are thus “told where to get 
to, but not how to get there” (Link, 2013a: 215). Finally, tifa refers to set, stock 
phrases, or ways of referring to specific issues or problems.  
The dissonance between highly formalised ‘official’ language and everyday ‘unofficial’ 
Chinese produces in China a ‘language game’, suggests Link, where:  
…utterances in the official language game are more reliable that ordinary 
assertions about truth or falsity. In ordinary language, a statement might 
or might not be true, and if a speaker means deliberately to deceive a 
listener, that statement is called a lie. But in the language game, where 
                                                       
88 Science has an important and complex relationship with reform and change in China. The borrowing 
of the West’s advanced scientific techniques (the West’s so-called yong) has invariably been advocated 
by Chinese reformers in the post Opium War period (Schell & Delury, 2013) and has been central to the 
post-78 transformation of the Chinese economy, with the number of students studying sciences in the 
West increasing exponentially each year since the early ‘80s. Marxism-Leninism has long sought to 
present itself as a scientifically-based set of beliefs rather than a utopian philosophy. Finally, the 
leadership under Hu and Wen in the 2003-2013 period positively prided themselves on technocratic, 
evidence-based competence.   
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the standard is not “Is it true or not?” but “Does it serve the speaker’s 
interests or not?” the counterpart of a “lie” is not possible. The person 
who hears a statement can be 100 percent sure that “this speaker believe 
that this statement serves his or her interests.” It might not be easy to 
figure out exactly what the specific interest is, but one can be sure that the 
speaker is aiming at it. It also can happen that a speaker miscalculates in 
the choice of words which will actually serve his or her interests. But that, 
too, does not change the principle that the speaker believes that the 
words will be expedient. To experienced players of the language game, 
this “impossibility of a lie” is a useful fact. One can use it to analyse what a 
speaker is doing with words. (2013: 281) 
Barme’s ‘Newspeak’  
Barme has also sought to codify many of these theme in terms of a single description 
of China’s “mainstream official language”, that of “New China Newspeak” (2012: 1). 
This is used by the Party, propaganda organs, media outlets and teachers to “shape 
(and circumscribe) the way people express themselves” (ibid). Barme identifies a 
“military-poetic complex” within post-1949 Mandarin which melds revolutionary 
discourse to poetic whimsy (ibid: 11). Numeration, he also agrees, is a favoured tactic 
of Party prose, as is the “moral-evaluative” nature of the language (ibid: 9).  
Barme notes the seemingly mongrel nature of modern political discourse. “It is the 
concern of many students of things Chinese (be they in or outside China) that the 
yawning gap between reality and rhetoric should, in the long run, make things 
untenable, or lead to some massive revision or collapse of the vestigial ideological 
power of the party-state.” (Barme, 2012: 9). He, instead, argues that the tendency to 
meld, say, scientific or technical jargon, classical references, market economy tropes 
and Marxist terminology does not signal an ideology which has lost its way. Rather:   
…the ruling ideology has gone through a transmogrification rather than a 
collapse, absorbing both leftist and neo-liberal ideas. In this context 
‘ideology’, as Epstein puts it, ‘becomes simply a habit of thinking, a 
manner of expression, the prism through which all views and expressions 
are refracted without depending on specific views and ideas – a sort of 
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universal network that may be compared to the advertising networks of 
Western nations.’ (Barme, 2012: 10, citing Mikhail Epstein89)  
Cognitive Dissonance – explanations and remedies  
These ideas intersect with the notion of cognitive dissonance, that is, the sustainment 
of ideas that are, ostensibly, in mutual contradiction. The theory has principally been 
used in the field of cognitive psychology and has, to Western theorists, been regarded 
as a puzzle or problem which demands remedy. One such theorist is Marx himself. 
Within Marxist discourse, contradictions “denote a pair of forces or phenomena 
whose co-existence, while not logically impossible, is sustained in practice only 
through tension or conflict. When they become sufficiently acute, such contradictions 
are what provide an impetus for the forces of progress to overcome capitalism” 
(Sandbu, 2014).  
Ironically, the term has also been used to describe the psycho-political necessities of 
living under communist totalitarianism90. What it demanded is obedience to a 
‘constructed’ truth which exists independent of physical reality and which may be 
altered for the sake of political expediency. Though one may believe the answer to be 
‘four’, one may ‘correctly’ give the answer five, despite this contradicting what one 
believes to be true.  
Some have sought to explain how the dissonance between language and observable 
facts is dealt with. He (2000) suggests that residual communist ideology is a zombie 
stalking political discourse in China. In his research on how dissonance affects media 
workers, he argues that journalists “do not feel unbearably disturbed by what they 
express in the public discourse universe because the hypocrisy of the Communist 
                                                       
89 The precise source of this Epstein quote was unattributed in Barme’s work. 
90 Orwell’s dystopian novel, 1984, provides the archetypal example. When Winston, the story’s 
protagonist, asserts that, “Two and two are four", his interlocutor, O’Brien, responds, "Sometimes, 
Winston. Sometimes they are five. Sometimes they are three. Sometimes they are all of them at once” 
(Orwell, 2005). This idea is amusingly re-articulated in Chang’s joke about an interview for the role of 
chief statistician in the 1930s’ Soviet Union. “The first candidate is asked by the interview board, ‘What 
is two plus two, comrade?’ He answers: ‘Five’. The chairman of the interview board smiles indulgently 
and says: ‘Comrade, we very much appreciate your revolutionary enthusiasm, but this job needs 
somebody who can count.’ The second candidate’s answer is ‘Three’. The youngest member of the 
interview board springs up and shouts: ‘Arrest that man! We cannot tolerate this kind of counter-
revolutionary propaganda, under-reporting our achievements!’ When asked the same question, the 
third candidate answers: ‘Of course it is four.’ The professorial-looking member of the board gives him 
a stern-lecture on the limitations of bourgeois science, fixated on formal logic. The fourth candidate is 
hired. His answer? ‘How many do you want it to be?’ (Chang, 2014: 210-211).  
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ideology as it has been implemented in China has made it a normal and an accepted 
social practice to wear a mask in public and to express what is not believed in private” 
(He, 2000: 608). 
Moser theorises that the polarisation of discourses in China is, itself, actually a new 
form of control. There is strict control of the ‘official’, seen by Moser as operating 
largely within the news media sphere, but almost totally free-rein given to the 
‘unofficial’ which, he claims, operates within a “hermetically sealed” sector. The 
contradictions that exist within the media between what is said to be, and what 
actually is, is so stark that both the journalists who produce such texts, and the 
audiences which consume them, internalise the contradiction as being normal. Moser 
suggests that these differences ultimately become invisible. The existence of two 
language worlds, and the gap between them, is accepted as normal and inevitable on 
the part of the audience (2006).  
Social Ideologies and Discursive Appropriations 
As Chapter 3 has discussed, the CCP is a party of mass mobilisation, one which has 
specifically used protest as a political tool on numerous occasions in its history. 
Protest is, at once, a natural and deeply embedded part of CCP ideology but also 
antithetical to a culturally-embedded preference for harmony.  
Chapter 3 provided a summary of the literature surrounding the nature of protest in 
China. In this section, I outline the discursive strategies and resources available to 
both Party and media in dealing with episodes of unrest. Because of the control they 
exercise over public discourse, political and media elites have a specific role and 
responsibility in sustaining dominant social ideologies (Van Dijk, 1995) and discursive 
appropriations (Van Dijk, 2000). They are historical and culturally-constituted and 
may both be exploited and reinforced within media narratives. The primary discourses 
are: Confucianism, nationalism, developmentalism, neo-liberalism and, importantly, 
Marxism (Barme, 2012).  
The most important discursive resource is what may be termed an underlying fear of 
internal chaos (luan). Those with even a cursory familiarity with the fascist 
governments of Hitler and Mussolini would be aware that fear has long been 
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identified as a resource for totalitarian regimes. However, in China’s case, this fear 
has specific historic credence, drawing from episodes of almost cataclysmic upheaval, 
such as the Taiping Rebellion and the Cultural Revolution. Kuo (2013) has suggested 
the Chinese popular fear of chaos, and concomitant faith in the State, may be 
compared to the American popular fear of regimented uniformity, and the 
concomitant suspicion of government. These currents are, in both cases, historically 
and culturally founded. The realities of conflict in Chinese history, as well assumptions 
of congestion and over-population91, have been deployed to suggest a binary choice 
between Party stability and chaos.  
Another of China’s key “narratives” of nationhood (Barme, 2013) is one of external 
exploitation, principally at the hands of European and Japanese colonial forces. 
Promotion and manipulation of such views may engender support for a state which is 
seen to be defending national, perhaps even civilizational (Jacques, 2009), interests. 
Again, there is historical substance to such claims. The period beginning with the 
opening British salvos of the so-called Opium War in 1839 and ending with the CCP’s 
victory over the US-backed Kuomintang government in 1949 has been dubbed the 
century of humiliation (bainian guochi) by the Party92. The CCP benefits from what 
Meng calls “historically grounded legitimacy” (2010: 502) on the basis they claim to 
have freed the nation from the yoke of colonialism. A China without the party would 
be enslaved, destitute and chaotic, hence the slogan, oft-repeated since its first use in 
the 1940s, “Without the Communist Party there would be no new China” (meiyou 
gongchandang jiu meiyou xin zhongguo). The peddling of such an image has been 
particularly vital at times when anti-foreign feeling has flared, such as protests 
following the 1999 bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade and major anti-Japan 
demonstrations in 2005 and 2012. 
                                                       
91 The author can anecdotally attest that among the most commonly cited responses to discussion of 
any given social ill in China is the argument that ‘there are just too many people’ (ren tai duo). This, of 
course, needs to be tempered with the knowledge that one’s interlocutor may be using the phrase as a 
tactic to avoid forensic or political dissection of sensitive issues. Nevertheless, there appears, on the 
face of it, to be a sincerely held impression that China’s large population has led to many undesirable-
but-unavoidable phenomena.  
92 Of course the CCP was not the first to seek to exploit perceived ‘national humiliation’. Nationalism 
was a major component of the reform movement of the 1890s – when large parts of the country were 
under foreign control – and key in explaining the rise of Sun Yat-sen and his Kuomintang Party.  
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The ‘exploitation narrative’ intersects with another important discursive resource, 
that of neo-liberalism. While claiming credit for initiating, encouraging and 
maintaining the economic dynamism which has delivered prosperity to the nation, 
there is a strategic eulogising of market-based solutions. These are presented as fair 
and even-handed in delivering practical solutions to an ever more complex polity. 
This discourse, as Mishra (2014) has noted, contains “paradoxical possibilities” 
wherein the very success of market reform results in the emergence of a supremely 
wealthy elite and a kind of capitalist anarchy. Rather than undermine the Party’s 
ideological legitimacy, the Party may be presented as the only viable counterweight 
to the business elite and corrupt local officials, presented as inevitable by-products of 
‘development’. Thus the Party is a bulwark both against external ‘exploitation’ by 
foreigners and internal ‘exploitation’ by the wealthy.  
Confucianism as a discursive resource was buried under Mao but saw a marked 
resurgence under the Hu-Wen leadership. “Confucianism’s position in Chinese society 
is equivalent to Christianity’s position in Western society” (Hamilton & Zheng, 1992: 
21) and, as such, touches almost every aspect of modern Chinese society. Thus it is 
too broad to elucidate in this short section. For the purposes of discursive potential, 
however, there are several particularly salient elements. Confucianism emphasises a 
principle of social responsibility, that is, understanding on an individual level correct 
and incorrect modes of behaviour. An important aspect of this is deference to 
established hierarchy. Even more significant is the “paternalist and welfarist” nature 
of the Chinese state which is engendered (Bell, 2008). This is an aspect which has 
risen to particular prominence in the post-Mao decline of class discourse (ibid). 
Nevertheless, class discourse cannot be completely discounted. Communist ideology, 
or Marxist-Leninist-Maoist thought, has had a profound impact on Chinese discourse 
and remains key to understanding political language (Boer, 2014). Though often 
dismissed on account of its anachronistic tenets in an era of freewheeling capitalism, 
China’s Marxist inheritance provides a significant set of resources. Marxism carries 
very helpful normative expectations of promoting positive freedoms, promoting 
cross-class integration and spurring social economic developments (Zhao, 2012). The 
CCP’s refusal to disavow this ideological legacy is generally taken to be little more 
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than a public relations sleight of hand but Marxist ideology is highly relevant to 
contemporary political discourse (Barme, 2012).  
Contradictions may be perceived within this discursive miscellany, not least in terms 
of the collapsing of neo-liberalism and Marxism. However, there are also interesting 
intersections. We have already seen how a vision of the Party as a defender against 
capitalist exploitation may be reconciled with the vision of it as a facilitator of 
capitalist development. The Confucian and communist inheritance, similarly, collide in 
the emphasis on moral instruction. China’s media, in particular, is tasked with 
ensuring its messages have a moral and ideological purity. Ideologically, the fact that 
the Chinese press does, ipso facto, perform moral duties fits didactic Confucian 
tradition, and Marxist-Leninist conceptions of the press. 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter has explained how China may be considered within broad political post-
communist transition theories. It has argued that fragmented control, born of 
commercialisation and political division, challenges simplistic notions of liberal versus 
authoritarian frames of analysis. Within this fragmented form of authoritarianism, the 
Party has worked to become responsive to societal demands and, crucially, to present 
itself as being so. It has suggested that the Party’s popularity is, in part, down to the 
ability of the Party to listen to societal currents and respond effectively.  
The response that has been foregrounded is that of media instrumentalisation and 
the promulgation of core ideologies. The rise of contention in China, expressed in 
protest and online discourses, poses a problem. An adaptive, responsive Party-state 
may choose to suppress such contention but the theory introduced points to it being 
dealt with somewhat more openly than has been previously assumed. The press, 
semi-free and highly commercialised, is seen as playing a role in asserting Party 
control though the fragmentation of political power, as discussed above, making it 
hard to predict exactly how that control will be used.  
This theoretical framework thus orients the reader towards the research questions 




Chapter 5: Methodology 
Introduction 
This research project arose from ideas that gestated during time spent working within 
several corners of the Chinese media and the weight of accumulated observation 
over a number of years prior to the beginning of doctoral study, all of which pointed 
to the fact that the media landscape in China was shifting under technologically-
facilitated social pressure. What began as a niche concern, however, evolved in the 
2011-2012 period into something approaching a mass media staple. Barely a day 
went by during that period when the author did not read commentary by journalists, 
bloggers or scholars on the subject he had begun researching. Far from assisting in 
the construction of a research design, the sheer weight of information, as well as the 
speed of change, particularly in the online sphere, led to difficulty in establishing a 
clear research focus and necessitated a number of radical revisions to both the 
conceptualisation of the project, and the specific methods to be used. This will be 
explained in more detail in the ‘Research Chronology’ section of this chapter. This 
chapter will explain and justify the methods which have been used to conduct this 
research. 
Questions, hypothesis and theoretical 
assumptions 
Research questions 
The theoretical framework sketched out in the previous chapter poses several 
research questions. These questions are:  
Q1 (Primary Research Question): How are labour, land and environmental protest 
events handled in the Chinese press? What might this indicate about press function 
in an environment where the authorities have rescinded their monopoly on 
information? 
Q1(a): What kind of representations are made of protestors and protest? 
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Q1(b): How obviously propagandized are these representations, in terms of 
Nationalist, Confucian, Neo-liberal and Marxist discourses?   
Q1(c): Is there evidence of an interplay between discourse in online and 
mainstream media?  
Q2: To what extent may variation and difference be observed in the mediation of 
protest events across the Chinese press? What might variation suggest about 
geographical and administrative fragmentation of political power? 
Explanations 
The primary research question aligns three specific areas of interest: one, the nature 
of Chinese press output on issues of political sensitivity; two, the nature of protest 
mediation in China; and three, the possible impact of online commentary and 
discussion in areas of political sensitivity.  
The decision to locate ‘the Chinese press’ at the beginning of the research question 
points towards the chief focus on this research project being the performance of 
Chinese newspapers, as opposed to the social implications of the respective protests 
or the general nature of online commentary on matters of social contention. Though 
not disinterested in these latter two points, the research is chiefly concerned with the 
potential for change, or otherwise, in the performance of the official media in China. 
The framing of the primary research question may appear to pre-suppose change and 
to pre-suppose that this change is driven by new communication technologies. 
Though the project is interested in the possibility of interplay between the online 
coverage and mainstream press coverage, particularly in terms of politically-sensitive 
news stories, it is keenly aware of other potential variables which may influence the 
reporting of the studied protest events, and influence the nature of this interplay. It 
has, for example, been notable to what extent environmental pollution and 
corruption stories have proliferated within the press during the course of this project. 
While online communications may have played a role in the formation of these news 
tropes, it is also highly likely that these, perhaps once-sensitive, news topics are, at 
the least, tolerated and, at most, encouraged, as they chime with national political 
agendas. The research is not investigating why there may have been change (or no 
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change). Rather, it is trying to articulate how protest is mediated and what the nature 
of the change is. To have any hope of answering the why question, it would be 
necessary to conduct interviews with working news professionals in China. Any 
hypothetical change is, of course, likely to be a result of competing forces, with online 
pressure being one of many competing forces, including political and commercial 
pressures. These strands cannot be separated out and understood though scrutiny of 
the output of media texts. It is for this reason that the author has limited the research 
project to the initial question of how. It is hoped that this research will provide the 
foundation for future enquiries to be made which may engage working media 
professionals and delve more into seeking causal explanations. 
Theoretical Assumptions 
The questions outlined above manifest several important and interlinked theoretical 
assumptions. Firstly, and most obviously, that the press, in all its forms, broadly 
remains an instrument of the Party-state, even at its commercial fringes and even 
where it offers ostensibly adversarial position vis-à-vis political power. The 
emergence of ostensibly critical reporting, while – at the practical level – being the 
result of individual and collective editorial decision-making, recognises the 
fragmentation of power within the Party-state. An adjunct of this assumption is the 
idea that media workers adhere at all times to explicit red lines and tend to be highly 
cautious around implicit red lines. De Burgh (2003) and others have spelled out 
possible cultural reasons for this but ultimately it is reasonable to assume that the 
vast majority of those with ‘skin in the game’ (Taleb, 2012) would not be willing to 
risk careers and livelihoods for esoteric ideals of free expression and the 
Enlightenment ideals on which they are based. 
Secondly, official recognition of the existence of widespread protest and 
consideration of legitimacy of protestor appeals is, to some extent, desirable for 
authorities. At a broad level it has the potential to create the veneer of accountability 
(see section of protest in the previous chapter). Certain tiers of government may well 
have a specific interest in seeing certain, limited cases of protest succeed at the local 
level. It is unlikely that the press will ever be saturated with stories of social 
contention, but it is possible to say some protest reporting will benefit some 
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stakeholders within China’s fragmented network of political power network, some of 
the time. Accordingly, protest can no longer be considered a ‘red line’ subject but 
rather a topic where the utmost caution needs to be exercised by media workers.  
Thirdly, in a system that has been opened up to a wider variety of public voices, 
censorship is increasingly concerned with management of information rather than 
suppression of information. Though there may remain a number of permanent red 
lines, most subjects are open to some degree of negotiation.  
Fourthly, the press has dual political and commercial functions within the overarching 
project of economic growth and national revival. The press has a role in both spurring 
economic development through advertising (Zhao, 2008) but also being sources of 
revenue for the Party-state (Lee et al, 2006). Politically, the Chinese press appears 
increasingly important in the broad task of crisis management during an era where 
social contention is both widespread and public. This doesn’t necessarily entail the 
Party dictating a version of events that absolves itself from any responsibility in times 
of social contention. Neither does it imply inconvenient information will inevitably be 
suppressed. Rather, it means the Chinese press is tasked with offering basic 
affirmation that complex problems can be resolved. There may be some tension 
between political and commercial instrumentalisation of the press but, where this is 
so, politics takes precedence. 
Finally, despite radical changes to the media system and the wider communications 
environment in China, it is assumed that traditional notions concerning the 
importance of language in forging unity remain firmly in place (Link & Qiang, 2013). 
Philosophical Assumptions 
The philosophies adopted by the researcher determine the specific approaches 
employed in conducting research. This first section will elucidate some of the broad 
philosophical debates around research paradigms, and locate the author’s own 
research within its proper philosophical context. 
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Positivism and post-positivism 
To begin, it’s useful to consider different approaches at work in the division between 
the physical and social sciences. The social scientist, distinct from the physical 
scientist, is rarely to be found consciously attempting to make a new discovery. It 
would of course be a gross caricature to suggest biologists, for example, spend their 
days searching for ground-breaking Darwinian discoveries which instantly advance 
human knowledge or introduce radical new paradigms; most practitioners in those 
fields are working on extremely niche problems which are deliberately tailored to 
advance knowledge fractionally. There is, however, a general sense with the 
discourse of physical science that practitioners are peeling back layers in a one-
directional effort to get at some established, verifiable truth. Once a certain 
procedure or theory has gone through a certain peer-reviewed experimental process, 
it enters the canon and is used as a basis on which to build future projects.  
Kuhn (1962) challenged this notion by arguing for the idea that scientists work within 
distinct ‘paradigms’ and, rather than relentlessly pursuing a process of incremental 
knowledge acquisition, are – on occasion – met with theoretical ruptures which, in a 
sense, ‘reset’ the paradigm in which they work. Though highly influential, this idea 
doesn’t essentially change the fact that, whilst within a single paradigm, physical 
scientists are using a method of incremental acquisition to make ‘knowledge claims’ 
(Creswell, 2009). 
This kind of approach to research and knowledge may be described as ‘positivist’, 
that is it asserts a ‘value-free’, ‘objectivist’ and ‘scientific’ approach which makes the 
key philosophical assumption that reality is there be to apprehended through 
experimental methodologies which seek to verify hypotheses. It takes for granted the 
fact that there are measurable facts which exist and that, while one must invariably 
introduce caveats and qualifications, these stand alone and should resist relativist 
interpretations. 
Though a positivist approach can be, indeed has been, applied to social scientific 
methods, the latter part of the 20th century saw a distinct gap emerge between the 
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social and physical sciences, particularly within the European academy93. A ‘post-
positivist’ approach has emerged which, in its most conservative position, 
acknowledges the impossibility of verifying or adequately generalising one’s findings, 
even when there is acceptance that an objectivist reality probably does exist. In its 
more ontologically expansive definition, it takes wholly interpretive perspectives, 
seeing reality as being locally, perhaps even individually, constructed within frames 
that must pay heed to social, political, cultural, ethnic and gender differences. 
Ontologically, those working within a post-positivist framework are likely to agree 
with the notion that, within the social sciences at least, there is nothing new which 
demands discovery. Knowledge is rather a filtering of reflective and interpretive 
points of view, as “all observation is fallible and all theory is revisable” (Trochim, 
2006). To crudely define the distinction, it would take gravity being miraculously 
suspended to warrant a re-examination of Newtonian physics94 for the positivist 
physical scientist whereas it requires only a change in sociological perspective – 
something that arguably happens with every passing decade, or generation – to 
justify re-examination of almost any aspect of the world in the eyes of the post-
positivist social scientist.  
It is important to stress that post-positivism is distinct from relativism. The relativist 
philosophy suggests the absolute incommensurability of different perspectives. This 
has particular pertinence in studies concerning China, a nation which only the US can 
rival in claiming for itself a quasi-spiritual exceptionalism. China ‘exceptionalists’ 
routinely argue that Chinese society represents a web of values and conditions so 
paradigmatically different to others than it may only reasonably be considered in 
terms of itself and comes from a sociology which has sought to explain, in a granular 
fashion, how the Chinese see the world and their place within it95.  
This thesis rejects this form of absolute relativism. One of its primary – post-positivist 
– philosophical assumptions is that polities and peoples that appear quite unlike are 
                                                       
93 Reading of a large number of research papers, produced across many different disciplines, 
emanating from the US suggests that American scholarly research is, in the main, guided by a positivist 
approach to knowledge and quantitative methods.  
94 Newtonian physics has, of course, been refined in the light of discoveries by 20th century physicists 
such as Albert Einstein and Stephen Hawking, discoveries which may constitute a Kuhn-like 
paradigmatic shift in scientific exploration. 
95 See Hamilton and Zheng (1992).  
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never absolutely unalike. To quarantine any particular jurisdiction – be it an individual 
or a society – is tantamount to saying that certain peoples are a world unto 
themselves and therefore must necessarily remain strangers to each another. Such an 
approach would seem to bankrupt the entire notion of academic enquiry, founded as 
it is, on identifying and exploring connections and relationships. Of course, it is vital to 
consider historical, cultural, and social specificities in order to achieve measured and 
nuanced conclusions but China’s cultural inheritance is neither simple, nor uniform, 
and must not be used to resist application of all non-Chinese theory.         
Qualitative and quantitative methodologies 
Such a distinction between positivism and post-positivism also draws into focus 
notions of qualitative and quantitative methodologies. What follows is an attempt to 
summarise the main advantages and disadvantages of both methodologies within the 
context of social science research, as well as the arguments made both for and 
against them. The author consciously introduces somewhat caricatured summaries of 
the respective positions, and acknowledges that there is an infinite number of 
qualitative or quantitative methodologies, each one potentially defensible.  
The qualitative social science researcher very often, though not always, takes a 
‘phenomenological’ approach where claims of reliable, independent, measurable 
‘facts’ are treated with extreme scepticism. He posits that social phenomena are not 
reducible to countable units, that the sheer number of causal stimuli in any given 
situation is too varied to be incorporated into the kind of preconceived coding 
framework or conceptual formula preferred by quantitative researchers. Instead, he 
prefers to open up a research problem to interpretation and alternative perspectives. 
Thus, the best method for revealing such points of view is to question and observe – 
without precondition –  to collect the data which presents itself, and then to attempt 
to explain the links. 
In addition to merely describing what exists, researchers will generally seek to offer 
possible explanations, and it is in this process that qualitative research is most open 
to criticism, particularly to those from a positivist perspective. Having collected a rich 
sea of complex, interwoven evidence, interpretation becomes necessary, but 
interpretation is only possible with the imposition of an analytical framework. This 
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framework cannot help but be subjective and influenced, to some extent, by the 
researcher’s own personal agenda. Researchers may deal with this problem by 
restricting their epistemological claims and, indeed, turn it on its head by arguing that 
knowledge is only possible through partiality.  
Quantitative research, on the other hand, attempts to make an objective and 
systematic analysis and, thus, claim for itself a more ‘scientific’ veneer. Hypotheses 
are made against which a sample can be tested96. These must necessarily be 
randomly drawn but, critically, must be representative of a given population (of 
people) or field (of, say, TV programmes or newspaper articles). These samples are 
then scanned for the presence of certain coded phenomena and against, usually, two 
or more coded variables, with the results being recorded statistically. These results 
are generally intended to be representative, generalizable and, thus, reliable. 
The chief objection to this method is the impossibility of accurately reducing 
sociological phenomena into countable units defined, often, in binary terms. If one is 
looking for positivist evidence of, for example, violence in TV soap operas, one must 
define ‘violence’ in a way that every reader of that research can agree with. From the 
point of view of the qualitative research, such a process inevitably elides complex 
strands of understanding. In its effort to make all its constituent concepts conform to 
standardised ‘units’, quantitative research generates poorly nuanced results. 
Moreover, the research is conditioned by the specific hypothetical questions that are 
posed at the outset. By designing one’s methods in a certain way, the quantitative 
researcher may load the dice in favour of a certain outcome. 
Both qualitative and quantitative researchers face what may be described as the 
‘Icarus Dilemma’, that is to say, the richness of one’s findings are very often 
dependent on proximity to one’s intended subject, and this proximity may distort the 
way one views the results. This notion is well established within the physical sciences 
as the ‘observer effect’, which suggests that the very act of observation and 
measurement may fundamentally change what is being observed and measured. 
Walker, a chemist, observes that “one of the lessons of [physical] science is that it’s 
actually quite hard to study something without changing it, but it’s quite hard to be 
                                                       
96 Hypotheses may, of course, also be used in qualitative research 
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on the earth without changing the earth or being changed, because we are part of the 
ecosystem” (2012). Frayn makes a similar point from the perspective of a social 
scientist: 
When you are in motion relative to your subject it’s very difficult to get 
into contact with it. You see it passing the window of the car or the train 
and it’s very difficult to lay your hands on it. …It’s very difficult to seize the 
world around you…whether you are looking at it, or listening to it…partly 
because you can only have a relationship, with even the most static 
objects, in time…You see very little at any one moment. The eye focuses on 
a very tiny part of the scene. It’s just that the eye keeps darting around 
and the brain puts together all the different bits you’ve seen and compares 
that with some idea you have of the subject and makes some kind of idea 
in your head out of it, but your actual physical relationship with the world 
around you is extremely fleeting and partial. (2013) 
It is crucial to stress that there is no consensus on the scientific character of either 
form of social science research. It must be admitted that manipulations and 
reductions take place in both methods; by definition, it is necessary to manipulate a 
topic in some form or other in order to make it researchable. However, one can hope 
to mitigate the distorting effects of this in a number of ways, most obviously, through 
a reflexive process whereby the researcher, as far as possible, is cautious in 
presenting one’s own findings and draws attention to the areas in which the research 
could, potentially, have been compromised. In such a situation, the social science 
researcher can do no more than justify one’s own standpoint and draw attention to 
one’s own limitations. The ‘limitations’ section of the final chapter marks the 
beginning of this process.  
Orientation to the philosophical context of this research 
project 
The discussion so far in this section has moved from an extremely broad philosophical 
view of epistemology and ontology to discussion of very general research 
methodologies in the context of social science research. This particular research 
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project is located in the field of media and communications which can claim unto 
itself yet another set of methodological and epistemological conundrums.  
Media research may be said to have moved through four broad phases since its 
inception as a distinct scholarly discipline in the 1960s97 (Couldry, 2014). The first was 
a focus on textual analyses, conducted to discern inherent and potentially hidden 
meaning. The second concerned itself with political economy and focused on 
questions of media ownership and media instrumentalisation by politics and business. 
Both strands made unverified assumptions around the effects of media texts. Thus, in 
the 1990s, a corrective emerged which examined how audiences read and 
understood texts. The most recent paradigm, which shows signs of evolving again 
(ibid), is focused on how media is used at the level of the individual to serve a set of 
specific social and psychological needs. 
This research embraces a linear approach to communications that has largely been 
supplanted in the Western context. That is, it focuses on the messages within Chinese 
media texts and assumes that authorial meanings are largely fixed. It does not seek to 
question whether the audiences which consumed those texts read the messages in 
the way intended. It adopts an entirely qualitative case study methodology and 
makes no claims to representative or generalizable findings. In this sense, this 
research project is grounded somewhere between the two extremes delineated 
above. It may be said that I adopt an epistemologically post-positivist approach 
(Lincoln & Guba, 2000, quoted in Bertrand & Hughes, 2005: 10) which seeks 
‘objectivist’ (ibid) knowledge within a realistic ontological framework, while 
acknowledging the impossibility of perfect verification, as well as the inherent 
subjectivity of the research methodology.  
Reflexivity 
As hinted above, reflexivity represents a partial solution to the problems outlined 
here. Put simply, reflexivity demands researchers make “a consideration of the 
practice of research, our place within it and the construction of our fields of enquiry 
themselves” (May, 2011: 44). This is done to demonstrate an awareness that the 
                                                       
97 Specialist departments of media and communications first began to appear in the 1960s though 
media texts had, obviously, been subject to scholarly research before then. 
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researcher can never unproblematically reflect social reality by producing “data 
without theory” or by positing “theory without data” (ibid: 43). That is to say, 
reflexivity demands the researcher critically reflects on his position within the social 
milieu in which the research is embedded. Reflexivity is a crucial method for guarding 
against that “scholastic fallacy” (Bourdieu, 2000, cited in May, 2011: 43) in which the 
researcher is assumed to be a neutral vessel, devoid of presupposition or prejudice, in 
a process of converting raw data into theory and, eventually, canonical truth. It is a 
means of guarding against what is known in the physical sciences as the 
aforementioned observer effect. Reflexivity is not an admission of the hopelessness 
of reflecting reality because of entrenched biases, but rather is a means of 
questioning, demonstrating an epistemological awareness of the nature of knowledge 
production.    
Reflexivity is a particular concern in a multi-disciplinary subject such as media and 
communications, which borrows both methods and theory from several different 
fields (Hansen et al, 1998). Results can be, and are, found to support any viewpoint. 
This makes verifiability difficult to achieve. One possible response of the post-
positivist researcher is to offer limited conclusions which recognise areas of weakness 
and which do not pretend to say more than they do. Reworking questions to take 
media away from being the centre of the subject is one possible response (ibid) and 
one taken by this research project.  
In the spirit of reflexivity, the following section delineates the way in which the study 
evolved chronologically and highlights changes to basic conceptions as well as the 
methods that were to be employed. To pretend the research design, as it is 
articulated later in this chapter, emerged, fully formed, after a period of hermetic 
isolation would be dishonest and, more importantly, unfaithful to the principles of 
reflexivity spelled out above. 
Research Chronology 
This section will summarise the way in which the project has changed over its 
duration and provide an explanation for these changes. It is a personal narrative and, 
as such, is written in the first-person.  
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My spur to doctoral work was excitement around newly developing Internet 
technologies, in particular the then-new microblog platforms. I wondered how they 
may impact journalism in China, and by extension the Chinese ‘public sphere’, and 
whether there may be an interplay developing between mainstream media and 
online communications. Both my research proposal and my early pieces of written 
work were concerned with notions of how Chinese journalists were exploiting online 
platforms for research and reporting and what this might say about political change in 
China. 
My initial assumption was drawn from a transitological frame, though this was not 
consciously recognised at the time. The idea which undergirded my thinking was that 
unidirectional change was taking place in China, driven by technological development. 
Citizens who had previously been shut out of public communication were asserting 
bottom-up pressure through web-based platforms, a phenomenon which offered 
journalists both personal succour and professional justification for expanding the 
reach of their own printed reportage. Thus my initial research occupied a frame in 
which the underlying theoretical conception was of a retreating state and an 
advancing demos, with journalists assuming a pivotal role in mediating this 
confrontation. My initial working hypothesis was that ‘self-restraint’ on the part of 
editors and journalists, a lynchpin of the censorship regime in China, would be 
undermined by the rise of social media. 
Such a conception oriented me towards literature on the democratising potential of 
web technologies; ideas of agenda-setting; concepts of journalist professionalism; 
and research on media control in the Chinese context. It also pointed towards a 
methodology which prioritised qualitative interviews with working journalists and, 
importantly, an attempt to quantify the scale of the journalistic crossover between 
mainstream and online sources.  
Because of this initial conception of a binary, and antagonistic, relationship between 
state and society, I was concerned to probe areas of online reporting and mainstream 
coverage in what I termed ‘politically sensitive’ subjects and analyse the battle 
between a repressive state seeking to control the flow of information, and a restive 
society seeking greater access to information. 
138 
 
This conception generated two methodological conundrums that proved hugely 
problematic as I began to design my research in my first and second years of study. 
Firstly, aware of the invasive censorship practices of regional and national 
propaganda departments, as well as commercial organisations bound to propaganda 
guidelines, I attempted to yield data in real-time from the Chinese web, capturing 
comments and discussions before they were removed from public view. Secondly, in 
order to capture such data, it was necessary to arrive at a deductive list of ‘sensitive’ 
story subjects, both in the online and offline (press) spheres, which led to a prolonged 
effort to search both literature and contemporary non-academic sources for clues as 
to what could be construed as perennially ‘sensitive’ to Chinese politics. 
A good deal of time was spent investigating the possibility of making quantitative 
comparisons between online and offline news sources and looking for agenda flows 
between online microblogs and official publications. I attempted to design a 
methodology which looked for correlations between online trending lists and 
mainstream press agenda, comparing them against core variables that took into 
effect commercial and political considerations such as a newspaper’s advertising 
revenue or its political ‘managing institutions’98. This necessitated taking a 
quantitative approach and a reductionist strategy where stories about, say, food 
safety scandals or political corruption were measured in binary units – either they 
were present in newspapers or they were not – with scant regard to their treatment.  
Such an endeavour generated theoretical and methodological problems. Theoretically, 
it became clear that my ‘liberation-control’ framework misconceived the Chinese 
state as monolithic, and misrepresented the politically-minded online community as 
representative of, one, all online discourse, and, two, Chinese society in general. 
Methodologically, I gradually realised that I had grossly underestimated the 
dynamism of online censorship practices at the same time as overestimating my own 
ability to capture and process real-time data. I also failed to properly grasp that, 
beyond a few well-defined tropes such as Falun Gong and June 4th 1989, the scope of 
‘sensitive’ subjects was very fluid. That is to say, sensitivity was defined, and 
redefined on a daily – sometimes even an hourly – basis. Along similar lines, I became 
                                                       
98 This administrative arrangement is discussed in more detail on page 42. 
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aware of the fact that the microblog itself was subject to debate among the political 
elite in China who, it may be reasonable asserted, saw in the technology both 
potential and threat. During the period in which I was conducting early fieldwork, 
both the Party-state and microblog providers appeared to be in a process of 
negotiating the theoretical and practical implications of weibo99 and thus were 
revising and refining policy and control techniques, making any survey of the field 
very problematic. Finally, I overestimated the amount of ostensibly ‘sensitive’ content 
in the Chinese press. Though there were episodes of great interest, to garner 
sufficient data for a comprehensive quantitative analysis, I would have needed to 
have expanded the definition of ‘sensitive’ so much that it would have compromised 
the intellectual rigour of the research. 
Finding myself at a dead-end, and having expended much time in exploring statistical 
analytical tools and developing coding sheets, I attempted a solution which took me 
even farther into that same blind alley by spending weeks pursuing the idea of 
systematically testing censorship practices across a range of microblog platforms, 
using a methodology tested by MacKinnon (2008) on static blog pages in which a list 
of sensitive keywords were deductively generated and input into Chinese blogs in an 
effort to test the gatekeeping mores of web censors. Though the nature and methods 
of censorship on the Chinese web is certainly of interest, I realised that it would have 
taken me further from my professed focus on Chinese journalism and also would 
have likely yielded no new findings. There is now considerable literature, primarily 
emanating from those with computer science backgrounds, probing the mechanisms 
and logic of online censorship. It is, for example, well-established that online 
censorship in China is extensive, broadly dispersed between different agencies, and 
subject to daily changes (Mackinnon 2009; Bamman et al, 2012; Yu et al, 2012; Zhu et 
al, 2013).  
During this early period, a lack of physical separation between ‘the field’ and my place 
of study compromised and confused my theoretical focus. In some senses, I was in 
‘the field’ from almost the first day of my PhD study. I was able to observe trends on 
microblogs and scan Chinese newsprint for corresponding articles using my PC. Some 
                                                       
99 Weibo literally means ‘mini-blog’ in Chinese and may be used generically, as in this instance, or used 
to refer specifically to the most celebrated microblog platform, Sina Weibo.  
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of my early, but ultimately discontinued, work including compiling daily, half-daily 
and hourly listings of trending topics using Sina Weibo’s data and downloading entire 
PDF copies of my sample newspapers, looking for correlations between popular 
online topics and news agendas. While this process helped to familiarise me with 
online technologies and provided bountiful pointers for possible research directions, 
it blurred the methodologically important line between preparatory work and 
fieldwork. It also led to a situation where – with hindsight – I felt as if I was chasing a 
shadow: one supposedly significant development was usurped by another, then 
another. All the while, my expected findings never quite materialised. My early 
writings were those of a journalist, not a scholar: often descriptive and speculative, 
with the focus shifting from day to day as new information and ideas emerged. In 
short, this period provided for me a fascinating but painful lesson in the need for a 
having a clear approach and research design before one steps into the field. 
The frustration of constantly pursuing the new led, in large part, to my decision to 
reorient my focus. At the practical level, I wanted to examine historic events that had, 
essentially, worked their way through the various censorship mechanisms – in both 
the online and mainstream sphere – and were thus relatively ‘settled’ as a matter of 
public record. As such, they could be studied in a qualitative manner, without the 
need for collection of enormous amounts of data. This presented a partial solution to 
the issue of the rate of change and my inability to capture that change in a sufficiently 
rigorous way.  
In terms of precisely what to study, I turned towards the subject of protest. This had 
inductive, rather than theoretical, roots. At the end of my first year of study, in late 
July and early August 2011, there were two major news events which exemplified the 
online-offline news flow I was interested in studying. The first was the crash between 
two high-speed trains near Wenzhou, on China’s east coast, which led to a flurry of 
online and press commentary, much of it highly antagonistic towards the Party-State. 
The second was a major protest in the prosperous northern coastal city of Dalian 
concerning the siting of a chemical factory. The two events, though very different, 
involved issues of online contention and provoked apparently very different media 
responses. This alerted me both to the special ‘sensitivity’ of protest in the Chinese 
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context, and the fact that protest reporting was now a feature within the Chinese 
press. This inductive discovery subsequently led to an exploration of the considerable 
literature around social contention and protest in China. Thus I began to channel my 
focus from vague notions of looking at anything ‘sensitive’ online, to a strict and 
much more workable focus on the specific issue of ‘protest’. 
The reorientation of my focus also had implications for the theoretical framework in 
which I was developing my research design. While the reporting around the Wenzhou 
rail crash appeared to send a signal that mainstream journalists were adopting an 
increasingly adversarial position, the sudden cessation of reporting on the issue, 
combined with the effectiveness with which the Dalian story was eliminated from 
mainstream news sources a few weeks later suggested that the press, and online 
media, remained firmly under the control of central and local propaganda 
departments. The incidence of protest reporting and online discussion thus took on a 
different theoretical hue: rather than seeing these phenomena as evidence of a 
significant shift in systemic relations between the State, society and the media, they 
appeared to indicate a process of what Sparks terms ‘functional adaptation’ (2010) of 
the media to a new media reality. This necessitated a paradigmatic shift in my 
conception of the entire project, seeing the possibility that change may equally be a 
directed, top-down process rather than one which comes from the bottom-up. Rather 
than see the press as a site for negotiation, it became an arena for the strategic 
implementation of communication techniques. What role, I began to wonder, did the 
press now take in mediating, moderating and ultimately controlling the threat of 
public protest. 
Methodologically, this reorientation had implications for how I went about collecting 
qualitative data. For a long time I was concerned to conduct interviews with working 
journalists. However, my new conception of the project logically meant I was no 
longer concerned with precisely what conceptions journalists had about their role in 
the communicative flow. What I was concerned about was the qualitative nature of 
what they produced for public consumption. By focusing in on social contention and 
making the assumption – born of literature and this preliminary fieldwork – that, in 
this narrow field at least, the press plays a strategic role in social integration, 
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assimilating competing ideologies, and setting the boundaries for discourse around 
contentious issues, sociological perspectives on journalistic ‘role-perception’ or 
‘professional practice’ appeared irrelevant. 
The research design thus began to assume the character with which it is presented 
here. However, even at this stage I was primarily focused on the question of how the 
development of the online sphere in China was generating change in the mainstream 
press, even if I began to be convinced this was a case of structural adaptation rather 
than the result of a negotiated outcome between journalists, voices from civil society 
and the state. As such, conducting a systematic analysis of online debate appeared an 
equally important task to the analysis of mainstream media output.  
However, this continued to cause methodological confusions. Through my second 
year of research, I continued to struggle to find a suitable methodology for handling 
large quantities of online data in a sufficiently rigorous qualitative manner, suspecting 
that a quantitative analysis would yield very little on account of the enormous 
technical expertise being brought to bear in terms of censorship. Once again, I came 
to the conclusion that, in order to clarify, I needed to reorient my focus onto print 
journalism, whilst being mindful of links to online discussion which may be pursued in 
a non-systematic manner. In a sense, this reinforced the theoretical reorientation 
detailed above. Rather than searching for evidence of print being changed by online 
commentary, I became concerned primarily without how the Chinese press was 
responding to online in the area of protest reporting. My focus was, therefore, less 
about the ‘interplay’ between the two spheres, and more about press adaptation in 
age where, manifestly, online platforms provide an alternative source of information 
for the citizenry.  
This section has summarised this research project’s radical shift in focus over the first 
two years of research. These changes may be defined in four ways, each of which 
represents a narrowing and a simplification of the research idea: firstly, the project 
has shifted in its temporal focus from contemporary events to historic (albeit recent) 
subjects; secondly, it has shifted in its theoretical focus from a sociological inquiry 
into journalistic practice to a political inquiry into press function; thirdly, it has shifted 
in terms of its object of study, from a concern with online contention and towards a 
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focus on press performance; and finally, it has moved away from an effort to collect 
representative, quantitative data to a more qualitative and necessarily subjective 
approach.   
It also entailed a radical revision of my theoretical frame, from one rooted in the 
control-versus-liberation paradigm to one of political communications and 
governance in China. This understands that the press remains a potential tool of the 
Party-state and though the space for journalism is expanded, nothing may evolve 
which has not been permitted, if not explicitly willed, by the Party-state.  
I do not seek to deny the potential for change in the Chinese media or to deny the 
potential influence from individual journalists, editors or institutions. However, the 
approach taken recognises that “the engine of innovation and change comes largely 
from within the CCP” (Cao, 2012: 142) and makes the assumption that any change 
observed serves a purpose that is ultimately in the interests of Party-state, or at least 




Qualitative research is largely an investigative process used to understand a particular 
social situation. The researcher is tasked with gradually making sense of a social 
phenomenon by contrasting, comparing, cataloguing and classifying the object of 
study (Miles & Huberman, 1984). Though a problem may be raised by qualitative 
analyses, theories to explain every facet of that problem are not established a priori.  
As the Research Chronology, above, makes clear, there is huge difficulty in studying 
the internal processes of such an inherently chaotic and mutable object as the 
Chinese press. To resolve this, I decided to focus not only on press output but only on 
certain aspects of Chinese press reporting. In making this decision, I accept that my 
findings cannot reveal anything about Chinese press behaviour as a whole, but rather 
seeks to demonstrate how different parts of the Chinese press perform in their 
approach to a specific issue of vital social and political importance.   
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Research design  
This research utilises a comparative case study research design and a qualitative 
content analysis method to explore the way in which different sections of the Chinese 
press reported three different protest events during the Hu-Wen era in China100, a 
period during which Chinese communications were radically altered by new online 
technologies. The mediation of protest is the primary unit of analysis rather than the 
realities of the issues surrounding the protest itself. As such, the research thrust of 
this project has a different focus than the extant academic literature on protest in 
China (Cai, 2010; O’Brien, 2009; Fewsmith, 2008; Perry, 2001; Hung, 2011).  
Case studies 
As has been explained above, this research was initially predicated on the idea of 
conducting systematic sampling of press output around politically ‘sensitive’ protest 
events. However, the episodic and unpredictable nature of political interference in 
media and culture in China dooms any attempt to deliver representative samples, 
particularly in an area such as protest. As such, a case study approach has been 
adopted. There are obvious limitations to this – a lack of representativeness and the 
impossibility of drawing reproducible findings, most obviously. However, as Kumar 
argues, examining purposively drawn cases “is extremely useful when you want 
to…develop something about which only a little is known” (2005: 179) – such as the 
way protest in mediated in China’s modern press.  
Each case was selected precisely because the events generated some degree of 
domestic and overseas media coverage, or academic interest. Their very presence in 
news pages is the reason for their inclusion – this is a necessarily first condition if one 
wishes to study media representations – but the research is careful not to make 
judgements about why they received media coverage, or to assume that similar 
events must necessarily generate identical responses. 
Each case also reflects a different category of social contention: environmental 
protest; urban labour; and land requisition. Chapter Three has pointed to the 
                                                       
100 Taken to mean the 2003-2013 period during which Hu Jintao acted as General Secretary of the CCP 
and President of the PRC, and Wen Jiaobao, in his capacity as Premier of the State Council, acted as the 
head of government. 
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emergence of specific genres of social contention in modern China. The above 
categories are only three of perhaps a dozen. However, they are among the most 
widespread and widely discussed. All three categories have, to some extent, been 
recognised in official discourse as legitimate social problems and so official reporting, 
though highly circumspect and carefully controlled, is not only possible but likely to 
increase in coming years. Environmental concern has grown across China over the last 
decade and the issue is widely discussed, particularly around the subject of air 
pollution101. Labour agitation is not the stuff of daily politics or news coverage but 
there is a focus on some of the social problems associated with migration for the 
purposes of urban labour, principally graduate unemployment, hukou reform and 
property prices. Forcible land requisition, the subject of the third protest, is 
absolutely central to the modern Chinese economy, and a source of wealth creation 
and government revenue. “China’s economic progress of the past 30 years is in large 
part the trick of conjuring private wealth out of communal property. Winners and 
losers have been determined by who got the land and how much they paid for it” 
(Pilling, 2012). These issues provide a challenge to officials in every province. Perhaps 
most importantly, they are obviously subject to conflicting explanations and debate.  
This research project thus seeks to analyse the mediation of protest events that 
involve vital issues of governance and which are subject to competing claims which 
may be seen as legitimate within China’s current governing framework, but which 
have not been so existentially troubling to central leadership for them to be 
considered ‘red-line’ events102. Such events are less likely to attract competing 
ideological claims and, because of the extreme political sensitivity, less likely to 
generate media coverage, which obviously renders them ill-suited to a media-focused 
project such as this.  
The very fact of mass street protest is critical in explaining why these case studies 
have been selected. The mere existence of protest means political sensitivity, and 
                                                       
101 This is most obvious in the relatively widespread media discussion of PM2.5, a particulate that is 
particularly deleterious for human health.  
102 ‘Red-line’ events are newsworthy incidents of high political sensitivity where a Chinese journalist or 
editor would understand instinctively that he or she would be ‘crossing a line’ by reporting upon it 
without explicit political supervision. Recent red line protest events include the Tibetan uprising in 
March 2008 and the Southern Weekend journalist strike in January 2013.  
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thus political instrumentalisation, may be assumed, something which is not possible 
in less extreme or sensational cases. Of course, the research cannot assume the 
precise source of that instrumentalisation, only that it will adhere in large part to the 
wishes of political masters. This is critical, and this justifies why these specific case 
studies were chosen.  
The methods employed here do not afford a forensic examination of why the issue 
became established, or claims of causality. Rather they help to examine how the issue 
appeared on the public screen and analyse how the issues are represented within 
different parts of the press. This analysis occurs within a framework which assumes 
the presence of a political propaganda strategy.  
Why newspapers? 
The press is China’s first mass-medium and continues to occupy a privileged position 
in the media pantheon, despite the competition posed by radio, television and the 
internet. Its privilege is political; newspapers are an elite media, control of which is 
necessary to influence elite politics in China (Ke, 2010: 43). Television can perhaps 
claim to be “the most influential medium shaping China’s rapidly forming market 
society” (Zhao, 2012: 159-60), but it is “highly print based and verbal oriented, rather 
than image driven, and it displays a high level of synergy with the press in terms of 
content” (ibid). In other words, in terms of political news, newspapers remain central. 
In a political environment where there is little transparency over the formal 
deliberations and decision-making processes of elite politics, newspapers have long 
been seen as a window into the opaque world of Chinese politics. Reading the signs 
have, over time, involved varying degrees of Kremlinological skill – “The art of 
interpreting non-existent inscriptions written in invisible ink on a blank page” in the 
memorable words of Leys (2013) – but what is clear is that the signs have often been 
writ in newsprint first. “The Chinese media under CCP control have been highly 
constitutive of political struggles…and of fundamental theoretical and policy debates 
over the direction of Chinese society” (Zhao, 2012). This project is interested in the 
interaction between politics and media. Newspapers represent the media form that is 




This thesis is keen to do more than analyse content on the assumption of media 
uniformity, which leads to the second major reason that newspapers have been 
selected. More than TV and radio, newspapers exemplify the ostensible threats to 
control cited in the second chapter: Chinese newsprint is highly commercialised, 
fragmented, and increasingly devolved from central power. It is thus more likely than 
other media to be a site of political and social contention. The popularity of TV has 
made it subject to tighter central control and scrutiny (Zhao, 2008) and perhaps 
explains why it is a cacophonous forum for entertainment and commerce. 
Newspapers, by contrast, have an historically-constituted role as ‘elite media’ (Ke, 
2010: 43) and thus let in more political light. If one assumes that this light may be 
reflected, refracted and diffuse because of the complexities of modern China, it 
makes it all the more pressing to study newspapers rather than more uniformly 
controlled and more commercially-focused media.  
Protest Events 
The three protest events selected for this thesis will be discussed and analysed in 
separate chapters and presented in chronological order.  
The research will begin by examining the reporting around an urban protest march 
against the siting of a peroxolyne plant. Peroxolyne – or PX – is a carcinogenic 
benzene derivative used in the manufacture of polyester. The protest occurred in 
Xiamen in early June 2007 after a period of online and offline contention and media 
discussion. Protestors were drawn from a number of constituencies but may be 
characterised as chiefly urban, relatively affluent and professional. This protest may 
be characterised as Urban Environmental Protest. 
The thesis will go on to examine reporting around a city-wide taxi strike that took 
place in November 2008 in the southwest city of Chongqing. The protestors 
comprised urban workers103 who appeared to organise along informal industrial lines. 
The incident involved drivers not only withdrawing labour but also taking to the 
streets in their cars to protest at what they saw as unfair terms by those who 
                                                       
103 Though participating taxi drivers may be said to be urban labourers and residents, many would 
undoubtedly be migrant workers who came to Chongqing from different parts of China. 
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managed and regulated their industry. This protest may be characterised as Urban 
Labour Protest.  
Finally, the research looks at reporting around a rural protest event concerning the 
alleged illegal requisition of communally-owned farming land. This took place in 
Wukan, a large village in the affluent southern province of Guangdong, between 
September and December 2011. Tensions escalated over several months, punctuated 
by short-lived episodes of physical violence against government property and workers. 
The final and most vociferous protest took place after the death in custody of one of 
the protest organisers. This protest may be characterised as Rural Land Protest. 
Some have characterised “Anticorruption” as a specific protest genre (Perry & Seldon, 
2000: 2). It could, however, be seen as a theme which forms a general backdrop to 
almost all modern protest in China104. For example, in the case of the three events 
cited above, anti-corruption is an explicit issue in the second and third protest, but is 
also related to the first, involving, as it does, political manoeuvring and opaque 
business deals. 
The research is principally interested in representations of the protest itself but also 
considers the manner in which the issues that directly precipitated the protest were 
covered by Chinese media. Thus, features and editorials which directly reference the 
ostensible cause of a protest event are also included within the analytical ambit, even 
if they do not refer directly to the protest itself.  
It is important to reiterate that this research is not attempting to compare the 
reporting to ‘reality’ in the way a content analysis might (Bertrand & Hughes, 2005: 
175). Nor is it attempting to understand how texts might be read. The media texts 
themselves are the singular core of the analysis. 
Core Newspapers 
Case studies generally seek to attract as much contextual data as possible and rarely 
rule out potentially helpful sources of data. Accordingly, this study considers potential 
data from all mainland Chinese newspaper sources. However, in seeking to assess 
potential differences between various parts of the Chinese press, some tentative 
                                                       
104 Only in religious and inter-ethnic protests may corruption be seen to be an irrelevance. 
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structural delineations are made to the analytical frame. Accordingly, this research 
makes some of the same assumptions of traditional content analysis research which – 
as Krippendorf puts it –  “assesses the differences in messages generated by two 
communicators, by one source in two different situations [and] differences in 
audiences addressed” (2004:  37).   
In scrutinising media output connected with the three protest events cited above, 
particular focus will be given to specific publications and newspapers groups. These 
are: the People’s Daily (renmin ribao), the flagship newspapers of the Southern Media 
Group (the Southern Metropolis Daily [nanfang dushibao],  Southern Weekend 
[nanfang zhoumo] and the Southern Daily [nanfang ribao]), the Oriental Morning Post 
(dongfang zaobao), and the weekly news magazine Caijing. Additionally, close 
attention is paid to both Party and commercial publications local to the specific 
protest event. 
As has been discussed in Chapter 2, literature points towards divisions within the 
Chinese press (Zhao, 2008: 81). The core newspapers above represent the three main 
genres that can be said to exist in the modern Chinese press – the Party press, the 
metropolitan commercial press and the elite business press. They also reflect 
potential power delineation along a further axis, that of geography. These 
newspapers and newspaper groups are drawn from Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou, 
three first-tier cities which each have their own political distinction. 
The research is aware of the complex ecology of the Chinese media landscape, which, 
much like China’s political bureaucracy, transcends a number of conflicting and 
competing power interests (Tong, 2008). The core newspapers vary slightly in the 
seniority of their political affiliation. One has political affiliations to the top echelons 
of the Party, while the others have provincial level affiliation. Local newspapers, in 
turn, are likely to have local political affiliations, though specifics are discussed within 
the relevant chapters.  
To discuss each core newspaper in slightly more detail, the People’s Daily, based in 
Beijing, is a so-called organ (jiguan) of the Central Committee of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP). It has played a central role in articulating political upheaval 
since 1949: editorials in the newspaper were key in marshalling the Hundred Flowers 
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Campaign and the Great Leap Forward (Scotten & Hachten, 2010: 43). In the post-
Mao era, hostility to student demonstrators in 1989 was provided by a People’s Daily 
editorial on April 26th of that year which labelled protest a “planned conspiracy” 
(Schell & Delury, 2013: 307). Confirmation of Deng Xiaoping’s later victory over the 
leftist pushback against marketization was signalled in the People’s Daily (ibid: 321).  
Though its journalists have perhaps the least scope for operating independently of 
political oversight, the People’s Daily is a worthy point of reference in any 
comparative analysis as it is regarded as being the most direct window possible into 
the opinions of national leadership. It is different from the others in this core sample 
in than it is not hard-news oriented. Its core audience are Party officials at various 
levels within the administrative hierarchy and, as such, its output is highly ideological, 
didactic, and moralising. News stories often have the feel of editorials and where 
hard news is concerned, exposition of a story is often minimal.  
The Southern Media Group is connected to the provincial leadership in Guangdong, 
China’s richest and most politically, socially and economically ‘open’ province 
(explicable by historic, cultural and geographic factors). Reflecting this, its flagship 
commercial daily, the Southern Metropolis Daily has a reputation for challenging and, 
occasionally, adversarial reporting. Its stable-mate, the Southern Weekend is a weekly 
publication renowned for its investigative, long-form reporting and takes a similar 
editorial stance.  
The Oriental Morning Post is a business-focused morning newspaper published by 
one of the most commercially powerfully media conglomerates in China, the Wenhui 
Xinmin United Press Group. It is published in Shanghai. 
Caijing is a national weekly news magazine with a strong business focus. It was 
founded in 1998. Though it has an explicitly business orientation, it carries in-depth 
stories on a variety of subjects, from media to military issues. Unlike the newspapers 
in this sample, the magazine does not have direct administrative oversight by 
provincial or ministerial level government bodies. Its official identity is that of a 
corporate newsletter and therefore it avoids a direct connection to governmental 
oversight. Caijing has an English-language edition.  
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Beyond these core newspapers, miscellaneous reports in other corners of the Chinese 
news media will be brought into the frame of analysis assuming they offer something 
substantially different to what is found in the core sample.  
As Krippendorf argues, “[a]nything connected with the phenomena of interest 
qualifies as data for content analysis” (1980: 171). Accordingly, news stories, feature 
stories, editorials, op-eds, as well as online postings that appear on platforms which 
carry the imprimatur of the news organisation are considered. Articles may be 
analysed even if they do not appear in the printed newspaper itself.  
Data Collection 
Stories were searched for through a variety of methods. The vast majority of Chinese 
newspapers, including all the core newspapers in this project, publish online versions 
of their publications. These are available to download in PDF format. The primary 
method of data collection was, therefore, to download the entire newspapers for two 
weeks either side of the protest event in order to scan for press output which 
referenced, either directly or obliquely, the themes of the event. 
There were times where online versions were not available. In these instances, the 
researcher conducted domain and date-specific searches for relevant editorial copy. 
This sometimes led to the identification of particular stories which could then be 
accessed through web-based text version rather than the original newsprint version. 
This occasionally meant it was not possible to verify that headlines and images 
matched the published output.  
The majority of stories indicated whether the story appeared in the newspaper or 
only on the newspaper’s website. Occasionally, a story did not appear in routine 
search engine results but was found to exist thanks to references in blogs or other 
online postings. In these instances, it was possible to find a copy of the relevant 
article, though this was not always sourced from the news outlet’s own website. The 
vibrancy of the online sphere in China means that stories considered politically 
interesting are very often cut and pasted in their entirety onto personal websites for 
distribution and comment. A handful of stories in the bibliography came from this 
method.   
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Methods of Analysis 
This study is interested in what Reah (1998) distinguishes as both the ‘representation 
of groups’ involved in protest, as well as the ‘discourses’ that surround both the 
protest itself and the issues from which the social contention arose. Ultimately, both 
are to some extent interested in how “language devices are used…to create and 
ideological stance’ (Reah, 1998: 110). In this respect, the project takes a broad view of 
content analysis as it is interested in language, narrative structure, typology, framing, 
and how images are utilised.  
The project is also specifically interested in the manner in which news output makes 
reference to, response to, or citation of, online, non-official sources of information or 
commentary. Though the structural and linguistic devices that are used are of interest 
in this effort, more relevant is Atkinson and Coffey’s notion of ‘intertextuality’ (1997: 
56). Under their conception:  
…the realm of documentary reality does not rely on particular documents 
mirroring and reflecting a social reality. Rather, we think of a semi-
autonomous domain of documentary reality, in which documents reflect 
and refer (often implicitly) to other documents.” (ibid).  
The research is interested in the ‘documentary reality’ of the representation of 
protest in China, not for what it says per se about the issues behind social contention 
or the descriptions given of the ‘social world’ (ibid: 61) but for what it says about the 
world constructed within media texts, subject to the conventions of that particular 
reality. “Rather than ask whether an account is true, or whether it can be used as 
‘valid’ evidence about a research setting, it is more fruitful to ask ourselves questions 
about the form and functions of the text themselves” (ibid).  Put slightly differently, 
the premise of this work is “that media content is not so much a secondary reflection 
as an artefact and a practice in which society is both reproduced and contested” 
(Schroder, 2002: 100). 
Because Chinese newspaper reporting on sensitive subjects such as protest, or indeed 
the issues that may generate social contention, is well known to employ a peculiar 
and non-natural ‘official’ register (Link, 2013a) with roots back to Maoist times, 
language and linguistics is a concern of this study. As such, the project is concerned to 
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conduct what Deacon, Pickering and Murdoch refer to loosely as a form of “media 
linguistic analysis” (2007: 150). The application of linguistics to the study of media 
texts, they argue, “has been most significant in helping to show the various ways in 
which media language use embodies relations of power and authority in society” 
(ibid). As Bertrand and Hughes point out, such kinds of analyses lend themselves to 
small samples which need not be representative (2005: 187), they seem to fit well in 
an area where data is not particularly abundant. 
The author’s linguistic analysis relies on a framework proposed by Link (2013), Davis 
(2013) and others, discussed in Chapter 4, which draws a distinction between official 
and unofficial modes of communication. Link argues that Chinese media nearly 
always uses ‘official Chinese’, which may be defined within five different categories of 
linguistic analysis, explained in the previous chapter. This largely linguistic framework 
can be merged with one that fits more comfortably in the realm of communications 
research, that proposed by van Dijk, which uses many of the same linguistic 
categories to form what he calls a ‘discourse structure’ which, in term, expresses an 
‘ideology’. Van Dijk notes the importance of lexical items, propositions, implications, 
presuppositions, descriptions, local and global coherence, and semantic moves and 
explains how these may be ‘integrated’ within a text to construct an ideology (Van 
Dijk, 1998: 31-40).   
In this merging, the author hopes to marry an analysis of the linguistic elements of 
the sampled media texts with the discourse they may reveal. Discourse, Cook says, is 
“not concerned with language alone. It also examines the context of communication: 
who is communicating with whom and why; in what kind of society and situation, 
through what medium; how different types of communication evolved, and their 
relationship to each other (Cook, 1992, cited in Bell & Garrett, 1998: 3). 
In summary, the analysis is concerned to consider structural aspects of news texts, 
and their relationship with other texts. At this level of analysis, in addition to linguistic 
elements cited by Link and van Dijk above, the research will consider newspaper 
headlines, captions, and ledes; the ordering of topics and quotation patterns, utilising 
Bell’s tools of ‘discourse structure’. These, Bell argues, can tell us “a lot about the 
character of the stories – indications of how they were made, evidence of 
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discrepancies and gaps, and manifestations of the news values behind them” (Bell, 
1998: 101). In addition to probing what is present, the analysis will question what is 
missing from news texts. Identifying absences can be as useful as identifying 
presences if the absence might have been expected, or predicted, by theory.  
This analysis relies on a broad understanding of qualitative content analysis, and will, 
where relevant, use some of the tools of structure, narrative, semiotic, framing and 
discourse analysis without being allied exclusively with any one in particular.  
Limitations of design 
This study is intended to be a cross-sectional study of the mediation of Chinese 
protest at a specific historical juncture. The case studies are, importantly, delineated 
according to protest type and geographical location – in other words, they were 
protests about different things that took place in different places. However, they are 
linked by fact of mass street protest, mainstream media involvement, and the use 
among protestors of online technologies. The most critical unifying factors is that all 
three protest events occurred during a single, coherent political period of national 
leadership under Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao.  
The author recognises the possibility of a longitudinal element being interjected into 
the analysis on the basis of two debateable liminalities. The first is the transition 
between the 16th and 17th Party Congresses in October 2007105 and the second the 
emergence of highly-social Web 2.0 technologies at approximately the same time106. 
These two evolutions did undoubtedly influence a new propaganda strategy, 
introduced early in the 17th Party Congress in March 2008, which detailed a move 
away from ‘public opinion guidance’ towards ‘public opinion channelling’107. This is 
interpreted as being a reaction to the challenges of controlling the new online 
technologies which were emerging at the outset of a new political era. One of the 
                                                       
105 Since 1992, senior Party leaders have served ten-year terms in office. These span two five-year 
periods, each marked by a single National Party Congress (zhongguo gongchandang quanguo daibiao 
dahui) at which leadership decisions are announced. 
106 Facebook and Twitter, taken to be archetypes of Web 2.0 functionality, were both launched by 
2007 and were, in the 2007-8 period, accessible from China (based on the author’s own personal use 
from China in 2007), along with Chinese copycat alternatives such as Fanfou. The launch of Sina Weibo 
in 2009, and its rapid popularisation in 2010 and 2011, may be seen as an important temporal 
threshold.   
107 This has been discussed in more detail on page 44. 
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three protest events took place before this conceptual threshold, and two after it. 
Therefore the research is mindful of the possibility that mainstream media 
performance may have changed on this basis. Nevertheless, as has been argued 
throughout this thesis, it is assumed politics takes precedence over technological 
development and the author rejects a ‘techno-utopian’ (Morozov, 2011) view of 
technology which may mark the arrival of any specific technology as revolutionising 
any given area of social, political or economic interaction. All three protests under 
examination took place during an era when the Party had manifestly surrendered its 
absolute monopoly on communicative control and was seeking to come to terms with 
a degree of unfettered public debate. This is the context against which these events 
should be considered and explains why this is very much a cross-sectional study. A 
more comprehensive longitudinal study of protest in the Chinese media would be of 
great interest to the author but is too great a challenge for this specific project and 












Chapter 6: The Xiamen PX Protest  
Background  
The Xiamen PX protest has deeply political roots. The island city has long been at the 
vanguard of the ongoing dispute between Beijing and Taipei. It was from Xiamen108 
that that Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist forces fled the mainland in 1949 and Jinmen, 
an island a few miles from downtown Xiamen, remains under Taiwanese control to 
this day.  
In the late 1980s, political tensions eased and the PRC was keen to attract investment 
from the now-wealthy island across the straits. In 1989, Premier Li Peng authorised 
the establishment of a 100sq-km ‘Taiwanese Investment Zone’ on farmland in the 
Haicang district (Ansfield, 2012). A section of the investment zone was designated for 
petrochemical development and Taiwan’s Formosa Plastics forged a deal to develop a 
large PX plant there, only for the deal to collapse amid national-level politicking (ibid). 
Xianglu, another Taiwanese-owned company with petrochemical interests, began 
operating in Xiamen in the early 1990s and, in 2001, it proposed adding a PX plant to 
its other petrochemical interests (Xiamen Evening News, 2007a). In May 2001 a 
proposal was sent from Xiamen to national regulatory authorities and a consultancy 
was commissioned to assess the project thereafter. In September of the following 
year, the consultancy reported back to the Beijing authorities. In a proposal issued in 
November 2002, the Xiamen PX plan was included within a nationally-planned PX 
network. The proposed Xiamen plant was, however, the only one which would be 
invested in by a non-mainland company.  
In 2002 and 2003, the head of Xianglu, Chen Yu-hao, became embroiled in a 
corruption scandal in Taiwan and fell out with the independence-minded president of 
Taiwan, Chen Shui-bian. Chen Yu-hao essentially became a fugitive in his homeland 
but pursued mainland investments with renewed vigour, leading to speculation that 
the project’s approval – initially by the State Council in Beijing in February 2004, next 
by the State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA)109 in July 2005 and, finally and 
                                                       
108 Then known as ‘Amoy’ in Anglophone circles. 
109 SEPA became known as the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) in 2008. 
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decisively, by the National Development and Reform Commission (guojia fazhan he 
gaige weiyuanhui), or NDRC, in July 2006 – had as least as much to do with cross-
Straits politics as it did with the specifics of the PX plant (Ansfield, 2013). 
During the years of stalled industrial development, Haicang became a focus for 
residential development. Apartments were built in large numbers – some of them 
luxury seaside condos – as well as schools and a new campus for Beijing Normal 
University. “Industrialisation and urbanisation were headed on a collision course” 
(Ansfield 2013: 151) as both government and developers sensed that real-estate was 
as potentially conducive to wealth-creation as industrial projects.  
In the spring of 2006 there was some controversy online as many of those who had 
purchased apartments in Haicang complained about smells from a nearby water 
treatment plant (Ansfield, 2013). This intensified after the official approval of the PX 
plant in July 2006. In August 2006, the Haicang Land Development Corporation began 
land requisitioning for the project and within just 80 days all the land requisitioned 
for the plant had been successfully cleared (Zhu, 2007).  
Protest Narrative 
Despite the proposal’s passage through various government bodies and the 
preparatory work conducted on-site, the project did not command media focus until 
early March 2007 during the so-called ‘two meetings’ (liang hui), that of the National 
People's Congress (NPC) (Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui, or Ren Da) and the Chinese 
People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) (Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi 
Xieshang Huiyi, or Renmin Zhixie), the PRC’s two governmental deliberative bodies 
which form every Spring. During the latter, a proposal to relocate the proposed PX 
plant, made by six academics from the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) (Zhongguo 
Kexue Yuan) – a scientific think-tank linked to the State Council – attracted 105 
signatures from fellow members of the CPPCC. The proposal was adopted as a key 
recommendation at the end of the session. The move attracted limited domestic 
media coverage (Zheng, 2007; China Business News, 2007). 
One of the CPPCC members was Zhao Yufen, a Xiamen University academic who had 
been in secret discussion with the Haicang authorities to build a biochemical plant on 
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land that was now earmarked for use by Xianglu’s PX plant (Ansfield, 2013). She and 
colleagues from Xiamen University had argued for the PX project to be relocated on 
scientific grounds in the autumn of 2006 and again in meetings with Xiamen city 
leaders in January 2007 (Qian & Bandurski, 2011). Having made no progress, Zhao 
took the case to the liang hui in Beijing. Her proposal included suggestions that 
paroxylene was a dangerous chemical which would heighten the rates of cancer and 
birth defects. It pointed to lack of adequate buffer zones between the plant and 
residential areas. PX was even linked with a highly publicized chemical spill two years 
earlier in northern China’s Songhua River.  
Online activity escalated in March when Xiamen-based freelance journalist Zhong 
Xiaoyong, writing under his pen-name Lian Yue, republished the story and repeated 
many of the claims made in the CPPCC proposal in his blog (Lian, 2007). Postings on 
the subject increased in several online forums such as Xiamen’s ‘Little Fish’ (Xiao Yu) 
forum and the student pages of Xiamen University. Anti-PX graffiti appeared in 
Xiamen, which, itself, became the subject of online discussion. Online agitation 
continued throughout the spring.  
On May 30th, with talk of a protest intensifying, the local government announced the 
suspension of the project, though left open the possibility of future resumption. 
Though the precise flow of political diktat remains unclear, it is unlikely that the 
decision to cancel was taken unilaterally at a municipal level. “Xiamen leaders, state 
media contacts confirmed [to Ansfield], had succumbed to pressure from the central 
authorities, who were plugged into the protest buzz via neican, or internal reports, 
from Xinhua news agency journalists on the ground” (Ansfield, 2013: 167-168).  
Protest marches nonetheless took place on June 1st and June 2nd, 2007. They began 
early on June 1st with a gathering of several hundred protestors outside the municipal 
government offices in central Xiamen. Protesters appeared to be largely urbanites 
concerned with deleterious health effects and the possible impact on the value of 
their properties, though this group included at least some people who, while from 
Xiamen City, were residing in rural and undeveloped locations on Haicang (Ansfield, 
2013). An initial plan to march across the bridge connecting Xiamen Island with 
Haicang was thwarted by a police block, but protestors curled back and marched 
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around the streets of central Xiamen and in the direction of Xiamen University, where 
the gates had been locked to prevent protestors entering the campus. Many carried 
banners calling for Xiamen to be protected from the chemical threat and for the 
people’s voices to be heard. Similar protests continued on June 2, documented by 
bloggers whose pictures and videos of large crowds reached a global audience via the 
web and their appropriation by mainstream media outlets. The protests ended on the 
evening of June 2 (Ansfield, 2013). 
In June there appeared some sporadic media reports though, outside of Xiamen itself, 
these referenced the protests only obliquely. In July there was limited media 
discussion of an initiative to require Xiamen Netizens to use their real names when 
registering for blog IDs. These also made oblique references to the protests. The story 
was resurrected on December 6th, 2007 when a revised Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) was released which claimed the project was safe but indicated that 
the public would have the ultimate say. Two ‘public’ seminars took place in Xiamen 
on December 13th and December 14th which received widespread media attention. 
Rumours of a decision to relocate the plant to the southern reaches of Fujian 
province were reported in a Hong Kong newspaper on December 18th amid a final 
wave of reporting on the issue on the mainland. Mainland sources were careful to 
point out that no firm decision had yet been made. Official confirmation of the move 
only came in 2008.  
A smaller scale protest in support of the PX plant was made in January 2008 by 
workers worried about losing their jobs, though this received no mainland media 
coverage (Ansfield, 2008). The NDRC ratified the decision to relocate the plant in 
2008 though further protests were reported by Taiwanese media in Dongshan, a 
tourist island close to the Gulei Peninsula, the final location for the PX plant (Beck, 
2008). The relocated plant finally began operations in 2013. 
In a final – and somewhat ironic – twist, an explosion at the plant occurred in July 
2013 on the same day the People’s Daily published an editorial in praise of the 
petrochemical industry’s safety record in mainland China (Li, 2013b).  
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The Protest in Historic Context 
The Xiamen PX protests of 2007 have been claimed as seminal in several aspects: 
firstly, they provided the first clear evidence that widespread public awareness of 
environmental costs of development had taken root in the developed and relatively 
affluent eastern seaboard cities of mainland China. For the first time in the post-89 
era, an educated middle-class was protesting on grounds beyond simple bread-and-
butter issues (Tong & Lei, 2010); secondly, the protests demonstrated how new 
online platforms and forums could be used to exchange information, organize 
opposition and foster civic engagement with China’s opaque political process (Hung, 
2013); thirdly, the Xiamen PX protest was the first to employ the ‘collective stroll’ (jiti 
sanbu), a non-violent, non-confrontational protest methodology (Trevaskes, 2012). 
Such ‘strolls’ have occurred on several notable occasions since 2007, most notably in 
Shanghai in January 2008 when hundreds of residents successfully ‘strolled’ in 
opposition to a proposed extension of the cities’ high-speed Maglev train110, and in 
2011 in Beijing when online calls were made, and apparently unheeded, for a ‘stroll’ 
in Beijing’s Wangfujing shopping district in support of so-called ‘Jasmine Revolutions’ 
taking place in north Africa. 
The Xiamen protests were not revolutionary, however, and should be seen in historic 
context. Environmental awareness has been building in China since the mid-1990s 
with the appearance of the first ‘green’ NGOs111 whose numbers, by 2008, had 
swelled to 3,539112 (Boyd, 2013: 44). There had also been a handful of prominent 
campaigns involving some levels of activism and protest which involved journalist 
actors, notably the anti Nu River dam in 2004. Certainly low-level protests against 
polluting factories or contaminated waterways had been taking place routinely during 
the first decade of the 21st century. And in terms of Information Communication 
Technology (ICT) impact, 2005’s spate of urban anti-Japanese protests had previously 
been organised by SMS.  
                                                       
110 The plan was later struck down and no extension to the Maglev has since taken place. 
111 A NGO is a non-governmental organisation. The term usually applies to not-for-profit groups which 
are not part of any given government structure. Such groups, however, may still be funded by 
government. 
112 All-China Federation figures, which include Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau. Of these, more than a 
third are actually ‘government organised non-governmental organisations’, or GONGOs. 
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In the years since 2007, anti-PX protests and marches have taken place in a number 
of major Chinese cities. A protest was reported in Nanjing in the week the relocation 
of Xiamen’s PX plant was announced (Xiao, 2008), while major protests have since 
taken place in a number of large Chinese cities, including Dalian (2011), Shifang 
(2012), Ningbo (2012), Chengdu (2013), Kunming (2013) and Maoming (2014). Indeed, 
PX protest has become so canonical within political ranks that by 2014, the China 
Executive Leadership Academy Pudong, a Shanghai-based Communist Party school for 
officials, was featuring a mock PX-related press conference as part of its training 
regime (Economist, 2014b). Anti-PX protest itself has come to be regarded as a pillar 
within the broader fold of environmental campaigning and awareness (Geall, 2013), 
which includes increased attention on matters such as air quality (specifically PM2.5), 
water pollution and movements against major infrastructure projects such as the 
damming of Tiger Leaping Gorge or the gorges of the central Yangtze.  
Narrative of Domestic Reporting 
Phases of reporting 
The national Chinese press reported the controversy around the Xiamen PX plant and 
protest in five phases. The first occurred in March 2007 when the issue was raised 
during the liang hui in Beijing. The second ran from late May until the suspension of 
the project on May 30th and largely focused on the brewing controversy. The third, 
short, phase, ran from May 31st to June 1st and focused on the cancellation of the 
project. The fourth, similarly short, phase is during the actual street protests, June 2nd 
and 3rd 113. The fifth phase comes in the immediate aftermath of the protest between 
June 4th and the middle of June. There were additional reports in November and 
December of 2007 when the PX project’s future was finalised.  
Phase 1: March 2007 (NPCCC meeting highlights case) 
The first newspaper to report the PX controversy in Xiamen was the Guangzhou-
based Southern Metropolis Daily which ran an interview with Zhao Yufen on March 
11th, prior to Zhao submitting her proposal to the CPPCC (Fang & Zhu, 2007). The 
article appears to carry a general criticism of the pace of construction across China 
                                                       
113 Protests took place on June 1st and 2nd, though, as a morning newspaper, all reports printed on June 
2nd and June 3rd would have, necessarily, been written on the previous day.  
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and the Haicang PX plant proposal is specifically referenced in the middle of the 
article. The China Youth Daily (zhongguo qingnianbao), a Beijing-based national daily 
and organ of the Communist Youth League (CYL)114, reported Zhao’s petition on 
March 15th (Zheng, 2007). On March 19th, the Beijing-based China Business News 
(zhongguo jingyingbao), a business-focused weekly run under the auspices of the 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), ran a longer story (China Business News, 
2007). Both news reports focus on the CPPCC proposal, jointly signed by 105 
members, condemning the proposed plant and highlighting its dangers, though they 
each carry supplementary interviews with Zhao Yufen. 
Phase 2: Late May 2007 (Online controversy builds, protest is threatened) 
In late-May, two publications carried interviews with Zhao Yufen. The Shanghai 
financial daily, the China Business News (diyi caijing ribao), and the Xinhua-associated 
Oriental Outlook Weekly (liaowang dongfang zhoukan) both reported concerns by 
Zhao that the Xiamen authorities had accelerated development of the PX plant and 
had refused to re-examine environmental concerns (Huang, 2007a). One of the China 
Business News (three) supervising institutions is the CYL.  
The Phoenix Weekly news magazine, affiliated with Hong Kong’s Phoenix TV channel, 
published a report on the brewing controversy in its mainland edition over the 
weekend of May 26th – 27th 115 (Liu, 2007). This was covered in Pheonix’s own You Bao 
Tian Tian Du news digest programme on May 28th, 2007 and was reprinted by blogger 
Lian Yue. However, the original magazine was physically removed from newsstands in 
Xiamen (China Economic Times, 2007). 
It was the Xiamen Evening News (xiamen wanbao), the commercial offshoot on the 
Xiamen Party organ, the Xiamen Daily (xiamen ribao)116, that first published PX-
related reports, printing first – on May 28th – a long interview with Xiamen’s 
environmental protection bureau director (Xiamen Evening News, 2007a), who 
defended the project, and, a day later, a similarly long report focused on the Dragon 
                                                       
114 The CYL is a mass membership Party organisation directly subservient to the CCP Central Committee. 
115 The magazine, issue no. 256, is technically dated May 29th, 2007 but, like many news weeklies, was 
distributed ahead of its stated publication date. 
116 As of early 2014, the Xiamen Daily is known as the Haixi Chenbao. 
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Aromatics (Tenglong) company, explaining the project’s planning process and overall 
safety (Xiamen Evening News, 2007b). 
These reports caught the attention of the southern media. Hong Kong media outlets 
covered the story in both print and on TV, while, on May 29th, the Southern 
Metropolis Daily (nanfang dushi bao) wrote a lengthy report summarising events and 
reporting on the viral spread of an SMS text message, calling for a protest, as well as 
efforts to spread dissent on its own online forum, Baoliao (Lan & Zhang, 2007).  
Locally, the Xiamen Daily, the organ of the Xiamen Municipal CCP Committee, first 
mentioned the issue in a front page report on May 30th (Xiamen Daily, 2007a). The 
decision to suspend the project was announced on the very morning the newspaper 
hit the newsstands. 
Phase 3: May 31st, June 1st 2007 (Project suspension announced) 
On May 31st the Southern Weekend carried a long summary of events, beginning with 
the news that the project had been suddenly suspended the previous day (Zhu, 2007). 
On May 31st and June 1st the Xiamen Daily carried a series of reports justifying the 
decision to suspend the development (Huang, 2007; Xiamen Daily, 2007b). 
Phase 4: June 2nd – 3rd 2007 (Street protests) 
News reports during the protests were led by the Xiamen Daily and represented a 
mixture of news stories and comment pieces. The news stories predominantly 
concerned official speeches and comments made at various governmental meetings 
specifically convened to deal with the crisis. Reports of these speeches were also 
carried on local TV (Liu, 2013). No other mainland newspaper directly reported the 
protest, though the Southern Metropolis Daily did print a story about the Xiamen 
government’s public warnings against so-called ‘rumour mongering’ on June 2nd 
(Southern Metropolis Daily, 2007a). 
Phase 5: June 4th – 26th 2007 (The protest aftermath) 
The Xiamen Daily was highly active in its reporting in the four days immediately after 
the cessation of street protests though few other publications drew attention to the 
issue. The Beijing-based business magazine Caijing published a lengthy report on June 
4th which discussed the issue of how the EIA review would be conducted but made no 
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mention at all of the protests (Zhuang, 2007). The China Economic Times (zhongguo 
jingji shibao), affiliated with the State Council’s Development Research Centre 
(guowuyuan fazhan yanjiu zhongxin), published a similar article on June 5th, delving 
into the planning and financing of the project and featuring a handful of critical voices 
from the Xiamen citizenry (China Economic Times, 2007). 
The Southern Weekend published nothing about the protest in the June 7th edition, 
the first following the protest, though it carried a comment piece, ostensibly about a 
concurrent piece of news concerned with pollution from the city of Wuxi, which 
reflected on the importance of popular happiness when pursuing an economic 
development which has serious environmental implications (Xiao, 2007). A similar 
comment piece was made in Shanghai’s Oriental Morning Post (dongfang zaobao) on 
June 5th which specifically cited the PX project, albeit briefly (Tong, 2007).  
A mission from the NDRC in Beijing visited Xiamen on June 7th (Tatlow, 2007) and the 
decision for SEPA to take control of the EIA review was made across all major news 
channels on June 8th. The Oriental Morning Post reworked a Xinhua story on the PX 
project which explained it would be reassessed on environmental protection grounds 
at a national level (Yan, 2007). The Southern Metropolis Daily also reported the story, 
with the bulk of its copy coming from a press conference exchange between 
journalists and the director of environmental protection in the Haicang district of 
Xiamen (Zhang, 2007). The Xiamen Daily, for the first time, took the majority of its 
editorial copy from Xinhua. 
China Newsweek, a magazine published by Xinhua, carried a lengthy, reflective cover 
story on the PX crisis in Xiamen on June 11th (Xie, 2007). 
On June 27th, Caijing published another report, again focused on, and arguing for, 
‘procedural fairness’ in the review process, but this time making explicit mention of 
the protest that had occurred (Long et al, 2007). 
A further round of reports on the issue appeared in December, led by the People’s 
Daily on December 19th, announcing the Xiamen government’s application to relocate 
the PX plant within the planning framework (Zhu & Jiang, 2007). In an article 
published online late on the same day, Southern Weekend suggested a “victory of 
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public opinion” (minyi de shengyi) and saw “enlightened government performance ” 
(zhengfu de kaiming biaoxian) (Zhu & Su, 2007). On December 28th the Southern 
Metropolis Daily published a special ‘thanking’ Netizens for their contributions to 
Chinese public life in 2007, making particular mention on their contribution in the 
anti-PX campaign in Xiamen (Southern Metropolis Daily, 2007b).  
Propaganda Strategies 
The following section outlines the propaganda strategy of both local and central 
government at various junctures in the 2007 protest movement, as discerned through 
an analysis of news texts.  
Xiamen Reporting 
Though there is some variety in reporting, it is helpful to delineate the core 
propaganda planks which undergird the local media’s reporting of first active phase of 
the crisis117. These set of core messages may be subdivided into two fields, the first 
addressing the nature of the project itself, and the second addressing public opinion 
towards the project. 
Explaining the project 
In terms of explaining the project, the following messages are consistently repeated 
during the pre-protest phase: 
 The project has gone through a lengthy and rigorous planning process 
 This process was approved at national level 
 The local government has reviewed plans in light of concerns raised in 
March 
 Paroxylene has been deemed by central government to be a chemical 
of “acute national shortage” (PX shu woguo jinque chanpin) 
Explaining the controversy  
In responding to the brewing controversy, Xiamen media demonstrates the following 
strategies: 
                                                       
117 Between May 26th and May 30th, defined according to the above categorisation as the second stage 
of national reporting on the situation in Xiamen. 
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 Identifies the existence of unspecified “views and opinions” (yixie 
kanfa he yijian) 
 Points to the source of these opinions as “some scholars and citizens” 
(youxie xuezhe, shimin) 
 Obliquely points to the online expression of these opinions by stating 
that they have been expressed by “employing different methods” (yi 
butong fangshi) 
 Acknowledges the views are based on an “interest in and care for” 
Haicang’s environment (chuyu… guanzhu, guanxin)… 
 …but declares that such views derive from “insufficient awareness” of 
environmental protection (bugou liaojie) 
It is evident that in Xiamen there is distinct turn-taking among the two local 
newspapers. The Xiamen Evening News was initially charged with articulating the 
government case in the first attempt to respond to online communications. However, 
just prior to the suspension of the project, the newspaper fell silent and responsibility 
evidently passed to the Xiamen Daily, the party organ and politically senior ‘mother’ 
publication, which did not report or reprint the Evening News’ interviews.  
Once reporting was passed to the Xiamen Daily, the crisis is reported primarily 
through the prism of government meetings in which the authorial voice is 
deliberately confused. That is to say, it is rarely made clear whether the printed 
words represent the reporting of the journalist or the words of government leaders.  
The first article was a short front page piece on May 30th which reported a special 
meeting of leaders, ostensibly convened to discuss the project and in which the first 
hints of a possible suspension are made (the actual suspension was formally 
announced at 9am on May 31st). The article’s headline reads: “Municipal leaders go 
to Haicang to convene a special meeting” (Xiamen Daily, 2007a).  
The content mixes defiance with apparent concession. The text itself foregrounds 
Xiamen Party Secretary, He Lifeng, and comprises a summary of his speech to the 
meeting. The article opens with a defence of the legitimacy of the PX project and 
claims that dissenting views (‘different views and opinions’) have been caused by an 
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‘insufficient awareness’ (buzu liaojie) of the process rather than any inherent problem. 
However, the dominant tone is one of concession. ‘Understanding’ (lijie) is expressed 
toward the ‘contradictions and problems’ (maodun he wenti); opposing views are 
declared to be good-natured and then; and, finally, the project is said to be in the 
process of being reassessed at the national level, prompted by unspecified changes to 
the ‘planning and construction situation’ (guihua jianshe qingkuang) at the beginning 
of the year. The result is that, according to the article, it’s possible to ‘wait a while, 
take a step back and slow things down’ (deng yi deng, kan yi kan, huan yi huan). 
A key passage makes clear the balance being struck being conciliatory recognition of 
the pure motives of commentators and the need to assert their position as being 
basically ‘incorrect’: 
Recently, based on their interest in and care for Haicang’s environment, 
but because of their insufficient knowledge of the environmental impact 
assessment, several scholars and citizens have used different methods to 
express their views and opinions. This makes abundantly clear that their 
environmental consciousness has increased and reflects their love, care 
and protectiveness towards Xiamen. (Xiamen Daily, 2007a) 
Explaining the suspension 
During the second active phase of the crisis118, a new set of messages is introduced by 
local Xiamen media. These are reconciled with the two categories of messages – 
concerning the project on the one hand, and the nature of public opinion on the other 
– that had been established over the previous few days. 
In explaining the reasons for, and benefits of suspension of the protest, the local 
media now makes the following arguments: 
 The PX project is being suspended to ‘carry out a broader 
environmental impact assessment’ (zai geng da fanwei jinxing 
huanping lunzheng) 
                                                       
118 Between May 31th and June 1st, defined according to the above categorisation as the third stage of 
national reporting on the situation in Xiamen. 
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 The government ‘respects science and public opinion’ (zunzhong kexue, 
zunzhong renyi)  
On May 31st, the Xiamen Daily carried the announcement of the suspension of the 
project. The isolated front-page headline (pointing to a longer story on page two) 
reads: ‘In order to discuss environmental impact within a larger context, the city has 
decided to suspend construction of the PX project’. 
At the top of page two of the May 31st newspaper are two near-identical stories, 
placed one below the other. The only difference between the two is the way the 
stories are introduced. The first is ostensibly a report of the outcome of an executive 
meeting, which features a list of the participants, as well as their official titles. The 
second is introduced as being a report of a news conference. Beyond the first 
paragraph, the two stories carry almost identical content, and attempt to both justify 
the original legitimacy of the project at the same time as explaining the reasons for 
postponement (the need to ‘enlarge the scope’ of the original EIA). Unlike the front 
page comment, however, both stories end with explicit references to looming 
protests. “We must actively maintain social peace and stability to protect the positive 
trend of exponential growth recently promoted by the city” (Huang, 2007b).  
Several norms are established on this day, which are repeated in the days ahead. The 
first is the establishment of a locus of PX reporting on page two of the newspaper. 
Between June 2nd and June 7th, page two of the Xiamen Daily carries multiple reports 
on the unfolding situation, dedicating the entire page to the task, and providing a 
physical locus for referencing the ‘official’ line119. Secondly, from this day forward, all 
news reports are stripped of a named author. In conjunction with the linguistic 
strategies described in the next section, this has the effect of obscuring the authorial 
voice and expanding the potential boundaries of the official, authorised, correct ‘we’; 
finally, an editorial voice is introduced for the first time, one which is deployed daily 
until June 7th. Editorials by Xia Zhongping – likely a pen-name – are numbered from 
the very first day, suggesting a strategic deployment. The first comment piece is 
printed on the front page within an eye-catching red box (Xia, 2007a), though later 
                                                       
119 The one exception is June 1st, where page two is given up to a Children’s Day report. June 1 is 
dedicated as ‘Children’s Day’ in China and school children are given a day off school and eulogised in 
civic events and activities. 
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editorials are on inside pages. That the commentator’s voice is indistinguishable from 
the general newspaper’s voice is demonstrated by the fact that it is this editorial 
which introduces the new plank of propaganda, that the government ‘respects 
science and public opinion’ as equal partners. 
Reports in the Xiamen Daily of June 1st mark a slight change in tone. For the first time, 
there is the semblance of reportage. Under a headline reading, “Suspension of 
Haicang PX Project Receives Support of Masses”, the Xiamen Daily journalist – 
unnamed – reports personally seeing work halt at the PX construction site. It also 
uses a direct quote from a manager from Dragon Aromatics. The story also features a 
purported interview with an untitled individual, named as Shen Yao, who admits to 
there having ‘previously’ been ‘worries’ (danyou) due to insufficient knowledge of the 
project, though this is immediately followed by Shen ostensibly claiming the 
suspension of the project “reflects the municipal government’s people-centredness, 
their respect for the people’s feelings and the people’s will, and their responsibility 
toward the people, which is worthy of our trust”. The story concludes with a series of 
paraphrases from CCP neighbourhood committee members, reporting that the 
people fully supported and praised the government’s care for the people’s will 
(Xiamen Daily, 2007b).  
Targeting the protestors  
The third active phase of the crisis120, coinciding with the advent of street protest, 
necessitates the introduction of another series of propaganda messages. Xiamen 
media makes the following claims in relation to street protestors: 
 Public gatherings have taken place ‘without authorisation’ (weijing 
pizhun), and ‘assemblies’ (juhui) and ‘marches’ (youxing) are ‘illegal’ 
(feifa) 
 Protests have ‘affected the normal economic and social order of the 
city, caused public transport travel inconvenience, and damaged 
Xiamen’s good image’ (yingxiang le woshi zhengchang de shengchan 
shenghuo zhuxu, gei shimin jiaotong chuxing dailai le bubian, ye 
                                                       
120 Between June 2nd and June 3rd, defined according to the above categorisation as the fourth stage of 
national reporting on the situation in Xiamen. 
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yingxiang le xiamen de lianghao xingxiang) – with particular emphasis 
made on the damage to its title as the ‘First Civilized City of China’ 
 Among the protestors lurk sinister forces. An ‘extreme minority’ 
(shaoshu ren) have ‘deliberately taken advantage of [the event] to 
cause trouble’ (youyi jieci zhizao shiduan) 
 Protestors were at risk of being harmed by the climate. Hot weather 
was likely to affect the people’s ‘physical and psychological health’ 
(shenxin jiankang) 
 Protestors were at risk of being ‘used’ (liyong) by ‘people with ulterior 
motives’ (bie you yongxin de ren) and ‘criminal elements’ (weifa fenzi). 
 Protest had damaged the odds of success for teenage students about 
to sit their gaokao university entrance exams. 
 In an expansion of an earlier propaganda plank, the government is now 







IMAGE 1: XIAMEN DAILY, PAGE 2, 2ND JUNE, 2007 
On June 2nd, the Xiamen Daily’s front page makes no mention of the previous day’s 
events, though page two (above) features eight distinct articles about the protest.   
The page lead story – headlined “Collectively redouble appreciation of peace, unity 
and [Xiamen’s] excellent situation” (gongtong beijia zhenxi anding tuanjie lianghao 
jumian) – is led with a boxed standfirst which detailed the various branches of 
government which had mobilised, pointing out that “all agree the general public 
should offer their views and suggestions through normal channels” (yizhi renwei 
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guangda shimin ying tongguo zhenchang qudao fanying yijian he jianyi) (Xiamen Daily, 
2007c). The body of the text is divided into four distinct sections, each of which 
begins in identical fashion (“Last night, the [organisational body or association] 
convened a meeting…”), differing only in terms of which organisation had mobilised 
(the Municipal People's Congress (a neighbourhood-based administrative structure); 
the municipal CPPCC; the Communist Youth League, and the Women’s Union. A fifth 
story, headlined “Citizens’ opinions reported through normal channels are welcomed” 
(huanying shimin tongguo zhengchang qudao fanying yijian), contains a brief 
description of the protest but urges participants to “remain sober minded” (baochi 
qingxing tounao) and to use “normal channels” (zhengchang qudao) to make their 
feelings known (Xiamen Daily, 2007d).  
All four initial reports begin with named representatives of the various governmental 
and administrative bodies and purport to quote their ideas without actually giving 
explicit quotes, in precisely the same manner that He Lifeng was introduced in the 
first report on May 30th (it is notable that He Lifeng is entirely absent from reports on 
June 2nd). However, in contrast to the formal reports of the proceedings of 
administrative or Party units, there is a separate story, printed beneath the cluster of 
stories and carrying its own headline (“Municipal Government Holds Press 
Conference”) which makes explicit the fact that the government is also 
communicating with the media – as opposed to pursuing intra-Party communications. 
At this press conference, the deputy mayor, Pei Jinjia, is reported as having used 
language which slightly resists the most obvious elements of the propaganda planks 
described above. He is quoted as describing the behaviour of protestors as 
‘somewhat excitable’ (bijiao jidong) while pointing to the ‘extremely few individuals’ 
(you ji gebie ren) – as opposed to an ‘extreme minority’ who had ‘deliberately 
hijacked the event to cause trouble’ (youyi jieci zhizao shiduan). 
The main report from the second day of the protest – written on June 2nd and printed 
on June 3rd – is similar in nature. It carries an almost identical headline to the previous 
day – demonstrating a consistency in the propaganda strategy – and is broken down 
into three distinct sections, with each – again – ostensibly representing a report from 
an official meeting. However, the three cited bodies are different and more junior 
173 
 
entities: democratic parties, federations of industry, people's organizations, trade 
unions and representatives from Siming District, the focus of the protest action. June 
3rd sees the first time that the phrase ‘people with ulterior motives’ (bie you yongxin 
de ren) is used (Xiamen Daily, 2007e).  
Beside the main report, the second page lead report puts the various propaganda 
messages, above, into the mouths of ordinary citizens. Headlined “Give students back 
a peaceful environment”, the article features apparent quotes from five citizens 
critical of the marches. ‘Mr Wu’ is reported as saying: “These people have wrecked 
my child’s precious revision time. They are hurting the people and damaging our 
lives”. The report goes on to quote a hotel clerk, a taxi driver, an elderly resident and 
an unnamed ‘shop keeper’ who is reported as saying, “Before you act, you need to 
think about whether you are being exploited by people with ulterior motives” 
(Xiamen Daily, 2007f). There can be no way of knowing if a member of the public 
genuinely uttered those words. What is interesting is the editorial decision to put 
words which are in absolute accordance with local government tifa into the mouths 
of citizens.  
Beside these attempts to spread anti-protest messages as widely as possible among 
representatives of Xiamen society, local media on June 3rd carries two straightforward 
reprints of statements made by academic Zhao Yufen and the Xiamen Public Security 
Bureau (Xiamen Daily, 2007g). These are not ‘reports of statements’ – the reporting 
vehicle used almost exclusively up to this point – but rather messages purported to 
be authentic by the apparent absence of mediation. They are printed in both the 
party newspaper, the Xiamen Daily, and its commercial offshoot, the Xiamen Evening 
News.  
Zhao Yufen’s signed statement disclaims comments attributed to her by ‘the media’ 
and agrees support for “the municipal government’s respect for science, respect for 
public opinion and respect for environmental protection”.  
Beside this is a statement by the Xiamen PSB which, in addition to referring 
generically to “illegal assemblies and marches” (feifa juhui, youxing), introduces two 
specific accusations of internet fabrications and threatening behaviour (discussed 
below). The statement goes on: 
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From the perspective of these events and in the view of information 
ascertained by security organs’, the character of the current situation is 
changing, and there are signs that the illegal assemblies and marches are 
being manipulated and exploited by criminal elements. The masses should 
be on high alert. The city’s security bureau hereby calls on the masses to 
treasure the benefits of peace and stability, to help the security bureau 
carry out its professional duty, to remain on a state of high vigilance, to 
clearly separate right from wrong, and to avoid being exploited by 
criminal elements. (Xiamen Daily, 2007h) 
The implied threat hinges on the term ‘high alert’ (gaodu jingjue). Not only should 
readers be alert to the presumably dangerous ‘criminal elements’ themselves, but 
they also need to be alert to the danger of being accused of belonging to that 
particular category, particularly given the fact that the assemblies have themselves 
been declared ‘illegal’.  
Reframing the protest 
June 4th marks the beginning of a new stage of the reporting of the protest. With the 
street protests now clearly over, the emphasis is on articulating resolution. The 
following messages are clear in local reports: 
 Economic development requires stability 
 Unapproved and illegal demonstrations, as well as ‘radical rhetoric’, have 
brought confusion, disorder and shame by affecting Xiamen’s hitherto 
unimpeachable national image 
 Publicity efforts must be stepped up so as to avoid future public 
misunderstandings 
 Real estate development is inseparable from social stability 
There is an obvious appropriation of national development discourse in terms of the 
need for strong economic development. There is also a renewed emphasis on the 
high quality of Xiamen’s existing environment. There are a series of articles 
specifically concerning the real estate industry in Xiamen which make clear that the 
industry will only ‘develop’ (subtext: prices will remain high) if there is a stable social 
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environment. Above all else, there is very clear emphasis on the adverse effect on 
Xiamen’s prestige and reputation caused by the protests. 
A full page of coverage in the Xiamen Daily on June 4th features a mixture of 
explanation, invitation and threat, though one which specifically addresses all of the 
primary complaints heard in the protests – procedural fairness, safety, environmental 
pollution, real estate prices – and, for the first time, hears from online commentators.  
The page-lead article appears to establish the range of permissible opinion. The 
report is based around the comments by municipal government Secretary General, Xu 
Mingyao, during a press conference the previous day. Gratitude is expressed towards 
the 1,557 residents who had already made their feelings known to the government 
through ‘normal channels’. These were declared to be of three kinds: those who 
admitted they knew little about the project and hoped the government would base 
their decision on the EIA; those who supported the project on the basis it was an 
enviable investment and good for jobs; and those who worried the project would 
cause environmental pollution. More feedback was solicited ‘through relevant 
channels’. The only reference to the protest is Xu’s comment that “we hope the 
masses will collectively safeguard Xiamen’s security and social stability” (Xiamen Daily, 
2007i). 
Contained within a large central red box are three stories and a simple cartoon which 
explains how all of Xiamen’s ‘major’ projects undergo ‘rigorous’ and ‘scientific’ 
planning and testing. One of the three stories contains an interview with a Xiamen 
resident – “a man who deeply loves the warm and beautiful city of Xiamen” – who 
had previously worked at a PX plant in the northwest region of Xinjiang. He explains 
that “From examining that plant’s recent history, not one fire or explosive accident 
has occurred to cause human injury” (Xiamen Daily, 2007j). It’s a peculiar interjection 
on the debate, given the conditional manner of the reassurance. It is stated only that 
nobody was injured in the listed accidents – not that they had not occurred – and that 
only that the ‘records’ show that no such accidents had occurred – as opposed to 
declaring no accidents having actually occurred.  
The three stories at the base of the page all purport to feature comments from real 
voices. On the left of the page is a story in which many real estate sources suggested 
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the ‘development’ of the industry would be damaged by social instability; an adjacent 
story features online voices which – again – used phrases in absolute concert with the 
official language of government officials to express their opinion. These included one 
user who claimed to have been on the marches but who realised that “individuals 
only thinking about their own gains (yi ji zhi li) stirred and organised those ignorant of 
the facts (bu zhiqing ren), and used online media to promote the marches”. Another 
features excerpts from a long story from a Netizen who was inadvertently caught up 
in the march because her taxi was blocked. She reports that the numbers were much 
smaller than the rumoured figure and reports overhearing a comment which proved 
that protestors were being organised and paid by real estate workers. The final story 
features reportage with the journalist asking six Haicang villagers their views. Aside 
from an admission from the fourth interview that “villagers had some concerns 
[about the plans] because they had insufficient understanding of the PX project” (you 
yu dui PX xiangmu quefa liaojie, cunmin duici you yixie danyou), all comments express 
explicit support for the government and condemnation of anything which upsets 
stability. 
The two stories printed in the sidebar are the most vociferous in attacking protestors. 
The uppermost is a statement from the PSB, released the previous day and printed in 
full, which asserts that offenders would be ‘punished according to the law’ (yifa 
yingyu chufa). The cited offenders are given as the “extreme minority” (jishao shu ren) 
who had continued marching on June 2; who deliberately confused the situation 
(youyi hunxiao shiting); or who had instigated and organised the marches and even 
“refused to follow orders”. A three day amnesty period is given in which those who 
“take the initiative in briefing [the PSB] on the issues would be treated leniently 
according to the law”, while those who refuse to come forward within three days, 
brief on the issues and accept punishment would be investigated and punished 
severely, according to the law” (Xiamen Daily, 2007k).  
The second story is the fifth121 instalment of Xia Zhongping’s commentary. It is filled 
with literary flourishes, metaphorical allusions and pervasive ambiguity. There are 
two related themes. Firstly, malevolent forces flourish in the dark and must be 
                                                       
121 Xia Zhongping’s editorials are actually numbered within the title of article. 
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flushed out (“Evil spirits are most afraid of the light. In the glare of the sun, they are 
shown for what they really are”). Secondly, “certain media” (gebie meiti) has allowed 
these “evil spirits” (mogui chimei) to flourish.  
There is considerable ambiguity as to exactly which media is referred to. The final line 
of the penultimate paragraph suggests it may be primarily regarded as being online 
and foreign sources: “We…advise the masses to believe the government, and to 
believe mainstream media and not to be led by the nose by alien122 and non-
mainstream media” (women…fenquan guangda shimin xiangxin zhengfu, xiangxin 
zhuliu meiti, buyao bei yixie wailai de, feizhuliu de meiti qianzhe bizi zou) which have 
“all been manipulated by invisible and impure hands” (Xia, 2007c). 
 The final paragraph is florid: 
Lin Yutang123once said that China is a country without memory. Though 
strongly put, this notion is not without substance. Haven’t we come across 
enough people with ulterior motives who have used ‘psychological tactics’ 
to confuse, deceive and harm us? Yet once the scar has formed on the 
wound, we always forget the pain it caused. The storm may have passed 
but the lesson has been a profound one. Decent folk must remain clear 
and alert. (ibid) 
June 5th marks change of tack in the local propaganda battle. The page lead picture 
story is on another major infrastructure project in Haicang which had gone through 
“scientific policy making” (kexue juece). The page lead story is a by-lined story by 
mayor Liu Cigui which extolls Xiamen’s adherence to the principles of environmental 
development, making prominent use of comments by Premier Wen Jiabao. The 
editorial, referring to the controversy as the “PX project which citizens recently paid a 
lot of attention to” (zuijin shimin guanzhu de PX xiangmu), makes repeated reference 
to the notion, espoused as one of the key philosophical planks of the Hu-Wen era, of 
“harmonious and scientific development” (Xia, 2007d). 
                                                       
122 The word ‘alien’ (wailai de) is highly ambiguous and may refer to something that is ‘foreign’, ‘exotic’, 
or merely ‘from outside the city’.   
123 An illustrious Chinese writer and translator of the early 20th century who left China in 1935 and lived 
out his years in the US. 
178 
 
Three below-the-fold stories feature direct reference to the protest. Two of the three 
feature unquoted interviews with a succession of business leaders – many of whom 
maintain political titles too – explaining the virtues of stability in terms of promoting 
Xiamen’s development. A third story features four interviews with members of the 
public who, again, speak only in official language. One is said to have “used the ‘four 
believes’ to express her view of the Haicang PX project”…“Believe the Communist 
Party, believe the municipal government; believe advanced science and believe the 
experts”. Other interviews argued for “resolutely opposing” and “resolutely stopping” 
the “illegal demonstrations and marches”. 
On June 6th, another near-full page of reporting repeats the message above, with 
another strong emphasis on the issue of real-estate. The reporting on June 7th 
features a piece on a hastily-issued explanatory booklet on the truth about PX. The 
page lead story is a summary of a letter from CPPCC member and anti-PX signatory 
Yang Jingcheng. Though it features no original quotes, Yang is said to also have “a lot 
of concerns” about environmental degradation and safety but offers criticism of the 
“illegal demonstration” which has been “hugely damaging"’ (pohaixing jida)’ to the 
city (Xiamen Daily, 2007l). June 8th sees the PX issue brought to an end in terms of 
local media coverage. A single page-two article features coverage of the news 
conference, held the previous day, where the deputy secretary general of the 
municipal government essentially announced that the national agency, SEPA, would 
assume responsibility for conducting a new EIA. Though the story is by-lined as having 
been written by an (unnamed) local reporter, it is, for the first time, predominantly 
drawn from Xinhua agency copy. 
Extra-linguistic strategies 
There are several extra-linguistic strategies worthy of specific note in the Xiamen 
Daily’s reporting on the PX protests. The newspaper’s use of images is particularly 
striking. PX articles on June 1st and 2nd are printed beside ostensibly unrelated news 
stories which carry images of pristine urban environments depicting attractive 
modern developments alongside luxuriant green lawns and trickling waterfalls. The 
visual idiom is redolent of real estate imagery, though – unlike most modern Chinese 
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real estate advertising124 – the images have not been overtly doctored as both show 
buildings appearing through a grey and hazy background. The June 2nd article 
prominently point to Xiamen’s ‘clean and beautiful’ (qingxin, meili) environment and 
depicts families lazing on a patch of grass.  
 
Xiamen Daily, June 1st, 
2007, Page 3 
 
Xiamen Daily, June 2nd, 
2007, Page 2 
 
Xiamen Daily, June 3rd, 2007, 
Page 2 
 
IMAGE 2: XIAMEN DAILY’S PRIMARY PX PROTEST COVERAGE, JUN 1-3 
The image on page 2 of the June 3rd newspaper again has an obvious connection with 
the PX protest, though, again, the article is apparently unrelated. It depicts police 
officers at rest – an obviously benevolent impression – beside a headline announcing 
the imminent establishment of a ‘police information bank’ which was to record 
performance data on individual officers. 
National Reporting 
The brewing controversy in Xiamen had manifestly not been ruled a ‘red-line’ subject 
prior to the protest. The huge reduction in reporting following the protest indicates 
the likely presence of propaganda instructions, though the continued, though 
                                                       
124 The author lived in China between 2003 and 2008 and was exposed to numerous real estate 
advertisements during this period, on billboards, brochure mailshots and media advertising. There was 
a pronounced tendency for developers to take an artist’s impression of the sale property and 
superimpose it onto an unrealistic background – a deserted bay, a tropical beach or a blue lagoon, for 
example – which was sharply at odds with the urban and congested milieu in which the property was 
actually located.  
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irregular, appearance of articles in the mainland press during June suggests that the 
story was still considered parochial enough to be covered by senior publications, 
albeit highly cautiously.  
The most significant reporting prior to the protests was made by newspapers within 
the Nanfang Group. The Southern Metropolis Daily’s (SMD) published a lengthy report 
on May 29th, building on the reports in the China Business News and the Xinhua-
associated Oriental Outlook Weekly but, uniquely, placing a clear focus on the viral 
spread of an SMS text message calling for a protest, which was quoted in full, and 
pointing to user comments on its own news website as a source to confirm the scale 
and impact of the SMS message’s viral spread.  
The SMD’s sister weekly, Southern Weekend, published a long investigative piece on 
May 31st, on the eve of the protest. This also repeated the SMS content, but claimed 
Xinhua as its source, despite the content being widely available online. The article is 
particularly hostile in its attitude toward Xiamen authorities. The report mentions 
censorship explicitly in reference to blogger and sometime newspaper columnist, Lian 
Yue.  
He was less subject to pressure from the Propaganda Department than his 
colleagues at Xiamen's newspapers and television stations, who risked losing 
their salaries, health insurance, housing subsidies and other benefits if they 
defied orders from the censors. (Zhu 2007) 
The story also reports attempts by the propaganda department in Xiamen to stifle 
non-local journalists.  
They thought they could control the national media the same way they 
controlled the media in Xiamen," one of them recalled, speaking on 
condition of anonymity out of fear the Xiamen censors could still harm him 
or his editors. (ibid) 
The occurrence of street protest on June 1st evidently made the story highly sensitive, 
though some national publishers continued to report it. Articles in the Southern 
Metropolis Daily on June 2nd borrow heavily from Xiamen Daily’s own reporting. An 
online report by Caijing on June 4th, meanwhile, assiduously avoids all mention of the 
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protest, but offers substantial detail on the procedural aspects of the PX plant’s 
planning application. On June 5th, an editorial in the Shanghai-based Oriental Morning 
Post contained a vague reference to the PX protestors. The events in Xiamen were a 
“true portrayal of the fact that the problem of environmental degradation has not 
been resolved from a systemic standpoint”, further highlighting aspects of political 
process (Tong, 2007). The objections of members of the CPPCC, academics and 
citizens were futile (wuji yushi) in effecting change in Xiamen. “Only when SMS 
messages were rapidly exchanged was there a turnaround” (ibid). Notably, there is no 
direct mention of the protest itself.  
A lengthy feature article in the Beijing-based China Economic Times (zhongguo jingji 
shibao) appeared on June 5th. The newspaper is affiliated with the Development 
Research Center of the State Council, an elite think tank based in Beijing. It too did 
not reference the protest directly, but referred, in its introduction to “public 
agitation”, and to the fact that the “controversy had not been stopped [by the 
decision to suspend construction]” (zhengyi bing meiyou yinci er tingxi) (China 
Economic Times, 2007). The article goes into considerable detail around the planning 
and financing of the proposed PX project, and claims to ‘reveal’ that complaints had 
been expressed by residents on Haicang for many months prior to the protest, but 
that the ‘channels [of communication] were not smooth’ (qudao bu changtong). The 
article, notably, also directly reports the fact that Xiamen authorities removed copies 
of a ‘legally sold’ (hefa xiaoshou) Hong Kong news magazine, though does not name 
the magazine as Phoenix Weekly (fenghuang zhoukan).  
On June 7th, a Southern Weekend editorial by Xiao Shu125 strongly praises central 
government but repeatedly cited “disorderly development of the chemical industry” 
and advocates greater public involvement in the process. The headline borrows the 
language used by the Xiamen authorities but suggests that the government must 
follow “the people’s will” (minyi), suggesting that the Xiamen government’s claim to 
already be ‘listening to the people’s will’ is overstated. The editorial deploys the 
                                                       
125 Xiao Shu went on to become a key figure in the so-called New Citizens Movement (Xingongmin 
Yundong), a collective of lawyers, journalists and activist, many of whom were subject to arrest and 
detention in 2013/4, including the group’s founding member, Xu Zhiyong. 
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political safe concept of ‘scientific development’ but does so ambiguously. At one 
point, there appears to be some scorn of the notion “scientific development”: 
Local industrial policies which follow the concept of scientific development, 
in fact, often directly violate local people’s environmental rights, property 
rights, and even their basic right to survival. (Xiao, 2007) 
The author goes on to argue that the ‘people’ (renmin) are the ‘firmest supporters’ 
(zui jianding de yonghuzhe) of scientific development. Thus safety is sought through 
strict adherence to an established political concept, but discussion of that concept 
implies a criticism of venal local officials.  
China Newsweek, a magazine published by Xinhua, carried a lengthy story on the PX 
crisis in Xiamen on June 11th. It is extremely positive in its reporting of protestors, and 
correspondingly hostile to the government in Xiamen. It begins with a story of a 
Xiamen citizen who received the aforementioned SMS and dismissed its outlandish 
elements after independent research. It features detailed description of their role in 
the protest: “From the city government to South Hubin Road, Ye Zi and her uncle's 
family followed a procession of nearly 1,000 people, and shouted slogans with them”. 
The dignity of the protestor is then contrasted with the Xiamen media’s portrayal: 
That night, Ye Zi found related news on the scrolling tickers of all of 
Xiamen's TV stations. But what she thought was just a gentle way of using 
a ‘walk’ to express her wishes was defined by the Xiamen PSB as an ‘illegal 
mass demonstration’ that ‘seriously disrupted public order and disturbed 
the lives and work of the general public.’ (Xie, 2007) 
The article features several other interviews with individual protestors, who are given 
the protection of pseudonyms and portrayed as reasonable, good-natured and 
constructive in their efforts to express their opinion. The article also features direct 
mention of the ‘screening’ of SMS messages, the forced closure of BBS forums and 
contains this transparently allegorical final line: 
At this time, the Xiamen municipal government had not revealed to 
citizens any further information regarding the PX project, so the "Boycott 
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PX, Protect Xiamen" feeling circulated by SMS gradually covered Xiamen, 
whose summer sun was unobscured by rain or thunder. (ibid) 
Inverting a metaphor used previously by Xiamen Daily columnist Xia Zhongping, here 
SMS information is presented as being ‘sunny’ and transparent, while intervention by 
local government is tantamount to the suppression of ‘rain’ or ‘thunder’.  
The article’s final line makes plain where the sympathies of editorial staff lie: 
‘Strolling’, Anti-PX, yellow scarves...these became the symbols of the citizens' gentle 
expression of their opinions” [author’s italics] (ibid).   
A lengthy article in Caijing on June 26th also deploys weather metaphors and, unlike 
its earlier report on June 4th, makes direct reference to the protest which it describes 
in the first line as a ‘spontaneous gathering’. Citizens were said to have ‘marched in 
protest’ and rather than a misunderstanding, the incident was characterised as a 
‘huge controversy’. Though protest is mentioned repeatedly in the first paragraph of 
the article, the protest is skipped during a later chronology of events, and is referred 
to merely as an ‘event’ (shi). The article’s chief focus is on procedural fairness and it 
mentions several potentially sensitive aspects of the case, including alleged problems 
in finding suitable contractors to conduct the new EIA, and wider issues around 
corruption and poor practices in the development of a major infrastructure project. 
There are specific references to the superiority of comparable systems in the US. 
Though much of this part of the article does not specifically mention Xiamen itself, 
the city is mentioned again in the final lines: 
In Xiamen’s PX storm, all the information that should have been made 
public is contained within a ‘black box’. Though the Xiamen municipal 
government widely distributed a "PX: What You Should Know?" brochure 
after the event, it contained only basic scientific facts and is obviously a far 
cry from the true knowledge and participation that the public demands. 
(Long et al, 2007) 
Summary 
The many narratives of the Xiamen PX protest that now exist pay lip service to the 
role of the press. The description of coverage within the national press indicates that 
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a substantial amount of coverage was generated in mainstream media. Though, prior 
to the protest, there is clear symbiosis between online comment and mainstream 
coverage, after the protest itself mainstream publications continued to report the 
incident, albeit under evident reporting restrictions, and kept the issue in the 
headlines, especially in December.  
An analysis of news texts is insufficient to provide a definitive description and an 
explanation of propaganda strategies at various tiers of the Chinese administration 
during this event. However, there are some limited conclusions that may be drawn. 
Firstly, and most obvious, there was a clear rift between national publications and 
local media in their mediation of the protest event. These differences were manifest 
in the way the protests were reported and the language employed. This will be 
discussed further in the next section. 
In terms of local reporting, the Xiamen government had initially dealt with the 
brewing controversy by suppressing reporting – either actively or implicitly – but was 
seemingly forced to enter into a public debate by the sheer number of non-local 
media. Once a threshold had been breached, local media conducted a large amount 
of reporting in the days before and after the protest in an obvious attempt to control 
the discourse. After an initial attempt to present a case in the commercial media, the 
local media strategy was enacted exclusively by the party organ, the Xiamen Daily, its 
voice reflecting the propaganda strategy of local government, and replicated in other 
local media.  
The strategy, such as can be discerned, initially revolved around an escalation of 
threat as the day of the protest approached, together with attempts to systematically 
rebut the various criticisms voiced by protestors. The outbreak of protest on June 1st 
led to two notable propaganda strategies, working to a singular purpose.  
Firstly, there was a rapid, and somewhat concessionary, re-articulation of the core 
propaganda message. Prior to the protest, the key propaganda message was that, 
essentially, ‘public opinion exists, but it was ‘ill-informed’. With the outbreak of 
protest, this moved to the argument that ‘the government respects public opinion 
and science’- a subtle change as it implies that, unless opinion is scientifically-based, 
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it is likely to be wrong. Finally, by the end of the street protest, the propaganda line 
became ‘the government respects public opinion, science and environmental 
protection’, by far the most concessionary and inclusive.  
Secondly, after initial reports which featured only the words of the political 
leadership, interviews with locals were used widely in the days after the protest, 
albeit in terms of interviews where the language employed never deviated from the 
‘official’. Reporting of the detrimental impact on real estate was notable and, likely, a 
riposte to those who had been protesting on grounds of the drop in value of their 
own homes. Equally notable was the manner in which the local press sought to 
appropriate voices of two of the senior opponents of the PX plant. Zhao Yufen’s 
signed statement of support for the government came first on June 3rd, followed by a 
summary of a letter sent by local politician Yang Jingcheng on June 8th.  
The strategy at work in the messages above is one of absolute inclusiveness. There is 
an attempt to generate a media screen in which all of the identifiable elements 
involved in protest are represented within the media frame and are drawn into a 
state of scarcely credible harmony.  
An adjunct to this strategy was the clear move away from the reporting of official 
meetings, in the final days of May, and a diversification of tactics as the protest got 
underway in the early days of June. This included ostensible reportage – reports from 
the PX site, interviews with ‘regular’ citizens, substantial reporting of ‘question and 
answer’ formatted copy, drawn from media-wide press conferences, and the use of a 
strident, literary editorial voice. Throughout this period, however, the newspaper was 
entirely in control of its own output, with each story by-lined as having been written 
by a newspaper staffer, albeit an unnamed staffer. This changed on June 8th when the 
newspaper used Xinhua copy for the first time. This coincided with the arrival of 
representatives of the NDRC in Xiamen and the decision, presumably taken in Beijing, 
to hand control of the EIA inspection to a national authority. This suggests strongly 
that the operation of the Xiamen press parallels that of the local government. One 
might argue that Xiamen, as one of Deng Xiaoping’s early Special Economic Zones, is 
run on a “mission control basis” (Kenny, 2014) with local officials and planners free to 
meet centrally-mandated targets and face down challenges on their own. However, 
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when central authorities override local decision making and step in, local media – like 
local government – becomes a conduit for the work of higher authorities.   
Nationally, reporting, both before and after the outbreak of the protest, was 
predominantly conducted by weekly news magazines with national-level affiliations. 
The newspapers of the Nanfang Group published important stories in the run-up to 
the protest, but the Southern Metropolis Daily and Oriental Morning Post limited 
themselves to using official copy from Xiamen after the protest or made brief and 
often oblique references through the prism of another environmental story occurring 
at the same time, the pollution in the lakes of Wuxi in Jiangsu province.  
Between June 2nd and June 7th, the presence of reporting restrictions can clearly be 
traced. There are several attempts to reference some of the core issues involved in 
the protest – pollution, the opacity of planning – in terms of editorials or comment 
pieces, but specific mentions of Xiamen are absent. The only reports of the protests, 
or the central issue, outside Xiamen during this time used identical copy to that in the 
Xiamen Daily126.  
Reporting restrictions seem to ease on June 8th when SEPA is given control of the EIA 
review process and Xiamen reappears in terms of news coverage and editorialising. 
Perhaps the clearest conclusion from the national reporting of the Xiamen PX protest 
is the alliance between the non-Xiamen commercial press and centrally-affiliated 
publications. Much of the serious investigative work conducted within the mainland 
media was conducted by commercial outlets such as Southern Weekend and Caijing 
but equally important were the stories in the Oriental Outlook Weekly and Newsweek 
which, while operating at the commercial end of the market, benefitted from 
affiliations with the national Xinhua news service, as well as the China Economic 
Times, which is supervised by an administrative body directly associated with the 
State Council. It is notable that, once the protest had taken place, it was only the 
Beijing-based publications with elite affiliations that published investigative pieces on 
the controversy. Even the often freewheeling Nanfang Group publications were 
quietened. When the local media ceased reporting after June 8th, publications 
                                                       




including Caijing and Newsweek – produced articles that were excoriating of the 
attitude of local government and highly sympathetic to protestors. Particularly 
notable was the explicit criticism by the State Council-affiliated China Economic Times 
and the Xinhua-published magazine Newsweek of attempts at media censorship. 
These intra-media dynamics are an important, and previously unacknowledged, 
aspect of the Xiamen PX protest. This negotiation generated a climate of media 
openness that, on the one hand, allowed news of the protests to be communicated 
through official media, and, secondly, allowed the events to be reflected on and 
editorialised prominently in mainstream Chinese news publications. 
News Discourse Analysis – Xiamen Media 
This section examines the specific construction of the core propaganda planks of 
Xiamen media reporting, described in the previous section by way of a news 
discourse analysis. This analysis seeks to reveal the underlying structures of the 
propaganda framework and how these evolve and change, both during this particular 
protest episode, but also in relation to the other protests considered in this thesis.  
The construction of ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
“Language and discourse have a broad range of structural possibilities to emphasize 
and de-emphasize information and hence also the ideologically controlled opinions 
about groups” (van Dijk, 1995). In terms of media texts, common strategies used for 
this purpose – identified by van Dijk (ibid), include use of headlines, bold characters 
(graphical structures), ordering strategies (first and later, higher and lower, bigger 
and smaller), control of word order, topicalisation, clausal relations (syntactic 
structures), use of positive or negative words (lexical style), over- and under-
statement (rhetoric), and assertions or denials (pragmatics). Some of these aspects 
will be explored in this section. 
The Press-Party ‘we’ 
The first aspect in the construction of the ‘we’ in the local Xiamen’s media reporting 
of the PX ‘issue’ (wenti) is the implied unity between the press and the party. As is 
often – though not always – the case in reporting by party newspapers, the Xiamen 
Daily’s first article on PX makes no typographical distinction between the quoted 
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speech of Party Secretary He Lifeng and the report’s authorial voice.  The report 
begins with a third person reference to certain leaders having met in Haicang. In the 
third paragraph, He Lifeng is apparently quoted in the form of a paraphrase (i.e. there 
are no quotation marks). However, at the end of this sentence there is no attempt to 
restate the identity of the speaker, even though the collective pronoun ‘we’ is used 
and the sentence is unambiguously a quote (“we will offer understanding and 
concern to their feelings and desires”). The identity of the ‘we’ is thus implied to be 
the Party Secretary himself, the other named leaders, the journalist, and the 
newspaper. 
In the Xiamen Daily’s article the following day, ‘the city’ becomes the agent of 
decision-making, rather than leaders or individuals: “The city has decided to…” (wo 
shi jue ding) reads the headline. Later, there is a reference to the “belief within the 
city…” (shi li ren wei). This hints at one of the article’s underlying linguistic 
frameworks which obfuscates actors and elides apparent differences between the 
parties involved in the apparent conflict. Such sentences are resonant of Link’s 
‘official language’ (Link, 2013a) and it would, of course, be impossible to conceive of 
them being used socially. 
Finally, the absence of named authors for all of the news stories between May 31st 
and June 7th may be viewed as another mechanism of the unification of press and 
party. The authorial voice is ‘this newspaper’ (ben bao).  
The local ‘we’ and the national ‘them’ 
At times in local reporting, the ‘we’ is constructed as a local force operating against 
an implied or explicit national ‘them’. For example, Xiamen Daily’s May 31st editorial 
makes conspicuous use of the collective pronoun, ‘we’ to establish an adherence to 
local government but to hint at a distinction from national government: “we [author’s 
italics] believe that correct opinions and well-intentioned advice brings great benefits. 
Party and city leaders place great importance on this and respect science and respect 
the will of the people”. Later, the same collective pronoun is used to suggest a 
distance from central government bodies:  
We have learned from answers given to journalists by spokespeople from 
the Municipal Development and Reform Commission and the Municipal 
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Environmental Protection Bureau that the produce of PX projects are 
regarded as being of urgent national need. (Xia, 2007a) 
This trope continues during the crisis when much is made of Xiamen’s 2005 title as 
the ‘First Civilized City of China’. “Why,” wonders Xiamen Daily commentator Xia 
Zhongping, “did Xiamen sprout forth amid such intense competition to stand on the 
highest podium of Chinese civilisation? Many media spontaneously provided the 
answer: ‘Because Xiameners love Xiamen’” (ibid). The implication is that the residents 
of other cities may not be as self-respecting and appreciative of their city as 
Xiameners are.  
The expanding ‘we’ 
The precise definition of the ‘we’ in the early stages of reporting is left unclear, with 
the assumption being that the voice of ‘the party’ is speaking through media 
reporting. However, this rapidly changes after the protest with a clear effort to 
expand this voice as widely as possible. The primary reports on the two days of the 
strikes report condemnation by members of various administrative and political 
bodies in Xiamen. However, a secondary report on June 3rd also cites five members of 
the public – a father, a hotel clerk, a taxi driver, an elderly resident and a shop keeper 
– who each deploy official tifa. By June 3rd, thus, readers of the Xiamen Daily had 
heard the same message – with little variation – from the Party Secretary [municipal 
party], the municipal CPPCC [municipal government], the Municipal People's 
Congress [neighbourhood administrative structure], the Communist Youth League 
[young people], the Women’s Union [women], democratic parties [non-Party 
politicians], federations of industry [trade unionists], people's organizations [social 
organisations], and specific citizen representatives of family, tourism, labour, the 
elderly and small business.  
Majorities and minorities 
The comment pieces by Xia Zhongping published in the Xiamen Daily lean heavily on 




Of course, rallies and marches are basic democratic rights of citizens. The 
country’s constitution clearly stipulated that citizens have the freedom to 
assemble, march and demonstrate. However, whether one assembles or 
demonstrates, the precondition is that it is carried out in strict compliance 
with the law of the country, and one must preserve social stability and 
public order. …I’m afraid to say that the vast majority of people 
participating in the assemblies and marches are still in the dark, and 
perhaps are not aware that their actions have violated the law (Xia, 2007b) 
Despite explicitly recognising that the ‘vast majority’ are in the dark and, implicitly, 
recognising the size and scale of the marches, the author goes on to ominously argue 
that the “government has been extremely restrained in its response to the 
assembling and marching activities participated in by an extreme minority [author’s 
italics]”. Such is the determination to contrast these two ambiguously defined terms 
that the coherence of the argument is seemingly compromised. It seems semantically 
implausible to identify a “vast majority” of marchers who are then called an “extreme 
minority”.  The term is invoked in another explicit threat: 
…for the minority of citizens who have marched on the street and 
instigated trouble without knowing either the truth or the law, the law will 
prove to be relentless and is certain to deliver severe punishment. (ibid) 
Exploitation of the terms ‘majority’ and ‘minority’ is also used in the threats issued by 
security forces after the end of the strike. The PSB statement insists the “extreme 
minority” (jishao shu ren) will be “punished according to the law” (yifa yingyu chufa) 
but the definition is broad. Cited offenders are given as those who had continued 
marching on June 2nd; who deliberately confused the situation (youyi hunxiao shiting); 
or who had instigated and organised the marches and even “refused to follow orders”. 
A three day amnesty period is given in which those who “take the initiative in briefing 
[the PSB] on the issues would be treated leniently according to the law”, while those 
who refuse to come forward within three days, brief on the issues and accept 
punishment would be investigated and punished severely, according to the law”. The 
efficacy of such a strategy would seem to rely on strategic division. It is highly unlikely 
that the authorities could punish everyone who marched, so it is only an “extreme 
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minority” who need worry. However, a reading of the text would suggest that 
everyone who marched on June 2nd may be considered part of that “extreme 
minority”. 
The construction of protestors 
Protestors are diminished by imprecision and ambiguity, and implied irrelevance. 
Prior to the outbreak of protests, the government had identified “some views and 
opinions” (yixie kanfa he yijian) among “some scholars and citizens” (youxie xuezhe, 
shimin). In the Xiamen Daily’s first series of protest reports on Jun 2nd, street 
protestors have become “some people” (yixie ren). Moreover, they had marched “on 
sections of some streets” (zai yixie luduan).  
The scale of protests is tacitly acknowledged, though diminished in the Xiamen Daily‘s 
standfirst on June 2nd which explains that these activities had “caused onlookers to 
gather” (qilai bufen gongzhong weiguan), suggesting that most people were not 
protesting but were rather just looking. It was, thus, an “extreme minority” (shaoshu 
ren) who had hijacked the event to cause trouble. No indication is given as to who 
these people may be or what their intentions may be. 
Ambiguity is also a routine tactic. Reports on June 4th give a hint of who “people with 
ulterior motives” – a phrase first introduced on June 2nd and used frequently in Party 
condemnation of perceived anti-Party forces – might be but it is highly ambiguous. 
“They are using environmentalism to cover up their stink of money. I hate them,” 
reports a Netizen. The quoted speaker clearly has identified the culprit, but the article 
neglects to establish the connection between the clues. This tactic, of hinting at 
malfeasance while omitting specific accusations, has the effect of spreading the 
suspicion widely. A specific accusation of corruption, or even an identification of what 
kind of corruption is being discussed, would limit the potential impact. As it is, 
anybody who has economic concerns appears damned. 
Understanding and ‘understanding’ 
The Xiamen Daily establishes a contrast between the verbs lijie and liaojie. In 
Mandarin Chinese, the two both may be roughly translated as ‘to understand’. 
However, the former – lijie – connotes a depth of understanding, while the latter – 
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liaojie – may refer more simply to a more superficial awareness of, or knowledge of, 
an idea, phenomenon or feeling. Thus, before protest erupts, dissenters are 
described as having insufficient ‘awareness’ – liaojie – while the municipal 
government, in its benevolent wisdom, ‘understands’ – lijie – that dissenting views 
and opinions are heartfelt and indicate a love of the city. The asymmetry of 
‘understanding’ is a rhetorical strategy employed through local reporting on the 
protest. 
In early reporting, one of the matters which the ambiguous ‘we’ – discussed above – 
is said to have ‘understood’ was the dispute, though the lack of precision in defining 
the dispute, or pointing to its constituent elements, renders the claim somewhat 
nonsensical. In typically euphemistic language, the dispute is labelled as 
‘contradictions and problems’ (maodun he wenti). There is no attempt to be more 
specific about what such ‘contradictions and problems’ may specifically point to and, 
as such, it is difficult to understand how a claim of ‘understanding’ can be justified. 
What is clear, however, is the manner in which obfuscation of the specific problem is 
a rhetorical strategy. In the media field, true understanding is reserved for leadership. 
This implication is repeated in Xiamen Daily’s front page comment piece on May 31st. 
It purports to explain the newly introduced propaganda plank, introduced in the 
headline of the article but does so in a way that makes it plain that real 
understanding cannot be conveyed through words alone. 
What exactly is ‘Respect for Science’? We believe it is respecting science!; 
What exactly is ‘Respect for popular opinion’? We believe it is respecting 
popular opinion! (Xia, 2007a) 
Such an attempt to explain a straightforward slogan has the effect of both 
highlighting its emptiness and drawing attention to the impossibility of refutation. 
This idiom employed in this phrase has an unmistakable condescension about it; it 
purports to render the complex simple but is almost comical in its vapidity.  
The same comment piece is printed on the front page within an eye-catching red box. 
The editorial’s headline establishes a new eight-character slogan which identifies two 
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competing pressures and, ostensibly, stresses their equal worth: “Respect Science, 
Respect Popular Will” (zunzhong kexue, zunzhong renyi).  
Some scholars and citizens have raised certain views and opinions in regard to 
the Haicang PX Project… We believe that correct opinions and well-intentioned 
advice brings great benefits. Party and city leaders place great importance on 
this and respect science and respect the will of the people. (ibid) 
The following comments, however, undermine the notion that ‘government will’ and 
‘popular will’ are equal partners:  
As the saying goes: when matters are not clear, there is always unease. 
Because some members of the public do not know much about the 
decision-making process and environmental assessment, and do not 
understand [the full picture], they have used different methods to express 
a variety of views and opinions which are based on their interest in, and 
care for, Haicang’s environment. (ibid)  
Thus, science is comprehensive and even handed, while the popular will, though 
replete with good intentions, suffers from knowledge deficit. The comment piece 
goes on to join up the opening phrase of the passage by implying that absolute 
transparency has facilitated a feeling of inner peace among the populace: “Nowadays 
we write reports for the public which discuss problems with crystal clarity; with 
innumerable channels of communication open, the truth is able to be made clear and 
[we] believe this will bring everybody peace of mind” (ibid). Such peace is 
immediately contrasted with the implied menace that derives from a separation 
between the masses and government: “It is quite a different matter for those 
individuals who deliberately confuse the senses and who instigate antagonism 
between the government and the masses. We believe the broad public will keep its 
eyes open and has the ability to differentiate between truth and falsehood and 
separate black from white” (ibid). Thus understanding is reduced to binaries between 




The most frequently cited suggestion of deviance is the repeated use of the notion of 
the safety and desirability of ‘normal channels’ after protests have begun on June 2nd. 
Such a description generates the implied existence of ‘abnormal channels’, such as 
public protest, though these are not named.  
The page two lead in the Xiamen Daily on June 2nd reports vice chairman of the 
municipal people’s congress, Du Mingcong suggests, suggesting the hot weather was 
likely to affect the people’s “physical and psychological health” (shenxin jiankang), an 
attempt to link the protest with mental deviance (Xiamen Daily, 2007c).   
There is later an accusation of criminal deviance in the PSB statement printed on June 
3rd. This is the first explicit reference to online activity. Secondly, there is an 
accusation that “an illegally organised ‘Anti-PX Union’ had anonymously telephoned 
the mayor’s office to issue threats”. The naming of specific, responsible people, is a 
key plank of social and political organisation and control in China (Wang, 2012), and 
thus the idea of an ‘anonymous’ but specific threat is to be regarded as particularly 
egregious. This is notwithstanding that much local reporting itself uses techniques, 
described above, to obscure the specific source of authority in the official response.  
News Discourse Analysis – National Media 
The construction of ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
As has been previously discussed, it was the elite, Beijing-based news magazines 
which persisted in coverage of the Xiamen PX controversy in the immediate 
aftermath of the protests in early June. The three major investigative articles, 
published by non-Party news magazines in the wake of the protest127 adopt an 
interrogatory position, seeking answers from ‘insiders’ (chiqing ren) but finding they 
are ‘still in the dark’ when it comes to matter of planning and process. Such a stance 
is, of course, standard in ostensible ‘investigative’ reporting. However, the portrayal 
of the public – and sometimes, explicitly, protestors – as having the same 
unanswered questions undoubtedly seeks to establish the ‘us’ as press-people. 
                                                       
127 China Economic Times on June 6th, China Newsweek on June 11th and Caijing on June 26th.  
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Rather than working on behalf of the people, or pursuing questions overlooked by 
others, the reporters explicitly use the same language to describe their quest and that 
of the protestors. Caijing, China Economic Times and Newsweek all take such an 
approach. The China Economic Times goes so far as to claim that “as the media 
persisted in its focus, it was on the newsstand that the great waves of the PX project 
controversy were unleashed” (China Economic Times, 2007). Thus, in this 
construction, journalists and the protestors of Xiamen become part of the same 
alliance. 
Construction of protestors 
Protestors in these series of articles are portrayed consistently in a positive light. The 
Newsweek article begins with a description of one protestor, described as a “gentle 
person who’s never been one to get excited”. She is described exchanging an email 
with a friend concerning the accusations against the PX plant. Such online 
communication is portrayed as non-threatening and, importantly, subject to her 
reasoned and considered criticism. “Things were not as sensational as the email made 
them out to be”. The article generates a dramatic sense of self-sacrifice – despite a 
natural timidity and fear, she acts for good of her ‘three-year-old son’ in going out to 
protest. When the protestor returns home to find her actions labelled as illegal, the 
article suggests, sympathetically, a sense of injustice. 
That night, Ye Zi found related news on the scrolling tickers of all of 
Xiamen's TV stations. But what she thought was just a gentle way of using 
a "walk" to express her wishes was defined by the Xiamen PSB as an 
"illegal mass demonstration" that "seriously disrupted public order and 
disturbed the lives and work of the general public. (Xie, 2007) 
The same article describes the graffiti artist – whose painted protest slogans were 
central to the online propagation of the story – as “sensitive, cowardly individual 
searching for his own voice”. A ‘colleague’, reports feeling a sense of belonging when 
he sees online calls: “I’ve finally found an organization,” reports an unnamed source. 
Thus protestors are presented as powerless and disenfranchised individuals who 
were keen to merely ‘find a voice’ and ‘express wishes’. The article ends with the 
magazine describing their actions, in summary, as a ‘gentle expression of opinions’, 
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which stands in stark contrast to the way the protestors were categorised in local 
media. 
Caijing’s June 26th article opens with a brief summary of the protest itself, reported as 
involving  ‘thousands of protestors…spontaneously gathering’, and ‘marching in 
protest’ (Long et al, 2007). The article tones down specific references to the protest, 
even omitting it from a later chronology which spanned the end of May and 
administrative machinations in early June. Later, adopting a politically-safe 
formulation, the incident is said to have ‘caused a high-degree of social concern’. This 
then morphs into the ‘local people responding in an increasingly fierce manner’ 
(dangdi minzhong fanying yuelaiyue jilie). Thus in both descriptors, all of Xiamen is 
implied to have been involved, rather than any specific sub-strata of the local 
population.   
Online Sources 
The news magazines take a varied attitude to online communications. The Newsweek 
article (Xie, 2007) relegates the importance of the widely-covered SMS message 
which is frequently claimed to have caused the protest. The article discusses its 
exaggerations. However, protestors are reported as having seen it, critiqued it, 
dismissed it, and marched anyway. Thus the protest issue is framed as bigger than the 
‘exaggerated’ online scandal and imbued with greater substance as a result. Such an 
approach obviously implies tacit acceptance of the fact that online communications 
are unreliable and riddled with potential problems. However, they are presented as 
being part of a communications mix which is otherwise criticised for being too 
opaque.  
Elsewhere in the Newsweek article, online communications are explicitly 
acknowledged as a reason for why the protests occurred, but – importantly – also 
recognised as playing a part in their conclusion too. The report tangentially reports 
the threats of the local PSB through the eyes of one of the protestors, but – through 
positioning within the story – acknowledges conciliatory online voices as encouraging 
an end to the street action.  
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Though its June 5th editorial does not go into specific detail on the Xiamen PX project, 
the Oriental Morning Post begins its commentary by pointing at the ‘intervention of a 
million text messages’ (Tong, 2007). There is no acknowledgment that these 
translated to action at street-level, but the reference to a large quantity of unofficial, 
mobile communications is, seemingly, sanctioned. 
The China Economic Times‘ story on June 5th is explicit in presenting online activity as 
being  the only way to get the ‘relevant departments’ concern and attention (China 
Economic Times, 2007). 
Conclusions 
The coverage of the Xiamen PX protest is heavily polarised. Propaganda diktat, as 
discussed above, appears to have silenced regional newspaper reporting of the issue, 
and so local media dictated presentation of the protest in the days immediately 
following the street action. Those publications which do report the protest between 
June 2nd and 5th source reports from Xiamen media. The fact that Southern Weekend 
issues a report on June 7th which does not mention the protest at all suggests that, 
even as late as this date, reporting restrictions are in place, despite the investigative 
and somewhat critical work undertaken by the China Economic Times.  
Local reports deploy various techniques and strategies to present protestors as 
deviant and operating beyond what may be considered reasonable behaviour. In 
stark contrast, the elite news magazines which, sporadically, take up the story later in 
June make almost the polar opposite case, suggesting protest is justified and 
constructively assisted by online and mobile media. Xinhua’s Newsweek, the semi-
independent Caijing and the national Development Research Centre-affiliated China 
Economic Times all demonstrate a willingness to explicitly criticise local government. 
Each aligns with protestors, via a distancing of protestors from extreme ideas; by 
emphasising the nobility of aims; and by explicitly making the suppression of 
information one of the core problems to be addressed. In such a strategy, the issue of 
environmental damage and chemical toxicity – ostensibly the reason the protest 
broke out in the first place – is barely discernible. Rather, it is the administrative 




This chapter has provided a systematic account of the mainstream press reporting 
around the siting of a PX plant in Xiamen in 2007 and the controversy it stirred. The 
research has been conducted in two broad areas. Firstly, by scrutinizing the manner 
in which the mediation of the event unfolded among the constituent parts of the 
Chinese press, it is possible to draw tentative conclusions about the manner in which 
the constituent parts of the press were instrumentalised by various actors, and from 
this emerges a complex picture in which any simple, uniform description of the action 
of the ‘Chinese press’ – used in many studies of Xiamen PX – is rendered virtually 
meaningless. As has been revealed, the Chinese press behaved in a polarised manner 
towards the crisis, with local media dictating reporting during the protest, and the 
investigative reporting among Beijing-based news magazines reframing the issue in a 
fairly radical way shortly after the end of the protest. 
The second strand of analysis was conducted in the linguistic sphere, and followed 
from a granular analysis of the way words were used to re-construct the real-world 
conflict within the mainstream media frame, and how different parts of the press 
approached this task.  It has identified some similarities and divisions between 
reporting methods between local and non-local media and examined linguistic 
strategies using a news discourse analysis. 
As suggested in the introduction, it was not the intention of this chapter to 
understand the factors which allowed the PX protest to occur and gain traction. 
Others (Zhang, 2009; Ansfield, 2013) have pointed to the critical importance of elite 
political actors at the outset of the process and the online interventions of well-
known media commentators such as Lian Yue and Xiao Shu. Rather, this analysis looks 
at the way the controversy was mediated through various actors within the national 
press. The Xiamen protest is regarded by some observers as being seminal in 
changing local and national attitudes towards this kind of crisis reporting. Qian and 
Bandurski argue for a link with Hu Jintao’s June 2008 media policy speech in which he 
advocated that party media should play a stronger role in reporting crises early to 
remove the initiative from commercial publications (2011: 70). This analysis suggests 
that, while commercial outlets such as Southern Weekend and Caijing certainly played 
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a significant role in the reporting of the protest, two news magazines with elite 
official affiliations - China Newsweek and the China Economic Times had – if anything, 


















Chapter 7: The Chongqing Taxi Strike  
Protest Narrative 
Beginning early on November 3rd and lasting for just over 48 hours, a taxi strike in the 
southwest municipality of Chongqing128 caused widespread transport disruption, 
receiving national attention and appearing to prompt a series of copycat strikes in 
several cities across China. It was hailed as a seminal moment for both media 
openness and protest management by professional commentators inside and outside 
of China. 
Approximately 8,000 vehicles, drawn from 35 different taxi companies, were 
simultaneously stood down in the early hours of 3rd. By the morning rush-hour, public 
transport networks were choked with commuters, who had no other way to move 
around what is a largely mountainous city129. Reports suggest there was some minor 
violence, with damage to vehicles recorded and a number of arrests made, though 
the strike appears to have been otherwise peaceful. Xinhua reporting indicates that 
10,000 police and security personnel were sent to the street to attempt to control the 
situation. Chinese law does not formally acknowledge the legitimacy of strikes made 
outside the Party-controlled All-China Federation of Trade Unions (zhonghua 
quanguo zonggong hui) and, as such, the action was essentially illegal.  
Reporters from Chongqing’s Xinhua office began filing reports from the city that same 
morning and issued regular dispatches over the following days. These were circulated 
widely around the Chinese press and formed the basis of both reporting by 
newspaper staffers and editorials by in-house commentators.  
The strike ended on November 5th and one day later, Chongqing’s Party Secretary, Bo 
Xilai, met with a number of striking taxi drivers and industry representatives. These 
meetings took place in front of a large number of journalists from all forms of official 
media, who reported live from the event via television and the Internet. 
                                                       
128 Chongqing is one of four provincial-level ‘municipalities’ in China, the others being Beijing, Tianjin 
and Shanghai. It is the largest of the four in both physical size and population.   
129 There is now (2013) a reasonably extensive metro network. In 2008, there was only one functioning 




A number of local policy initiatives took shape in the days following the strike, widely 
reported by local media. Media coverage of the Chongqing taxi strike essentially 
ended on November 18th when it was announced that two prominent local officials, 
Ding Chun and Liang Peijun, were being subject to ‘administrative punishment’. Both 
figures had featured prominently in early coverage of the strike outside of Chongqing 
and were quoted repeatedly by several newspapers.  
Context and significance 
There are a number of important contextual strands which feed into the Chongqing 
taxi strike of 2008. The year saw major rioting in Lhasa, Tibet, and other ethnically-
Tibetan regions. In September, Sanlu, China’s biggest producer of dairy products, was 
accused of tainting baby milk with toxic additives. Perhaps the most significant event 
of 2008 in media terms was the Wenchuan Earthquake, which occurred in May, six 
months prior to the taxi strike. The earthquake seemed to signal a new response to 
crisis management with many observers surprised at just how freely domestic media 
reported from the scene at the outset of the crisis. Noticing the mainland Chinese-
language reporting around the strike, and tying it to an ostensible trend that had 
developed over the course of 2008, a Reuters journalist quoted an unnamed 
academic source “close to propaganda authorities” in asserting that a new principle 
of, “report the facts quickly, but be cautious on the causes behind the facts” was 
being employed by news workers (Hornby, 2008). The same report quoted another 
anonymous official as saying, “It's almost impossible to block anything nowadays 
when information can spread very quickly on the Internet…We also noticed that it will 
benefit us if we report the news first.” 
Finally, 2008 was the year of the Beijing Olympic Games. Prior to the games the broad 
political environment within which Chinese journalists work became more constricted 
and there was greater adherence to a Party-mandated line, as is common before 
planned events of major political significance (Brady, 2010). However, the autumn 
heralded a loosening of restrictions, and with the 17th Party Congress having taken 
place the previous autumn, and the Spring Festival and annual meeting of the 
National People’s Consultative Committee several months away, it could be argued 
that November 2008 was a hiatus in between a politically sensitive period.  
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The presence of Chongqing’s then-Party Secretary, Bo Xilai, is an extremely important 
contextual factor. Son of Bo Yibo, a member of the CCP since the 1920s and one of its 
most powerful leaders during the 1980s, Bo Xilai had gained national fame and 
widespread affection for his uncharacteristically relaxed public persona as well as his 
invocation of Mao-era ‘Red’ culture and governance. Bo was sometimes seen as a 
standard bearer of the so-called ‘New Left’, supporters of strong central government, 
highly patriotic and in favour of increased redistribution of wealth to ameliorate the 
inequalities that had arisen from China’s economic development since the late 1970s. 
The economically liberal wing of Chinese politics – though manifestly very different 
from a US and European ‘liberal’ position – can be seen as favouring promoting 
market mechanisms and diminishing, though not necessarily eliminating, state 
dominance in key fields. The economically liberal faction has been dominant in elite 
Chinese politics since the early 1990s. For these, and other, reasons, Bo was 
something of a political outlier during the Hu-Wen era (2003-2012). In 2012 – in one 
of the most surprising political moves in the PRC’s post-reform history – Bo Xilai was 
removed from his post and put on trial under the CCP’s internal disciplinary system 
on charges of corruption. His trial took place in August 2013 and he was sentence to 
life imprisonment the following month.  
Though the details of Bo Xilai’s subsequent fall are not pertinent to this particular 
case, the context needs to be considered when analysing the reporting that 
surrounded the events in 2008, both in terms of ostensible media openness, and also 
the neo-liberal discourse which is so evident in media reporting. 
Finally, several major similar taxi strikes were reported in a number of major cities 
such as Guangzhou, Sanya, Nanyang and Shantou in November and December 2008. 
It is not possible to say with any degree of certitude whether the largely sympathetic 
response received by the media and government in Chongqing encouraged these 
strikes, though the timing of the strikes suggests the well-publicized Chongqing 
precedent may have been an important causal factor.   
Analysis  
This section will analyse the reporting and editorialising around this incident in four 
distinct geographic regions and across different tiers of the Chinese press. The 
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nationwide reporting was dominated by Xinhua agency copy, though the fact that 
reports were widely re-edited and editorialised suggests the absence of stringent 
national Propaganda Department guidelines. Investigative reporting was undertaken 
by the Southern Metropolis Daily, albeit only after the strike ended. 
Chongqing Media 
This study looks at the output of the three titles belonging to the Chongqing Daily 
Newspaper Group. These comprise the Chongqing Daily itself, the Chongqing Party 
Committee’s flagship title, and its two commercial off-shoots, the Chongqing Morning 
Post (chongqing chenbao) and the Chongqing Evening Post (chongqing wanbao). 
Referencing the strike 
All three newspapers cited above printed articles about the incident on November 4th, 
the first day after the strike began. The Chongqing Daily carried two separate stories, 
one on the front page, another on page two. These two stories were reprinted in 
both commercial newspapers, which used simple, banner front page headlines which 
pointed to the content on the inside of the newspaper. 
Using ‘correct’, politically-palatable expression, or tifa, has long been a priority for 
media workers who find themselves writing about, or editing the coverage of, 
potential sensitive events. Appropriate or inappropriate tifa may change over time, 
something signalled by those senior media outlets with the loftiest political 
affiliations. In this example, all three newspapers may be regarded as having the 
same basic affiliation – the Chongqing Party Committee. Indeed, all three newspapers 
work from the same office in central Chongqing. However, the Chongqing Daily, as 
the party organ, has seniority.  
In its two articles on November 4th, the Chongqing Daily refers to the strike action 
itself in three ways. Two are highly euphemistic: the initial reference occurs in the 
first paragraph of the front page article which refers to an ‘obstruction’.  
Yesterday morning at 5.30am, a portion of Chongqing city’s cab drivers could 
not operate normally due to being obstructed (shouzu) in their normal 
activities… (Liu, 2008a) 
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The precise word used to denote the ‘obstruction’ is important. Shouzu (受阻) – 
literally, to ‘receive’ a ‘block’ – is a highly generic verb-object (dongbin jiegou) 
construction which indicates a class of action but does not describe it specifically. In 
this specific instance there is no hint in the word alone to indicate whether this is a 
natural or man-made ‘block’.  
The second euphemistic reference to the strike, deployed by the Chongqing Daily, is 
in the first paragraph of the page two article which refers to an ‘abnormality’ in the 
operating environment. 
Beginning early on November 3rd, an abnormality appeared in the 
operating situation of the city centre’s taxis. (Chongqing Daily, 2007a) 
The third reference is to an ‘outage’ (tingyun, literally ‘cessation of travel’), used in 
the strapline of the inside story and in the quoted comment of both an anonymous 
‘journalist’ and an unnamed ‘government news spokesperson’. This is the most direct 
reference to the strike, though tingyun is a relatively neutral term that may be used 
to describe any transport mishap – halted trains after a rail accident, for example. The 
term is only referenced directly in the purported quotes by the journalist (“What is 
the main reason for this partial city centre taxi outage?”), rather than on the part of 
government. Moreover, the newspaper and government spokesman both couch the 
term. The strap line to the article reads, “On the partial city centre taxi outage matter” 
(jiu chongqing zhuchengqu bufen chuzuche tingyun yi shi) while the only reference by 
the spokesman to the term was in claiming, euphemistically, that safety concerns 
meant some drivers had “no choice but to adopt the outage method” (budebu caiqu 
tingyun zuofa). 
The Chongqing Daily refers to the strike in three new ways on November 5th, the 
second day of reporting on the strike, both highly abstract. The first reference is, 
simply, ‘this thing’ (zhe yi shiqing), the second is to a ‘social event’ (shehui shijian), 




The copy used by all three newspapers is virtually identical, and derives from 
reporting by the Chongqing Daily. There are subtle changes to the way the headlines 
are arranged.  
Chongqing Daily 
 Page 1 Page 2 
Nov 4th 
2008 
Party Committee and Municipal 
Government Take Active Steps To 
Ensure Normal Taxi Service Resumes 
By 4pm yesterday, more than 1,000 taxis 
had returned to normal service 
 
On the subject of the partial city centre 
taxi outage matter 
Municipal government spokesman 




More than 80% of taxis in the city 
centre have recovered normal 
operations 
 
Municipal government news spokesman 
Answers further questions about our 





City centre taxis completely returned 
to normal operation at 8am yesterday 
Municipal government says an alliance of 
relevant departments will protect the 





Nov 7th  Ardently enquire about suffering, 
carefully listen to the people’s voice 
A record of the discussion between Bo 




principles for serving the people: 




TABLE 2: CHONQING DAILY TAXI STRIKE HEADLINES, NOV 4TH-7TH, 2008 
Not one of the front page headlines references the actual strike over the four days of 
reporting on the issue. Between November 4th and November 6th, the headline 
consistently tracks a progressive “resumption of operations” (huifu yingyun) or a 
return to “normal operations” (zhengchang jingying/zhengchang yingyun). The first 
day emphasises the alacrity of government action (“Party Committee and Municipal 
Government Take Active Steps To Ensure Normal Taxi Operations”) with the 
authorities positioned as body capable of ‘guaranteeing’ or ‘ensuring’ such a 
normality. The strap line points directly to those 1,000-plus taxis claimed to have 
“returned to normal service”, even on the first day of the strike. The following day it 
is claimed that 80% of taxis had ‘resumed operations’ (huifu yingyun) while the third 
day (November 6th) declares ‘a complete resumption of normal operations’.  
The inner page headlines on the first and second day of the strike do reference the 
event, but in virtually identical terms. The tifa is identical: the strike is an ‘outage 
matter’ (jiu…tingyun yishi) and ‘partial’130 (bufen) in its nature. 
The headlines on November 7th are concerned entirely with the activities and 
comments of Chongqing Party Secretary Bo Xilai and make no direct reference to the 
strike at all. 
 
 
                                                       
130 ‘Partial’ in the sense that the word bufen indicates the outage only applied to a portion of the total 
number of taxis. The word bufen can be modified to make clear what kind of portion is being discussed 
– a large, or small, portion, for example, but is not here, creating ambiguity. 
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Chongqing Morning Post 
 Front Page Inside Pages 
Nov 4th 
2008 
Portion of city centre taxis blocked 
from operating yesterday 
Party Committee and Municipal 
Government Take Active Steps To Ensure 
Normal Taxi Service Resumes 
 
Party Committee and Municipal 
Government Take Active Steps To 
Ensure Normal Taxi Service Resumes 
More than 1,000 taxis have returned to 
normal service by 4pm yesterday 
 
Municipal government spokesman 
responds to journalists questions On the 
subject of the partial city centre taxi 
outage 
City centre taxi operations completely 




More than 80% of taxis in the city 
centre have recovered normal 
operations 
Daily supply of CNG natural gas to increase 
by 100,000 cubic metres daily to alleviate 
refuelling difficulties; government to 
implement pricing management of drivers’ 
‘fees’ 
 
More than 80% of taxis in the city 
centre have recovered normal 
operations 
Municipal public security bureau and 
transport department will continue to 
strike against criminals and illegal 
operations to protect legitimate operators 
 
Nov 6th Taxis completely return to normal 
Municipal government apologises to 
Taxis completely return to normal 
Municipal government apologises to 
208 
 
2008 citizens for inconvenience; portion of 
criminal elements arrested 
 
citizens; taxi ‘banban qian’ will be lowered 
 




Bo Xilai chats with taxi brothers and 
sisters 
Dialogue between government and people 
highlights people-centredness and 
administration’s new thinking 
 
Bo Xilai chats with taxi brothers and 
sisters, citizens approve of 
government’s frankness and 
pragmatism 
Meeting lasts for two and a half hours, Bo 
Xilai demonstrates consideration for the 
interests of the majority 
 
Huang Qifan answers taxi brother’s 




Record of Bo Xilai’s Dialogue With Taxi 
Brothers and Sisters 
 
Dialogue between government and 
people highlights administration’s 
new thinking 
 




The Chongqing Morning Post does directly reference the strike itself in its first 
headline on November 4th – “Portion of city centre taxis blocked from operating 
yesterday” – though the word ‘blocked’ (shouzu), discussed above, offers no clue as 
to whether this is an internal or external obstruction and thus avoids the need to 
reference the actual strikers. The strap line predicts a ‘full-resumption of operations’, 
a claim repeated in one of the two headlines on the strike on page three. The 
Chongqing Morning Post is alone in emphasising these predictions in its headlines. 
The page three headline – “City centre taxi operations to completely return to normal 
from today” – appears below a kicker131 which implies the claim has been made by a 
government official – “Municipal government spokesman responds to journalists’ 
questions on the subject of the partial city centre taxi outage”132. This kicker is used 
as the main headline in both of the other two newspapers, suggesting the presence of 
specific propaganda instruction to maintain that particular formulation. Though the 
formulation was maintained, the Chongqing Morning Post editors’ decided to usurp it 
with a secondary headline that predicts an end to the strike, a prediction which 
turned out to be false; the strike did not end on November 4th, as highlighted in the 
newspaper’s two subsequent front page headlines. On November 5th, the headline 
confirms that “more than 80% of taxis had resumed operations”, and, on November 
6th, it points to a “complete resumption of operations”. From November 7th, the 
headlines focus exclusively on the work of the government and various policy 
initiatives in response to the issues raised by the strike. 
The headlines otherwise reflect the language of the Chongqing Daily newspaper, with 
an emphasis on government action and multiple references on inside pages to the 
“resumption of operations” (huifu yingyun) and a return to “normal operations” 
(zhengchang yingyun).  
 
 
                                                       
131 A kicker is a journalistic term referring to the first line, or paragraph, of an article, often printed in a 
larger typeface than the main body of the text.  
132 The story itself actually reports the government spokesperson citing the city centre taxi companies’ 
promise to ‘return to normal operations’ that same day. 
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Chongqing Evening Post 
 Front Page Inside Pages 
Nov 4th 
2008 
Three measures to solve the partial 
taxi outage problem 
[Increase natural gas by 100,000 cubic 
metres daily] [Implement price 
management of drivers’ fees] [Crackdown 
on criminals and illegal operators]  
 
Portion of city centre taxi prevented 
from normal operations yesterday 
Party Committee and Municipal 
Government Take Active Steps To Ensure 
Normal Taxi Service Resumes, More than 
1,000 taxis have returned to normal 
service by 4pm yesterday 
 
On the subject of the partial city centre 
taxi outage 
Municipal government spokesman 




More than 80% of taxis in the city 
centre have resumed normal 
operations 
Municipal government spokesman: 
drivers’ fees will return to last year’s level 
 
More than 80% of taxis in the city 
centre have resumed normal 
operations 
 
Municipal  government spokesman 
answers further journalists questions 
about partial city centre taxi outage 





Complete resumption of normal 
operations 
Municipal government apologises to 
citizens, responsible transport committee 
to conduct investigation 
City centre taxis completely returned 
to normal operation  
Municipal government apologizes to 
citizens on the matters of the taxi outage 








Municipal government vice secretary 
general answers journalists’ questions in 
relation to taxi outage event 
Insufficient attention on taxi industry. 
Urge lowering of drivers’ fees 
 
Four seats of measures to prevent 
similar thing occurring again 
Municipal government says an alliance of 
relevant departments will protect the 
normal operation of taxis 
 
 
TABLE 4: CHONGQING EVENING POST TAXI STRIKE HEADLINES, NOV 4TH-7TH, 
2008 
The group’s other commercial outlet, the Chongqing Evening Post, is notable for its 
more visually varied page design133, and published headlines on the strike in four 
different colours, as shown above.     
                                                       
133 The newspaper uses varied colours and typefaces, and routinely manipulates images – with crops 
and image blends – even on the front page. 
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Of the three newspapers, the Nov 4th headline is the most direct in referring to the 
strike, though this is a question of degrees: “Three steps to solve the problem of the 
partial taxi outage”. The strike is still ‘partial’ and the action of government is still the 
subject of the sentence134. However, in contrast to the other two newspapers, the 
front-page headline explicitly recognises the strike, calling it an ‘outage’ (ting yun, 
literally, ‘a cessation of travel’), although collocates the noun with the word 
‘problem’135 relegating its significance to that of a puzzle to be faced, rather than a 
fight to be faced down (as the word ‘strike’ (bayun) – used in non-Chongqing media – 
clearly implies).  
The fact that the inside headline is identical to the front page headline of the 
Chongqing Morning Post strongly suggests there were also local propaganda 
instructions around this specific formulation too.  
As with the other two newspapers, from November 7th, the headlines are more 
varied and less constrained by specific formulations, but uniformly focus on Party 
Secretary Bo Xilai and various policy initiatives.  
Images 
Images were not used in any of the Chongqing publications whilst the strike was still 
in process on November 4th and 5th. Restrictions were evidently lifted on November 
6th when both commercial newspapers printed prominent images of ranks of yellow 
taxis back at work. The Chongqing Morning Post used an image of two parallel ranks 
of taxis queued on the road in opposite directions on an otherwise empty main 
thoroughfare beside the Traders World Hotel in central Chongqing (below). The 
image is likely intended to be evidence that taxi operations had been returned to 
normal but it has a certain ambiguity. The lack of obvious activity and other vehicles 
on the road does not suggest a busy scene. Indeed, given the modus operandi of 
drivers during the strike was to park their vehicles on the roadside, the image could 
just as easily depict a strike. Indeed, other images seen of taxi strikes around China 
depict just such scenes. As a footnote, the only taxi that is obviously moving appears 
                                                       
134 The strapline lists the three measures: “Increase to natural gas supply of 100,000 cubic metres per 
day, carry out price management of ‘fees’, strike hard on lawbreakers and illegal operators”. 




to be turning against the direction of the queue which again undermines the sense 
that this is a scene of dynamism and activity.   
 
IMAGE 3: CHONGQING MORNING POST, PAGE 17, NOVEMBER 6TH, 2008 
The Chongqing Daily printed its first taxi image since the start of the strike on 
November 7th with an almost identical shot of the same small section of street 
(below), likely shot from the same elevated vantage point. The image is 
comparatively dynamic and has slightly less room for ambiguity. The taxis are ranked 
in a less uniform fashion, there is a public bus in the foreground, the image is tilted 




IMAGE 4: CHONGQING DAILY, PAGE 2, NOVEMBER 7TH, 2008 
The Chongqing Evening Post’s image on November 6th is clearer in its depiction of 
activity. A passenger, smiling, clutches a baby as she clambers into an obviously 
working taxi. The image caption indicates the picture was taken just a few yards away 
from where the other two images were captured, on the opposite side of a major 




IMAGE 5: CHONGQING EVENING POST, PAGE 2, NOVEMBER 6TH, 2008 
Explaining the strike   
Reporting on November 4th in all three newspapers is based on twin reports by the 
Chongqing Daily. The only notable change between the three is in the Chongqing 
Morning News which prints the four-point explanation for the strike in table format. 
Not a single word of text is changed, but the box typographically delineates the four 
reasons given for the strike and the corresponding four remedial government 
measures (see below). Such a change may be considered insignificant but it is notable 
that, as with the headline changes discussed above, the Chongqing Morning Post is 
fractionally more adventurous within the obvious propaganda constraints it is 
operating under.  
Aside from contradictions in explaining the strike – discussed below – all initial 
reporting on the strike offers a clear and consistent explanation for driver grievances. 
The very first reports offer four distinct reasons which explain why drivers may feel 
dissatisfied; each of the four is addressed with a corresponding government action. 
Such a strategy has the effect of closing down debate, diminishing potential space for 
alternative arguments. The event is explicable and provides an opportunity to 
demonstrate responsiveness. There is, however, some interesting variation between 
the newspapers in the way these reasons are presented, and some differences in the 
way these evolve over the three or four days on which the strike is reported.  
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The main story – which appeared on the front page in the Chongqing Daily and 
formed the page lead stories in both commercial newspapers – directly references 
the strike only in the first and the last paragraphs. It begins with a brief synopsis of 
events: 
Yesterday morning at 5.30am, a portion of Chongqing city’s cab drivers 
could not operate normally due to an obstruction to their normal activities 
causing travel difficulties for city centre passengers who use taxis and 
generating extremely adverse effects. (Liu, 2007)  
The introduction couches events in terms of an ‘obstruction’ to normality – the 
‘obstruction’ of drivers, the ‘inconvenience’ to ‘normal’ routines of citizens. However, 
the second paragraph appears to legitimise the actions of the protestors by 
explaining what appear to be legitimate problems.  The article offers up an 
explanation of what has happened in clearly delineated terms. There are four reasons 
cited which, it is claimed, have been ventured by drivers themselves: conflict within 
taxi companies over fees; overly low taxi tariffs; difficulties in finding fuel; and 
unlicensed cabs. The logic suggests a clear path for remedial action.  
The second paragraph presents a semantic juggling act, thanks to the euphemistic use 
of the expression ‘blockage’ to describe the strike. The story explains that “the 
obstruction of normal operations has four main reasons”. As discussed above, the 
term ‘obstruction’ implies passivity and its use here avoids the need to refer directly 
to those active participants who may have caused the block. The avoidance of this 
reference to strikers is glaring. However, in the sentences explaining the four 
ostensible reasons for the action, strikers themselves become the sentence subject. 
The second of these even reads: “Hopes that the unreasonable price structure of taxi 
tariffs and the low prices that drivers are able to charge while stuck in traffic will be 
adjusted.” The omission of a sentence subject is grammatically possible in Chinese in 
a way it is not in English without using a passive construction. However, though 
unnamed, drivers are the ones doing the ‘hoping’, and are therefore presumably the 
people doing the ‘blocking’ early referred to. 
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The final three paragraphs of the November 4th story refer to remedial action and 
present the government as both aware and responsive. There is also an attempt to 
emphasise negotiation:  
The government has launched an ongoing investigation of price 
adjustments and, after soliciting views from a wide range of opinion, will 
propose a plan to deal with the situation. (ibid) 
The government’s position as neutral arbiter is emphasised in the fifth paragraph 
which announces the beginning of an investigation into the share of benefits (liyi), or 
profit, between taxi enterprises and their drivers. The dispute is thus posited as a 
commercial dispute.  
The second story takes the form of a Q&A between one or more unidentified 
journalists and news spokesman. A news conference was indeed held on November 
4th and this story could be read as a transcript of this meeting. However, the fact all 
three newspapers use identical copy – in a way they do not in the reporting of later 
press conferences – strongly suggests a single copy was drafted by a single individual 
or editorial team and subsequently distributed to other outlets for reprinting under 
local propaganda department instruction, despite appearing in a format which makes 
a pretence at a live, interactive exchange.  
After a one sentence introduction, in which the strike is referenced as an 
“abnormality...in the operating situation of city centre taxis”, the story is structured 
around four ostensible questions from one or more journalists and corresponding 
answers for the unnamed news spokesman. These match the basic structure of the 
front page article.  
The first question-and-answer deals with what has happened and why; the second 
explores the reasons for driver grievance; the third question solicits the ‘attitude to 
taxi companies’ and the answer declares ‘resolute support’ among taxi companies for 
government action; and the fourth asks what will happen if the strike persists, 
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providing an opportunity for the government spokesman to issue a threat to 
continuing action among drivers136.  
There is a clear tension between the reasons given for the strike in the first two 
answers. The government spokesman’s first answer clearly portrays the incident not 
as a co-ordinated mass action but rather as a violent intimidation of drivers which has 
seen a small number of vehicles “smashed” (bei da za). Because of fears for their 
safety, drivers had “no choice but to suspend their service”. This initial exchange ends 
with the government issuing an apology to commuters for the inconvenience caused.  
The second paragraph, however, presents an obvious contradiction by enumerating 
four cited reasons for the taxi strike, reflecting the reasons already given in the front 
page story.  Where the first answer appeared to place blame for the event on 
intimidation, the second elucidates four distinct reasons why drivers may be 
dissatisfied. This contradiction is present throughout the first two days of reporting by 
all three newspapers in Chongqing. There appears a wish, or more likely a 
propaganda need, to initially present the strike as the result of intimidation and 
violence – implying that the majority are not involved – but there is a subsequent 
attempt to offer explanations for strike action. No attempt is made to resolve or 
disguise this contradiction, though it is notable the extent to which the Chongqing 
Daily’s front page story does not employ the language of the news spokesman in 
blaming the ‘outage’ on violence and intimidation.  
This changes on November 5th when the ostensibly contradictory paragraphs are 
included in all three newspaper’s page-lead reports on the strike. The following two 
paragraphs were used in all three newspapers: 
At 5.30am two days ago, a portion of Chongqing city’s cab drivers were 
obstructed from operating normally. A small number of cars were 
attacked. Because drivers were worried about their safety and that of their 
cars could be not guaranteed, they had no choice but to adopt measures 
                                                       
136 The news spokesman is quoted as saying: “There will be a serious and legal strike against the illegal 
behaviour which prevents the normal operation of taxis so as to protect the legitimate interests of taxi 
operators and to guarantee social stability and harmony”.    
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to suspend services, causing difficulties for city centre passengers in 
finding a taxi.  
 
It is understood that difficulties in refuelling with natural gas, illegal cabs 
and several other factors were among the causes of the event (shi qing) 
but the main reason is the daily increase of between 50 and 70 RMB in the 
‘fee’ (fen’er qian) that taxi companies collect from their drivers. This has 
caused the drivers’ yearly income to be reduced by more than 20,000 RMB. 
Additionally, the monitoring and management by relevant government 
departments has been ineffective, thus causing a partial taxi service 
outage. (Chongqing Daily, 2008b) 
What has a clear cause-and-effect in the introduction –drivers had no choice but to 
stop working because of worries about their safety and that of their cars – is 
complicated hugely in the second paragraph which essentially repeats the four-point 
list of legitimate drive grievances which had been initially proffered the previous day. 
Moreover, it also elevates the comparative importance of one factor – the issue of 
contractual fees paid by drivers to their companies – and positions this as one of 
egregious corporate greed, facilitated by the lack of proper government “monitoring 
and management”.  
The Chongqing Morning Post and Chongqing Evening Post reprinted this report on 
November 5th with no substantial alterations137.  
The ending of the strike, sometime on November 5th, signals an obvious freeing of the 
strict propaganda constraints on the three newspapers, and greater variety is seen in 
the reasons for the strike. In its main story on November 6th, the Chongqing Daily 
printed the following paragraph: 
According to investigations, the four main causes of this outage event are 
taxi companies’ unauthorised increase to their management fees, the flag 
fares that drivers believe are relatively low, difficulties in refuelling and the 
illegal operation of ‘black cabs’. (Liu, 2008b) 
                                                       




In the following paragraph, the government response is restated. Four of the five 
cited actions are a direct response to three of the four cited reasons for the strike – 
only the issue of low flag fares is omitted and is not returned to again in the article – 
and a final action indicates the government will take a dim view of future strikes, 
implying one need only ‘obstruct operations’ to be regarded as a ‘criminal’: 
[The government immediately corrected] the mistaken actions of taxi 
companies who have increased management fees without authorisation, 
doing everything to guarantee [smooth] transport during the outage 
period, increasing the daily supply of CNG natural gas by 100,000 cubic 
metres from the 4th onwards to solve ‘refuelling difficulties’, upping the 
intensity of the strike of ‘black cabs’, establishing 25 enforcement points in 
the city centre, and by striking at those criminals who obstruct normal 
operations. (ibid) 
The Chongqing Morning Post’s story on November 6th is the first which has ostensibly 
been written by its own journalists. It reports the now-named government 
spokesman – Zhu Bo – giving the reasons for the strike as “the unauthorised and 
unapproved increase of fees by taxi companies, refuelling difficulties, and rampant 
illegal cabs.” The issue of low flag-fares, cited in the Chongqing Daily as a reason for 
the strike, is reported in a breakout story which does not position the issue as a cause 
of the strike. The article does, however, quote Chongqing’s Deputy Secretary General 
Cui Jian as saying there will be no immediate change to the fare structure. 
The newspaper also lists the same five basic government responses, but switches the 
order of the first two and lumps the establishment of ‘25 enforcement points’ into 
the same category as the “strike” on criminals – stating these are both examples of 
“increased monitoring”. There is the use of the word “criminal” (bufa fenzi) but it is 
used to describe those who have attacked the taxis’ lights or light casings, rather than 
being – as was the case in the Chongqing Daily – anyone who obstructs operations. In 
this way, though it is clear that the senior Chongqing Daily sets the basic structure 
and tifa for reporting by junior, commercial publications, there is room for alterations 
to the vocabulary and logical reasoning.  
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In a similar vein, the Chongqing Morning Post, uses a virtually identical introduction 
to its senior stable mate – indicating clearly the articles came from a single source – 
but changes the last line to state that the event “created a bad social impact” (Yu & 
Lin, 2008a). The Chongqing Daily article, by contrast, explained that the event 
“created a certain social impact” [author’s italics] (Liu, 2008b). Such a change appears 
to be fairly insignificant in itself, but it is noticeable in the context of a paragraph that 
is otherwise exactly the same. It begs the question: if there are no stringent 
propaganda guidelines, why use almost exactly the same copy as another publication; 
if there are stringent guidelines, wouldn’t the editing of this single adjective be seen 
as subversive?    
The same process can be seen in the reporting by the Chongqing Evening Post, which, 
if anything, ventures even farther from the senior publication’s position138. Its 
introduction collates single lines from the Chongqing Daily copy but changes the tone 
by splicing them in a completely different order. The introduction reads as follows:  
Yesterday the municipal government convened a news conference where 
Cui Jian, deputy secretary of the municipal government made an 
announcement about the taxi outage event, expressing profound 
apologies for the major inconvenience caused to a large number of citizens 
by the occurrence of the outage event. Cui Jian said that, because of long-
term management neglect by the municipal transport committee, the 
primary body which manages taxis, responsibility would be unavoidably 
born. The party committee and municipal government enjoined the 
municipal transport department to conduct a root and branch 
investigation of the matter. (Chongqing Evening Post, 2008a) 
This introduction takes the same basic starting scenario as its senior sister publication 
– the calling of a news conference attended by senior propaganda and party 
personnel – but completely reorients its focus away from comments about an ending 
of the strike, and towards the admission of culpability. The apology is not only 
                                                       
138 It may be significant that this story has been removed from the newspaper’s online archive, despite 
the stories that surround it on the page all being present. There may be a straightforward explanation 
for this unrelated to any sensitivities around the report. However, it is odd that this is the only story in 
that day’s newspaper which is not available online. It was read by the author on the PDF copy of the 
page, which was still accessible via the newspaper’s website. 
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elevated to the introduction, it is also attributed to Cui Jian himself, and thus 
personalised. The Chongqing Daily’s treatment, by contrast, makes clear the apology 
is being made by the municipal government as a whole, not an individual, and 
appears in the final paragraph of the story rather than the first.  
The Chongqing Evening Post and the Chongqing Morning Post both print extensive 
quotes from the news conference lead by the now-named senior Chongqing officials, 
Zhu Bo and Cui Jian, though – for the first time – there is variation in how the answers 
are reported. The Chongqing Morning Post reports only the questions and answers 
which align with the main issues that have already been reported, and edited the 
responses in a way that appears to flatter the speakers. By contrast, the Chongqing 
Evening Post reported the words of both journalists and officials which combine to 
offer a more complete picture of how the strike came about, and paint a far less 
edited – thus less flattering – picture of two official’s occasionally awkward or 
somewhat rambling answers.  
Of particular note is that way in which the Chongqing Morning Post reports Cui Jian’s 
comments as representing an assurance that prices will not rise. It reports him as 
saying: 
Increasing prices affects citizens and researching prices is a very complex 
process, therefore there are no current plans for prices to increase. (Yu & Lin, 
2008b) 
The Chongqing Evening Post reported a very different quote from what was, in all 
likelihood, the same utterance, which not only put different words in the official’s 
mouth, but also leads to a very difficult conclusion about the likelihood of price rises:  
If I was to say today that prices will increase, it will cause a new problem 
for citizens. If we want to investigate prices, it requires a very complex 
research process, therefore I have not talked today about the issue of 
whether or not prices will rise. (Wang, 2008) 
This could simply be a case of the two different journalists having differing shorthand 
skills, but it is noticeable that, by November 6th, differences have emerged in what, 
the day before, was uniform reporting of the press conferences. 
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November 7th saw a decisive change in reporting on the incident. All three 
newspapers carried special reports on the high-profile meeting between Bo Xilai and 
several municipal government leaders and taxi driver representatives, which was 
televised and broadcast live online. The meeting offered drivers the chance to speak 
for themselves in reporting their problems, and several new grievances were added, 
including a scarcity of toilet stops, as well as pick-up and put-down stops; chronic 
congestion; inconsistencies in social security and pension contributions between 
companies; problems around obtaining laundered seat covers; and the number of 
fines habitually incurred by drivers. However, no participant makes the explicit causal 
link by admitting to going on strike or explaining directly why they may have taken 
that course of action.  
The new factors are only formally corralled into a narrative which represented 
potential ‘reasons’ for the strike by Bo Xilai’s use of a slogan – “One Difficulty, Two 
Shortages, Three Surpluses” (yi nan, er shao, san duo). The ‘one difficulty’ is explained 
as the “difficulty in refuelling”; the ‘two shortages’ are the lack of stopping points and 
driver toilets, and the ‘three surpluses’ are the high number of illegal cabs, high fines, 
and high fees.  
Bo is quoted as claiming he personally came up with the slogan having read the 
opinion of various online commentators who had identified “One Difficulty, One Low 
and Three Highs”. Bo’s referencing of online explanations – which obviously 
contained a far broader range of opinion than had been reported by the media – 
indicates a willingness to go beyond the narrow four-point explanation of the strike. 
However, Bo asserts control by eliminating the ‘one low’ – the issue of low fares – 
from his own personal variation on the slogan.  
The Chongqing Morning Post printed a double page spread from its sister-website, 
CQNET (hualong wang), in which the entire two hour meeting is broken down into 25 
distinct passages, each focused on a specific issue, and with lengthy quotations used 
from both Bo Xilai and driver representatives (CQNET, 2008). A lengthy report on the 
following page lists a number of immediate government initiatives which deal directly 
with many of the complaints cited during the meeting.  Among these are rules to 
forbid the secret monitoring of taxis by traffic police, the establishment of 100 new 
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temporary stopping points , a stepping up of the crackdown on illegal taxis and a 
general "sunshine enforcement” and a "flexible enforcement" policy which uses 
“persuasion and education, rather than punishment, for minor offences.”  
The final page of coverage comprises three sections of opinion. The main page lead is 
an op-ed pieced together from two distinct Xinhua sources. This is the first time that 
local Chongqing media uses Xinhua copy, which has guided most national reporting 
on the issue. The version that appears in the Chongqing Morning Post is cut directly 
from Xinhua article, and appears word for word, aside from the addition of a Bo Xilai 
quote. This quote is drawn from a different Xinhua article but has been altered 
slightly. The first line reads “I believe it’s no accident that the majority of taxi drivers 
have [this] opinion” (Xinhua, 2008i). In the original Xinhua article, the quote reads as 
follows: “I believe it’s no accident this taxi outage has occurred.” Secondly, Chongqing 
Morning Post’s edit uses the generic term ‘the government’ in its advocacy of change, 
rather than making clear that Bo includes himself in the phrase (i.e. “The government 
needs to…”, rather than, as it appears in the original Xinhua article, “We, the 
government, need to…”) (ibid). Additionally, the Chongqing Morning Post adds its 
own subheads, one of which emphasises a line in the Xinhua copy which describes 
the government’s role as being that of a ‘referee’, balancing competing interests.  
The second and third stories on this page both feature praise for the meeting from 
local sources. The op-ed by the newspaper’s own writer declares the meeting will “go 
down in history” for the “beautiful template [it provides] for a virtuous interaction 
between officials and the people” (Wang, 2008). The meeting represented “…a 
valiant effort….to gather up public opinions, concentrate popular wisdom, and ease 
the people’s emotions”. Finally, the sidebar column features three similarly glowing 
comments from Netizens, full of praise for the meeting, and its mediatisation, which 
“sets a precedent in China’s public crisis response” (Du, 2008).   
In summary, though the reporting on November 7th includes a huge amount of new 
information and new potential causes for the strike, reporters are extremely 
circumspect in placing these reasons in the context of the strike. Rather, discussion of 
problems was made in the context of an open and frank discussion between drivers 
and government leaders, with the propaganda purpose being to demonstrate a 
225 
 
willingness among leaders to listen and reflect. It is only Bo Xilai, in his coining of a 
slogan, who appears to take responsibility for corralling these various threads into an 
‘explanation’ for the strike. 
The Chongqing Evening Post prints two Xinhua articles on page seven, both of which 
are striking in the way they contradict previous reporting. Both articles begin with the 
same line – that “Chongqing citizens unexpectedly discovered that their taxis had 
disappeared without a trace” on the morning of November 3rd, which is strikingly 
different to the tone taken by reporting in the first two days, which emphasised 
repeatedly the limited, or ‘partial’ nature of the strike. The main story points to the 
speed and ostensible transparency of the government response, as well as the 
apology made, as being praiseworthy and representing something of a new crises-
response strategy. The second, sidebar story, is entitled “Playback of the strike” and 
essentially rewrites history with detail that was lacking in the early reports by local 
newspapers. Where earlier reports were at pains to present a picture of a minor 
disturbance, this ‘rewind’ story makes clear there were 10,000 police or traffic police 
on the street during the strike, and that attempts were made to organise a strike-
breaking fleet of taxis but they were ultimately unsuccessful (Xinhua, 2008h). The 
‘open and transparent’ response praised in the main headline of the page is, by 
implication, not the reporting that was seen in Chongqing itself, but was rather that 
of Xinhua and other publications.   
Non-Chongqing Reporting 
Xinhua 
Xinhua Chongqing Bureau’s initial dispatch of November 3rd was used, to varying 
extents, by the national newspapers the following day. It is interesting in its own right 
– and shall be discussed initially – though its treatment by the commercial press is 
also noteworthy. 
Although the first quoted source of information in Xinhua’s November 3rd dispatch 
was Chongqing’s Public Security Bureau (PSB), the report emphasises eye-witness 
testimony, albeit testimony of journalists themselves, rather than the official data 
and quotes that are preferred by the more cautious reports of Chongqing newspapers. 
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Indeed, the vivid headline of the dispatch, “Witnessing the Chongqing Taxi Strike”, is 
in stark contrast to the very straight headlines in other publications. 
Of semantic interest is the prominent use of the word “transport strike” (bayun), 
preferred to the more neutral and euphemistic terms, described in detail above, such 
as “outage” (tingyun) or “blockage” (shouzu). 
The government response is initially de-emphasised. The writer uses sub-headings to 
divide the article into four distinct sections: after a brief introduction, there’s a 
section titled “Strike affects life for the masses”; the following section is titled “Taxi 
Driver Appeals”139; while the final section deals with the official response, under the 
title, “Government vigorously implements measures to calm the storm”. This is a 
reversal of the priorities as ordered in local Chongqing media. 
The menace of the striking drivers, and implied threat to public order, is made explicit 
at the end of the second section. While acknowledging the determination of some 
drivers to engage the government on specific issues, the writer explains that, “there 
were also drivers who did not dare go out on the street for fear that their vehicles 
may be attacked”. In the next paragraph, the reporter details an encounter with a 
large group of drivers who hurled water bottles at passing drivers and surrounded the 
cab of a female driver, suggesting strikers had engaged in physical intimidation.  
However, the reporter cites unnamed “citizens” and “Netizens” in asserting that the 
public mood was ‘understanding’ (lijie), rather than ‘angry’. Threats have been 
identified but a distinction is clearly made with the reasonable appeals of some 
drivers. These two parallel themes are clarified over subsequent days as violence is 
de-emphasised and a more emollient attitude is displayed by the authorities.  
It is also notable the extent to which the Xinhua copy is written from a first-person 
perspective and features the quoted voices of participating drivers. While quotes 
from ‘citizens’ during the protest period in the Xiamen PX incident were 
indistinguishable from government spokesmen, here there is apparently an attempt 
                                                       
139 The original word suqiu may be translated as an ‘appeal’ or as a ‘demand’. In English, the latter 
obviously carries a somewhat more strident tone. There is an in-built ambiguity in the original Chinese.  
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to capture genuine opinion, or at least opinion which is expressed in a non-official 
vernacular. 
Oriental Morning Post 
The commercial newspapers focused on in this study used the Xinhua report as the 
basis for their coverage of the incident. However, the two commercial newspapers 
showed different degrees of latitude as to how the story was framed within their own 
publication, in terms of both positioning in and editorial choices in headlines, 
straplines and pull-quotes. 
The Oriental Morning Post’s (OMP) initial November 4th report on the strike, for 
example, was a page four lead story and carried the entire contents of the previous 
evening’s Xinhua dispatch140 word-for-word. However, the newspaper added its own 
headlines, sub-headlines, straplines, images and captions.  
While the story led with the negative impact of the strike on commuters (1st 
paragraph) and emphasised the violence exhibited by a minority of strikers (4th 
paragraph), the headline is assiduously factual (“Widespread taxi strike takes place in 
Chongqing”) while the strapline not only offers the reasons for the strike but also 
appears to blame the managing government departments which had not solved these 
underlying issues earlier: 
Concerns over high petrol costs, low fares, frequent fines and other 
problems repeatedly made known to management department but 
appeals have not been resolved. (Xinhua, 2008a) 
The OMP story is split into five sections: the same brief introduction, followed by a 
timeline of the development of the strike; the reasons for the strike; the reaction of 
citizens; and government measures. However, the newspaper inserted its own sub-
headings and straplines. The first of these draws attention to the damage being 
caused to vehicles which broke the strike. However, the following three all present 
frame strikers positively, pointing to the fact that problems have existed for a long 
                                                       




period of time and highlighting quotes which call two of the driver appeals 
‘reasonable’ and the existence of ‘understanding’ amongst the public.  
The last section of the Xinhua report, which hones in on the government response, is 
separated out from the main lead story and given its own headline in a separate box, 
appearing to draw a clear typographical distinction between the course of events 
themselves, and the official response, a distinction that did not exist in the original 
report and was not present in the local reporting in Chongqing. 
A separate Xinhua story is also printed, ostensibly around the news conference which 
formed the basis of the secondary stories in the Chongqing press during the first two 
days of the strike (see above). The headline makes clear that the taxis that had 
already returned to operation were “organized” to do so – “More than 1,000 taxis 
organized to resume normal service” – which stands in stark contrast to Chongqing 
press reports, which did not make this distinction and, in fact, left the impression that 
the taxis had returned of their own accord.  
The copy itself is curt:  
Responding to the taxi strike event, the relevant government bodies said 
they would step up mediation between taxi companies and drivers over 
the distribution of benefits, and increase the supply of natural gas used to 
fuel taxis, strike hard at illegal cab drivers and ensure that normal order is 
returned to order and that social stability is secured. (Xinhua, 2008b) 
This news came from the Chongqing Municipal Transport Committee press 
conference that was called on the afternoon of November 3rd. 
On the morning of November 3rd, a taxi strike event occurred in central 
Chongqing. For the convenience of citizens, the relevant Chongqing 
municipal departments organised more than 1,000 taxis to resume 
operation on two successive occasions. (ibid)  
A Xinhua report, published in the Chongqing Evening Post three days later, indicated 
that these attempts were largely unsuccessful and it was these drivers, organized by 
the municipal transport department, who were primarily victims of the intimidation 
and violence by strikers.  
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The image which accompanies this story shows drivers lounging beside their vehicles, 
and carries the caption: “A number of drivers have said that they would like to get out 
and earn money but that they would not go back onto the road until their requests 
have met with a response” 
The newspaper’s news report on the strike on November 5th takes a more 
conservative approach in its headline, declaring, much as the Chongqing newspapers 
had, that “80% of Taxis in Central Chongqing Return To Operation”. This claim is 
drawn from a Chongqing government spokesman and is undermined in the copy itself, 
with a succession of comparisons between what is claimed and what was witnessed 
by on-the-spot reporters: 
Liang Peijun, deputy director of Chongqing’s transport committee, said 
that half of the city’s taxi fleet had returned to work by 2pm on November 
4th. There are 34 taxi companies which are operating more than 100 taxis 
and – in total – nearly 8,000 vehicles of one kind or another. 
 
But your correspondent saw in the street that most of the taxis on the 
road had not lit the dome light because of fears among some drivers that 
their cars may be attacked or surrounded. Reporters also learned that a 
number of the taxis were carrying staff from the taxi companies or family 
and friends. (Xinhua, 2008c) 
The picture caption also makes clear that the ‘resumption’ of services was, at best, 
partial: “Yesterday, under the organisation of a number of relevant municipal 
government departments, a portion of taxis returned to the street to resume 
operation”. 
The story accentuates driver fears of violence in explaining the absence of taxis. The 
second paragraph begins with this line: 
In order to protect the safety of taxi drivers, Chongqing’s transport 
administration department and police officers deployed a large number of 
officers onto the streets , but most taxi drivers still refused to go onto the 
streets because of safety concerns and threats. (ibid) 
230 
 
A second story quotes a specific Chongqing official in explaining that the petrol 
station shortages were due to a recent “temperature drop”, and a tendency for 
drivers to refuel at the same time – information that is entirely absent from local 
reporting. Moreover, a third editorial places the incident in context of “mass 
incidents”: 
In recent years, channels where the masses can express their demands 
have not been clear in some areas and there have been times where the 
interests of the masses have been damaged, giving rise to mass incidents, 
which not only seriously damages the image of the party and government, 
but also affects social stability and social harmony. Before the taxi strike in 
Chongqing, drivers raised problems with the relevant departments on 
many occasions but these did not generate sufficient attention among 
these relevant departments, causing tensions to mount, grievances to pile 
up, and eventually fermenting the large-scale strike event. (Xinhua, 2008d) 
On the same day, the newspaper published a long editorial on the incident, entitled 
“Judging from the ‘taxi strike’ event, ‘what should be done’ after information is 
disclosed?’ This took as its main subject the subject of “mastering the power of public 
opinion guidance” in a society where there is inevitably increasing social ferment: 
These give the impression that social problems are becoming more and 
more acute.  In fact, to a society which is transforming itself, these 
problems have long existed. However, their exposure today is the result of 
prolonged foment. That they can now be “intensively” displayed in the 
public eye reflects the government’s wisdom and courage in facing 
complex social problems. (Zhang, 2008) 
The op-ed argues that given the inevitability of conflicts of interest, learning how to 
manage information is critical. It is conceded that “in the past, in large part” the 
government would tend to "block" or…delay information about sudden events”.   
That [problems] can now be “intensively” displayed in the public eye 




A little later, Chongqing’s “methodical and measured handling” of the event is praised, 
though within the context of one of the ideological lynchpin’s of the Hu-Wen 
government, that of the ‘harmonious society’.  
There is no doubt that the method employed by Chongqing to deal with 
this taxi strike is one of the means of building a harmonious society. So, 
from the handling of this incident, what useful inspiration should we take? 
(ibid) 
The Oriental Morning Post’s news coverage on November 6th once again uses Xinhua 
copy. The story once again quotes Zhu Bo, the Chongqing propaganda official, as 
blaming the outage on drivers’ fears for their safety, and asserted that punishment 
that would be administered to as-yet unnamed officials. 
As the department responsible for taxis, the Chongqing transport 
committee has long neglected its management duties and cannot shirk its 
responsibility. The municipal government has instructed the municipal 
transport committee to conduct an in-depth investigation… (Xinhua, 
2008e) 
In both senses, the story is not hugely different to that which was appearing in 
Chongqing on the same day, though there is an emphasis on the punishment of local 
officials which was absent from local reporting. The strapline of the story leads with 
the fact that the “responsible people will be dealt with severely” – ambiguous in itself, 
though the story makes no mention of violence and several mentions of negligent 
officials – including the quote above – leading to the obvious conclusion that 
‘responsible people’ refers not to errant drivers but rather officials.  
In stark contrast to its editorial the previous day, a combative op-ed is printed in the 
Oriental Morning Post on November 6th which accentuates the severity of the strike – 
describing it alternatively as a “city-wide taxi strike that has defied wind and rain”; a 
“full city” strike; and a “worse-case scenario” – and mocks the self-congratulation 
which is perceived amid the reporting and editorialising on the strike: 
The situation up to now can be described as ‘satisfactory’ and all parties 
can breathe a sigh of relief. But what this ‘breath’ will amount to in the 
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end is not easy to say. I have a lurking feeling that a fishbone remains 
stuck in the throat and will continue to tickle the airways. (Yang, 2008) 
This impediment is claimed to be a lack of channels for meaningful communication 
between protestors and government, and a failure to resolve fundamental problems. 
Rather than praise the response in Chongqing, as the previous day’s editorial did, the 
writer emphasises the local government’s tendency to blame strikers and argues its 
response is mere ‘nit-picking’: 
…it is not difficult to see that the relevant government departments will 
continue to lay the largest share of the blame on the strikers, rather than 
looking at the illegal increases in driver fees levied by the taxi companies. 
While an inconvenience to the general public of course requires an 
apology from the government, don’t those drivers who have felt the 
additional burden of increased driver fees also deserve a sincere apology? 
After all, regardless of the exact causes of a strike movement, a strike 
demonstrates that a government’s supervision has been ineffective and 
the service it has provided inefficient. (ibid) 
The Oriental Morning Post published another Xinhua news article on November 7th 
which covered the Bo Xilai public meeting. It is notable for the manner in which Bo 
Xilai’s slogan, “one difficulty, two shortages and three surpluses” is used to offer 
explanations for the strike, without – as it is in Chongqing itself – being attributed to 
Bo himself. The strapline reads: “Xinhua issues commentary arguing that a “new way 
of thinking” should be used in facing public events”, though the article doesn’t once 
mention this fact, suggesting that there may have been a propaganda instruction to 
reference the Xinhua editorial (Xinhua, 2008f). 
A final article on November 9th reports that “Chongqing taxi operators have publicly 
committed to lowering driver fees” and that all the city’ companies signed a public 
letter committing themselves to this goal, “provided the government issued specific 
policies to bring down fees”. This report, based on Xinhua copy, did not feature in the 
local media in Chongqing (Xinhua, 2008g).  
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The Southern Metropolis Daily 
The Southern Metropolis Daily (SMD) also used an abridged version of the same 
November 4th Xinhua story used by the Oriental Morning Post (OMP) but without 
such typographical additions and editing the story in such a way that emphasised the 
taxi driver’s reasons and government measures, lending the story a more factual tone 
than its Shanghai counterpart. It did, however, employ the lexical term ‘strike’ (bayun) 
in an otherwise extremely matter-of-fact headline (“Widespread taxi strike takes 
place in Chongqing”). 
Its report on November 5th was much briefer than that which appeared in the 
Oriental Morning Post and omitted the eye-witness passages which appeared to 
contradict the official statements of Chongqing officials. The article flags its 
provenance in the first sentence – “Journalists learned from Chongqing’s municipal 
transport committee that, by 2pm on November 4th, half of the city’s urban taxi fleet 
had returned to work” (Xinhua, 2008j) – and the remainder of the article is very 
similar to that which appeared in the Chongqing press, emphasising the government 
response, laying the blame for driver malcontent on an increase in the fees levied by 
companies. However, unlike, the articles which appeared in the Chongqing press, the 
SMD story does not repeat the admission by the Chongqing government spokesman 
that a failure of administrative oversight allowed this increase to take place. With 
these factors taken together, it’s possible to argue the SMD article is the most neutral 
of all articles in this study. This is a surprising finding for a newspaper that is routinely 
labelled as being the most adversarial in China. Given the reporting by the same 
newspaper on November 6th, it is possible this was a deliberate editorial strategy to 
decrease scrutiny on the newspaper and thus decrease the possibility of pre-emptive 
censorship ahead of an expected investigative article the following day. 
On November 6th, however, under the headline “The Chongqing Outage - the 
background chain of exploitation”, the SMD ran a 5,700-character investigative 
expose of “a multi-layered chain of exploitation [that] has formed within Chongqing’s 
blighted taxi industry” (Long, 2008 – See Appendix B). 
The article appears to be the result of two-day’s worth of reporting on the ground in 
Chongqing, indicating the SMD dispatched a journalist to the city on the day the strike 
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first broke. In contrast to Xinhua’s relatively factual eye-witness reports, the writing 
carries a pessimistic, almost noir-ish tone: “The feeling of conflict spreads like a germ 
throughout the city”; “This kind of pessimistic mood of frustration is rendered on the 
faces of drivers in the wake of the strike. [Driver Jiang] is worried about the future”; 
“…there is an acute sense of awareness among drivers that the strike…has become 
increasingly acrimonious”; and ends with the line, “Rain soaks the streets and 
occasionally taxis without their lights on abruptly swung in off the main road”. There 
are later references to “institutional decay”, a “rotting” industry, and claims “the 
government stands accused of collusion with the illegal car rental companies” (ibid). 
Finally, violence is introduced as a theme in terms of the main image, which carries a 
photograph, “provided by a Netizen”, of an ostensible mob attack on an illegal cab 
driver. 
The first half of the story is written as eye-witness testimony as the reporter rides 
with a driver who has had his vehicle smashed, though a single line implies that much 
of it was written on November 4th, “the day after the strike began”, which suggests a 
story may have been written and prepared for the November 5th edition but never 
published. This part of the story suggests that evidence seen by the reporter “implies 
that the transport strike wave is continuing” despite official pronouncements, and 
quotes the driver as saying, "[the incident has] stirred the government, but the 
fundamental problems have not been solved” (ibid). 
Elsewhere in the article, the journalist examines in detail the economic interests 
involved in the fee structures, explaining that even drivers are capable of being both 
victims and perpetrators in an “exploitative fee chain”. This economic perspective is 
unlike anything that was published in Shanghai or Chongqing and points to a 
fundamental structural problem that requires a structural solution. 
The article also points to the roots of the strike, revealing there was a near-strike in 
July 2008 that was averted because of the local government’s hyper-sensitivity to the 
upcoming Beijing Olympic Games. There are lengthy quotes from an industry 
campaigner, Yang Xiaoming, who had tried to operate outside the system but had 
been thwarted by what he calls a “monopoly”. In the later section, the article includes 
the official Chongqing government response to the strike but then positions Yang’s 
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criticisms of the response. “The government putting the blame [for the strike] on 
‘fees’ only scratches the surface, and does not touch on the core issues of the taxi 
industry.” 
Finally, the article points to Xinhua’s “rare rolling coverage of the incident” and makes 
the assertion that, “Transparency of information avoided further deterioration of the 
event” (ibid). But even here the compliment is offered negatively. Rather than being a 
refreshing and encouraging sign of transparency that improved the situation and 
brought about resolution – the dominant tone of other articles – Xinhua’s proactive 
reporting stance is taken to be a tactic that stopped things getting even worse. 
Moreover, the article ignores the fact that local media did not use Xinhua-sourced 
reportage at all. 
An editorial, printed in the newspaper on the same day, takes a more measured 
approach, claiming that “the Chongqing municipal government emerges with some 
credit” and comparing its approach of relative openness to “the past response of 
many other local governments” which was “to conceal, evade, scold and suppress” 
(Chang, 2008). However, the article also points out that the four responses 
announced by the local government “did not touch on the most fundamental 
problem: the monopoly system of taxi management” (ibid). Moreover, the author – 
an unnamed ‘senior media person’ – criticises the local government for initially trying 
to blame the strike on a small number of troublemakers.  
Initially the government said that "a small number of people were 
manipulating the event" on the grounds that "most taxis had begun 
operating normally that morning but then met with a small number of 
people who attacked cars or forced passengers out of vehicles." 
Merely focusing on a small number of people smashing up cars was clearly 
not consistent with the fact that 8,000 taxis had stopped operations. 
Moreover, if the government departments had understood the real 
reasons behind the strike, they should have realised that the event was 
not down to the manipulations of a minority of people, but was rather 
because of the dissatisfaction of the majority of people….Maintaining that 
the strike was the work of "a small number of troublemakers" was the 
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government’s biggest regret in its emergency response that day and 
reflects the fact that some relevant departments still hold on to ridiculous 
old ideas.(ibid) 
The author claimed that the government retreated from this position on November 
4th. However, this study has shown that local media were still maintaining the notion 
that the strike was down to fear and intimidation by a minority on November 5th and 
beyond. 
The SMD’s final article on the incident was an edited version of a Xinhua report on Bo 
Xilai’s televised meeting with driver representatives, printed on November 7th. It 
actually strips out quotes from drivers and includes only direct comment from Bo Xilai 
himself. As such, it is a return to the highly cautious style of reporting seen on 
November 4th and 5th.  
The People’s Daily  
The news story carried by the People’s Net, the People’s Daily news website, on 
November 4th is nearly identical in tone and content to the reporting in the 
Chongqing Daily and, indeed, is drawn from reporting by People’s Net’s Chongqing 
office. This is to emphasise the ostensible threat to stability and to highlight the 
government response to nullify such a threat. The headline’s subject is the ‘statement’ 
issued by local authorities to deal with the taxi ‘suspension’. The strapline offers 
reassurance that more than 1,000 taxis had resumed ‘normal service’, with the 
assertion made in the second paragraph that ‘a number of others’ had not gone back 
to work ‘because of worries over their safety’. The report leads on the inconvenience 
caused to passengers and the swift government response. While there is 
acknowledgement of driver concerns, the issues are presented as a specific checklist 
of problems which are identifiable and, therefore, by implication, eminently solvable. 
This four-point checklist, explaining the reasons for the strike, is common to all initial 
reports. In the People’s Daily report of November 4th, on the four ‘main issues’ raised 




By November 7th there is greater variety displayed. An online opinion piece carried on 
the People’s Daily Net website on November 7th references the event as a ‘strike’ (ba 
gong) and suggests that the event is a test for Chongqing’s city leaders.  The author 
argues that “the critical issue” is not the taxis or the drivers, but “how city managers 
are going to find a balance between the interests and demands of all the parties 
related to this notable event.” The author praises the Chongqing administration for 
its ‘opening gambit’: “…they have given a profound apology to the general public – 
having the courage to directly face the issues and not evading responsibility or 
prevaricating with empty words, or wasting precious energy on blocking 
communications or ‘hushing up’ the news. Moreover, they allowed authoritative 
media to report events immediately; this aspect of the government response which is 
most worthy of commendation” (Jiang, 2008). However, the author suggests the 
Chongqing government needs to follow this up with real action: 
…old habits of issuing directives are not only ineffective but also do not 
accord with policies of a country ruled by law. Thinking about how city 
managers can face this change without panicking; how they can get past 
superficial appearances in emergency situations and crack difficult 
problems; how they can do their best to avoid those simplistic conclusions 
where a ‘minority of troublemakers’ are blamed… Action is more 
important than just admitting that a problem exists (ibid).  
The subtext of the comment is that the much-reported news conference of the 
previous day could be interpreted as ‘superficial’ and intended to ‘generate the 
greatest popularity’. What is praised is the decision to allow authoritative media to 
report events immediately – and notably not the rather ostentatious live televised 
‘driver discussion’. When it is remembered that the impetus for this open reporting 
came from outside Chongqing, as Chongqing’s official media, while acknowledging 
the strike, did engage in fairly traditional prevarication and blaming the situation on 
‘a minority of troublemakers’, this ostensible praise may be interpreted as concealed 
criticism.  
The article concludes that meeting the above conditions would constitute “the real 
meaning behind the idea of a people-centred scientific concept of development” – an 
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ideological theme which may be said to be the guiding policy of the entire Hu Jintao-
era (Barme, 2012). The article points to potential anxiety about the way Chongqing 
authorities had handled the propaganda surrounding the strike. 
Summary and Conclusions 
This account draws attention to the extent of reporting and the diversity of reporting 
that existed in mainland press reporting of the 2008 Chongqing taxi strike. This event 
attracted more coverage, and more diversity within the coverage, than any other in 
this study.  
The most obvious conclusion is the schism between Chongqing publications, whose 
reporting was largely dictated by the most senior Party-affiliated newspaper, and 
those outside the city, whose reporting was largely dictated by copy from the Xinhua 
News Agency. Publications within the city were obviously responding to restrictions, 
though these are not absolutely stringent, while those outside appeared to operate 
fractionally more freely, all the while responding to the parameters imposed by 
Xinhua. On November 6th, the day after the strike finally ended, it becomes clear that 
the reporting restrictions are loosened, both at a national level, and within the 
Chongqing press.  
The reports analysed here are clearly not completely co-ordinated and there are 
times where contradiction creeps in. There is also a surprising amount of 
condemnation of Chongqing authorities. This is not carried out by Xinhua itself, but 
Xinhua’s obvious attempt to impose a veneer of transparency and openness is the 
cover which publications such as the SMD and OMP use to deliver excoriating 
criticisms of distant political leaders. 
To turn first to the local Chongqing press, there is a clear strategy at work within the 
reporting. Clear, enumerated explanations are given for the strike, each of which 
have corresponding policy responses; the threat to stability is emphasised and a 
minority of drivers are blamed for the strike; officials are not named; the Party 
publication sets the tone for commercial offshoots, which deploy apparently 
sanctioned copy, quotes, and tifa; and no Xinhua reports appeared within the 
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Chongqing press until well after the strike ended; even then, they were edited to 
appear more favourable to local leaders141.  
However, junior commercial publications did not always parrot the reporting of the 
senior Party publication. For example, the decision of the Chongqing Morning Post to 
emphasise a prediction, made by a local official, of a full resumption of operations in 
a situation where there was obvious uncertainty is notable given that other 
publications had been circumspect in their deployment of the same quote. This may 
suggest nothing more than a difference of editorial decision making but the lack of 
stringent propaganda discipline is significant in this instance. 
In terms of the reasons given for the strike, locally there was a clear attempt to 
impose a strict four-point explanation onto events. Each of these four points had a 
corresponding policy prescription. However, this was refined noticeably to 
deemphasise one of the four explanations – the low flag fare – when it became clear 
that changing this would obviously involve angering taxi customers. These facts 
reflect well Brady’s (2010) notion that media do not tackle problems which have no 
obvious solution. Where one causal factor for the strike became disassociated from 
an obvious and straightforward policy response, it was simply removed from the 
explanation.  
Early Chongqing reports, hailed for being unusually open and transparent, presented 
contradictory messages about the cause of the strike. This suggests a level of 
unpreparedness for both the protest and the fact that Xinhua was essentially forcing 
an immediate, and public, local response. Issues that perhaps would have been 
worked through behind closed doors before being issued to the media were being 
worked through in something approach real-time and the contradictions this threw 
up were likely humiliating for the local news spokesman, who was one of the officials 
later reprimanded. He promised an end to the strike which never came to pass, and 
used intemperate language in threatening strict sanctions for strikers, later 
contradicted by Bo Xilai. 
                                                       
141 See the Chongqing Morning Post on November 7th, for example.  
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Xinhua’s reporting, used widely through the Chinese press, appeared to mark the 
imposition, or perhaps encouragement, of a new media policy when it came to 
protest events. This needs to be understood as having the most senior approval, and 
being part of a year-long media strategy to change media response to crisis events. 
The reporting may be characterised as emphasising the human and de-emphasising 
the official. Xinhua’s willingness to allow its staff to conduct reportage was scaled 
back on the second day of reporting, where official voices once again came to 
dominate and the violence of strikers is more pronounced. Nevertheless, the 
difference with local reporting was stark and there was an attempt by journalists to 
compare official statements with facts on the ground, and to draw attention to 
incidents where the two appeared not to match. 
There was a distinctly self-congratulatory tone to much of the Xinhua-based reporting 
and editorialising of non-Chongqing publications. These highlighted the relative 
openness and criticised explicitly the supposedly outdated methods of stifling 
awkward information. However, the inherent contradiction in this was that the new 
centrally-mandated policy of rapid response and transparency was not in evidence in 
the market where it could be expected to have the most effect – the local Chongqing 
press. Indeed, in Chongqing, most of the coverage reverted to traditional methods of 
blame the strike on a minority of troublemakers.  
The one publication which drew attention to this was Shanghai’s Oriental Morning 
Post. It used Xinhua copy for the most part, but appeared to deliberately draw out 
and place emphasis on elements of Xinhua’s dispatches which were seemingly critical 
of Chongqing authorities. Moreover, it published two in-house editorials. The first 
was a general praising of the new approach to crisis response, detailed in the last 
paragraph. However, the second actually suggested this policy had not been fully 
implemented and that local transparency was something of a sham. The editorial 
does not, of course, question the wisdom of media openness. Rather, it exploits the 
fact that media openness has the approval of national leaders, to damn local 
authorities in Chongqing.  
The behaviour of the Southern Metropolis Daily through the strike is extremely 
unusual. The newspaper is conservative in reprinting sanctioned Xinhua copy – even 
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removing aspects which appear critical of the local authorities – either side of a single 
day in which the newspaper publishes an extremely detailed expose that is highly 
unflattering to Chongqing authorities. It might be characterised as a ‘guerrilla’ 
approach. 
Finally, it is notable the extent to which reports of the People’s Daily website mirror 
the reports in the Chongqing party publication rather than Xinhua, despite the 
equivalence of their administrative seniority. This suggests the transparency push 
emanating primarily from Xinhua rather than the Party, and that Party priorities and 
















Chapter 8: The Wukan Protest  
Protest Narrative 
Located on a natural harbour connected to the South China Sea, the Guangdong 
village of Wukan has approximately 13,000142 residents. The roots of the 2011 protest 
date to the agreed sale of a large plot of collectively owned land in the 1990s. At that 
time, Xue Chang, the secretary of the village Party branch and member of the 
provincial-level People’s Congress143, set up a ‘collective enterprise’ known as the 
Wukan Port Industrial Development Corporation for which he acted as general 
manager. The company later partnered with Gangjia Lian Zhiye, a company 
associated with a Wukan-born144 Hong Kong businessman, Chen Wenqing. The 
partnership resulted in the formation of the Lufeng Jiaye Development Corporation. 
Xue promised 1,200 acres of Wukan land for development, while Chen pledged 22 
million Hong Kong Dollars in investment. Both Chen and Xue took senior roles in the 
company, along with Chen Shunyi, the village head.  
Land was progressively requisitioned though the 1990s and 2000s with villagers 
reportedly being given as little as 100 RMB in compensation. Villagers either did not 
understand that collectively owned land was effectively being privatised, or took a 
sanguine view of their loss. The first formal objections were raised in 2009 when a 
local group, initially founded on an anonymous QQ145 group, banded together and 
sent formal Xinfang petitions (see page Error! Bookmark not defined.) to both 
                                                       
142 With approximately 13,000 residents, Wukan would be too large to be considered a ‘village’ in the 
context of most Western European countries – even in countries with the largest population densities 
and may reasonably be thought of as comparable in size to a small Western European town.  
143 The Provincial (Guangdong) People’s Congress is the provincial-tier equivalent of the National 
People’s Congress (Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui). It has powers to legislate, to oversee the 
workings of government and the power to elect major state officials at its tier within the overall 
political hierarchy. In theory it is the highest organ of state power in the province, though – like its 
national equivalent – it is generally regarded as a forum for rubber-stamping and lending democratic 
credibility to decisions taken by provincial level organs of the Party. 
144 Caijing reports that Chen Wenqing was born in Wukan and was smuggled into Hong Kong in the 
1960s, a time when there were large numbers of Guangdong residents illegally entering the then 
British-controlled colonial territory. 
145 Tencent QQ, or QQ for short, is a hugely popular Chinese instant messenging service, similar in 
nature to Microsoft’s now-defunct MSN Messenger, Skype’s IM platform or Facebook Chat. It allows 
messages to be shared online between an approved network of friends or contacts. 
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provincial, prefecture and county-level governments in Guangzhou, Shanwei and 
Lufeng respectively. 
The Lufeng petition was apparently received though delegated down to authorities at 
the township level. Petitioners were able to have a meeting with township officials 
but nothing came of their efforts. Over the next two years, the group petitioned a 
variety of government bodies in Guangzhou, including the provincial party committee, 
the provincial commission for discipline inspection, the provincial government, the 
provincial People's Congress, and the provincial branch of the National Land Agency 
(Zhang, 2012). The progress of these efforts was recorded and disseminated via the 
same QQ mailing list (ibid). In September 2011, members of the original group 
attempted to draw more villagers into the fight, apparently spurred by the fact that 
construction machinery was moving in onto a central area of cleared land. They put 
up notices pointing out the developments and, on September 21st, led an organised 
sit-in at the Lufeng government building, protesting the fact that there had been 
insufficient compensation for the land that was about to be developed. 
After being told that the land had not in fact been sold, protestors returned to Wukan 
and convened at the offices of the village party committee, demanding to see Xue 
Chang. When he did not appear, some protestors began attacking property 
associated with the village party committee and businesses owned by Xue and Chen 
Wenqing. This violence continued throughout the day. Protestors returned to the 
party building the following day, but riot police had gathered and a pitch battle 
ensued. Anger allegedly swelled when rumours spread that a schoolgirl had been 
killed by a shot from police lines, leading to police being pushed back and protestors 
laying siege to a police station. Police officers and officials remained trapped for most 
of the day, while six police cars which had been parked outside were overturned.  
On September 24th several village representatives travelled to Donghai to meet with 
Lufeng leaders. In concession, Lufeng leaders promised an investigation into land 
expropriation, illegal financing and electoral irregularities. On the same day, police 
returned to the village and order was restored. Xue Chang was removed from office 
in late September. An Interim Council (linshi lishi hui) was subsequently formed, 
consisting of 12 villagers. 
244 
 
The result of the Lufeng government investigation in early October conceded that 
some public funds had been misappropriated for the purchase of cars but concerns 
over land and election fraud were not addressed. On November 17, Lufeng’s 
discipline commission entered Xue Chang and Chen Shunyi in the shuanggui 
system146. On November 21st, a second collective petition began, with liveried 
villagers holding banners and forming a three-kilometre long caravan which marched 
from the village to the Lufeng government offices, some five kilometres north of the 
village. Villagers delivered the petition and returned to the village where they 
congregated and continued to shout slogans.  
The response of the government was to wait a fortnight before, on December 3rd, 
arresting Zhuang Liehong, a villager who had been involved in organising the 
September protest, on charges relating to that earlier event. A police road block was 
set up on December 7th, stopping Wukan villagers freely leaving the village without 
showing ID. The following day, Wukan villagers set up their own barricades around 
the village and became highly active in communicating with journalists. On December 
9th, four more alleged protest leaders were arrested by plainclothes police and the 
Shanwei authorities staged a press conference announcing their actions and 
discussing some of the background to the protest. Two days later, on December 11th, 
Xue Jinbo, one of the four arrested two days earlier, died while in a Lufeng detention 
facility, increasing tensions within the now-besieged village.  
Reports of this period paint a contradictory picture, though it is clear that leaving the 
village was, at the very least, difficult. Images and reports on social media indicate 
that there were regular gatherings and marches within the village itself. Police 
attempted to break the barricades on December 11th but were repelled. Overseas 
journalists began arriving in Wukan from around December 14th and TV crews had 
gained access to the village by December 15th and released numerous written reports 
and to-camera video pieces which were broadcast on television and the Internet. 
Villagers turned a two-storey village building into a de-facto media centre and the 
siege continued, covered extensively by overseas journalists.  
                                                       
146 Shanggui is a non-civil system of administrative punishment. Though the word, literally ‘double 
regulations’ implies an adherence to both civic rules and Party discipline, the shanggui system is 
commonly understood as an internal Party disciplinary structure which deals with cadres on its own 
terms and out of the public eye. 
245 
 
On December 14th, the Shanwei authorities again staged a news conference to try 
and deal with the public anger in Wukan, and increasingly on the Internet, around the 
death of Xue Jinbo. On December 18th, Zheng Yanxiong, the Party chief of Shanwei 
gave a speech to a closed party meeting chastising villagers for talking to foreign 
journalists. With negotiations seemingly unable to resolve the standoff, the village 
had announced that they would attempt to make another collective petition to the 
Lufeng government on December 21st, a march which would have drawn significant 
media attention and been highly provocative as a result. Perhaps sensing danger of 
serious unrest in the eyes of the global media, a provincial working group – consisting 
of several high profile members of the Guangdong government – held a meeting in 
Lufeng on December 20th during which the working group’s leader, Zhu Mingguo, 
made conciliatory remarks. The petition was cancelled and Zhu himself entered the 
village on December 23rd promising concessions and no further arrests of villagers. 
On December 28th the results of Wukan’s previous village election, in February of that 
year, were declared invalid. In January 2012, a protester, Lin Zulian, was elected as 
the head of a newly established Wukan general party branch, a position of relatively 
little power. Residents elected an 11-strong committee to organise village-wide 
elections, which then took place on March 4th, 2012.  There were voting stations 
around the village and the elections themselves received widespread coverage. Lin 
Zulian was elected as village head. 
Intermittent reports suggest that the new village committee continued to struggle for 
public support during 2012 and 2013 over their inability to have stolen farmland 
returned or adequately compensated. The Guardian newspaper reported in March 
2014 that one of the protest leaders, Zhuang Liehong, quit his elected position within 
the village committee in 2013 and fled to the US, seeking asylum. Furthermore, two 
more key figures from the 2011 protests, and likely replacements for Zhuang – Yang 
Semao and Hong Ruichao – had been arrested on charges of corruption ahead of the 
2014 election. One of the key political figures from the event – Zheng Yanxiong, party 
chief of Shanwei – was promoted to become the provincial propaganda chief in 2013 
(Lau, 2013). An announcement that the provincial-level official chiefly associated with 
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ending the Wukan standoff, Zhu Mingguo, was being investigated for corruption was 
made in November 2014 (Wang, 2014).  
Administrative Orientation 
An explanation of China’s administrative hierarchy and Wukan’s place within it is 
central to explaining the machinations of the 2011 protest in Wukan. In the English 
context, a ‘village’ is normally understood to describe a geographic location, assumed 
to be rural in nature, and associated with a distinct social identity based on 
indigenous institutions and organisations. These definitions may hold in China, but a 
Chinese village has an additional definition as an administrative unit. A ‘village’ in this 
sense marks the lowest sub-division within China’s complex political hierarchy. In this 
sense, a Chinese ‘village’ may equally exist in sparsely populated countryside location 
or – counterintuitively – within a city147.  
China, effectively, has five administrative tiers which vary slightly between the 
parallel bureaucratic structures of ‘Party’ and ‘State’148. The most powerful units are, 
of course, those which belong to the national government; below this are the 
provincial level units (which include autonomous regions, municipalities such as 
Beijing and Tianjin which are under direct national control, and the two SARS of Hong 
Kong and Macau); below this is the prefecture level administration which include, at 
the upper end of this tier149, big cities like Guangzhou, but which may also include 
                                                       
147 Though China has few ‘slums’ that a resident of Rio de Janeiro or Mumbai might recognise, areas of 
obvious urban deprivation – characterised by poor infrastructure, dilapidated buildings and tiny 
subdivided living spaces – are known as ‘urban villages’. The title is derived from the fact that many, if 
not most, are technically administrative ‘villages’. Most would have begun as distinct geographic 
entities which were absorbed into urban spaces through incremental development, particularly in the 
30 years since reform and opening up. ‘Urban villages’ are often where migrant workers live due to the 
low cost of rent (Miller, 2012). 
148 The government of the People’s Republic of China is routinely referred to as the ‘Party-State’ 
because of the strategic intertwining of these two organizational hierarchies. The state bureaucracy 
exists as an independent entity and is, in practice, a civil service tasked with implementing the affairs 
of government, similar to that found in most Western European nation states. Equivalent units of the 
Communist Party of China exist down the length of this administrative chain. The party unit is 
theoretically subordinate to that of the state – which includes ‘People’s Congresses’ at most tiers of 
the hierarchy – but it is widely acknowledged that the two, ostensible separate, bodies are intimately 
connected, and that, in case of conflict, power lies with the Party leaders at any given level. Though 
restrictions apply, it is not uncommon for the same individual to occupy positions in both Party and 
state structures. 
149 One may view a city like Guangzhou as either at the upper end of the prefecture tier or the lower 
end of the provincial tier. It is governed by provincial level authorities for Guangdong (also based in 
Guangzhou) but – unlike prefecture-level cities – has independent control of economics and law. 
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smaller and less economically significant cities; below this is the county level, which 
includes often sprawling county regions, districts within large cities and relatively 
small ‘county-level’ cities; finally, there is the township. Villages exist below the 
township level of governance and are not formally connected to the township 
bureaucracy.  
The current arrangement has important resonances with administrative organisation 
in imperial times where the county level was the point at which a boundary between 
state and society was marked. At this point, the bureaucratic organs of government 
stopped (Huang & Yang, 2002). At the grassroots, clan organisations and allegiances 
had a vital role to play in social organisation. The early totalitarian instincts of the 
Communist Party meant that the party organisation was, and is, constituted right 
down into village households. However, the state bureaucracy has always stopped 
short of this realm. Though village ‘committees’ and other organising groups exist, 
villages in China do not have governments150 with statutory political powers (ibid). 
In the post-Mao years, there have been signs that the Party is willing to step back 
slightly from this grassroots sphere. Election for village leadership, for example, can 
theoretically be contested by any individual. Moreover, the advent of household 
responsibility – explained in more detail below – effectively stripped village leaders of 
their power over the rights of distribution, thus effectively removing a key 
component in their local influence. However, village committees are overwhelmingly 
likely to be dominated by Communist Party members and their links with township 
cadres and officials, particularly over the sale of collective land, means they continue 
to exert important influence. All this said, they are not, and cannot be, ‘officials’ as 
such, and there are signs that historic clan allegiances are experiencing a revival of 
importance in local politics, something that Lagerkvist (2012) sees evidence for in the 
Wukan conflict itself.  
This is important when one considers the ultimate outcome of the protest, a formal 
reconfiguration of local power relations151. This represented an ostensible climb-
down on the part of local authorities. However, it was likely palatable only because 
                                                       
150 These would be known as village ‘councils’ in the British context.  
151 Albeit one which was not seemingly able to fundamentally change the central complaint of Wukan 
villagers – historic land expropriation. 
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the village leadership structure is not heavily integrated into the administrative 
bureaucracy. Though Party pride and influence may have been damaged somewhat, 
the foundations of state power were certainly not.  
Wukan’s precise place in the administrative hierarchy is important to note as the 
engagement of these various tiers of government is an integral part of the story of 
the protest. Wukan village is located within the ‘township’ of Donghai, a larger urban 
centre located less than 10km to the north. Donghai is, by turns, under the control of 
the ‘county’ of Lufeng. Lufeng is technically a ‘county-level city’ located midway 
between Wukan and Donghai, though it has no urban centre, and is dominated by the 
government offices which administer the county. Lufeng, in turn, comes under the 
auspices of the prefecture-level city of Shanwei, around 30km to the southeast. The 
Shanwei authorities are directly subordinate to provincial level government in 
Guangzhou.  
Wukan is located around only 20km, as the crow flies, from Dongzhou, also within the 
Shanwei prefecture, which was scene of another protracted and violent protest in 
2005152. That protest lasted seven months and culminated in a pitch battle between 
villagers and police which resulted in at least three deaths153. The Dongzhou protest 
also pivoted on villager anger around perceived illegal land expropriation and was 
reported widely in the international press and received some minor coverage in 
domestic media. It’s possible to draw some connections between these two events – 
there seem to be similarities in governance, village culture, and economic conditions, 
and the proximity is such that verbal accounts of the Dongzhou protest may have 
spread to Wukan and potentially been instructive for villagers there.      
The Protest in Historic Context 
Moore (2012), one of the journalists involved in coverage of the Wukan protest, has 
suggested that the protest’s ‘success’ was related to the fact it did garner so much 
attention. That it did so, he suggests, is down to the villager’s media savvy, which may, 
in turn, be related to the fact that villagers have personal links with Hong Kong and 
were potentially influenced by media practices there. Moore does not acknowledge 
                                                       
152 And, to a lesser extent, in 2006. 
153 This is the official number given in domestic Chinese media. 
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the other obvious way in which Wukan’s proximity to Hong Kong may have played a 
part: that it made the village readily accessible for the world’s media. The fact that 
the protest caught the attention of global media and, perhaps related, domestic 
media, certainly seems likely to have played a part in Guangzhou’s decision to 
intervene, and chimes with other research on protest in China which suggest media 
engagement to be a key factor in the success, or otherwise, of protest actions (Cai, 
2009). However, while mindful of this background, this research is not attempting to 
explain the protest itself, but is analysed here because it took place and subsequently 
received media attention.  
Wukan was heralded by some of the foreign journalists present as being something 
approaching an epochal protest and a revival of the 1989 student movement. In 
reality, rural land protest has deep precedent in both ancient (Hung, 2011) and recent 
(O’Brien, 2009; Perry & Seldon, 2000) Chinese history. Given China’s size and the 
prevalence of rural discontent, the uprising is unlikely to have been the only one of its 
kind in 2011, let alone the previous 22 years.  
To understand the discourse surrounding the protest, it is necessary to explain some 
of the policy aspects which loom large in the background of this particular incident.  
Conflicts of interest between lower tiers of government and peasant farmers grew 
rapidly in the 1980s as the economic shackles were removed from what had, since 
the early 1950s, been a collectivised system of production. The advent of the 
household responsibility system, pioneered in secret in the late 1970s and rolled out 
across the country in the early 1980s, allowed farmers of smallholdings to privately 
profit from their activities. Land was, and indeed remains, under “collective 
ownership”, with government-issued land contracts guaranteeing use of a particular 
parcel of land to anyone with a village hukou ID. This land could then be tilled for 
private economic gain.   
This reform transformed local power configurations; rural cadres remained tasked 
with growth quotas and the implementation of unpopular laws such a birth control 
but were unable to rely on traditional techniques methods of economic control. 
Coercion was often used as a substitute and disputes escalated.  
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Village elections began to be pioneered in the 1980s as a response to these rising 
tensions. Li and O’Brien (1996) and Guo (2001) have documented the sometimes 
visceral antipathy that has existed between villagers and their immediate leaders – 
the former resenting the latter’s arbitrary and disruptive use of power, the latter 
often regarding the former as hopelessly Luddite in the face of economic 
transformation in China. With villages existing outside China’s state bureaucracy154, 
village elections were a means to make local leaders more practically accountable to 
their communities without seriously affecting top-down power in the wider political 
structure. Village elections were phased in across the country from the mid-1980s. 
Initially, villagers could only select from a list of Party-appointed candidates though, 
latterly, in the haixuan (literally, “Sea of choice”) initiative, posts were open to public 
nomination (Guo, 2001). It should be noted that these privileges have not been 
universally upheld and, even where elections have taken place, complaints have 
persisted about the extent to which positions are genuinely accessible to the public. 
The potential for tension between villagers and leaders was exacerbated in the 1990s 
and 2000s as potential economic gains from farming diverged from the potential 
gains to be made from the development of land155. Land under collective ownership 
could, theoretically, be sold to developers with the profits being shared among those 
whose land156 was lost. With rapidly rising land prices, such a trend led to the mass 
loss of farmland, deemed vital by central government for China’s overall food security. 
To combat this, the so-called dipiao system has developed. This divides China’s total 
rural land stock into two kinds: rural construction land and farmland. If village-owned 
‘rural construction land’ – on which there may be existing factories, warehouses, 
schools, or houses – is converted into farmland, a dipiao credit is produced which can 
then be sold on rural exchanges to developers. The purchase of this credit then gives 
that developer the right to develop an equivalent parcel of land at the edge of a 
nearby city. Thus new farmland is created as villagers take a profit on the sacrifice of 
                                                       
154 Village cadres play a vital role in administering policy at the grassroots level but there is no specific 
representation for villages within the state hierarchy and members are, therefore, not ‘officials’ as 
such (Li & O’Brien, 1996: 56) 
155 ‘Development’ should be taken to mean the conversion of agricultural farmland into industrial or 
residential land which could be then built upon. 
156 Taken to mean the ‘land’ to which a villager has usage rights. It has previously been explained that 
no villager owns the land he works, but what is bargained for is the relinquishment of usage rights. 
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their land and land rights, and move into denser concentrated developments – either 
in new village developments or in nearby towns or cities. Meanwhile, developers can 
expand existing towns or cities, to both service and profit from the national trend of 
urbanisation, without any net loss in the total stock of farmland (Miller, 2012).  
Rapid development and rising prices provide incentives for the powerful to coercively 
expropriate farmland, while the system of ostensible ‘collective ownership’, as well as 
political opacity, provides the means. Some have argued that the abolition of a 
centuries-old ‘agricultural tax’ in 2006 – designed to ease dissatisfaction at the 
grassroots and signal growing financial strength – may have inadvertently 
exacerbated this problem by making county and township governments increasingly 
reliant on the proceeds of land sales to fund their expenditure (Fewsmith, 2010). 
There is clearly a nexus of power around township officials, who must ultimately sign 
off on land deals, village chiefs, who are responsible for arranging, agreeing and 
administering land clearance, and developers looking to obtain land for development. 
Though villagers must legally be compensated for any loss, the exact terms of 
compensation are often ambiguous. Moreover, it is the developer – not government 
– responsible for compensating villagers for the transfer of their ‘land user rights’ 
(Guo, 2001). The opacity of the political and business structures makes it 
straightforward for officials to, for example, undervalue land, pay villagers modest 
compensation, and take kickbacks from developers. Should villagers object to the sale 
of land, a number of coercive mechanisms may be used, ranging from the quasi-legal 
– delaying the renewal of land use contracts – to the straightforwardly thuggish.  
The Wukan protest represents a confluence of two of the most persistent and 
intimately intertwined grassroots issues – elections and coercive land sale. Village 
elections were initially conceived of as a mechanism designed to offer some measure 
of protection from the coercive sale of collectively owned land. In theory, elections 
gave local leaders an incentive to work for the collective interest. Failure to do so 
would result in the loss of local power. In Wukan, electoral fraud and land 
expropriation were the two core issues at the outset of the protest. However, anger 
over election fraud was intimately linked with the second economic issue; electoral 
fraud was the mechanism which allowed land expropriation to take place. The 
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retention of leadership positions give village Party officials and village heads both the 
incentive and means to force through land sales for the enrichment of both 
themselves and leaders within the county hierarchy. In short, the local democracy 
issue associated with this protest does not appear to be an issue in and of itself. 
Rather it seems to have been conceived as the means by which the egregious 
infringement of land rights could be challenged.   
Narrative of Domestic Reporting 
Phases of reporting  
Phase 1 – September 2011 
Several newspapers reported the outbreak of violence in Wukan in contemporaneous 
reports. Though these began by implying the unrest had essentially been resolved, 
they were followed up with reports detailing violence and injury. An initial news 
report of the petition was made on the Shanwei government web portal and formed 
the basis of reports by Xinhua and other major news organisations. This was the only 
announcement made in the local Shanwei media during this initial phase of the 
protest157. 
Within Guangdong, the Southern Daily (Nanfang Ribao), the Party mouthpiece of the 
Guangdong Provincial Committee, reported the Wukan protest in a series of four 
reports over the course of five days. The first acknowledges the petition but attempts 
to indicate the issue is at a close. However, the subsequent reports detail violence 
and injury. The last two reports make clear that the journalist is conducting reportage 
at the scene rather than using Xinhua copy.  
The Southern Metropolis Daily carried a prominent, illustrated news story on 
September 23rd with reporting conducted by its own journalists. 
Caijing magazine did not report the incident in its magazine but carried news on its 
website, largely derived from the same official sources in Shanwei. 
                                                       
157 The author has not been able to ascertain whether this report appears in the Shanwei Daily itself, 
though many subsequent Wukan-related reports which appeared on the ShanweiGov website did 
appear in exactly the same form in the pages of the Shanwei Party publication.  
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Phase 2 – November 2011 
The second, very brief phase of reporting surrounded the second petition, which 
began on November 21st. A solitary news report of the event appeared in the local 
Party publication, the Shanwei Daily on November 22nd, a copy of which also 
appeared in the Southern Daily. The same report was syndicated elsewhere in the 
Chinese press, and was published in Shanghai’s Oriental Morning Post and on online 
news sites, including the website of Caijing magazine.  
Phase 3 – December 10-15, 2011 
December marks the most active phase of both the protest and reporting on the 
protest. After months of intermittent police action in and around Wukan, a 
crackdown began on December 7th leading to the arrest of several alleged protest 
leaders on December 9th. The situation was addressed at a Shanwei government news 
conference on the same day and led to the first report on the incident in the 
subsequent day’s Shanwei Daily newspaper158. A series of reports then appeared 
around the press in Guangdong and elsewhere in China, though these adhered to a 
basic reporting framework established by propaganda authorities in Guangdong.   
A second news conference took place on December 14th, which yielded further 
reporting across the Guangdong press the following day. This was specifically related 
to reports around the death of Wukan villager Xue Jinbo whilst in custody in Shanwei. 
This phase of reporting ended on December 15th as the situation in Wukan became 
increasingly tense and the ongoing siege began to receive heavy coverage in 
international news outlets.  
Phase 4 –December 20, 2011 – January 6, 2012 
There does not appear to be any coverage of a speech made by Shanwei Party chief, 
Zheng Yanxiong, on December 18th at a meeting between village representatives and 
county leaders in Shanwei. Local media may have broadcast parts of the speech 
(Patience, 2011)159 but no reports of the speech appeared in the press, either in 
                                                       
158 There were earlier reports released online on the evening of December 9th. The dayoo.com news 
portal, affiliated with the Guangzhou Daily newspaper, was the earliest report found. This can be seen 
at: http://news.dayoo.com/news/201112/09/85080_20884797.htm.   
159 The author was not able to locate evidence of a live broadcast. Other Anglophone media sources 
suggest the speech was made at a private government meeting on December 18th, 2011 (Lau, 2013) 
from which a DVD of Zheng Yanxiong’s speech was made and sent into the village as a negotiation 
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Shanwei or around Guangdong. The Wukan issue only re-emerged in the pages of 
China’s newspapers from December 20th onwards. On this day the Southern Daily led 
the reporting of what may be termed the ‘resolution’ stage of the crisis.  It was the 
only story which appeared in print on this day, though the content was published by 
Caijing on its website. From the following day, December 21st, onward, the Wukan 
protest, specifically its resolution, received widespread coverage around the Chinese 
press. A significant moment occurred on December 22nd with the publication in the 
People’s Daily of a prominent editorial praising the provincial government’s effort to 
resolve the crisis and chastising county-level officials. Guangdong publications did not 
publish independent editorials though the Beijing News (Xinjing Bao) carried an 
editorial on the same day. 
In late December the provincial working group staged a number of media briefings 
which garnered coverage across the Chinese press. The tone of these was conciliatory 
and there were several admissions of corruption and malfeasance in the village 
electoral process and land requisitioning. 
The period ended with the publication of two lengthy features, one in the Xinhua-
affiliated China Newsweek in the January 1st, 2012, edition, and the other in the 
Caijing-affiliated Lens magazine in its January 6th, 2012 edition. Both articles are 
presented as investigative reportage and purport to ‘uncover’ serious abuses at local 
levels of government.  
Caijing did not publish anything in the magazine itself, its December publication dates 
(on December 5th and December 19th) coming before the beginning of the most 
intense round of protest and then during what appears to be a national media 
blackout in the days prior to December 20th.  
Phase 5 – Spring 2012 
There was limited coverage of the election of former protest leader Lin Zulian to the 
role of village Party leader, on January 16th. Caijing wrote a lengthy follow-up feature 
at the end of February 2012 which offered some new details of the return of Xue 
                                                                                                                                                             
tactic. The fact that a press photographer has imaged (Patience, 2011) a protestor alongside a shot of 
the Shanwei party chief, displayed on his TV (as opposed to a computer) indicates this was being 
played from a recorded source, and thus is likely to be the DVD cited.  
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Jinbo’s body and arrangements for upcoming village elections. Wukan was cited in 
the Chinese press as elections took place in March, though coverage was occasional 
and less intense than that in the Anglophone media. Reflective stories were published 
a year on from the incident and many of China’s major news portals set up dedicated 
‘primer’ sites to revisit the incident.  
Analysis 
This section will describe and analyse the reporting and editorialising around this 
incident. The focus will be on the reporting at the height of the protest event in early 
December 2011.  
Party Media Coverage 
Shanwei Reporting160 
The author of the local party publication employs several interesting linguistic and 
extra-linguistic strategies to represent the protest in print and point to its implied 
resolution. Unsurprisingly, the author seeks to minimise the significance of the 
conflict, to suggest imminent resolution and to extol the diligence, transparency, 
fairness and effectiveness of the government response. The author also emphasises 
solidarity between the prefecture, county and township-level authorities. None of 
this is particularly surprising in a Party publication. However, the mechanisms of this 
are worthy of study. 
Stratified government 
As the mouthpiece of the Shanwei Party Committee, it is entirely predictable that the 
Party should emerge from the story’s narration with credit. Of more interest is the 
extent to which gaps may be discerned between various tiers of government. 
The conflict is presented as being the result of village-tier squabbling which is 
ultimately rectified by the co-ordinated efforts of the three senior tiers of 
government. Shanwei – the prefecture level authority – and Lufeng – the county level 
authority – are explicitly linked; in the recounting of the September conflict, “Party 
                                                       
160 This section references reporting in the Shanwei Daily. This is the only local newspaper found by the 
author which specifically focused on the Shanwei prefecture, location of Wukan village. 
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and municipal leaders from Shanwei and Lufeng attached great importance to the 
issue” (Wu et al, 2011); in November “Party and municipal leaders from both Shanwei 
and Lufeng” arrived on the scene (Shanwei Daily, 2011a); later, “responsible officials 
from Shanwei and Lufeng responded promptly (Wu et al, 2011)”.  
In the December 10th story, Donghai – the township authority – is cited three times. 
In the first and last mention, the township is said to be acting on explicit advice from 
Shanwei authorities, or implementing a decision taken at the senior level. However, 
arguably the most important political decision reported by the newspaper is said to 
have been taken at the township level:   
…in response to disciplinary issues, Donghai’s party committee has 
removed Wukan village branch secretary Xue Chang, and deputy 
secretary Chen Shuyi; accepted the resignation of Chen Shuyi as village 
committee head; and begun investigations into Xue Chang and Chen 
Shuyi. At the same time, those members of the village committee with 
whom there are issues will be removed according to the law and 
elections will be held to fill the vacancies. (ibid) 
There is some ambiguity in the projected role of the Donghai township government. 
For the most part, it is constructed as junior and lacking in agency, though in the most 
crucial – and perhaps contentious – aspect, it is accorded absolute authority. The 
structuring of these entities intones the primacy of senior leaders while affirming the 
effective functioning of the administrative hierarchy. 
Government as active 
Through reference to its seamless interlinking parts, the article posits the government 
at all levels as active. This impression is bolstered with other textual strategies. Senior 
leaders make plans and issue instructions to deal with the problems. There is a clear 
downward flow of power; senior leaders “give attention” to the issue, “visit” the site 
of disorder and, once there, “do work”. This work is not further defined – it is an 
action done to a place, rather being the outcome of an exchange. Throughout the 
article, conflict is resolved by the authorities “doing work”. After this work is done, 
“the ideas of some villagers began to turn towards the right path” (ibid) – in this 
construction, the government is diligent and active, the villagers passively ‘corrected’. 
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Numerous forms of ‘work’ are cited by the author: “rural work”, “persuasive work”, 
“ideological work”, “transformation work” and, on several occasions, generic “work”. 
The intended impression is one of a decisive and diligent government response.  
In response to earlier upheavals in Wukan, the actions of unnamed but ‘senior’ 
leaders from Lufeng and Shanwei is presented in heroic, militaristic terms. In 
September they “immediately hastened to the scene to issue instructions from the 
vanguard” (zuozhen zhihui) (Shanwei Government Online, 2011), while in November 
“responsible officials from Shanwei and Lufeng responded promptly, commanding 
from the front” (kaoqian zuozhen zhihui) (Shanwei Daily, 2011a). Overall, the tone is 
one where activity is top-down. Work is done, action is taken, order is restored. There 
is one mention of villagers as active participants in a hierarchical flow – the masses 
have given information to officials – but this is only a means for credit to be claimed 
by officials for acting on that information. Otherwise, villagers are either voiceless 
within the media texts, or characterised as violent thugs. 
Official harmony, village discord  
The article is structured around the notion of riotous and unreasonable village 
behaviour contrasted against political order and efficiency. At the point that 
government and villagers meet, there is a civilized exchange – villagers make a 
petition; officials proffer a clear response – but on their return to the village, violence 
ensues. The village is posited as the site of disorder. Each action by villagers is 
portrayed as random; each counteraction by government is clear, systematic and 
bounded by hierarchies. Villagers step outside the boundaries by ‘congregating’, 
‘smashing’, ‘blocking’ and ‘destroying’; the authorities ‘plan’, ‘instruct’, and ‘work’. 
Rather than defending its complicity in the dispute, the government takes on a 
parental role – one of marshalling and adjudicating, rather than being a participant in 
the disorder.  
A line at the end of the Shanwei Daily’s first December report attempts to separate 
the village from the political hierarchies by suggesting the problem is one of internal 
squabbling and descries ‘insiders and outsiders’ who have ‘ulterior motives’: 
From looking at the incident itself, the entire incident was mainly about 
internal village contradictions (cunnei maodun). The majority of village 
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demands are mainly about internal village economic problems. 
Nevertheless, the incident has been manipulated, exploited and incited 
by some insiders and outsiders with ulterior motives in an attempt to 
escalate the situation. (Wu et al, 2011) 
There is notable couching in the construction of the first sentence: “the entire 
incident was mainly about internal contradictions”. The adjective and adverb in this 
construction appear to be in jarring contradiction. The sentence’s meaning would be 
more specific with the inclusion of one or the other of the italicised words. Including 
both words results in a contradictory textual reality which the author leaves 
unresolved. Nevertheless, in meeting disorder, the mechanisms of government are 
presented as operating in a clear, smooth and predictable manner. In the final 
paragraph of the description of the September riot, the village “returned to normal” 
(huifu le zhengchang zhuxu) after a team from Lufeng and Donghai entered the village 
to “maintain order” (chixu zhengchang).  
Order is structured around semantic binaries. Order is “normal” (zhengchang); the 
petition made by villagers is “abnormal”. “Legitimate demands” (heli de yaoqiu) are 
“implemented” (luoshi) by authorities, with the implication being that illegitimate 
demands have also been made. Finally, the article of ends with ambiguous allegations 
of criminality and conspiracy. Authorities resolve to “strike” (da ji) against “leading 
elements” (wei shou) and “core elements” (gugan fenzi). “Nevertheless, the incident 
has been manipulated, exploited and incited by some insiders and outsiders with 
ulterior motives in an attempt to escalate the situation” (ibid). 
Government as transparent 
The appearance of the conflict in the pages of the only significant local Party 
newspaper on December 10th must, manifestly, be concerned with projecting a 
veneer of transparency. The precise audience for this transparency cannot be 
determined from a textual analysis, though it seems likely that the Shanwei 
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authorities would have wanted to signal its public relations effort both to senior Party 
leaders in the provincial capital as well as local readers of the newspaper161.  
The author highlights the journalistic mechanisms at work in the construction of the 
article. The occasion of the government-run news conference is highlighted in the 
first paragraph, with it being stressed that the government leaders “answered 
questions from reporters”. The author thus claims authenticity for the article by 
pointing to the fact that it is the outcome of a negotiated exchange between media 
workers and officials, rather than the diktat of those officials.  
The most obvious effort to generate the impression of transparency is in referencing 
the conflict directly. The first paragraph employs a common technique for pointing to 
potential sensitive events by referencing it as an ‘incident’ without further 
elaboration. The implied definitive article162 - “the Wukan incident” – suggests a 
settled, historic matter which need not be explained in detail due to its commonly 
understood characteristics. However, the second and third paragraphs specifically 
mention violence, the siege and disorder. Much of this is to discredit protestors and 
claim credit for officials, but the presence of this detail in the pages of the newspaper 
suggests an attempt to create the impression of transparency. 
There is an admission of fault on the part of some village Party committee members 
and one local company, but this only bolsters the sense that problems occur within 
the village. The village is presented as a place of lawlessness and greed. The problem 
thus becomes one of villager vulgarity rather than Party malfeasance. From an 
ideological point of view, the solution is thus increased development. 
Extra-linguistic strategies 
The story also features the by-line of two intern reporters. It seems inconceivable 
that a story drawn entirely from a single press conference and involving no reportage 
                                                       
161 It should be assumed from studies of Party newspaper audiences that local readers are likely to be 
Party cadres. Though circulation numbers are often high due to bulk subscriptions, the ‘general public’ 
have not been a vital constituency for Party newspapers since the 1980s (Zhao, 2008).  
162 Mandarin Chinese does not have definitive articles as such but collocating a place name with the 
generic term ‘incident’ (shijian) has the effect of suggesting it is something established and ‘known. It 
works in much the same way that ‘the incident’ operates vis-à-vis the phrase ‘an incident’; the former 
can, semantically speaking, stand independently within a sentence, the latter demands elaboration 
demands immediate elaboration. 
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or external quotes should require three staff to produce. The results of this study 
indicate that citing of ‘intern’ reporters in potentially sensitive news copy is a 
consistent strategy used by Party and commercial newspapers, presumably as a 
hedge against being found to have reported something politically unacceptable, or to 
have reported it in an unacceptable manner. This appears to suggest that news 
production during these protests has not been directly orchestrated by Party 
propaganda officials, but rather journalists and editors who are attempting to 
perform ‘correctly’ but who do not have absolute confidence in their tactics.  
Southern Daily Coverage 
The Southern Daily coverage of the December 9th press conference, which appeared 
in the December 10th edition of the newspaper, has similar but not identical copy. 
That the main structure of the articles is similar indicates high political sensitivity. 
That there are differences points to a limited degree of journalistic freedom on the 
part of the media workers who wrote and edited the stories. This freedom should not 
be taken to mean freedom to report the press conference – or indeed the protest – in 
a manner of their choosing; rather it suggests media workers are operating to slightly 
different priorities. 
It is notable that, at face value, the more senior publication takes an ostensibly more 
aggressive line against the protest. It explains the protest in the following manner: 
The briefing analysed the causes of the incident, the main one of which is 
believed to be the fact that the demands raised by villagers relating to 
the distribution of benefits has been manipulated, exploited and incited 
by people with ulterior motives.(Li & Hong, 2011)  
In the local Shanwei Daily’s coverage of the same press conference, the same basic 
structure and tifa are employed, but the first line is conciliatory and implies a genuine 
grievance at the heart of the issue: 
The majority of village demands are mainly about internal village 
economic problems. Nevertheless, the incident has been manipulated, 
exploited and incited by some insiders and outsiders with ulterior 
motives in an attempt to escalate the situation. (Wu et al, 2011) 
261 
 
Likewise, the Southern Daily’s explanation of the remedial government steps uses 
florid language:  
Qiu Jinxiong said that…[Lufeng City] has stepped up the work of banning 
the illegal organisations…captured core elements, including Zhuang 
Liehong, Zeng Zhaoliang, and Xue Jinbo…and  integrated the specific 
operations that are currently underway in the criminal crackdown and 
resolutely attack the criminal and evil forces that have infiltrated and 
manipulated this mass incident in order to effectively maintain social 
stability. (Li & Hong, 2011) 
The Shanwei Daily report also contains a very similar final paragraph outlining the 
government’s work ahead. However, it strikes a rather different tone: 
…the government will strive to do a good job in the following aspects of 
work: firstly, to continue to fully implement the reasonable demands of 
the villagers, particularly issues relating to land, residential development 
and elections; secondly, to continue to patiently do ideological work with 
villagers, focusing on sorting out “village representatives” and focusing 
on persuasion and transformation work of the targets (zhongdian 
duixiang de shudao zhuanhua gongzuo); thirdly, select the team for the 
"two committees" as quickly as possible, and form a village security 
defence team, earnestly safeguarding the stability of the village, and the 
tranquil and orderly environment for the people (laobaixing); fourthly, to 
increase the attack on those leaders and core elements. Those involved 
in illegality will be resolutely attacked so as to propagate the rule of law. 
(Wu et al, 2011) 
There is no reason to believe these quotes are the imaginative work of the author of 
the report. They are likely to reflect what was said in the briefing. However, it is clear 
that while adhering to the same structure, the Southern Daily report strikes a 
consistently more aggressive tone. However, this tone is consistently attributed to 
Shanwei and Lufeng officials. Rather than fuse the journalistic and official voice, the 
assertions made in the article are attributed to officials at the briefing and, in the case 
of the final paragraph, a specific individual.  By contrast, the Shanwei Daily report 
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personalizes nothing. The words can only be read as the generic activities of 
government.  
These differences may be understood in two ways: firstly, provincial government is 
keener to project a harder line on protesters to what is a more widespread audience; 
secondly, that provincial level media workers – and by extension provincial level 
government – are content to let the work, and words, of junior-level colleagues speak 
for themselves without additional work in massaging messages. The structural 
similarities of both reports and use of reasonably consistent tifa is evidence of 
adherence to a singular propaganda message; there is no contradiction or 
questioning of what might be termed the ‘official’ line. However, the tendency to 
point clearly to the source of highly aggressive language, suggests the second 
explanation is more likely.  
People’s Daily Editorial 
The People’s Daily editorial on December 22nd, after compromise had ostensibly been 
reached in Wukan itself, is a fascinating melange of discourse, and marks an attempt 
to quickly install the Wukan protest – and its resolution – into the canon of 
experimental triumphs for the Party.  
The text suggests that the handling of the protest marks a ‘turning point’ for the 
methodology of ‘social management’. An explanation is offered at the end of the 
second paragraph: 
Today’s turnaround concerns the firm belief of the provincial working 
party that “the primary demands of the masses are reasonable”. (Zhang, 
2008) 
Thus the primary purpose of the editorial may be said to be signalling that provincial 
leaders – with the clear support of central officials – had deemed the protestors to be 
justified and “local government” (dangdi zhengfu) to have been negligent. Rather 
than being a concession, the provincial government’s response was to recognise that 
villagers were correct all along and that the mistake was entirely located at the level 
of local officialdom. 
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The structure of the editorial is less about explaining and defending this specific 
conclusion – the details of the case are barely referenced – and more about 
establishing the incident’s pedagogical value for junior officials. The ‘Wukan incident’ 
is presented as a case study which may be used to improve the performance of local 
government.  
Labelling the ‘incident’ 
The second paragraph of the editorial details some background to the protest: 
Since September this year, many villagers have repeatedly made 
petitions derived from their dissatisfaction with the village cadres’ 
disposal of land, finance, compensation and other general issues. (ibid) 
However, the more serious protest itself is referenced only obliquely. There are 
references throughout the editorial to the generic term ‘incident’ (wukan shijian) 
which, like its English equivalent, may be used to describe a multitude of 
occurrences163. There are two further semi-explicit references to the protest: the first, 
in the second paragraphs, deploys the term ‘mass conflict’ (quntixing chongtu); the 
second talks of ‘extreme actions’ (guoji de xingdong). In all three cases, there is no 
attempt to articulate what, specifically, the ‘incident’, ‘conflict’ or ‘extreme actions’ 
comprised. There is a fleeting mention in the first paragraph which points out the 
‘intense’ (jilie) emotions of local villagers and the fact that a ‘small thing had 
escalated’ (xiaoshi shi da) and ‘evolved into a mass conflict’ (yanbian cheng qunti xing 
chongtu).  
The obtuse referencing of the event has the effect of suggesting the event is at one 
simple and, flowing from this, that it has been comprehensively understood. Its 
simplicity is implied by the refusal to attempt to define, to frame, or to articulate the 
constituent issues. Events that are complex and contested require unpacking, 
exposition and other rhetorical treatment so that they become either neutralised and 
settled, or malleable for political manipulation. Here, we have merely a simple 
‘incident’.  
                                                       
163 It should be noted that, though generic, the term is frequently used to euphemistically refer to 
episodes of potential political sensitivity. Readers with basic media savvy are likely to read the term as 
pointing to an episode of some kind of sensation or controversy.  
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This implied simplicity, however, need not be a function of the event itself, but rather 
the implied omniscience of the Party. All ideas, theories, concepts and historical 
narratives, regardless of their original complexity, may be distilled and reduced if one 
is sufficiently familiar with the constituent parts. The implication of the repeated use 
of the term ‘wukan shijian’ is that both the Party – the implied authorial voice – and 
the reader share the sense of the ‘incident’ as both simple and comprehensively 
understood. 
There are, of course, inherent contradictions in this position. Firstly, the authorial 
decision not to articulate or explain suggests the implied audience must necessarily 
be familiar with the outline of events. The rest of the article would, of course, be 
rendered meaningless without a common understanding of the analytical reference 
point. However, there had been no prior discussion of the event in the pages of the 
newspaper. The implication, thus, is that readers are already familiar with the event 
and share the senior Party’s knowledge but have, presumably, acquired this 
knowledge from other sources. If the event described really was as quotidian as the 
terminology suggests, there is no reason believe that an implied audience (of lower 
level officials) would have this knowledge. Thus, in seeking to downplay or diminish 
the incident, there is an implicit recognition of its importance. 
Secondly, if the incident was so simple, why is there a need to discuss it in the annals 
of the People’s Daily? The justification is implied in the title of the article, which 
ascribed to the ‘Wukan Turning Point’ the status of a prescription. What has been 
observed, labelled and understood at the national level may not be seen in the same 
way lower down the political hierarchy. That an incident has occurred is, as discussed 
above, assumed to be common knowledge and not worthy of contestation. That it 
may be branded a ‘turning point’ (zhuanji) is not so obvious.  
The manipulation of symbols is key to political communications in any cultural 
context and symbols may be ambiguously constructed so as to retain the greatest 
range of potential meanings. What is distinct here, however, is the refusal on the part 
of the author to attempt to imbue these concepts with any kind of semantic 
grounding or context. Thus they only make sense in terms of what might be termed 
the ambient discourse. As discussed, the ‘incident’ is presented as if it is obvious at a 
265 
 
glance what such an ‘incident’ means. So it is with the proposed remedy, suggested in 
the editorial’s subheading and the article proper. “… [I]n the face of specific conflicts,” 
it suggests, “to grasp the masses’ interest demands is to grasp the key to solving 
problems” (ibid). All four terms here are loaded with ambiguity to the point of 
vapidity. The conflicts during which this remedy should be carried out are not all 
conflicts, but rather ‘specific’ conflicts. Which conflicts, precisely, is not stated. The 
primary task of lower level officials is to ‘grasp’. It’s not to ‘speak’, or to ‘listen’, or to 
do anything which has a concrete physical manifestation. Rather to ‘grasp’ connotes 
the development of some level of understanding and mastery of a subject but must, 
by definition, remain abstract. As for what needs to be ‘grasped’, it is the ‘interests’ – 
a term, as described above, which may mean any number of things. And, finally, the 
people whose ‘interests’ need to be ‘grasped’ are the ‘masses’, a collective label 
which, while possessing long roots in Leninist political discourse, contradicts starkly 
the realities of China’s increasingly social and economically sophisticated polity, a 
complexity which the article later goes on to acknowledge.  
Discourses 
The dissonance within the article does not apply only to the distance between advice 
and displayed behaviour. The article also displays a noticeable blending of a range of 
discourses. 
The first, most evident and in keeping with the form of the editorial as a ‘prescription’, 
is that of traditional Chinese medicine (TCM).  Notwithstanding the fact that it comes 
immediately after a reference to Lenin, the final line of the editorial makes explicit 
the remedial tone of the editorial.  
The “Wukan Turning Point” tells us that social management must be 
placed at the helm and the problem of mass interests must be solved if 
we want to find the right pressure point for reducing social 
contradictions and lowering the temperature. (ibid) 
Momentarily leaving aside the obviously Maoist terminology – ‘mass interests’ and 
‘social contradictions’ – the framework for understanding is akin to that of the 
acupuncturist: management of a complex system through attention to points of 
stress. The penultimate paragraph presents a more holistic interpretation of the 
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health of the body politic with the introduction of a triumvirate of problems which 
need to be addressed: thwarted ‘expression’, unbalanced ‘distribution’ and a failure 
to ‘protect’ the essential – all redolent of a TCM discourse:  
…how can the benefits [of development] be justly distributed? How can 
interests be clearly expressed? How can benefits relief be guaranteed? 
Only by properly answering these questions will conflicts and problems 
arise and pass away, as water flows in a stream and not clog the 
waterway and cause a raging torrent. (ibid) 
The final reference to water draws in another culturally-contingent discourse, that of 
Daoism which locates water’s free flow as one of its core metaphors (Watts, 1977). 
Indeed, Daoist notions of ‘flow’ underpin the philosophical basis for many strains of 
modern TCM but, here, are invoked as a governing strategy. 
As alluded to above, interwoven with the medical discourse stands are what may be 
termed classical Marxist-Leninist references. Frequent mentions are made to ‘the 
masses’ (qunzhong) throughout the text recalling the assertion, made in classical 
Marxism, of the ability of the Party to unproblematically speak for, and act on behalf 
of, all of society. There are two semi-specific references to ‘local villagers’ (dangdi 
cunmin) against 14 mentions of ‘the masses’. In this context, claims that China is in a 
“period of social transition” and the conflicts [that occur around the country] 
described as “inevitable” (biran xing) take on the patina of Marxist dialecticism. Even 
the acknowledged ‘market society’ is said to be in ‘continuous advance’ (buduan 
qianxing); while ‘problems’ may ‘evolve’ in the manner of viral contagion, society 
‘advances’ in the manner of a military unit. 
Finally, into this discursive spider’s web enters the discourse of market economics. 
The ‘market society’ is to be advancing, which has, among other ‘contradictions’, the 
‘pluralisation of interest groups’ (liyizhuti duoyuanhua).  
Competition between interests is no bad thing. Only with this kind of 
dynamic can interests be properly balanced and relations coordinated so 
that the whole of society is dynamically stable. (ibid) 
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Here, the notion of “competition” is lauded though not for its ability to generate 
wealth, but rather as a mechanism for stability and harmony. Overall, what emerges 
is a promiscuous picture of blended ideologies. 
Vocabulary 
One of the recurring concepts central to the argument is that the ‘interest appeals’ 
(liyi suqiu). Both terms need to be unpacked. The term liyi is most commonly 
translated as ‘interest’ as it euphemistically divorces the notion of ‘gain’ from any 
specifically economic aspect. In English, as in Chinese, it is perfectly possible to ‘work 
for the interests of a person’, ‘an institution’, or ‘a country’ without implying that 
one’s work is going to result in monetary gain, per se. However, the term – as in 
English – is most commonly used in the context of equations of profit or loss. In the 
article, the penultimate paragraph sets out various collocations, the first and last of 
which are unambiguously related to money – ‘interest allocation’ (liyi fenpei) which, 
the author claims, needs to be ‘fair’ (gongzheng); ‘expression of interests’ (liyi biaoda), 
which need to be ‘unfettered’ (changtong); and ‘interest relief’ (liyi jiuji) which need 
to be ‘guaranteed’ (baozhang). 
The second term, ‘appeal’ (suqiu) may also be translated as ‘demand’. In both 
instances, there is an explicit recognition that ‘interests’ – which are implied, as 
discussed above, to be primarily economic – are something which are demanded of 
government. In English, one might ‘defend’ interests, or ‘push’ one’s interests, or 
‘argue’ in one’s own interests. Semantically speaking, it is difficult to develop a 
construction in which ‘interests’ are the subject of an appeal to a higher body or 
power – one may ‘petition on behalf of [someone’s] interests’ perhaps – but the term 
is usually with a defence of what exists at the individual level, rather than a petition 
for something to flow down from above. Not so in the discourse of the People’s Daily 
where interests become the responsibility of higher authorities. While this may be 
regarded as a linguistic tic, the article subtly asserts the tacit and historically-
grounded political contract between ruler and ruled as being concerned with 
economic rights guarantees (Hung 2011; Perry, 2008b; O’Brien, 2009; Bianco, 2001; 
Yu, 2009a).  
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Illegality and extremity 
It is notable that illegality and extreme measures are only mentioned once in the 
article. As mentioned at the beginning, the tone of the editorial is one of prescription 
and remedy for ‘social contradictions’. The editorial states that, “Of course the 
masses cannot be ‘radical just because they have demands; as soon as there is 
radicalism, there is illegality’. Reasonable demands should be resolved within a legal 
framework” (ibid). However, the very next sentence appears to put the blame for the 
‘radicalisation’ of the masses in this instance squarely on local officials: “Local 
governments likewise cannot use “blocking” or “pressure” against the expression of 
normal demands so that they evolved into radical confrontations.” In the same 
paragraph there is an assertion that “local government made initial mistakes” but this 
is discursively balanced a few sentences later with an explanation that senior leaders 
had descended to, essentially, ‘correct’ these mistakes: “This kind of political course 
to correct mistakes reflects one of our party’s most consistent basic tenets: being 
responsible for the people’s interests is to be responsible towards the party’s basic 
cause” (ibid). 
Commercial Media 
The Southern Metropolis Daily’s report on December 10th takes as its basis the report 
that appeared in the Shanwei Daily on the same day. The similar structure and 
language employed by all journalists suggests that, as with the other two incidents 
dealt with in this study, propaganda strictures are obviously at work. The fact that all 
reporters arrived at a near-identical narration of the new conference suggests little 
autonomy in the way the event was allowed to be explained.  
However, there are several interesting and subtle differences that emerge in the 
reporting of the Southern Metropolis Daily, many of which point to the newspaper 
seeking to push against reporting strictures.  
Typographically, the story occupies more than half page of the newspaper and is 
broken into three distinct sections, with the headline appearing in the middle of the 
story. The story’s treatment elsewhere, along with its sensitive nature, makes it 
reasonable to assume that propaganda guidelines were in place for how this story 
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should be covered (i.e. non page lead, low-key, no images164). However, the 
unconventional appearance of the SMD’s marks it out; in contrast to the reports in 
the Party publications, sub-editors at the SMD have attempted to turn sanctioned 
copy into something that is likely to appeal to ‘lure readers’ (daodu).  
 
IMAGE 6: SOUTHERN METROPOLIS DAILY, PAGE 12, DECEMBER 10TH, 2011 
An important plank of this is the vertical section on the right of the page which list the 
five ‘problems’ (wenti) which are said to have caused the problems in Wukan. 
Through this mechanism, news of the dismissal of village cadres is, effectively, 
                                                       
164 The China Digital Times website has previously reported similar guidelines reportedly leaked by 
working journalists in China. Examples can be seen here: 
https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2013/01/ministry-of-truth-guangdong-peoples-congress. Though it has 
not been possible to verify whether such guidelines were in place on this occasion, the precedent for 
this kind of guideline, along with other evidence presented here, makes it a reasonable assumption.  
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elevated to a headline issue, even though mention of this is demoted to final 
paragraphs in other reports. 
Textually, the SMD consistently refers to the September protest as the ‘9.21 incident’, 
a shorthand reference which, through association with 9.11165, and 6.4166 dignifies 
the event with the status of a major event. Notably, this method of referencing the 
protest disappears in all of the newspaper’s subsequent reports on the Wukan 
protest. 
The second paragraph of the main narrative of the protest is identical in form and 
structure with the Shanwei Daily report, though adds a number of significant details. 
In the Shanwei Daily, the recurrence of protest in November is explained as follows: 
In the middle part of November, the incident flared up again. (Tan & 
Shan, 2011) 
In the SMD, an explanation for the ‘flare up’ is inserted into the middle of the 
sentence.  
In the middle part of November, just as a working group was in the 
middle of investigating the resolution of villager demands, a minority of 
villagers made a post on the internet which said “’Wukan Villagers 
Provisional Council of Representatives’ will organise a demonstration 
and petition on the 21st [of the month] and invites Chinese and foreign 
reporters to report” and the incident flared up again. (ibid) 
On the one hand, this additional sentence explains the continuance of protest as 
antagonistic villager behaviour in the face of government action, and cannot be read 
as being overly critical of official actions. However, in making a point that is, 
ostensibly, supportive of government actions, the author points directly to the use of 
the Internet in organizing dissent, and the implied importance of journalists in 
covering such an event.  
                                                       
165 Referring to September 11, 2001, the date on which four passenger aircraft were hijacked in the US, 
two of which were later flown into the World Trade Center in New York City and one of which struck 
the Pentagon in Washington DC.  
166 Referring to June 4, 1989, the date on which protests in Beijing were finally cleared by members of 
the People’s Liberation Army resulting in widespread injury and loss of life. 
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It cannot be assumed that the sentence was inserted by SMD journalists. It is possible, 
for example, that this construction appeared in a set text released by the Shanwei 
propaganda authorities. However, the additional details that are included by the SMD 
in the remainder of the paragraph – in contrast to the more vague statements made 
in Party publications – suggests very strongly that, while working within the strict 
framework of the officially-sanctioned news release, SMD journalists have inserted 
details which they have discovered from non-official sources, principally postings or 
videos put onto the Internet by protesting villagers. For example, rather than ‘some 
villagers’ (yi bufen cunmin – literally, ‘a portion of the villagers’) going to Lufeng to 
petition, ‘at 10.35 on November 21st, 400 Wukan villagers” went to Lufeng. In 
addition to explaining that they submitted a petition, the SMD described the slogans 
they used: “topple (dadao) corrupt officials” and “It’s my arable land” (ibid). The 
article explains that “white banners and large posters had been removed” by 
November 26th. The report not only points out the ‘mass incidents’ that occurred the 
following day, it explains that these had been planned and communicated to 
journalists ahead of time. 
In sum, where the Party reporting is vague and ambiguous, the SMD adds several 
significant details. It should be stressed that the journalists are using the framework 
handed by authorities in Shanwei, and are only reporting – after weeks of silence – 
after the decision by Shanwei to hold a news conference. Thus, this is not 
investigative work, or cross-regional reporting in the usual sense.  
Beijing News 
The Beijing News is a commercial newspaper formed by two regionally and 
hierarchically distinct Party publishers – the national-level, Beijing-based Guangming 
Daily and the provincial-level, Guangzhou-based Southern Daily. It was the first 
newspaper of its kind to operate under such an arrangement. It built a reputation for 
relatively liberal interjections into debate on national issues, and for being somewhat 
critical of authorities in Beijing. Its licencing arrangements were altered in September 
2011, bringing the newspaper under editorial control of municipal leaders in Beijing.  
On December 22nd, the same day as the People’s Daily interjection, the Beijing News 
published two articles on the Wukan incident. The first, on page two, is one of the 
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very few editorials to appear on the Wukan incident during December 2011. The 
editorial employs the ‘divided government’ discourse employed by the People’s Daily 
– national and provincial government setting high-minded standards; prefectural, 
county and township-level governments failing in their duties. The editorial employs 
the language of the key provincial government figure, Zhu Mingguo, but goes beyond 
his ambiguous prescription for conflict resolution by suggesting that tolerance 
towards rights-based protest and online supporters is the key, and that such a 
response would make for a model of crisis resolution which could be exported around 
China.     
The writer – a person identified as an academic, though writing under a transparent 
pseudonym (Dragon Tree, or long shu) – places blame for the troubles entirely on the 
failure of “the regions to uphold the principle of the rule of law” (dangdi runeng 
bingchi fazhi de yuanze). Though the article uses the term “regions” (dangdi) twice, it 
does make explicit in an early paragraph that it is referring to authorities in Lufeng 
and Shanwei.  
The editorial uses excerpts from the December 20th speech of Zhu Mingguo to 
criticise the two tiers of local government in Guangdong for failing to meet the 
standards Zhu Mingguo had articulated, standards that he promised would be 
enforced from now on:  
The villagers began to report problems up the chain on June 21st, 2009. If, 
during this two years, the relevant departments and officials in Lufeng 
and Shanwei  were able to “emphasise the popular will, and use the 
greatest determination, the greatest sincerity and the greatest effort” to 
confront the villagers’ reasonable  demands, adhere to the “supremacy 
of the law”, resolve Wukan’s real problems according to the law, and 
engage in multiple efforts to explain and communicate, then things 
would perhaps not have gone out of control, and the series of incidents 
including smashed up factories would perhaps not have occurred. (Long, 
2011) 
Here, protest behaviour – violence included – is posited as a straightforward reaction 
to official actions.  
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The editorial makes two references to the growth of online opinion, both of which 
implicitly recognise their active participation in the conflict.  
Obviously everyone hopes for a resolution and that issue does not 
deteriorate, be they the people of Wukan, local government or the many 
citizens who have been online “onlookers”. (ibid) 
Here, online observers are accorded equal status with villagers and local officials. In 
other words, they are implied to be active participants.  
The Internet era has formed an audience of “onlookers” concerned with 
rights protection (wei quan) which expanded the impact of the incident. 
These new conditions have given local governments unexpected pressure. 
This kind of pressure poses a dilemma. (ibid) 
The dilemma is one that should be answered with understanding and restraint. In a 
final flourish which echoes the simplified and rigorously logical prescription of Zhu 
Mingguo, the author says:  
…as long as public opinion is respected, the rule of law is insisted upon, 
legitimate rights and interests are safeguarded, and criminals are 
cracked down upon, complex issues can be resolved. (ibid) 
However, again, the author wants to extend this and suggest Wukan might represent 
a new paradigm for “social management”:  
…if this logic can actually be implemented then the incident can finally 
have a perfect solution and be worth the wait. If this is the crux of the 
issues then other regions will have a good reference point. (ibid) 
The Beijing News’ associated news report on December 22nd has a lead story on Zhu 
Mingguo’s task force going into Lufeng to solve the problems. The background story 
printed underneath is the first and only example found of a journalist using material 
sourced directly from protestors in their articles: 
Zeng Zhaoxian and Zeng Zhaorong, village representatives from Wukan, 
Lufeng, said that they believed the party and government would deal 
274 
 
with villager demands and solve Wukan’s problems during an indirect 
interview. (Beijing News, 2011)   
The information was taken from the previous day’s online report on the 
gd.chinanews.com website, but was not reproduced in any Guangdong newspaper. 
The “indirect interview” mentioned (jianjie caifang) is likely to refer to information 
gleaned from online exchanges.   
Specialist press 
Unsurprisingly, the most obvious rupture in the flow of reporting on the Wukan 
protest comes with the publication, in early January 2012, of lengthy investigative 
reports in both the Xinhua-affiliated China Newsweek and the independent business 
magazine Caijing. Both publications feature reportage and the results of investigative 
work into the financial histories of the involved companies and officials. They also 
make eye-catching claims about the treatment of the deceased protester, Xue Jinbo, 
while in detention in Shanwei. However, Shanwei is posited as the source of problems 
and there is no extrapolation to wider issues. China Newsweek does employ the 
language and discursive strategies of the People’s Daily’s editorial. There is discussion 
of Wukan being a “turning point” and heralding a “new situation” (China Newsweek, 
2012). Throughout, the intervention of [Guangdong official] Zhu Mingguo is 
presented as being the straightforward panacea.  
Caijing’s report167 is more vivid in its language. It describes, for the first time in the 
Chinese media sphere, the bloody nature of conflict – “blood was spilt on both sides 
of the divide” (Zhang, 2012) – but, significantly, reworks the argument that this was a 
case of dereliction of duty on the part of the local government and presents a 
complex picture whereby both sides in the conflict “strayed from their original [good] 
intentions” (ibid) – protestors in terms of their increasingly provocative protests and 
online postings; the government in terms of its increasingly hard-line stance. In this 
way, Caijing does point at a systemic problem around communication where 
messages were misconstrued and bad will was allowed to fester. 
                                                       
167 The report was featured in the January 2012 of ‘Lens’ magazine, ostensibly a separate publication 




Caijing’s report also hinges around quotations from an interview with Zhuang Liehong, 
one of those arrested and who, two weeks earlier, had been castigated as a violent 
criminal in the majority of reporting. Indeed, in describing the rioting and violence 
that took place, the author suggests a psychological explanation for the actions: 
“Villagers who had spent so long dissatisfied found a rare emotional outlet” (ibid).  
It is notable, however, that both lengthy investigative reports in China Newsweek and 
Caijing both include lengthy passages reflecting the officially sanctioned wording 
from December 21st and December 22nd. Rather than separate these chunks of ‘Party 
speak’ from the rest of the text with typographical or stylistic devices, they are 
integrated into the story. 
Conclusions 
The Wukan protests of September to December 2011 were characterised by many in 
the Anglophone media as a great victory for the oppressed peasantry against the 
arrayed organs of the Chinese state. Contrary to the impression given in many of 
those Anglophone news reports, one of the organs of the state they were up against 
was the Chinese press – not in terms of the absence of coverage, but rather in terms 
of the nature of coverage. Though its reporting was constrained within fixed 
boundaries, the Chinese press featured the Wukan protest in its pages. And while 
media coverage would certainly have been an objective of protestors, the reporting 
demonstrated a propaganda system that was functioning reasonably efficiently.  
The lines of command within the propaganda system remain opaque. However, 
through an examination of the media texts that were produced, this analysis has 
sketched the discourses that were in play during the domestic mediation of the 
Wukan protest. These were certainly tightly controlled, testament to the fact that this 
was a deeply sensitive event, but the relative openness – relatively being key here – 
indicates that the Wukan protest was perhaps not as exceptional, or as traumatic, as 
it has previously been seen.   
The Chinese journalism that appeared around Wukan was, in the main, led by 
managed news releases or press conferences. In September, as the protests began, 
these were led by reports emanating from the Lufeng propaganda department. While 
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there was some small typographical variety, propaganda discipline held and Lufeng’s 
version of events was reproduced around the country with little variation. Likewise, 
during the recurrence of events in November, a solitary report appeared around the 
press, with no variation between publications from different locations and from 
different tiers of the press. 
Reporting began to become localised as events escalated in early December. Rather 
than the story being eliminated from the Chinese media landscape, Wukan was 
reported only in the province in which it occurred, Guangdong. This suggests a 
focusing of the propaganda effort.  
It is notable that throughout the period of the protest, there is no reportage, no 
attempt and integrating alternative perspectives or voices. Rather discourse is 
constructed entirely from official sources. 
Overall, what emerges in this stage of reporting is an attempt to discuss the ongoing 
protests as transparently as possible while retaining control of the discourse. One of 
the means by which this is done is to allow reporting to be led by the closest 
prefectural government, that in Shanwei. When the Shanwei authorities reported, 
other media outlets followed suit quickly, in September, November and December. 
This points to a critical conclusion, reached by others who have looked at protest in 
China (Cai, 2010, Hung 2011), that, far from being a rare and existentially threatening 
occurrence, such an event provides opportunity for various tiers of the political 
structure to demonstrate governing virtues and leadership qualities. These 
opportunities are most effective in some form of controlled media glare. 
The Southern Metropolis Daily’s December 10th report of the previous day’s Shanwei 
press conference does exhibit some attempt to push back against the propaganda 
strictures and does suggest that the attempt to instrumentalise the press in crisis 
management may run up against the instincts of individual journalists and sub-editors. 
Furthermore, after the intervention of Guangdong’s provincial leadership on 
December 20th, some fracturing can be seen in the way that various publications 
handled the story, specifically Shanwei’s authority to control the discourse absolutely 
is broken. Again, it needs to be stressed that these changes can be observed only 
after political intervention – there is no suggestion that journalists treated Wukan as 
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anything other than a highly sensitive story which demanded propaganda discipline. 
However, this intervention leads to individual publications making fractional changes 
within the framework of sanctioned reporting. This fracturing occurs along the lines 
of political tiers. For example, Zhu Mingguo’s words in his December 20th speech are 
edited differently by staff at the Shanwei Daily to those at the Southern Daily in 
Guangzhou. Words are not changed, but lines are included, or omitted, which change 
the tone from one of support for local leadership to one of condemnation.  
As in other protests examined in this thesis, the investigative reporting that occurs 
after the most acute stage of the protests has passed is involved and hard-hitting, and 
free from any discernible trace of tifa discipline. The underlying discourse remains – 
that of benevolent central leaders and errant local officials – but direct discussion of 
electoral fraud, prison violence and propaganda manipulations is in stark contrast to 
the majority of news reporting. However, that it occurs only in the specialist press, 
publications which have national political affiliations, and after the protest has 
dissipated is notable.   
The discourses that can be seen around the event hinge mainly on the notion of 
tiered authority. There is a great and obvious effort to localise the issue, but its 
national mediation also points to its widespread relevance. It’s also notable that, 
more than in other protests examined in this study, Leninist rhetoric abounds. The 
villagers are ‘the masses’; there is no attempt to describe different interest groups. 
Door-to-door ‘village work’ is done to persuade and cajole protestors, the implication 
lingering that they are incapable of being trusted with complex matters and both 
need and are capable of being ‘corrected’. These are reported faithfully in commercial 






Chapter 9: Conclusions 
Introduction 
This previous chapters have provided a detailed account of the extent and nature of 
mainland Chinese newspaper coverage of three specific incidents of protest. This has 
highlighted how it is possible for high-profile social unrest to be treated within the 
mainstream Chinese press, albeit in a limited and cautious manner. This observation 
cannot be taken to imply that all street protest comes under the mainstream media’s 
reporting ambit. The specific confluence of factors which forced these three events 
onto the public screen is undoubtedly complex and has not been systematically 
interrogated. However, the mere presence of protest within the Chinese media 
sphere is a scarcely acknowledged fact in the literature that exists on the Chinese 
press and the Chinese propaganda system. Most studies have, at best, made cursory 
reference to a simple, homogenous and highly controlled (and, thus, uninteresting) 
‘mainland press’ response to protest, or, at worst, totally neglected this aspect of the 
political management of protest. This neglects both the extent and the variety of 
official, mainstream mediation of social contention. 
This thesis is concerned with press function amid political change in China. It has 
proceeded from the assumption that the CCP has moved from being an ideologically-
driven ‘vanguard party’ in the Leninist sense, one which serves the people by 
‘enlightened’ dictatorial leadership, to an increasingly technocratic and pragmatic 
entity which is perhaps best seen as ‘co-ordinator’ amid political, economic and social 
fragmentation and contention. The Party has consequently moved to position itself as 
a responsive governing entity, one which both listens – and is seen to be listening – to 
issues of public concern.  
Street protest is public concern made manifest, as well as evidence that engagement 
has, at best failed and, at worst, never existed. For protestors it may be a ploy to 
force a dialogue in the absence of meaningful interaction. For the government, it has 
generally been assumed that protest is a threat. Assuming protest is explicitly anti-
government – and, of course, not all is – it does point to a breakdown in such an 
idealised political process. However, as well as a threat, protest invariably presents an 
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opportunity. Not only may the Party symbolically reposition itself as mediator rather 
than manager – co-ordinator rather than controller – it affords an opportunity to 
demonstrate effectiveness and responsiveness.  
The overall political response to episodes of street protest is inevitably multi-faceted 
but, assuming the unwillingness to impose repression – something which is 
increasingly undesirable in a communications landscape where contestation can 
easily take place and where credibility is important – symbolic mediation of the 
interaction between protesters and the Party-State may be increasingly seen as part 
of a governing strategy. It must, therefore, be considered more closely in terms of 
theories of ‘authoritarian adaptation’.  
The different manner in which protest appears in these three case studies 
demonstrates significant reluctance, and points to some of the contingent factors 
which force such contention into the public gaze. These have been acknowledged, 
where possible. There is significant evidence of vertical and horizontal division in the 
media response to protest. That is, there were inter-regional variations and as well as 
differences in the way conflict was handled at the national and local level. The 
presence of significant elite forces in each of these case studies was also notable. 
Moreover, outright suppression – the nuclear option – was deployed in each of the 
cases at least some of the time. However, there was sufficient evidence to draw 
tentative conclusions around press function in an era of ‘authoritarian adaptation’. 
The first part of the conclusion will attempt to do this. 
The second part will discuss the precise nature of the propaganda strategies and 
techniques which were used in these three cases. As far as the author is aware, these 
have not been mapped previously, largely because the mainstream mediation of 
protest in China has not been deemed significant enough to warrant serious study. 
The previous paragraphs have argued why this may have been a misguided 
assumption.  
Protest in the Media and Authoritarian Adaptation  
The presence of media reports on major protest events such as those discussed in 
this project points to the fact that mainstream media are a key plank in a process of 
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authoritarian adaptation, discussed at length in Chapter 4. This has been widely 
acknowledged in terms of the perceived trivialisation and commercial exploitation of 
the media (Lagerkvist, 2010; Brady, 2010; Stockmann, 2013). However, this study 
suggests that the media may also play a significant role even in terms of issues of high 
political sensitivity.  
Tong (2008) suggests mainland Chinese journalists and editors are rarely willing to 
cover ‘social events’ such as street protests due to the potential political sensitivities 
of such reportage and concomitant threats to personal careers and livelihoods. The 
presence of protest within the mainstream Chinese media thus indicates that the 
authorities tasked with overseeing any given media outlet believe there is a gain to be 
had from publishing.  
Chan (2007) has suggested that opening up space for ostensibly critical reportage has 
value for the senior tiers of government as well as specific institutions within 
government168. Brady (2010) and Leibold (2011) frame this in terms of ‘image’ and 
public relations concerns. The appearance of conflict on the public screen does not 
imply genuine ‘responsiveness’ or the advent of a new strategy of governance. Rather, 
it is a tactic of ‘popular authoritarianism’ where control is maintained through 
appearing to be responsive. An expanded space for discussion and contention 
indicates a willingness of the part of the government to assert control in areas that 
had previously been controlled through outright repression (Tanner, 2004), a tactic 
that appears increasingly ineffective in the public media age. 
The patterns of reporting around the three case studies featured in this project 
support the notion that Chinese authorities are increasingly comfortable with 
contention appearing within the public screen. Though there is evident caution and 
hesitation – discussed further below – protest invariably ends with media texts which 
herald a transformation. There is a keenness to recognise the positive, progressive 
forces at work within public contention – similar in some senses to Marxian notions 
that ‘contradictions’ act as the midwives of progress (see page 121) – which allows a 
positive to emerge from an apparent negative. Such a perspective is, ironically, a 
                                                       
168 See Xin (2012), who points to the determination within the ranks of Xinhua – China’s largest and 
most important news agency – to speed up its response to unplanned and potentially-sensitive events 
as part of a wider drive to keep itself relevant.  
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contradiction itself, standing, as it does, in contrast to an indigenous Chinese ideology 
which sees mass protest as be a potential harbinger of chaos (see pages 51-52).  
There was a noticeable determination within media texts to proclaim government 
responsiveness to public concern as a new, important development. After the Xiamen 
protest, Southern Weekend suggested that heeding public opinion represented 
“enlightened governance” (see page 165); in Chongqing in 2008, the Oriental Morning 
Post declared that the “intensive” portrayal of disputes through the media “reflects 
the government’s wisdom and courage in facing complex social problems” (page 230); 
and in Wukan in 2011, the People’s Daily called the handling of the protest a “turning 
point” in “social management” (page 265). Journalists and editors in each case 
narrated, often in a highly self-congratulatory manner, a new method which, while 
poorly defined, suggested new transparency and a renewed intimacy between the 
public and officials.  
The pervasive use of news conferences in both Chongqing and Wukan is significant 
here, as was the way that media texts made a particular point – usually in headlines 
and opening paragraphs – of pointing to the fact that dialogue was taking place 
between officials and ostensibly independent journalists. Indeed, the small 
differences in ordering and emphasis in the way that news conferences were written 
up suggests the presence of guidelines without absolute propaganda blueprints (see 
page 220).  
This phenomenon interlinks strongly with the development in Internet censorship – 
as discussed in Chapter 3 – with outright suppression of information being seen as 
kindle to the flames of rumours and misinformation, with ‘softer’ techniques being 
increasingly preferred. The new strategy, as far as it can be discerned, seems to be 
predicated on, one, the impossibility of complete information repression, and two, 
increased effectiveness of information management.  
Part of this strategy was an obvious determination to move away from Party 
meetings and towards news conferences as vehicles for information dissemination. 
There appeared a longitudinal shift here, with party meetings particularly dominant in 
protest coverage in Xiamen in 2007. During the Chongqing taxi strike in 2008 and the 
Wukan protest in 2011, most news coverage pivoted around Party-organised news 
282 
 
conferences. While the output of these conferences was very similar across news 
organisations – suggesting propaganda discipline – there was clearly an attempt to 
create the veneer of an open, frank exchange between well-meaning officials and 
adversarial members of the press. The use of the Q&A format in reporting these 
conversations – particularly in the Chongqing example – was stark.   
Such a shift in tactics suggests that propaganda officials in China continue to ‘cross 
the river by feeling the stones’ (mozhe shitou guohe), that is, evolve tactics through 
pragmatic experimentation. This was particularly in evidence in the Chongqing taxi 
strike. Rather than shut down channels of communication until a preferred narrative 
was distilled at the local level – the obvious modus operandi during the Xiamen 
protest the previous year – Xinhua conducted street reportage with surprising alacrity 
and its reports were widely syndicated. The specific events of 2008 are likely relevant 
in explaining this strategy. Damage had been done to China’s global reputation in 
March 2008 when unrest on the Tibetan Plateau led to Tibet being essentially 
quarantined. In the information vacuum, rumours and presuppositions held sway, 
just as they had done five years earlier during the SARS episode. Much greater 
openness was visible in May 2008 during the Wenchuan Earthquake, when domestic 
and overseas journalists were allowed to report widely from the scene of the calamity. 
This appeared to be the case in Chongqing later that same year and a similar 
approach persisted for some time after169.  
Akhavad-Majid (2004), Wu (2000), Chu (2007), Shambaugh (2007) and Yu (2009b) 
argues media change in China is invariably a top-down process, but that individual 
publications and journalists may use the space opened by senior policy decisions to 
‘creatively renegotiate’ the rules of the game. The presence of elite actors in 
fomenting conflict and generating media coverage does appear important in each of 
these three case studies. In the case of the Xiamen protest, it was the agitation of one 
Xiamen-based NPCCC member which first propelled the issue of PX into the public 
arena and resurrected it several times over a span of several months. In the case of 
                                                       
169 The 2009 Xinjiang riots saw journalists being actively welcomed to the restive province and guided 
to the scene of activity; publications across the nation becoming markedly critical of the high-speed rail 
infrastructure project after the Wenzhou rail crash in 2011; even the trial of Bo Xilai in 2013, may be 




Chongqing, rapid and ostensibly highly transparent reporting appears to be have 
been directed from on high at Xinhua central offices in Beijing, and is likely part of a 
trend, pronounced in that year, to adopt a more dynamic and fast-paced response to 
sudden events such as a city-wide strike. In Wukan there was no single elite actor, but 
senior provincial leaders were drawn into the event through intense overseas media 
coverage, itself probably a product of internet-enabled communications and easy 
transport links to nearby Hong Kong, home to a number of foreign correspondents.  
At the national level, Xinhua’s trumpeting of its own on-the-scene reportage during 
the Chongqing taxi strike appeared to give certain commercial publications outside of 
Chongqing the confidence to demand even more transparency of Chongqing officials 
(see the Oriental Morning Post’s November 6th, 2008, editorial on page 231 for an 
example). A similar process seemed to be at work in the eye-catching typographical 
strategies used by the Southern Metropolis Daily to emphasise certain aspects of the 
official Shanwei report of its news conference on December 10th, 2011 (see page 269), 
as well as the Beijing News’ editorial, published on the same day as an editorial in the 
senior People’s Daily, which expounds on similar themes, critical of local government 
in Guangdong, while also including sensitive information drawn from Wukan 
protestors themselves (see page 273). Both examples support theories of media 
change as a process of ‘creative negotiation’ (Akhavad-Majid, 2004; Yu, 2011; Chu, 
2007) – boundaries defined by elite political forces and renegotiated at junior levels.  
The importance of senior publications providing ‘cover’ for renegotiation at the local 
level was perhaps most significant in Chongqing. The presence of national Xinhua 
reportage which jarred heavily with local coverage is a potential explanation for why 
commercial publications, obviously working within strict propaganda guidelines, 
made a number of subtle changes to copy sourced from the local Party publication to 
strike a more frank and conciliatory line. They labelled the strike more directly in 
front page headlines (see page 210), reinterpreted the word ‘criminal’ to refer only to 
those who had explicitly used violence (as opposed to being anybody who had 
engaged in the strike in the Party publication [see page 220]), and reworked 
government quotes to emphasise the local government’s apology and deemphasise 
its ‘achievement’ in ending the dispute (see page 221). 
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Of course, the extent of media ‘transparency’ should not be overstated. The urge for 
control on the part of the Party-state was strongly in evidence in all three cases in this 
study and there is obvious hesitancy at important junctures. Both the 20007 Xiamen 
PX protest and the 2011 Wukan dispute saw periods of virtual blackouts where 
contention vanished from the national media screen before re-emerging once the 
perceived danger had passed. Theory may predict that rather than block coverage, 
the press is tasked with providing nuanced and finely-tuned reports which manage 
and contain conflict. The ‘nuclear’ option of centrally-mandated censorship may be 
less desirable than it once was, but it is still an option and one that is used. Likewise, 
theories of seamless authoritarian adaptation tend to point to the end of “shopworn 
conspiracy theories” (Tanner, 2004) in explaining contention. This study has 
suggested that, at the local level at least, they continue to be used regularly.  
Administrative fragmentation 
The evanescence of “conspiracy theories” at the local level and their apparent 
absence at senior levels hints at perhaps the most important finding of this thesis. 
This thesis has consistently drawn attention to the subtle but important differences 
that exist in coverage between different publications, as differentiated by region and 
political affiliation, even in the face of obvious central or provincial propaganda 
department diktat. The tendency among most scholars who bring China media into 
their analysis is to refer to the behaviour (or non-behaviour) of the ‘mainstream 
media’ and to assume, as Chan puts it, that “the voice of the Party state always 
prevails” (2007: 559). This thesis would not dispute this on the whole, but what it 
would dispute is the notion that the Party-state is an unproblematic, monolithic 
entity. This study has shown the extent to which the behaviour of journalists may 
reveal fragmented political power within the political hierarchy in China. 
There was a surfeit of evidence to suggest that elements within the Chinese press 
were engaged in a dynamic interaction between themselves. This has already been 
discussed above in terms of publications using elite cover to deliver implied or explicit 
criticisms of local governments. More generally, it is possible to see the way the local 
press in Xiamen, for example, was reacting against other media, the newspapers of 
the Southern Media Group in particular, and was stirred by agitation in other corners 
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of the press. Likewise, the Chongqing press’s performance had to take heed of the 
fact that Xinhua journalists were reporting stories which contradicted 
pronouncements from local officials.  
A concept of China’s fragmented, ‘polymorphous state’ (Howell, 2006) helps to 
explain such differences observed in this study. It also provides a discursive resource. 
One of the most consistent elements to reporting across the three case studies 
featured in this thesis is the presence of the stratified government in textual 
representations of protest. Contrary to the popular conception of the monolithic and 
homogenous ‘Party-state’, the manifold tiers of Party bureaucracy are present in 
reports, and form a crutch to the media workers tasked with publically explaining or 
justifying contention.  
The Wukan protest, for example, saw sharp lines drawn around the five tiers of Party-
state bureaucracy, with the junior township, county and prefecture tiers drawn 
together in solidarity during the early stages of protest, and the national and 
provincial tiers coalescing in apparent opposition to the junior tiers of government 
towards the end of the public mediation of the crisis. ‘National integration’ (Zhao, 
2012) was thus achieved with the elevation of powerful central authorities and the 
undermining of local tiers. That this facet was pronounced in the Wukan protest is 
perhaps no coincidence. Li and O’Brien (1996) and others have found that the myth of 
the ‘strong centre and corrupt village’ is particularly strong amongst rural protestors, 
and it is notable the extent to which press coverage towards the end of the crisis 
seeks to play to this conception. 
The delineation between the centre and the regions is manifest slightly differently in 
the Xiamen protest where Party reporting made frequent appeals to protestors on 
the basis that local plans had the imprimatur of national policy. The assumed 
superiority of central policy and central supervisory agents was part of the 
explanation given to local people in Xiamen in the effort to ward off protest, and then 
castigate protestors where protest took place. However, an equally pronounced 
discursive strategy was to articulate public contention as evidence for specific 
concern for the city of Xiamen itself (see page 167 for an example). 
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In terms of the gap between commercial and Party publications, no broad divisions 
were found. However, there are two notable trends. In both the Chongqing and 
Xiamen protest, the Southern (Nanfang) Media Group newspapers were extremely 
active in articulating contention. However, while they both took notably aggressive 
attacks on regional authorities in Chongqing and Xiamen, they were easily silenced, or 
– in the case of the Chongqing taxi strike – adopted what might be termed a ‘guerrilla’ 
approach whereby a series of highly conservative reports sandwiched a lengthy 
investigative piece which was excoriating of the local government in Chongqing (see 
page 233). Moreover, the Wukan protest, which took place within the Southern 
Media Group’s own province, saw the group’s newspapers cleave closely to the 
group’s leading Party publication which suggests Party defined limits. It is, of course, 
impossible to say from this research whether this form of ‘guerrilla sniping’ is derived 
from journalistic or political imperatives. The theories of ‘creative renegotiation’, 
discussed above, make it likely that inter-regional political rivalry may have opened 
up the space for the likes of the Southern Metropolis Daily and the Southern Weekend 
to work. Where there is no elite political division to exploit, their potency as vehicles 
of adversarial journalism is neutered.  
The other obvious trend was the importance of what Zhao calls the ‘elite’ niche press 
markets. In both the Xiamen and Wukan protests, it was low-circulation, national 
publications with senior political affiliations which published long investigative 
articles which went far beyond the confines of the mainstream news discourse. This 
elite media appears to float above the fray and, in all three cases, delivered damning 
verdicts on local officialdom, albeit only after protest had passed. The effect of this is 
impossible to discern clearly, but resonates with theories of authoritarian adaptation 
through ostensible transparency (Brady, 2010; Stockmann, 2013) and bolsters Fenby’s 
myth of the strong centre and weak provinces (2012). The power of the elite press is 
clearly not without limits. A period of weeks had passed in both cases before 
magazines published these pieces – time enough for investigation to be carried out 
and for the threat of further protest to have receded. However, these articles went 
far beyond anything that had previously been discussed in the mainstream news 
press. They claim for the news media special importance in fomenting protest and 
providing protestors a means to express their voice, often in the discourse of 
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democratic awakening. This is particularly pronounced in the cases of the Xiamen and 
Wukan protests. Significantly, they point out media censorship in the case of the 
Xiamen protest, though this is presented as an affordance open to local leaders and 
no connections are made with such activities at the national level.  
Concluding this point, this thesis has argued that change is present and observable, 
especially in the media realm, and that, in an environment as protean as China’s, that 
change is inevitable. However, rather than search for a linear account of this change, 
it is more appropriately seen as a negotiation between power holders. Power in China 
lies at the nexus of business and politics but may vary immensely between the 
national and local, between regions and between institutional actors. Thus change 
emerges as linear in one sense, in that – in media, at least – the Party remains firmly 
in charge, but non-linear in the sense that ‘the Party’ is increasingly hard to define in 
simple, monolithic terms.  
Propaganda Strategies  
The section above has pointed to the significance of protest appearing within the 
Chinese press. This section will outline some of the strategies deployed by Chinese 
publications in reporting protest. Once again, these strategies should not be seen as 
those of guerrilla journalists fighting against an overbearing and dictatorial 
propaganda machine; the strategies are aligned with those of the propaganda 
machine, even if, as shall be explained, the evidence suggests that government 
propaganda workers are not dictating how events should appear. However, there is 
evidence of some differences between publications, regions and in the different 
events which unfolded which, again, problematize the notion of a singular ‘China 
media’ and point to inter-regional, inter-administrative tension. 
In the main, it can be observed that local news outlets, directed by local Party 
authorities, take the lead in directing reporting, emphasising the notion that protest 
is most often about local concerns as, as such, deliberately avoided by senior political 
tiers. The correspondence absence of wider reporting suggests a deliberate strategy 
of allowing local Party tiers to take responsibility in searching for solutions, rather 
than an elite indifference to such events. News from these local publications may be 
syndicated nationally but the template for reporting is set at the local level. This trend 
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was observable in the Wukan and Xiamen protests but was less observable in the 
case during the Chongqing protest when Xinhua led national reporting at the same 
time as the local Chongqing press were at work, leading to a dual discourse that was, 
at times, in opposition.  
At the local level, protest coverage tended to display similar characteristics. Most of 
these are what might be termed ‘predictable’ responses from a press working to an 
explicit propaganda model in which achievements are trumpeted and problems 
obfuscated or otherwise downplayed (Brady, 2010).  Firstly, there was a notable 
absence of named leaders during the periods of unrest. Whilst the outcome was 
unclear, there was collective responsibility exercised by the local government, though 
the naming of specific officials returned as soon as the unrest ended.  
In each of the three events, there was an initial attempt at the local level to suggest 
nothing important had happened or to suggest that whatever had happened had 
already stopped happening. This went hand-in-hand with an effort to define the 
debate and explain, point by point, the specific remedies (see page 215 for an 
example of how this worked). When unrest persisted, the conflict was symbolically 
contained within this framework, with certain elements of the explanation 
emphasised or quietly withdrawn. Regardless of the individual specificities, the 
immediate imposing of a multi-point explanation and corresponding remedy was a 
common tactic.  
In terms of describing the unrest, local publications invariable blamed protest on 
violence and intimidation of a “tiny minority” and explained wider unrest by claiming 
that everybody else was merely an “onlooker”, linking participation with a 
historically-constituted, and passive, cultural habit (weiguan, discussed on page 84) 
rather than active, participation. This strategy again dovetails with a pronounced 
reluctance to label clearly what has happened. In Xiamen, a mass demonstration was 
an ‘incident’ (shijian); in Chongqing, a strike was a ‘incident’ (or, even more 
euphemistically, ‘incident things’); in Wukan, a riot and blockade are both ‘incidents’. 
After the persistence of serious protest, local media deploy a number of defensive 
strategies which indicate they are working under caution, rather than under 
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immediate supervision by the local propaganda bureau: reporters routinely deploy “it 
is reported” clauses to point to other news sources; news by-lines disappear, or are 
given as ‘interns’. In all three events, local media suggested that sinister forces were 
at work. Protestors were accused and illegality and the threat of criminal sanction 
was stated forcefully. Finally, a more conciliatory position is articulated as the scale of 
protest becomes clear, albeit one which pours scorn on those who have been 
excessive or used abnormal methods or channels. This conciliatory voice tends to 
have a moralistic quality, with protestors chided for their failure to grasp the full set 
of facts.  
That such a narrative arc is present and discernable lends credence to those who 
posit modern China as a state coming to terms with the inevitability of social 
contention (Lorentzen, 2013). That said, the initial reaction by local media suggested 
that deploying “shopworn conspiracy theories” (Tanner, 2004) is still a preferred 
tactic, but that other strategies are forced, by circumstance, to the fore.  
In terms of textual tactics, reporting deliberately confuses authorial voice. At 
moments of tension, the voice of the journalist and the party leaders are one and the 
same. This operates in tandem with the tactic of removing the names of specific local 
party leaders from coverage during the period of social contention. That said, it was 
notable the extent to which all three protest events were covered with reference to 
news conferences at which journalists questioned local government leaders. The 
uniformity of the output, particularly at local level, suggests this is a tactic favoured to 
create the veneer of openness.  
There appears to be a gradual move away from a focus on elite meetings to a 
preference for news conferences. In Xiamen in 2007, early reports focus on the elite 
response, as articulated through emergency meetings of senior representatives. In 
Chongqing this changes with street-level reportage. Though municipal leaders do 
later arrange meetings to address problems, these are imbued with an ostensible 
democratic spirit by the presence of members of the public and protestors. In the 




In a similar vein, where the build-up of tension is predicted, as in the Xiamen and 
Wukan examples, local media is clearly instrumentalised before and after periods of 
protest, in an effort to persuade readers of the fact that protest issues are already 
being addressed. In Chongqing, unrest appeared to come as something of a surprise 
as it was fomented within non-visible labour-based communities. Significantly, this 
appears to have taken place offline, unlike the other examples where mainstream 
media was instrumentalised to intervene against obvious non-mainstream media 
voices. In all three episodes, there is a general focus on news over commentary. 
Editorials that are written are generally on tangential subjects and do not address, or 
refer directly, to protest. They are often apparently written by ‘intern’ reporters, 
suggesting journalist and editors are not entirely sure of the precise boundaries in 
which they are authorised to operate and wish to retain a defensive card should they 
stand accused of transgression. 
The above section has highlighted specific textual or editorial tactics. Chapter 4 
discussed the importance of language and ideology in media discourse and this next 
passage will address these issues in relation to the three studied cases.  
Some of these “discursive conventions” (He, 2000) relate to textual strategies, 
described above. These include texts which have strong moral evaluative dimension 
to the language (Link, 2013a; Barme, 2012; Zhao, 2008); the widespread use of 
numeration and sloganeering (Barme, 2012); and militaristic language (Link, 2013a; 
Barme, 2012). These qualities were present in abundance in the texts studied here.  
More generally, there was ample evidence of the hybrid blend of discourse Barme 
has discussed in his work, particularly at the national level. He (2000) argued that 
“communist ideology” was “gradually dying” but this study suggests Barme is correct 
to label it “transmogrification”. While in Wukan in 2011, the ‘masses’ were 
discursively raised time and again from their fitful Maoist sleep, they were frequently 
aligned with a developmental discourse of competing ‘interest claims’. Similarly, in all 
three examples, the ‘masses’ were invoked differently, from being ‘offended’ or 
otherwise disturbed by the behaviour of an initial ‘minority’ (often an ‘extreme 
minority’) to publications later coming to accept ‘legitimate concerns’ amongst the 
masses which were being addressed and solved by a diligent and sensitive State 
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response. In some senses, the invocation of the ‘masses’ in these two contexts is, to 
borrow a useful phrase form the Leninist songbook, a ‘contradiction’. Yet it is notable 
the extent to which the core concept remains even as the political position radically 
alters. 
Perhaps the most notable discursive tension seen in these cases was that between a 
discourse which sought to stress uniformity, harmony and co-operation, and one 
which recognised the legitimacy of dispute, contention and even conflict. This may be 
characterised at its most simple as a clash between communist, or Marxist, ideology 
which stresses fundamental (economic) commonalities among the ‘masses’ 
traditional separated by culture, language, ethnicity and manifold other division, and 
a neo-Liberal ideology which celebrates and encourages diversity as being an engine 
for growth and development and representing a healthy ecosystem where inevitable 
tensions may find self-correction and balance. Thus in the case of the Chongqing 
protest, media emphasised the multiplicity of interests at stake and exhibited strong 
neo-liberal tendencies in explaining the strike and seeking solutions. In Xiamen, there 
was a pronounced desire, expressed through media texts, to symbolically unite all 
Xiamen citizens and to demonize the notion of division – the authorial voice of media 
texts attempted to embrace, literally, everyone (see page 187). From a slightly 
different angle, in Chongqing – and Wukan – the local party attempted to present 
itself as a neutral arbitrator, a presence which hovered over the dispute and 
intervened to defuse an inevitable and natural tension which had arisen. In Xiamen, 
by contrast, the Party allowed itself to be associated with the source of the dispute 
and, as such, found itself arguing a certain political position. This necessitated its view 
being represented as the view of all.  
It is interesting to note how this discourse inverts the usual impression of the 
respective cities. As an early SEZ, Xiamen is at the forefront of economic liberalisation. 
Chongqing, under Bo Xilai’s leadership, was often seen as epitomising a revival of the 
‘new left’ which looked increasingly to the Maoist past. And yet it was in economically 
liberal Xiamen that the Marxist discourse of unity and harmony was deployed most 
explicitly, and in Maoist Chongqing that a neo-liberal tone was more clearly struck.  
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Finally, a division between ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ discourse was discussed in Chapter 
4 (Link, 2013a; Schoenhals, 1992; Moser, 2006; Barme, 2012). There was some 
evidence of some elite commentaries rejecting the staid language of Party 
propaganda but, generally, there was no obvious sign of the ‘unofficial’ making 
incursions into press discourse. However, there were a couple of hints that the 
‘unofficial’ may be deployed strategically. In terms of online discourse, Xiamen’s Party 
newspaper printed quotes from (pro-government) voices online in an attempt to 
wrest discursive control from the ‘rumour-mongers’ (see page 175). And in Chongqing, 
Party leader Bo Xilai went even further and appropriated a slogan he acknowledged 
as having been drawn from an online commentator (see page 223), albeit one which 
– in its enumeration and simplifications – maintains the characteristics of Party 
discourse (Barme, 2012). During the widely-reported public meetings held after the 
strike, Bo positions the Internet as a source of reasoned discussion from which he, as 
leader of the municipality, can use to seek solutions.  
Moreover, reportage did feature in both the Xiamen and Chongqing protests. These 
texts emphasised on-the-spot observations and featured natural language dialogue 
and little sloganeering. In Xiamen, the reportage was conducted by the Party press 
ahead of a threatened march and appeared to be an attempt – an ultimately failed 
attempt – to interject into the vociferous online debate with a voice which more 
closely matched those heard in non-mainstream sources as a possible means of 
allaying unrest (see page 169). Xinhua’s reporting in Chongqing (see page 225) had an 
even starker feel of reportage but was here deployed in response to a strike which 
had already begun. Reportage was used by two elite news magazines in Wukan, but 
only after the event, and not as a strategic response to a contemporary threat as was 
the case in Xiamen and Chongqing.  
Implications for Authoritarian Press Theory  
These observations demand a return to the widest theoretical discussion, that of 
authoritarian press theory. Here the findings are ambiguous. The behaviour of elite 
niche publications and publications with the Southern Media Group are not easily 
accommodated within authoritarian press models. However, the bounded discourse, 
the effective censorship, the elimination of non-official voices, the cultivation of a 
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veneer of openness – all point to a press operating in reasonably synchronicity to 
maintain harmony and social integration. Many aspects of this research reveal 
Chinese press operating to a surprisingly old-fashioned script – that of demonising 
protestors, whispering conspiracy and equating tension with disloyalty and treason – 
discussed in the previous section. However, the minor but important differences 
observed point to the necessity to develop theories which better map media 
behaviour to the authoritarian states different constituent parts, which are 
occasionally in tension with each other.  What is being discussed is “political 
parallelism” by any other name (see page 114). In China, it has generally been 
assumed that Hallin and Mancini’s conceptual tool for categorising and analysing 
media is redundant due to the homogeneity of the Party state. This simplistic 
understanding looks less obvious if one conceives of the Party-state in terms 
proposed by Zheng, that is a “competitive oligarchy where factional competition and 
power-sharing among factions takes place” and where there is an “inclusive 
hegemony where political parallelism by different social forces takes place” (2010: 
177) 
Conceptualising both the Party-state and the Chinese press as increasingly 
fragmented represents a helpful corrective to the tendency among observers of 
Chinese politics and media to observe intensely strategic thinking in every action. This 
thesis does make the assumption that the media remains a tool of government and 
invariably performs in the interests of power. However, the fragmentation of that 
power makes it hard to envisage every action, or every printed word, working to 
service a single, strategic purpose. The fragmented nature of nature within China may 
well explain why different media behave differently and why officials may remark – as 
one did to the author in 2010 – that journalists are irritatingly antagonistic and 
adversarial. Such a position is not, this research argues, an expression of media or 
journalistic power, but an expression of heretical political power. Journalists working 
for senior political units may well be instrumentalised by those units to put pressure 
on junior officials, but this works within the political hierarchy rather than outside it. 
As has been discussed throughout this thesis, many accounts of change in China lean 
on assumptions borrowed, consciously or not, from transitology, that is the balance 
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between authoritarianism – repression, suppression, control – and libertarianism – 
based around ideas of social plurality and freedoms of speech, movement and 
association. The corollary of this frame is the ‘top-down, bottom-up’ problematic, 
which sees change as forced upon the authoritarian ‘top’ (read, the Communist Party) 
by an assertive, liberal ‘bottom’ (read, society), or, by contrast, imposed by the 
authoritarian ‘top’ (Party) upon the downtrodden ‘bottom’ (society). It is very difficult 
to escape these binaries entirely and researchers are well advised to declare their 
hand as best they can. This thesis rejects most aspects of the transitological account 
without rejecting the frame. In other words, there are identifiable aspects of 
authoritarianism and liberalism but change doesn’t involve either a unidirectional 
move from one to the other. It is possible to read an ostensible expansion of the 
liberal sphere as the activities of an increasingly sensitive state imposing a self-
defined version of democracy – in order words, ‘authoritarian liberalism’ (Donald et al, 
2002); likewise, an expansion of ‘authoritarian’ state control may equally be willed by 
an ostensibly ‘liberal’ majority, seeking a bulwark against the actions of a self-
interested minority, be they newly-moneyed Chinese entrepreneurs, or imperialist 
aggressors. In both accounts here, there is a relationship between state and society 
which is dynamic and symbiotic, and which cannot be described in zero-sum terms. 
Theories of the press, much like theories of democracy, are problematic. The press, 
like democracy, doesn’t just do one thing; it’s necessarily interwoven with historical 
and cultural contingencies. The search for universals which drove early press theory 
are doomed to failure – as Hallin and Mancini (2004) predicted – if one’s framework 
of understanding is stymied by concepts of free, or unfree, liberal or authoritarian, as 
it was for Siebert, Peterson and Schramm (1956). If one assumes that the liberal can 
display authoritarian characteristics, and the authoritarian is liberal at certain 
junctures, then one realises that perhaps such terms are ultimately unhelpful, thus 
the search for new frameworks of understanding. The developmental framework has 
its value. In the same way that the US’s industrialisation and rise to geopolitical 
dominance at the turn of the 20th century begat a journalist like Upton Sinclair, 
perhaps the Chinese press, despite its culturally, socially and political bounded 
operational practices, also must necessarily play a similar function. However, though 
the press may, theoretically be ‘liberated’ to perform certain role in mediating 
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conflict and interests in process of rapid social turmoil and change, it does not follow 
that the press is ‘liberal’. And it this does not mean that power-holders have 
necessarily withdrawn from their efforts to control. Rather the liberation of 
journalists may be seen as an instrumentalisation which is still bounded by rules and 
limits, and which has a power-supporting function.   
In many ways, the modern Chinese press does resemble a blend of Siebert, Peterson 
and Schramm’s Soviet and Authoritarian Press. Siebert ‘authoritarian’ press admits to 
some flexibility as to what the press may publish. Indeed, there may even be some 
occasions when, assuming the audience is sufficiently limited, there may be scope for 
nuanced political issues to be discussed. This appears to be the case in terms of the 
Chinese elite press. However, the press is restricted from engaging the masses and 
certain subjects – the legitimacy of central authorities – remain impermissible. 
Publishers who might be reaching a wider mass audience are required to ‘announce’ 
and ‘explain’ the results of private deliberations rather than draw readers into an 
argument. Schramm’s Soviet press is also relevant in terms of the continued 
relevance of the emphasis on moral instruction, the promotion of ‘positive freedoms’ 
(Zhao, 2012) and helping to facilitate centrally-mandated social and economic 
developments.  
There are manifestly times where the Chinese authorities at all levels need to 
interject in matters of social contention. This interjection necessarily draws on certain 
assumptions about the role and importance of the state – that it is responsive, 
effective and necessary. However, beyond this core assurance, there is no coherent 
ideology which may be discerned. One might argue that this constitutes something 
akin to ‘de-dogmatised dogma’ – a system which attempts to make things work 
without any semblance of a unifying theory, or concern for contradiction. Schell and 
Delury have argued that Mao’s great legacy was an enduring pragmatism and a 
willingness amongst government for experimentation. This appears to apply as much 
to the Chinese media as it goes to other arms of government. The move in media is 
therefore not from ‘free’ to ‘unfree’. It is rather a pragmatic utilisation of tools. The 
press, though not directly controlled, is leaned on by a Party-State which manifestly 
retains ultimate power. Thus Authoritarian and Soviet press theories remain useful, 
296 
 
but there is an additional need to create the veneer of transparency and diversity in 
order to satisfy the increased plurality of the citizenry and the Party itself. 
Contributions to Knowledge 
A case study methodology can only ever lead to suggestive and tentative conclusions. 
This thesis’ primary claim for a contribution to knowledge comes from a single, and 
simple, source: this is the first known study to place an exclusive emphasis on the 
mediation of protest in China.  
For all the nuanced scholarly work conducted around areas of political significance in 
China – social injustice, civil society, governance, demographics, economics – Chinese 
newspapers still tend to be assumed as operating within a simple, one-dimensional, 
top-down environment. It is hope that this work will supplement the work of China 
media focused scholars such as Yuezhi Zhao (1998, 2008) and Chin-Chuan Lee (2000) 
in delineating the workings of China’s diverse and, in many respects, dynamic 
newspaper industry.  
Though protest is not core to this thesis, there is value in terms of the fact that this is 
one of only a handful of studies to probe protest mediation in China. Though there is 
much discussion of Chinese protest in terms of its sources, its methods, and its causes, 
analysis of the reporting of protest in China is absent. In this sense, this study makes a 
very straightforward contribution to knowledge in that it looks at an area which 
others scholars have assumed to be either, one, irrelevant, or, two, non-existent170. 
The mass protests in Hong Kong between September and December 2014 suggested 
that others may be beginning to see value in studying the mainstream press for its 
coverage of issues of contention and protest. Several major newspapers took the 
time to examine and interpret what mainstream news outlets on the mainland were 
saying in relation to the protest. However, the persistent framing was one of 
assuming mainstream Chinese newspapers to have a singular voice and to speak for a 
singular authority. This study hopefully introduces some caution to this approach. 
                                                       
170 There are two exceptions, both in work by PhDs at the University of Westminster. Hsaio-wen Lee’s 
(2010) thesis on the public and popular press looked in brief at coverage of the Dingzhou uprising 
(2005), while Jingrong Tong (2008) looks at a couple of examples of media coverage of incidents of 
protest using a version of CDA.  However, even these do not go much beyond a simple description and 
do not engage deeply in issues of language. 
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 On a related point, media representations, routinely dismissed from scholarly 
analysis, have had vital role in the unfolding of protests. In the Wukan protest, 
examined in this thesis, interviews with villagers suggest reporting in local media 
intensified the anger felt by villagers, just as it did in 1989 when the People’s Daily ran 
its infamous editorial on the “counter-revolutionary” demonstration unfolding in 
Tiananmen Square (Buckley, 2014). This thesis will act as something of a corrective to 
the scores of accounts of modern social contention which make scarcely a mention of 
the way protest events were publically mediated. 
Ultimately, this research has aimed to improve theoretical understanding of press 
function in authoritarian regimes, with appreciation of the varied specificities of 
Chinese context. China’s media system is one which is semi-controlled, and which has 
come under pressure from non-political sources such as the market, online 
competition and changing mores amongst young media consumers. By analysing 
press performance at times of social stress, the fracture lines that manifestly exist 
within the assumed ‘monolith’ of the mass media – and, by extension, the ‘monolith’ 
of the unitary Party-state – become clearer. Certain corners of the press reflect 
certain strands of a diverse, differentiated and increasingly fragmented communist 
party. Though the press remains an appendage of the state, the way the Party-state, 
or various parts of the Party-state, instrumentalise the mass media may say 
something very important about the evolution of both politics and propaganda work 
in China. 
Limitations and Future Research 
This thesis may be argued as being overly niche in its focus given the wider and more 
obviously dramatic political forces that are gathering around China as this thesis is 
finished in late 2014. Foremost amongst these is China’s place within the global 
economic and political order. This has seen China rise, rapidly in recent decades, to a 
prominence which Deng Xiaoping cautioned against in the early 1990s and which cuts 
against the celebrated strategy of ‘hiding brightness and nurturing obscurity’ (tao 
guang yang hui). Governance in China is manifestly more complex in a society which 
may be characterised as partly-developed, partly-open, partly-prosperous. This thesis 
has engaged with ideas related to authoritarian resilience. However, the author is 
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extremely sympathetic to the argument that China’s current model of governance will 
not be tested by a commercialised media, by adversarial guerrilla reporting in a small 
corner of the press, or by demands from online communities. Rather, the success of 
the current political model can only be declared after its survival in the face of 
economic shock and the social convulsions such a shock is likely to produce. Ignatieff 
puts it well: 
The issue is whether…[authoritarian] governance is capable of dealing with 
radical shocks like a long-term economic slowdown of the kind currently 
predicted for China” (2014)  
Such a shock, of course, cannot be manufactured or modelled for the purposes of an 
academic study such as this one and so research must proceed on the basis of an 
assumed robustness within the current governance model. However, the author 
recognises that discussion of the press is niche when set against the bigger picture.  
The precise insights that have been sought in this thesis concern the reporting of 
protest and what this might say about the Chinese media and its function and 
operation within the communications landscape. The author acknowledges fully that 
it is difficult to claim knowledge about the reporting of protest in China, per se. The 
specific and highly localised contingencies at work in the three studied episodes of 
protest make it impossible to claim them as representative or generalizable. The 
opacity of these factors, rooted as they are in politics, is a problem. As such, while 
these events did see some form of public mediation, they cannot point to other 
similar events playing out in the same way. The specific combination of variables and 
factors which may lead to an event receiving mainstream media coverage is of 
interest, and may represent a future research avenue. However, it is not the precise 
interest of this thesis.  
The thesis obviously lacks an answer to questions of media effects – in other words, 
do the new strategies and ideas suggested by this research actually work to increase 
confidence in the Party’s governance and allay fears of social disorder? In 
conversation with the author, one foreign news worker employed by China Central 
Television (CCTV) suggested that mainstream media has lost all credibility and is 
disbelieved. Link, likewise, suggests “artificial” official language has generated 
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widespread cynicism and is widely disbelieved (2014). This research contends that the 
CCP has not yet given up on instrumentalising the media for the purposes of 
ideological instruction but, again, the precise effect of the media studied in this thesis 
is not the point. The point is rather what media texts say about the Party-state. 
Nevertheless, future work may well be conducted to ascertain the effects of this 
approach amongst media consumers.  
Finally, this research has been designed as a cross-sectional study of media 
behaviours at a particular point in time. However, the case studies examined did span 
a period of four and a half years which suggests the possibility of longitudinal findings. 
Indeed, these case studies suggest evidence of policy shifts, from a fairly conservative 
position with Xiamen where local media was allowed to dictate coverage, to a more 
integrated and ostensibly open national solution, to something of a hybrid, where 
limited openness is permitted, albeit with outright suppression maintained as an ever 
present option. The temporal scope of these three case studies is too short to confirm 
such a trend, and specific local factors will, of course, have influenced what was 
ultimately reported. But there is some evidence of the shape of the on-going reform 
to China’s crisis response propaganda strategy which may be re-examined in future 
research. Along similar lines, future research must place a greater emphasis on news 
disseminated through new media channels. In the period in which these case studies 
took place, newspapers may legimiately claim to have been paramount in 
disseminating information and setting a wider media agenda. Stockmann’s 
experimental and survey data suggests Internet usage remained around 20% at a 
national level and that newspapers were read by around 80% of city dwellers in the 
2005-2009 period. Trips made by the author to China in late 2012 and early 2015 
confirm comments made by contacts within the Chinese media that newspaper 
reading has dropped off sharply since this research project began. For a time, China 
appeared to be resisting downward trends in newspaper reading (Sparks & Zhou, 
2012). Not so now. This makes it all the more vital that future research shifts its focus 
to news output on online platforms. 
China makes a fool at anyone who predicts its future. Change is an ever present fact 
in contemporary China and is dizzying in speed and complexity. This thesis has not 
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attempted to state what will happen next, not at the level of media reform, and 
certainly not at the broader level of political change. What seems more attainable is 
the hope of identifying facets of change where they may, hitherto, not have been 
observed and pointing out why predictions made elsewhere may be based on false 
assumptions. In this task, this thesis has pointed towards areas where change is 

















Appendix A: Key Xiamen Anti-PX Protest 
Translations 
China Newsweek 
June 11th, 2007 (See reference: Xie, 2007) 
Note: The following article was translated from the original Chinese by Joel Martinson 
of the China media translation site, Danwei.org. It was posted on June 18th, 2007, at 
http://www.danwei.org/state_media/xiamen_px_sms_china_newsweek.php  
 
Expression of Popular Opinion in the New Media Era  
Thirty-two-year-old Ye Zi (name changed) received an email from her friend on 26 May. That was her 
first time to see the English word PX, and the first time that she was aware that in Nandu, Haicang 
District, not far from her home on Gulangyu Island, a massive PX (paraxylene) chemical plant was being 
constructed. 
In the email from her friend, Xiamen's PX chemical plant project was described thus: starting 
production "would be like dropping an atomic bomb on Xiamen Island; it would mean that in the 
future, the people of Xiamen would live in the shadow of leukemia and deformed children." "This 
really shook me," said Ye Zi, who calls herself a gentle person who's never been one to get excited. 
At first, Ye Zi did not believe that this was true. After searching through materials online, though she 
found out that things were not as sensational as the email made them out to be, Ye Zi still determined 
that PX was a dangerous chemical product. And in the following period, she received similar messages 
about the PX project through MSN and QQ. 
At this point, a close friend from high school gave her a phone call asking if she'd received an SMS 
about PX. This friend urged Ye Zi, saying: "Don't just stay at home with your husband and kid. Look at 
what's happening outside. Don't forget to put on a yellow band and go out for a walk on 1 June." 
Put on a yellow band and go for a "walk"? This gave the timid Ye Zi a pause. But she thought about her 
son, only three years old, and her life in the future with her whole family breathing PX fumes, and 
decided to go out. "I hoped to express the true wishes of a citizen of Xiamen," Ye Zi said. 
On Friday, 1 June, at 7 in the morning, Ye Zi found a piece of yellow cloth at home. She tore off a strip 
and put it in her bag, and then went out toward Xiamen Island. Coincidentally, on the ferry to Xiamen 
Island, she ran into her uncle's family. Talking to them, she found that their aims were identical. 
From the city government to S. Hubin Road, Ye Zi and her uncle's family followed a procession of 
nearly 1000 people, and shouted slogans with them. "However, I kept that strip of yellow cloth in my 
bag and never dared to take it out," Ye Zi said. What disappointed her was that the good friend who 
had first urged her to "walk" never appeared for their meeting. 
That night, Ye Zi found related news on the scrolling tickers of all of Xiamen's TV stations. But what she 
thought was just a gentle way of using a "walk" to express her wishes was defined by the Xiamen PSB 
as an "illegal mass demonstration" that "seriously disrupted public order and disturbed the lives and 
work of the general public." 
This was not the first time that the Xiamen public expressed their will about the PX project. 
Proposal 
During this year's Two Congresses, 105 CPPCC members signed a joint "Proposal recommending 
moving the Xiamen Haicang PX project." This became the first key proposal of this year's CPPCC. 
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Spearheading the proposal was CPPCC member Zhao Yufen, a CAS academician and a Xiamen 
University professor of chemistry who resides on Xiamen Island. 
"If I say PX you may not understand, but you'll definitely remember the November, 2005, explosion at 
the Jilin benzene plant as if it were yesterday. PX is p-Xylene, a dangerous, highly carcinogenic chemical 
that causes a high rate of fetal deformations. And the PX project is located in the densely-populated 
Haicang District," Zhao Yufen said in an interview with China Business. 
In the proposal, Zhao and her colleagues set out the safety consequences and pollution threat that the 
PX project might cause. On the site selection, for example, the proposal said that international practice 
for similar projects is to have them separated from cities by 70 kilometers; Chinese practice is usually 
20 km, but the Haicang PX project is just 7 km from the main city districts. 
After this proposal was reported in many papers like China Business, Southern Metropolis Daily, and 
China Youth Daily, there was an instant, fierce reaction in Xiamen. And more citizens wondered why 
such a major project connected to the public interest was not announced to the public beforehand. 
According to media reports, on 26 March, all the homeowners in the "Future Waterfront" around 4 km 
removed from the PX project sent a letter to Zhao Yufen saying that the proposal revealed an 
unsettling inside story unknown to the majority of homeowners. Another letter signed by the villages 
of Wencuo, Dongyu, and Zhongshan in Haicang District expressed their pleasure at the willingness of 
the proposal to "offer advice." 
Graffiti 
On the evening of 8 May, a long-term resident of Xiamen originally from out of town returned to 
Xiamen from a business trip, passing by the construction site facing the Lujing Hotel east of Xiamen 
University. He discovered some English-language graffiti of tears, egrets (Xiamen's city bird), and the 
words "I LOVE XIAMEN," "Everyone is island," "Everyone is Xiamen," and "ANTIPX." 
At first he thought that this was graffiti put up by foreigners who loved Xiamen, so he took photos of 
the graffiti and posted them to his blog. He never imagined that back in his company, a colleague 
would see the photos on his blog and immediately get a jubilant look in his eyes that said, "I've finally 
found an organization!" This colleague turned out to be a steadfast opponent of the PX project. 
The designer of these pieces of graffiti was eventually confirmed. They were the work of Zhezi, 
moderately-well-known in Fujian, who had done a "Don't want to graduate" series of works on 6 May. 
On the night of 10 May, Zhezi posted to his blog: "About ANTIPX, I want to say that I am not an angry 
youth standing on principles, and I'm not a courageous person." 
Zhezi said that this was just the action of a sensitive, cowardly individual searching for his own voice, 
not opposition or challenge to anything. "So I think that everyone should treasure this land. To know 
that at this place and time there is someone else writing down the same thing that is in your mind: 
Xiamen, I love you," Zhezi wrote on his blog. 
Even though Zhezi felt compelled to say, "Forgive me for my impotence in the face of reality. Facing PX, 
facing the pollution in this city, there's nothing but sorrow and wan description," and although there is 
now no longer any trace of the graffiti in many places lining the route of the walkers around Xiamen 
University, through the swift dissemination of the Internet, ANTIPX became the unanimous aspiration 
of the legions of Xiamen environmentalists. 
SMS 
On 29 May, the media reported that more than ten thousand Xiamen residents were circulating the 
same SMS message. But before long, the message was screened and it became hard to send or recieve 
it again. 
The contents of the basically ran: "The Xianglu Group has invested in a (benzene) project in Haicang 
District. Should this highly-toxic chemical product be manufactured, it would be like dropping an 
atomic bomb on Xiamen Island; it would mean that in the future, the people of Xiamen would live in 
the shadow of leukemia and deformed children. We want to live. We want our health! International 
organizations have rules that these projects must be developed at least 100 km from cities; Xiamen is 
just 16 km away from this project! For our children and grandchildren....when you see this SMS please 
sent it to all of your friends in Xiamen!" 
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According to this reporter's understanding at the scene, there were not all that many city residents 
who received the SMS. "I did not personally receive that kind of SMS. I heard that some people around 
me got it. Everyone was passing it on. And I learned about today's action too," said Ms. Wen, who said 
she worked at a foreign trade company and who was out "parading" at noon on 1 June. 
However, this did not seem to prevent "Have you received the SMS?" from becoming a greeting 
among Xiamen residents who met each other during that period. Mr. Chen, a man from Anhui who has 
been driving a taxi in Xiamen for five years, talked about PX with this reporter and had the solemn air 
of someone who knew inside information. "Just so happens that the past few days I've taken a number 
of people from Haicang District, and they've all been talking about this." 
But at this time, the Xiamen municipal government had not revealed to citizens any further 
information regarding the PX project, so the "Boycott PX, Protect Xiamen" feeling circulated by SMS 
gradually covered Xiamen, whose summer sun was unobscured by rain or thunder. 
Internet 
Ms. Wang, who participated in the 1 June "walk," said that she first learned of the PX project about 
three months ago on Sina. "However, it seemed that before long the post was deleted," Wang said. In 
fact, for many local Xiamen residents, it was on the most popular local BBS - Xiaoyu Community - that 
they learned about the important base for PX. 
On 30 May, this reporter tried to access the Xiaoyu BBS but found the message, "The community is 
temporarily closed for a program upgrade. 2007.05.29." According to one user of the Xiaoyu BBS, they 
had all received an email from the BBS whose general message instructed them not to post anything 
having to do with PX. On 5 June, this reporter again tried to access the BBS and found that it had 
returned to normal. 
At the same time, during a period at the end of May, Xiamen's netizens used email, MSN, and QQ to 
receive information about PX. 
Ye Zi received a message on QQ that went like this: "For our children and grandchildren, take action! 
Take part in a 10,000-person YX [游行, march]. At 8 am on 1 June, set off from your home for the 
municipal government. Tie a yellow band on your hand. If you have no time to participate, then send 
this information as widely as possible. For your own life, take action!" 
On 2 June, the information sent through these channels went like this: "For two days, spontaneous 
parades have demonstrated our attitude. Production must continue, life must go on. There is no need 
to be impetuous and give unlawful elements eager for chaos an opportunity. Let us turn our eyes 
toward how the government handles the critical issue of the PX project." 
"Anticipation for a green home never falters. Let us use soft, quite means to bring that forth. If you 
oppose the PX project, then tie yellow scarves everywhere - on your vehicle, on your work desk, on the 
bag you carry with you....at any place and at any time, ANTIPX, yellow scarves, so the city dances!" 





Appendix B: Key Chongqing Taxi Strike 
Translations 
Southern Metropolis Daily 
November 6th, 2008 (See reference: Long, 2008) 
Chongqing Taxi Outage – The Background Chain of Exploitation 
From early on November 3 until the morning of November 5 --- A taxi strike lasting 
more than two days came to an end. The Chongqing Municipal Government 
announced that taxis in the central district resumed normal operation on the morning 
of November 5. The main cause of the event is considered to be the unauthorized 
decision by taxi companies to increase the daily fee [‘fenqian’] charged to its drivers. 
An investigation by this reporter has revealed that a multi-layered chain of 
exploitation has formed within Chongqing’s blighted taxi industry. This strike is a part 
of the expression of a profound sense of resenthment felt by overwhelmed drivers. 
It is understood that in the majority of Chongqing taxi companies, the total amount needed to contract 
a car for four years is between 265,000 and 300,000RMB, with the highest price being 408,000RMB. 
Against this "backdrop", the main driver [of the vehicle] will "logically" transfer his risk onto secondary 
or replacement drivers, thus creating a varied and diverse system of risk distribution. 
"Therefore, this creates the situation where the driver rears the chicken, while the taxi companies take 
the eggs. The main drivers are forced to deduct secondary drivers’ [income], and are free to increase 
banban fees (ie. fenqian), forming a complete chain of exploitation." 
On the road leading from the airport to the city centre, very few of the distinctly bright yellow taxis can 
be seen. It is the second day after the Chongqing-wide taxi strike began. Although the government has 
adopted several measures, including research around taxi fare increases, and continuing the strike 
against illegal cab operators, most drivers are continuing to wait. To drive at this moment is a risky 
business.  
At Shangqingsi station, a taxi is parked up by the roadside. The driver, surnamed Jiang, has just 
rejected a fare to Shapingba. The transport strike has made people feel insecure, and to reject a fare 
has become something that seems normal. Behind him stands a black Jetta, touting for business on the 
street. "Where are you going? Wanna take a bus? The taxis are on strike." 
"Illegal cabs are part of the reason, but now illegal cabs are even more widespread," Jiang smiled. This 
kind of pessimistic mood of frustration is rendered on the faces of drivers in the wake of the strike. 
[Jiang] is worried about the future. 
Jiang took to the street in response to the appeals of the government and his taxi company and 
tentatively drove down the road. There is a hole in the bottom right corner of the windshield, with a 
crack spreading across the glass. It looks as if the glass has been bludegoned. He said that this was the 
price of driving his cab the previous day. “I parked up at the roadside to use the toilet. When I returned 
[to the car], it had been smashed with a stone.” Prior to this, the Xinhua News Agency had reported 
that more than 20 vehicles had been attacked during the strike, including three police cars. 
"We don’t dare go to places that are remotely out of the way.” Jiang said that in common with the 
other taxis on the road, the ‘taxi’ light atop the cars have all been removed and placed in the boot. This 
implies that the transport strike wave is continuing. 
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"The effect is not at all obvious." When the car passed Chenjiaping bus station, the station square was 
completely empty. Three days ago, it was filled with cars lining up to take passengers. He said, "[the 
incident has] stirred the government, but the fundamental problems have not been solved.” 
The collective ‘break’ that began before daybreak 
The timing of the transport strike had been confirmed by at least last Thursday, the previously 
mentioned driver, surnamed Jiang, confirmed to reporters. The message spread between drivers, 
especially the night shift drivers. Some taxi companies also becoming aware of the plan but everybody 
was aware that [the strike] was an inevitability.  
As a new day dawned at 5am on November 3rd, not a single taxi could be seen in districts such as Yubei, 
Yuzhong, Shapingba, Jiulongpo, Nan'an and Jiangbei. Chongqing’s urban centre has more than 8,000 
taxis but they seemingly ‘vanished’ overnight. Drivers look on from street-side railings. The feeling of 
conflict spreads like a germ throughout the city. Whenever a taxi passes by, they stand in front of it 
forming a barrier, throwing water bottles and asking drivers to stop working and to join the collective 
struggle (集体抗争).   
Even though police have said no malign forces have entered the strike, there is an acute sense of 
awareness among drivers that the strike, dubbed a collective 'break', has become increasingly 
acrimonious. At least 20 taxis have been attacked and unauthorized drivers have been warned or even 
beaten up. Reporters have acquired a photograph showing traffic disruption after an ‘unauthorised’ 
taxi belonging to the Lingyang company was surrounded by Chang’an vans and its driver pulled from 
his vehicle and beaten by a group of men at the Guanyinqiao Ring Road Laogan district centre on the 
afternoon of November 3. Chongqing police were forced to mobilize in large numbers at Chenjiaping, 
Yanggongqiao, Tianxingqiao, Fengmingshan and other gathering places in order to maintain transport 
order.  
On normal days, the citizens of this modern riverside mountain city of bridges and rugged roads have 
plentiful complaints about the taxis which surround them, accusing drivers of cheating, making detours 
or refusing fares, and discrediting the city. It is only in this moment that they become aware how 
important they yellow cabs which fill the street are to their lives.  
On the morning of the strike, the Chongqing municipal government held an emergency meeting, 
resolutely preventing the transport strike triggering a chain reaction, and taking measures to ensure 
that operations returned to normal levels. 
At 10am [that day], the official Xinhua News Agency also released rare rolling coverage of the incident, 
with reports such as "Taxis in urban Chongqing all stop work", and "Four reasons for Chongqing’s 
urban taxi transport strike". Transparency of information eased further deterioration of the event. 
At 4pm that afternoon, the Chongqing municipart transport committee set up a news conference 
where deputy director Liang Peijun explained that four main reasons had caused the urban taxi 
transport strike: firstly, that contradictions existed in the distribution of benefits between the taxi 
companies and drivers; secondly, that difficulties faced by urban taxi drivers in refuelling their cars had 
not been fully resolved; thirdly, that taxi tariff structure was unreasonable; and fourthly, that illegal 
taxis had disturbed the normal order. 
At the same time, under the protection of staff from relevant government departments, hundreds of 
taxis had gone to Chongqing’s busiest central areas, such as Liberation Gate (Jiefangpai) and the train 
station.  
Although the government and taxi companies both pledged to make adjustments, the majority of taxi 
drivers continued to look on. The minority who dared take to the streets, the previously mentioned 
Driver Jiang included, saw their vehicles unaccountably smashed up.  
Income only starts after earning above 270RMB per day 
The chain of exploitation has already given [primary] drivers an unbearable burden; secondary drivers represent the final link [in this exploitation chain] 
This is not the first time Chongqing taxis have gone on strike. One insider told this reporter that in July, 
prior to the Olympics, strike ferment had already taken root among taxi drivers and they had decided 
on July 14 as the day to take a collective ‘break’.  
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 What was different about that event was that the primary complaint concerned difficulties refuelling 
with natural gas. Use of air-conditioners had increased the speed fuel was depleted, meaning drivers 
were squandering, on average, around three hours a day waiting to refuel. 
The need to preserve stability during the Olympic period meant the government was unusually vigilant 
and took quick action. At the same time as increasing the supply of natural gas, a special rule was 
brought in meaning cars, other than taxis, were only allowed to fill up between 10pm and 8am the 
following day, staggering the peaking refuelling times for cabs. Because of this, a storm was avoided. 
However, for the long-suffering Chongqing taxi industry, the solution to the refuelling problem merely 
deferred the moment when anger would erupt.  
According to investigations by one local reporter, the Chongqing taxi industry had decayed over many 
years and created a multi-layered chain of exploitation. Overwhelmed drivers were full of resentment 
and sooner or later would break. This transport strike is one part of this process.  
Qian Liang, a 28-year-old driver, provided this journalist with a breakdown of his accounts. In the first 
half of this year, he paid the Guotai taxi company 135,000 RMB in advance fees for the operation rights 
to his Amagatarai car. Beside this, he paid his company 8,200 RMB every month in ‘fees’ (份子钱). 
According to the rules, after a full four years, the vehicle is taken out of usage and the company will 
only return 20,000 RMB of the advance fee. In four years, according to Qian Liang’s calculations, his 
company will earn 408,600 RMB from him. 
Central Chongqing currently has 34 taxi companies which operate 100 or more cabs, with the total 
number of cabs amounting to nearly 8,000. Journalist investigations have revealed that each 
company’s advance fees are very different. 
An investigation among drivers revealed that the Chongqing Guoji company charged drivers 160,000 
RMB and returned 50,000 RMB at the completion of four years’ [service]; the Guotai company charged 
135,000 RMB and returned 20,000 RMB after four years; the municipal taxi company took 100,000 
RMB from drivers and returned 20,000 RMB after four years… 
Within this chain of exploitation, Qian Liang numbers one of the “exploited”. At the same time, he is an 
“exploiter”. He employs a secondary driver (the majority of taxis have a primary driver, a secondary 
driver, and a fill-in driver). According to the regulations, 460 RMB needs to be paid to the company in 
fees (fen’er qian) (230 RMB for the day shift, 230 RMB for the night shift). A months’ fees amounts to 
13,800 RMB (half of which is paid by himself, and half by the secondary driver). In reality, he only pays 
the company 8,200 RMB, the remaining 5,500 RMB being returned by the company. However, this 
money is not returned to the secondary driver. 
“I must retain this part of the price differential as I am the one who has invested 130,000 RMB in the 
car”, Liang said. After four years, the company will only return him 20,000 RMB. 
Going from the taxi company to the contractor (the primary driver), the secondary driver represents 
the final link in the chain of exploitation. After working off the daily 230 RMB to cover half of the fen’er 
‘fee’ and the minimum of 30 RMB spent in petrol and 10 RMB for lunch, a secondary drive must earn 
270 RMB before he sees any return. One secondary driver told this reporter that, taking last month as 
an example, he regularly saw only 10 RMB profit for a days’ work and occasionally he had to take a loss. 
High contract fee forms chains of exploitation 
The highest four year contract costs as much as 400,000 RMB, thus creating a system of risk transfer. 
“Primary drivers are forced to make deductions from secondary and fill-in drivers." 
In 2004, Chongqing began to implement taxi reforms, extending the life of a taxi from five to 25 years, 
moving from contractual operations to corporate operation. Around this time, dozens of “taxi incidents” 
occurred across China, and the taxi industry could be said to represent an abbreviated version of 
China’s more general course of development. 
The urban centre taxi franchise and property rights management system reform plan, a government-
issued (Yu Fu Fa) document (No.85, 2003) shows that according to government regulations, for urban 
taxi operators a one-time payment of 50,000 RMB is levied per vehicle, entitling operators to 25 years 
of usage, making the average annual cost just 2,000 RMB. 
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On March 12, 2005, the then-deputy mayor of Chongqing, Huang Qifan, spoke about the management 
of the taxi industry, saying that only by encouraging the development and expansion of taxi companies 
and standardizing management could quality and efficiency within the taxi industry be improved. In 
the past, Chongqing had more than 100 taxi companies but the uncoordinated situation was evident. 
Through consolidation, the number of companies has been reduced to 30 companies, with seven to 
eight thousand taxis. These companies were strong, with standardised operations and good prospects 
for development. 
It was at that time that Yang Xiaoming, laid-off and confined to his home, signed a ‘taxi labour 
agreement’ with the Chongqing Road Transport (Group) Rental Branch. He paid a 7,000 RMB deposit 
to become a member of the secondary driver team. 
He said, in the process of restructuring the company, the government did not profit. However, having 
taken a cheap price from the government in order to win operating licence, the price of the licence 
rose precipitously due to the quota of taxis being limited. This price once broke through the 1m RMB 
mark, coming close to the record price set anywhere in China for the transfer of a taxi licence.  
This explains the increase in contract fees. According to local media reports in 2007, in order to 
become a primary drive one needed a total investment equivalent to the price of two taxis (Chang'an 
Lingyang), 115,000 RMB, and a monthly fixed revenue of 10,800 RMB payable to the company. By the 
beginning of this year, when Qian Liang wanted to step into the taxi business as a primary driver, he 
needed to pay costs of more than 130,000 RMB, in addition to the 10,000 RMB-plus monthly revenue. 
It is understood the total costs of taking a four-year contract with the majority of Chongqing’s taxi 
companies is between 265,000 RMB and 300,000 RMB with the highest cost reaching 408,000 RMB. 
Against this ‘backdrop’, it is ‘logical’ for the primary drive to transfer his risk onto secondary and fill-in 
drivers, forming a multifarious and multi-layered system of distributing risk. 
"It has created a situation where drivers rear the chicken but taxi companies grab the egg! Primary 
drivers make deductions from secondary and fill-in drivers and at can freely do things like increase fees 
(banban qian, or fen’er qian), thus forming a complete chain of exploitation," Yang Xiaoming said. After 
working for a year and discovering that deductions had been made from his salary and pension, [Yang] 
complained to his company and was then dismissed by the taxi’s primary driver.  
According to [Yang], drivers in Beijing have a daily ‘fee’ (fen’er qian) of only 170 RMB, while Shanghai’s 
brothers’ daily ‘fee’ is only 380 RMB. "Though Shenzhen colleagues’ fees are as much as 420 RMB per 
day, they charge a flag fare that is more than 50% higher than in Chongqing. In the nine districts of 
central Chongqing, fees generally reach 380 or 400 RMB, with the highest as much as 460 RMB!" 
Yesterday afternoon, in analysing the causes of this latest strike, the Chongqing municipal government 
spokesman indicated the main reason for the event was the fact that this year some companies had 
increased their daily fees by between 50 and 70 RMB, decreasing the annual take-home pay of drivers 
by more than 20,000 RMB, thereby increasing the economic burden faced by drivers and exacerbating 
their life difficulties and ultimately creating this social event (shehui shijian). 
The corruption after the spread of illegal cabs  
According to estimates, there is nearly one illegal cab for every 3.5 operating legitimately. Illegal cabs have seriously disrupted the market order 
The 45-year-old Yang Xiaoming attempted to break free of this chain of exploitation. Beginning in 2005, 
he began to formulate and establish "the Chongqing Municipal People's Taxi Company Ltd." 
"The company was established through a public offering, with share distributed equally among 
shareholders, and professionals hired to manage the process. Shareholders only have the operating 
rights to one vehicle, which he must drive himself. If other drivers are employed to drive the taxi, they 
must receive the same remuneration as the driver, while the company pays social security fees for all 
employees,” he said, describing the company. 
In terms of the chain of exploitation described above, [Yang] altered the middle link. Primary drivers 
have become shareholders. After taxis have been withdrawn [by the company], they can still be used, 
thus ameliorating the exploitation of secondary drivers.   
But until today, Yang Xiaoming’s company remains stuck on the drawing board. The application 
became stuck in the government administration licencing office as he prepared to register with the 
Trade and Industry Bureau. He has yet to break through the barriers around the taxi industry 
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monopoly [in Chongqing]. This stands as a microcosm of China's taxi industry at large. Economist Sun 
Liping reflects that China’s taxi industry is a half-marketised and reformed hybrid (guaitai). 
In Chongqing, there are other factors intermingling with the institutional decay that has set into the 
taxi industry. Illegal cabs are considered to be a blight on this mountain city. The November 28, 2007, 
issue of Chongqing Morning News said that the number of counterfeited or cloned taxis operating in 
the city centre had reached 1500 to 2000 vehicles, seriously disrupting the urban taxi market. 
According to figures made public by the government which put the number of legitimate cabs at more 
than 7,000, it may be estimated that there is one illegal cab for every 3.5 regular cabs.  
Anonymous industry sources said that the emergence of illegal cars reflects the ineffectiveness of the 
work of law enforcement officers, and may even be related to corruption among some government 
departments. In Beibei District, more than 200 unapproved green taxis have been operating for more 
than six months. The government stands accused of collusion with the illegal car rental companies. 
This reporter obtained a copy of one [driver] contract from a taxi company in Chongqing. This contract 
said that one Lingyang branded 7100 car with an operating period of two years required a one-time 
basic payment for safety and manufacturing of 110,000 RMB, 80,000 RMB of which would be refunded 
at the end of the service period, with a monthly fee (fen’er qian) of 6,600 RMB charged. 
Insiders pointed out that this is a classic black car model which has actually been scrapped, and its 
licence transferred to a new car, which is why the disparity in fees charged is so great, and why 80,000 
RMB is mysteriously able to be returned.  
Vice Mayor of Chongqing Yu Yuanmu said that illegal cabs had seriously disrupted the market order, 
and not only made it hard to ensure the safety of passengers, but also delivered a heavy blow to 
legitimate taxi drivers’ income. The average taxi drivers’ monthly income has dropped to between 
1500-1700 RMB. 
Regular taxi drivers face more stringent regulation. On October 28, in response to the phenomenon of 
drivers refusing fares and cheating, the Chongqing Municipal Transportation Department implemented 
new regulations where a driver’s credentials will be revoked if more than three complaints are 
received about them. Although the new rules have a use in terms of the deterrent, most taxi drivers do 
not think the method is particularly humane and is directed at the needs of the passenger without 
consideration for the driver. 
"This year I have written at least 200,000 words’ worth of comments and recommendations which 
have been sent to every department involved in the review of Chongqing’s taxi industry. I’ve had no 
replies," Yang Xiaoming said. In his view, the taxi industry in Chongqing is a closed shop. The 
government refuses to hear outside voices, even though the industry has become rotten. 
The background to the speedy recovery of operations 
Yang Xiaoming, a celebrity among Chongqing taxi drivers, believes that ‘fees’ (fen’er qian) do not address the core problem 
The taxi transport strike which broke out early on November 3 forced the Chongqing municipal 
government to pay attention to the lurking dangers within the industry. 
As the self-appointed “lead proponent of Chongqing taxi drivers’ rights”, Yang Xiaoming was finally 
invited to an interview with relevant government departments on the afternoon of November 4, 
suspected of being the instigator of transport strike. 
"I still would not go as far as to do such a thing," Yang said. While publishing articles and comment in 
[various] forums over the course of many years, [Yang] has become a celebrity among Chongqing 
drivers. "I would not participate in mass events. Aside from using the law, I can do nothing but wait 
patiently." 
He believes that the city of Chongqing taxi transport strike may be a turning point. But as the day broke 
yesterday, taxis once again emerged on the street, drivers with their lights switched off once again 
began lining up in search of passengers, and the police presence on the street also returned to normal.  
As of 5 pm yesterday, as this newspaper went to press, the Chongqing municipal government held a 
news conference which said that Chongqing’s urban taxi operation had basically returned to normal 
that morning.   
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The government also announced that it had been following the event closely and assiduously 
researched [the problem]. The unauthorised increase in driver fees (fen’er qian) by taxi companies was 
the main reason drivers’ were economically burdened and the main cause of the problem was illegal 
operations. 
Municipal government yesterday decided that the phenomenon of unauthorised increased in fees 
must be resolutely corrected and instructed each taxi company to return ‘fees’ (fen’er qian) to the 
previous year’s level. Each taxi company expressed its endorsement and support. 
Chongqing Municipal Economic Commission said it would increase the supply of natural gas by 100,000 
cubic metres daily, easing the problem of ‘refuelling difficulties’.  
In the press conference, the Chongqing Municipal Government Deputy Secretary-General Cui Jian 
apologized for the inconvenience that the incident had caused to people and said that municipal 
transportation had an inescapable responsibility for the occurrence of the incident, and that the 
current municipal government had already launched an administrative accountability system for the 
incident and would pursue those responsible within the relevant departments. 
Yang Xiaoming was disappointed when he saw the news from the press conference. The government 
putting the blame [for the strike] on ‘fees’ (fen’er qian) on scratched the surface, and did not touch on 
the core issues of the taxi industry. 
The transport strike entered endgame at this point. One drive, ‘Tianyu’, told reporters about the 
episode. She said that [her] company convened a meeting of all contractors on the afternoon of 
November 4th requiring them to get back to work, but promising a subsidy of 300 RMB for those who 
signed in twice a day.   
"I did not [return to work] for the 300 RMB," the driver said. Even though there was no sign of pension 
insurance, “if you don’t run around all day [in pursuit of fares], you need to pay every day to keep 
running an unprofitable business”.   
When this reporter visited the Chenjiaping main passenger terminal yesterday afternoon, the square 
was full of parked yellow taxis with drivers loudly attempting to attract fares. Rain saturated the 













Appendix C: Key Wukan Land Protest 
Translations 
People’s Daily 
December 22nd, 2011 (See reference: Zhang, 2008) 
What the “Wukan Turning Point" Shows Us 
To grasp the key to solving problems is to grasp the masses’ interest demands 
The incident at Wukan, Lufeng, Guangdong, recently ushered in a turning point. A provincial working 
group, headed by vice-secretary of Guangdong’s provincial committee and including several 
departmental level cadres arrived in Lufeng to listen to public demands. With important instructions 
for the provincial secretary to “directly face and solve these conflicts and problems", the working 
group adopted a sincere stance which “took seriously public opinion, put the masses first, was people-
oriented, totally transparent and elevated the law” which allowed local villagers emotions, which were 
once intense, to move towards peace.  
Looking at the Wukan incident, villagers demands are about their interests; the turning point is about 
their interests. Since September this year, many villagers have repeatedly made petitions derived from 
their dissatisfaction with the village cadres’ disposal of land, finance, compensation and other general 
issues. If [the villagers’] economic demands had been grasped in a timely fashion, listened to seriously, 
judged fairly and decisively solved, a small incident would not have become a big issue, there would 
have been no escalation and the situation would not have evolved into a mass conflict. The Wukan 
event may have demonstrated a different trend. Today’s turnaround concerns the firm belief of the 
provincial working party that “the primary demands of the masses are reasonable”. This suggests that 
in the face of specific conflicts, grasping the key to solving problems is to grasp the masses’ interest 
demands. 
Today, China is in a period of social transition. Amid the continuous advance of the market society, 
there will be an inevitable build up contradictions, such as the pluralisation of interest groups, 
diversification of benefits appeals, and the exposure of conflicts of interest. As the trailblazer for 
reform and opening up, Guangdong has experienced rapid economic development, a high degree of 
openness, fast social transformation, a large mobile population, social management pressures, and the 
early and repeated occurrence of social conflicts which are both typical and cautionary. The land issues 
which directly led to the Wukan incident are not uncommon in other parts of the country. These issues 
intertwine individual and public interests, short-term and long-term benefits, so that behind the 
"unforseen" conflict, there is actually an "inevitable" impulse. 
Competition between interests is no bad thing. Only with this kind of dynamic can interests be 
properly balanced and relations coordinated so that the whole of society is dynamically stable. Of 
course the masses cannot be “radical just because they have demands; as soon as there is radicalism, 
there is illegality”. Reasonable demands should be resolved within a legal framework. Local 
governments likewise cannot use “blocking” or “pressure” against the expression of normal demands 
so that they evolved into radical confrontations. In the Wukan incident, local governments made initial 
mistakes and failed to address the villagers’ reasonable interest demands, so that rational petition 
upgraded to extreme actions. The provincial working group will use the "utmost determination, the 
greatest sincerity, and its best effort" to make a strong commitment to address the reasonable 
demands of the masses and resolve the intense emotions, and create the basic conditions to allow for 
a thorough resolution and for local stability and harmony. This kind of political course to correct 
mistakes reflects one of our party’s most consistent basic tenets: being responsible for the people’s 
interests is to be responsible towards the party’s basic cause.  
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In reviewing the many mass incidents of recent years, at heart, they the majority stem from the fact 
that interest appeals of the masses have not been eased and satisfied. This demonstrates to use that 
local governments need to be highly conscious of the overall situation when facing interest appeals 
from the masses, and even contradictions and conflicts. On the one hand, it’s important to recognise 
that “the interests of the people is the ultimate goal of development”, and that the most important 
aspect of politics is to “strive hard to solve the practical issues of benefits that the people care most 
about and that are most relevant to their lives”.  On the other hand, we must sweep away the 
tendency to treat the masses as “enemies” and treat solving interest issues “as a test of a cadre’s 
awareness of the masses, their consciousness of the tenets [of the party] and a touchstone of their 
leadership competence”, truly as their central comrades have demanded.  
In fact, effective social management is not about whether contradictions and problems exist; it’s about 
whether contradictions and problems can be effectively contained and resolved. Under the core 
principle of the rule of law, how can the benefits [of development] be justly distributed? How can 
interests be clearly expressed? How can benefits relief be guaranteed? Only by properly answering 
these questions will conflicts and problems arise and pass away, as water flows in a stream and not 
clog the waterway and cause a raging torrent. 
Lenin once said that interests impinged on every single person. The “Wukan Turning Point” tells us that 
social management must be placed at the helm and the problem of mass interests must be solved if 
we want to find the right pressure point for reducing social contradictions and lowering the 
temperature. 
Beijing News 
December 22nd, 2011 (See reference: Long, 2011) 
“We-Kan” Make “the Law Supreme”  
If the local government had upheld the principle of the rule of law from the first, clung to the will of 
the people, and employed the “greatest determination, the greatest sincerity and the greatest effort” 
in facing the reasonable demands of the masses, the Wukan incident would not have bubbled up to 
such a huge extent.  
According to the Southern Daily report on December 20, at a rally for cadres and the masses in Lufeng, 
Zhu Mingguo, member of the Central Discipline Inspection Committee, and deputy Secretary of the 
Guangdong Provincial Committee, said that the provincial government attached great importance to 
the issue, and cared for the mass interest demands in Wukan, and had decided to establish a provincial 
working group, using the greatest determination, the greatest sincerity , and maximum effort to 
resolve the reasonable demands of the masses, and to restore normal order to production, life and 
society in Wukan as soon as possible. A day earlier, Shanwei City announced that it had taken back 
agricultural land which had been appropriated, and that the village branch party secretary and villager 
committee director had been entered into the ‘shanggui’ system.  
According to reports, Wukan villagers had been petitioning problems around the requisition of land  
since June 2009, and that there had been instances of the smashing of public and private property and 
attacks on police stations since September 21 this year. In November, again made a collective petition, 
after which the incident gradually caught the attention of the outside world.  
The latest updates have given hope to the people that Wukan’s problems can be solved. Obviously 
everyone hopes for a resolution and that issue does not deteriorate, be they the people of Wukan, 
local government or the many citizens who have been online “onlookers” (weiguan).   
Speaking at the meeting, Zhu Mingguo said that “popular will would continue to be emphasised, and 
that greatest determination, the greatest sincerity and the greatest effort would be used to resolve the 
masses’ reasonable demands”, and “problems would be properly resolved through making the law 
supreme, and following the law and regulation and being reasonable”. These were excellent words. As 
long as the local government and the judiciary respect Wukan villagers' interest demands, adhere to 
the principle of the "supremacy of law", and resolve the attendant issues in a fair and transparency 
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manner according to the law, then surmounting “Wukan” would be no problem and solving the Wukan 
incident would proceed smoothly. 
Then again, in the Wukan incident progressing to this point, the village (dangdi) has already paid a high 
price for “stability maintenance” (wei wen). Was it worth it? Where will problems next occur? 
In this regard, the Guangdong Provincial Party Secretary Wang Yang believes that "the occurrence of 
the Wukan incident is both out of ordinary but also inevitable. In a process of economic and social 
development, this is the result of the long-term neglect of the accumulated contradictions that have 
occurred in the process of economic and social development, and it is the inevitable consequence of 
our having promoted one thing while neglecting another.” This can be said to point to the essence of 
the Wukan incident.  
The Wukan incident is indeed a process of the long-term accumulation of contradictions and the 
process of resolving these has not been carried out according to the law. The villagers began to report 
problems up the chain on June 21, 2009. If, during this two years, the relevant departments and 
officials in Lufeng and Shanwei were able to “”emphasise the popular will, and use the greatest 
determination, the greatest sincerity and the greatest effort” to confront the villagers’ reasonable 
demands, adhere to the “supremacy of the law”, resolve Wukan’s real problems according to the law, 
and engage in multiple efforts to explain and communicate, then things would perhaps not have gone 
out of control, and the series of incidents including smashed up factories would perhaps not have 
occurred.   
Indeed, if the local government could have upheld the principle of the rule of law even in recent days, 
then the Wukan incident would not have bubbled up to such a huge extent. 
China faces a period of opportunity and also a period of contradiction and unevenness. In some places, 
these contradictions are extremely acute and, if not handled properly, can very easily lead to mass 
incidents. On the other hand, the Internet era has formed an audience concerned with rights 
protection, which expanded the impact of the incident. These new conditions have given local 
governments unexpected pressure. This kind of pressure poses a dilemma.  
What I want to emphasise is, given the existence of contradictions has been acknowledged, there is no 
need to overreact to such events and take irrational measures to solve things which may actually 
intensify the problems. At the moment, the best thing to do is to "talk about the rule of law" and "talk 
about justice". If local governments make “rule of law supreme”, the people will naturally make 
“rational behaviour supreme”. Because of the nature of these events is not complicated, people are 
mainly concerned with expressing their interest demands and long for real justice.  
A similar logic in dealing with [this kind of problem] can be seen when thinking back to previous 
incidents in Weng'an and Menglian, as long as public opinion is respected, the rule of law is insisted 
upon, legitimate rights and interests are safeguarded, and criminals are cracked down upon, complex 
issues can be resolved. With the current Wukan incident, if this logic can actually be implemented then 
the incident can finally have a perfect solution and be worth the wait. If this is the crux of the issues 
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